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This study examines issues relating to the mandatory adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by Greek listed companies.  
Initially, the impact of transition, as a result of differences between IFRS and Greek 
GAAP, on the first IFRS financial statements in 2005 is assessed. Then, a disclosure 
index is constructed, containing all the disclosure items mandated by the IFRS extant 
at the end of April 2006. Based on this research instrument, and two disclosure index 
methods, compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures in their first year of 
implementation is examined. A review of disclosure theories, the features of the 
Greek financial reporting system, and considerations regarding the timing of the 
research are used as a basis for establishing a priori expectations and testing the 
potential factors explaining compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
Subsequently, any change in the value relevance of accounting information before 
and immediately after IFRS mandatory implementation is examined. Whether the 
reconciliation statements required by IFRS 1 provided value relevant information to 
investors is also explored. Finally, the valuation implications of IFRS mandatory 
disclosures are explored. 
The above analyses indicate the following. Greek listed companies’ financial 
statements were affected significantly by the adoption of IFRS. The average level of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures approximates to 80%. The impact on 
net income and shareholders’ equity, as a result of the transition to IFRS, as well as 
audit firm size, are significantly associated with the extent to which companies 
comply. No change in the value relevance of accounting information between 2004 
and 2005 is identified. Reconciliation adjustments are incrementally value relevant 
and levels of mandatory disclosures do have valuation effects. 
Based on the findings of the above analyses, the study contributes to the relevant 
literature and discusses policy implications. It also concludes with suggestions for 
further research and recommendations on the methods for measuring compliance 
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Chapter 1 - Motivation, Objectives and Overview of the Study 
1.1 Motivation 
For the accounting periods are starting on or after 1 January 2005, European Union 
(EU) publicly traded companies are required to prepare consolidated accounts on the 
basis of International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS).1 This decision 
was taken in an attempt to increase comparability of accounting information 
throughout the EU member states following the limited success of harmonisation 
process by the means of the EU company law directives. Approximately 9,000 listed 
companies in 28 EU countries (25 member states and three countries in the 
Economic Area) (Whittington, 2005) would have to switch to IFRS at the same time. 
This development has been described as the most significant event in the history of 
financial reporting. Additionally, this decision lead to countries outside the EU also 
implementing IFRS (at the same time or soon after) based on the rationale that IFRS 
would be of higher quality than the corresponding national standards. Thus, 
comparability of financial information would be enhanced, resulting in the attraction 
of foreign investors. These developments meant that 85 jurisdictions now2 require all 
listed companies to follow IFRS, four require some listed companies to follow IFRS 
and 24 permit all or some listed companies to follow IFRS. 28 of these jurisdictions 
require all non-listed companies to follow IFRS as well (Teixeira, 2009).  
However, not unexpectedly, mandatory adoption of IFRS in so many different 
jurisdictions was followed by scepticism. The main reasons were similar to those 
hindered a successful level of comparability, by the means of the EU company law 
directives, would provide ‘motives’ or ‘opportunities’ for the non-uniform 
application of IFRS across different jurisdictions (Nobes, 2006).  
                                                 
1 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002. 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) were issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) and adopted in 2001 by the restructured International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), which has since been amending them or replacing them with IFRS. 
2 At the time writing this thesis. 
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Put simply, accounting standards are only one element of the ‘financial reporting 
chain’ within a country (Damant, 2006: 30); there are also several social, political 
and institutional factors of relevance. Differences in compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms as well as different cultural and institutional backgrounds play an 
important role in the way accounting is practiced and how accounting information is 
perceived (Schipper, 2005; Ball, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Larson and Street, 2004; 
Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Zeff, 2007). Accordingly, the different socio-economic 
contexts of EU countries (and their influences on accounting) would not change just 
because of the mandatory implementation of IFRS. In a similar vein, Weetman 
(2006: 359) questions ‘the effectiveness of accounting standardisation in terms of 
comparability without harmonisation of managers’ incentives across Europe’. 
Additionally, the different versions of IFRS and/or the options (overt or covert) 
provided by the standards can lead to differences in IFRS practice (Nobes, 2006).  
Following the ‘concerns’ expressed and the research opportunities suggested by the 
above literature, the present study explores three different dimensions of this 
significant event. First, it looks at the immediate effects of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on financial statements because of the significant pre-IFRS accounting differences 
(Nobes, 2006), using the reconciliation statements provided in the first IFRS 
financial statements as required by IFRS 1 ‘First-time adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards’. Second, it examines companies’ compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures and the factors associated with these levels during the 
first year of IFRS implementation (cf. Giner and Rees, 2005; Schipper, 2005; Nobes, 
2006; Zeff, 2007; Ball, 2006). Third, it examines effects of the switch to IFRS in the 
value relevance of accounting figures in several fronts (Ball, 2006; Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). The study 
intentionally focuses on the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption as it not only 
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1.2 Greece and Its Relevance to the Dimensions Examined 
All the above are explored in an in-depth case study of Greece. The possibility of 
conducting a comparative study which would examine some of the above dimensions 
across two or more countries (e.g. Greece vs. UK) was explored. However, this was 
rejected because it would restrict the research to examination of fewer dimensions 
(due to time constraints) rather than the broader and deeper investigation which can 
be found in the present research.  
Focusing on a single country is also in line with Weetman (2006: 364) who 
encourages authors of single country studies to ‘recognise and discuss the country 
specific context rather than set it to one side or assume it does not exist’. (This study 
does so by providing the Greek context in chapter 2. The Greek features are also 
considered for the development of the testable hypotheses as well as the discussion 
of the findings.) She also points out that ‘country-specific studies reveal the potential 
for comparative studies on a wider geographical basis’ (ibid: 351). However, single 
country studies entail the limitations of small datasets and of uncertainty about the 
quality of the accounting information. Nevertheless, mandatory adoption of IFRS is 
highlighted as an opportunity to surpass the first limitation (Giner and Rees, 2005). 
More specifically, it provides the ability to use large samples at a single country level 
and make comparisons regarding IFRS implications. This allows for more powerful 
tests and conclusions compared to what was the case before the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS. Finally, a single-country case study approach allows controlling for 
institutional and political factors which affect companies’ reporting and stock market 
participants’ investing behaviours. This could not easily be controlled for in an 
international comparative study (Ruland et al., 2007).3 
Greece is a particularly interesting locus for examining the objectives of this study 
because of its unique accounting environment. The accounting/audit profession is 
relatively young and weak (Baralexis, 2004). Enforcement of accounting regulation 
                                                 
3 Of course, even in single country studies, the research design needs to account for sampling bias 
(Rulald et al., 2007). The present study considers this issue (see section 5.5.1). 
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is very weak (La Porta et al., 1998; Baralexis, 2004) and creative accounting4 is 
common (Polychroniadis, 2002; Spathis, 2002; Spathis et al., 2002; Baralexis, 2004). 
In fact, Leuz et al. (2003) classify Greece (along with Austria) as the country (out of 
31) with the highest earnings management. As a result, there is general mistrust of 
the accounting numbers published (Papas, 1993; Ballas, 1994; Kontoyannis, 2005). 
Ownership concentration is high (Tzovas, 2006) and, arguably, adoption of IFRS 
may not necessarily lead to a more transparent reporting system. Additionally, Greek 
GAAP5 differs significantly from IFRS (Ding et al., 2007);6 therefore Greek 
companies’ financial statements should be affected considerably by the transition. 
Additionally, Greek culture is distinct. Greece is the country with the highest score 
for uncertainty avoidance (out of 52) in Hofstede’s (1983) study. Nevertheless, since 
2000 the Greek market has been considered to be a developed market (Mantikidis, 
2000).7 Additionally, at the end of March 2006 almost 50% of the market 
capitalisation belonged to foreign investors (Central Security Depository, 2006). 
Thus, there is not only a national but also an international interest in the quality of 
Greek listed companies’ financial statements.  
Nobes and Parker (2008: 195) argue that ‘weak legislation, lack of resources and 
ineffective audit profession in some EU countries make compliance with IFRS in 
practice voluntary’. On that basis, the above mentioned national features raise 
concern regarding Greek listed companies’ compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosure requirements. Beyond examining this, it remains an empirical question 
then whether adoption of IFRS do change investors’ perception about the quality of 
                                                 
4 Baralexis (2004: 440) defines creative accounting or earnings management ‘as the process of 
intentionally exploiting or violating the GAAP or the law to present financial statements according to 
one’s interests’. This definition is followed here. 
5 By Greek GAAP is meant codified accounting rules, in particular Law 2190/20 and Presidential 
Decree (PD) 186/92 (Tax Law - known also as Code of Books and Records) and pronouncements of 
the Committee of Accounting Standardisation and Auditing (ELTE). This is a narrow definition of 
GAAP. The term ‘GAAP’ in other jurisdictions may refer also to professional pronouncement or non-
promulgated guidance or practices (cf. Evans, 2004). 
6 A brief discussion of the limitations of Ding at al. (2007) based on Nobes (2009), is provided in 
section 3.4.1. 
7 In September 2006 FTSE classified Greece in the ‘watch list’, meaning it may change status to 
‘Advanced Emerging Market’ (this is still the case in September 2009 (FTSE, 2009)). 
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financial statements and companies’ compliance explicitly matters for valuation 
purposes. 
More specifically, one dimension of accounting quality is the value relevance of 
accounting information, i.e. the relationship between book values and market values 
(Barth et al., 2008).8 Thus, one could argue that, after adoption of IFRS which are 
expected to curtail creative accounting practices previously followed under Greek 
GAAP, users would place greater trust in financial statements. Additionally, this 
would suggest that the impact revealed in the reconciliation statements, which was 
expected to be significant because of the substantial differences between Greek 
GAAP and IFRS, was incrementally value relevant to the 2005 IFRS book values. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the behaviour of accountants and auditors 
regarding creative accounting practices would not change just because accounting 
standards change (cf. Weetman, 2006; Nobes, 2006, Ball, 2006). If investors made 
the latter assumption, their perception about the quality of financial statements would 
not change and thus no change in the relative value relevance of accounting 
information (i.e. R2) would be identified. In line with this proposition, the 
reconciliation adjustments may not be value relevant if investors perceive them as an 
outcome of a transitional ‘big bath’ instead of genuine changes as a result of the 
differences between the two regimes.  
Finally, research indicates that companies’ disclosures have valuation effects (e.g. 
Hope, 2003a; Bushman et al., 2003; Lundholm and Myers; 2002; Hussainey and 
Walker, 2009). Greek GAAP did not require disclosures as substantial as those 
required by IFRS and in practice companies provided very limited notes to the 
financial statements (Vlachos, 2001). Adoption of IFRS would provide (if enforced) 
more complete information to investors by substantially increasing disclosures 
(Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). Thus, Greek investors might consider companies’ level 
of compliance with disclosure requirements when making their investment decisions. 
This would make the level of disclosures also value relevant (as a reflection of the 
                                                 
8 Other aspects of accounting quality include timely loss recognition and earnings management (Barth 
et al., 2008). 
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extent of the information provided) and should result in different valuation effects 
across high versus low compliance companies.  
Considering the Greek context (which is explained in more detail in chapter 2), the 
results can shed light on the ‘concerns’ expressed in the literature regarding the 
improvement of accounting quality expected from mandatory IFRS adoption, by 
looking at a single country.  
1.3 Research Questions 
Taking into consideration the above opportunities for research, as well as the brief 
introduction to the features of the Greek context, this thesis addresses the following 
research questions: 
Q1. Was the impact of transition to IFRS on Greek listed companies material and 
statistically significant? 
Q2. To what extent did Greek listed companies comply with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures, during the first year of IFRS adoption?  
Q3. Which factors explain Greek listed companies’ compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures?  
Q4. Is there a change in the accounting quality (defined as the value relevance of 
accounting information) after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Greece? 
Q5. Is the information reported within shareholders’ equity reconciliation 
statements of Greek listed companies incrementally value relevant to the 
2005 book values? 
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1.4 Research Objectives - Contribution 
Providing answers to the above questions informs the objectives of this study 
resulting in contribution to the relevant literature. In broad terms, this research makes 
a contribution to knowledge by adding a single country study to the growing 
literature on implementation of IFRS in different cultural and regulatory contexts, 
relevant not only to academics but also to regulators and standard setters. The Greek 
case is of relevance in particular to transitional economies which recently joined or 
are in the process of applying for EU membership and to other continental European 
countries (e.g. Spain, Italy, Portugal) with which Greece may share more cultural, 
political and economic features than with its western European neighbours. The 
findings would also be of interest to countries which will adopt IFRS in the near 
future. Additionally, this study provides insights useful to stock market regulators on 
the extent of companies’ compliance with accounting standards and how this affects 
investors’ perceptions.  
In more specific terms, the objectives of this study are to make a contribution to the 
relevant academic literature with regard to:  
 Financial statement effects of transition to IFRS.  
 Compliance with mandatory disclosures in general and after IFRS 
implementation in the EU in particular.  
 The methods for measuring compliance with accounting standards’ 
mandatory disclosures.  
 Disclosure theories via the exploration of proxies for the factors explaining 
compliance with accounting standards’ mandatory disclosures.  
 Value relevance research and valuation theory using the Ohlson (1995) 
model. 
 The effects of IFRS implementation on the relative and incremental value 
relevance of accounting information.  
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 The valuation implications of mandatory disclosures.  
Figure 1-1 provides a ‘portrait’ of the research steps this study followed in order to 
meet these objectives. The sections after Figure 1-1 explain the research objectives 
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1.4.1 Contribution to the literature exploring the financial statement effects of 
transition to IFRS 
To facilitate a better understanding of the impact of transition, this thesis provides an 
in-depth comparison of the de jure differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no such recent comparison available in 
the English language academic literature.  
This thesis also contributes to the academic literature on international GAAP 
comparisons by extending the use of Gray’s comparability index (Weetman et al., 
1998) to key ratios and by contributing to the discussion of its limitations. By 
measuring the impact of transition by means of a commonly applied index, the 
analysis also provides a benchmark for comparison with studies examining the 
impact of mandatory transition in other countries, especially those with stakeholder 
accounting regimes such as Germany, France and Italy (cf. Spathis and 
Georgakopoulou, 2007; Bellas et al., 2008).  
The identification and examination of the accounting standards which had the 
strongest economic impact on shareholders’ equity on transition to IFRS provides an 
answer to the question why changes occurred. In particular, this research explores the 
question of whether introduction of IFRS curtailed creative accounting practices 
previously followed in Greece.  
This will provide insights for future comparative research on the survival of 
differences in accounting practices and de facto harmonisation (Nobes, 2006). This 
contribution is expected to be of particular relevance to companies, investors, 
auditors, regulators and the IASB.  
1.4.2 Contribution to the literature on compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures after 2005 
One of the main objectives of the IASB is to produce enforceable standards (IASCF 
Constitution, paragraph 2). This is stressed because it is well documented that 
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companies do not comply with accounting standards’ mandatory disclosures (e.g. Ali 
et al., 2004; Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hodgdon et al., 2008) and thus the implementation of high 
quality standards [as IFRS claim to be] may not necessarily lead to high quality 
reporting (Ball et al., 2003).  
Following the above mentioned evidence and the fact that the existence of legislation 
and enforcing bodies does not guarantee compliance (Yeoh, 2005), the possibility of 
uniform application of IFRS across different jurisdictions has been questioned (Ball, 
2006; Nobes, 2006; Larson and Street, 2004; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Zeff, 2007; 
Weetman, 2006).  
The present study addresses this problem in the Greek context where low 
enforcement and low audit quality have been documented. Based on two disclosure 
index methods, it examines 153 Greek listed companies’ compliance with all IFRS 
mandatory disclosures during the first year of their implementation. This sample 
represents approximately 48% of companies listed on Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
at the end of March 2006. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first large scale single country 
academic study which examines companies’ level of compliance with all IFRS 
mandatory disclosures after their implementation in 2005 in EU countries. The 
results are expected to be of particular interest to regulators and standard setters, as 
well as to academics who may wish to conduct similar studies. 
1.4.3 Contribution to the literature on the methods for measuring compliance 
with accounting standards’ mandatory disclosures 
The most common approach for determining compliance with disclosure 
requirements by a company is that of the unweighted disclosure index where 
compliance is calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed to the maximum 
possible score applicable for that company (e.g. Hodgdon et al., 2008; Ali et al., 
2004; Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Street and Gray, 
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2001; Street and Bryant, 2000; Craig and Diga, 1998; Patton and Zelenka; 1997; 
Cooke, 1996; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994). For reasons 
explained in section 4.6.2, this study refers to this method as ‘Cooke’s dichotomous 
approach’. (Aljifri (2008) also refers to this method by using the same term.) 
However, this kind of disclosure index has an important limitation: the number of 
disclosure items required by different standards varies considerably. Some standards 
require a large number of items to be disclosed (e.g. IAS 1 ‘Presentation of financial 
statements) while some others require only a few (e.g. IAS 2 ‘Inventories’). This 
may become a significant problem when studies examine compliance with IFRS (or 
other sets of standards’) mandatory disclosures.  
An alternative method that avoids this problem is the ‘Partial Compliance (PC) 
unweighted approach’ (hereafter PC method) employed by Street and Gray (2001)9 
and Al-Shiab (2003, 2008). According to this approach, ‘the degree of compliance 
for each company is measured by adding the degree of compliance for each standard 
and then dividing this sum by the number of standards applicable to each company’ 
(Al-Shiab 2003, 223).  
Street and Gray (2001) use both methods but do not test the significance of the 
differences in the compliance scores identified. Interestingly, they find different 
significant associations under each method between the dependent variable 
(compliance score) and a number of independent variables. This study uses both 
methods and tests the significance of the differences in the compliance scores 
identified. Additionally, it explores the implications of the application of both 
methods with regard to the factors appearing to explain compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the first study to 
perform such analysis. In contrast to Street and Gray (2001), this study considers as 
valid findings only those factors that appear to be significant under both methods.  
The findings illustrate the following. The scores calculated under the PC method are 
significantly lower from those calculated under Cooke’s dichotomous approach; 
                                                 
9 The results of this study have also been published in 2002: Street and Gray (2002). 
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similar to Street and Gray’s (2001) study, not all factors appearing to explain 
compliance scores under the PC Method are the same as those appearing significant 
under Cooke’s dichotomous approach.  
To provide more insights about this issue, the present study provides alternative tests 
by excluding IAS 1. IAS 1 is excluded for the following reasons: it contains the 
largest number of items required to be disclosed; prior studies which tested 
compliance with selected standards typically included it in their analysis (e.g. Al-
Shammari et al., 2008); and the standard does not require complex disclosures 
related to recognition and/or measurement issues and thus most companies tend to 
comply with its requirements (e.g. Al-Shammari et al., 2008).10 The supplementary 
findings illustrate that the two methods continue to produce significantly different 
compliance scores (albeit less diverged). Additionally, different factors continue 
appearing to explain compliance scores across the two methods.  
Subsequently, these findings should alert researchers who plan to use these methods 
to the implications of their own findings and the care that needs to be taken in their 
interpretation. It is suggested that simultaneous application of both methods produces 
more robust findings than using only one of the two. These findings also raise an 
opportunity for further research by questioning the validity of the findings of prior 
research which applied only one of the two methods. The findings of similar studies 
may be substantially biased because of the method employed for measuring 
compliance.  
1.4.4 Contribution to the literature on the applicability of disclosure theories 
when examining compliance with mandatory disclosures 
Chapter 4 examines compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. It 
does not explore issues related to voluntary disclosures. This distinction is important 
for the development of hypotheses as well as for the inferences to be drawn.  
                                                 
10 This argument is consistent with the findings of the present research. 
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Mandatory disclosures are more comparable across companies and are measured 
more in the light of the standards’ requirements and less in the light of the potentially 
subjective disclosure index that researchers may have constructed. Additionally, 
mandatory disclosures force companies to ‘talk about current cash flows, profits, net 
assets and ownership claims rather than firms’ aspirations for future success’ (Leuz 
and Wysocki, 2008: 68). Thus, to some extent, the presence or absence of 
‘anticipated’ disclosures may provide different signals to investors (Hassan et al., 
2009) compared to the presence or absence of voluntary disclosures. This may 
prompt managers to act differently from the way they would for voluntary 
disclosures. In fact, the disclosures provided depend on companies’ attitudes towards 
compliance with the regulation, i.e. companies’ ‘compliance culture’ (Jenkinson, 
1996).  
Adams (1994: 279) defines compliance as ‘the management of regulatory risk — the 
risk that a rule or regulation will be broken’ and explains that this risk has many 
elements (e.g. financial risk, litigation risk, risk of regulatory engagement and 
reputation risk). Accordingly, managers observe and assess these before making 
decisions on compliance. An important factor in this process is also the level of 
enforcement in each country. If enforcement is low and costs of non-compliance are 
negligible, as is the case in Greece at the time of this study, one could treat the 
mandatory disclosures as voluntary.  
Yet, as explained by Dye (2001: 184) ‘there is, presently, no received theory on 
mandatory disclosures in accounting’. On that basis and considering all the above 
arguments and limitations, this study draws upon theories of voluntary disclosures to 
explore the potential factors that may explain the level of compliance identified. 
Thus, in line with prior studies (e.g. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Hodgdon et 
al., 2008; Hassan et al., 2006; Ali et al., 2004), drawing on capital market based 
theories, agency theory, and cost based theories, this study tests several variables as 
proxies for the factors related to the compliance identified. These factors include 
size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, industry and audit firm size. 
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Beyond this, the present research complements and extends prior literature in the 
following way. The unique setting, i.e. measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures during the first year of implementation, allows also for examination of 
the possibility that the change in the 2004 shareholders’ equity and net income, as a 
result of the adoption of IFRS, constitute also explanatory factors for compliance. 
Thus, this study hypothesises that inter alia not only financial measures can be 
proxies for explaining compliance as derived by relevant theories. It argues that, in 
addition, a significant change in fundamental financial measures, because of the 
change in the accounting regime, may also explain compliance. 
Research has indicated that information reported in reconciliation statements is 
perceived as meaningful by investors (e.g. Christensen et al., 2007), who are 
considered to be among the main users of financial statements by the IFRS 
Framework (paragraph 10). Therefore, the behaviour of managers regarding the 
amount of overall disclosures provided may be influenced by the impact of IFRS on 
company key measures, as this can be assessed through the reconciliation statements 
and the 2004 restated comparative figures. (With reference to the arguments of 
Adams (1994) regarding the risks assessed by managers before making decisions on 
compliance (see above)). 
The following example illustrates the rationale behind this investigation. As 
discussed above, Greek companies’ net income and shareholders’ equity were 
expected to be affected considerably from the introduction of IFRS. Thus, on the 
grounds of signalling theory, companies which faced a positive impact on their 
reported financial position on transition to IFRS would be more tempted to provide 
higher levels of mandatory disclosures so as to ‘screen’ themselves. This would 
allow them, indirectly to argue that their worse position under Greek GAAP was a 
result of the ‘poor quality’ of accounting rules, rather than a result of bad 
management. This would result in the impact reported in the reconciliation 
statements with regard to this measure to be positively associated with companies’ 
levels of mandatory disclosures. (Further propositions are discussed in section 4.5).  
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In summary, theories relevant to voluntary disclosures are employed and analysed in 
this study in relation to mandatory disclosures. This, and the findings of prior 
literature, assists in deriving possible factors associated with compliance of IFRS 
disclosure requirements and forming testable hypotheses. However, in addition to 
what has been suggested in the prior literature, this study is informed by the specific 
timing of the investigation (i.e. first year of IFRS implementation). Testing these 
hypotheses fills the gap in the literature regarding the factors associated with non-
compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in European countries, especially 
after IFRS mandatory implementation in 2005. 
1.4.5 Contribution to value relevance research and valuation theory using the 
Ohlson (1995) model (OM) 
1.4.5.1 Contribution to relative association studies and transition to IFRS 
As discussed above, IFRS consider investors as the main users of financial 
statements. They are not debt and tax oriented as traditionally are the accounting 
regulations in code law or continental European countries (and as is Greek GAAP). 
Supposedly, IFRS reflect economic gains and losses in a more timely fashion and 
provide more useful balance sheets compared to the accounting rules governing 
continental European countries (Ball, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). This has led to the 
expectation that accounting figures would become more value relevant in a country 
which ‘switches’ to a shareholder oriented system, such as IFRS.  
Recent research tests this proposition (e.g. Capkun et al., 2008; Paananen, 2008), 
with mixed findings. One part of the present study adds to this literature by 
implementing the Ohlson (1995) model (in its most commonly employed form – see 
below), examining the pre-and post-IFRS period relative value relevance in Greece.  
By testing the proposition for higher value relevance in the particular stakeholder and 
tax driven accounting environment of Greece, this study contributes to the debate on 
whether shareholder-focused accounting principles are more value relevant than the 
traditional extensive and complex continental European accounting regulations (e.g. 
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Ali and Hwang, 2000). This analysis also responds to Healy and Palepu’s (2001: 
431) question: ‘What types of standards produce high quality financial reports’. 
(Defining accounting quality as the relationship between book values and market 
values. The closer the relationship the higher the accounting quality (Barth et al., 
2008)).  
This analysis is partitioned across sub-samples of large and small companies and 
companies with ‘Big 4’ versus non-‘Big 4’ auditors. This allows the identification of 
factors which may affect value relevance of accounting information (i.e. firm size 
and audit quality) in Greece. 
1.4.5.2 Contribution to incremental association studies and transition to IFRS 
Another stream of the literature examines the incremental value relevance of an 
accounting item (e.g. Amir et al., 1993; Harris and Mueller, 1999; Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007). Accordingly, these types of incremental association studies 
investigate ‘whether the accounting number of interest is helpful in explaining value 
… given other specified variables’ (Holthausen and Watts, 2001: 6). Biddle et al. 
(1995) illustrate that relative value relevance and incremental value relevance are 
two distinct concepts. Two measures may be incrementally value relevant with 
respect to each other although resulting in no differences in relative value relevance 
(Hung and Subramanyam, 2007). 
A later part of this study adds to the literature on incremental association studies in 
general and to those with a specific focus on the transition to IFRS in particular (e.g. 
Horton and Serafeim, 2009; Capkun et al., 2008; Schadewitz and Markku, 2007). By 
decomposing the 2005 book value of shareholders’ equity, it examines the 
incremental value relevance of the reconciliation adjustments reported in the first 
IFRS financial statements. With regard to the transition of Greek listed companies to 
IFRS in particular, this analysis illustrates whether the adjustments expected to 
curtail creative accounting are perceived as value relevant by investors. Additionally, 
since the relevant research hypothesis tests the significance of the adjustments 
reported within the reconciliation statements, it indirectly tests the usefulness of the 
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reconciliation statements. If the balance sheet adjustments are indeed value relevant, 
the reconciliation statements provide useful information to investors. 
This analysis is partitioned across sub-samples of large and small companies. It 
cannot be examined across the partition of companies regarding audit quality due to 
the relatively small number of companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors (see 5.5.4 for details). 
1.4.5.3 Contribution to the theory of valuation with linear information dynamics 
(LID)11 and to the literature examining the valuation implications of 
mandatory disclosures 
 
Ohlson’s (1995) model (hereafter OM) of current accounting data and estimates of 
‘linear information dynamics’ is defined as follows:12 
jtjtitjtjt vbXbBbaP ε++++= 3210                (Eq. 1.1) 
where Pjt stands for the value of a company, Bjt is the book value of shareholders’ 
equity, Xjt net profit and v is ‘other information’ being available to market 
participants not yet captured by accounting (i.e. events that have not yet affected B 
and X) (Myers, 1999), and εjt is the mean zero disturbance term.  
The most common way in the literature to employ OM is by omitting the ‘other 
information’ (v) term which captures ‘other information’ relevant to forecasting the 
future (Ohlson, 2001). Ohlson (2001) explains that excluding v from the equation 
makes the model ‘patently simplistic’ because assuming v is zero implies that what 
matters in the setting of market values is only the publicly available information of 
the book value of shareholders’ equity and net income. Expectations or information 
about future prospects and future income which essentially are not recognised in the 
financial statements are ‘heroically’ assumed to be of no relevance. This may lead to 
                                                 
11 Richardson and Tinaikar (2004: 226) define LID as ‘linear stochastic processes exhibiting the 
temporal evolution and interdependence of accounting and non accounting information variables. The 
LID provide forecasts of future expected abnormal earnings given the current realisations of 
accounting variables and other information’.  
12 Section 5.3 explains how Ohlson (1995) derives this equation. 
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potentially inaccurate conclusions regarding the coefficients of the variables included 
in the model (Hand, 2001; Lo and Lys, 2000a).  
Some researchers have responded to this concern by introducing several variables as 
proxies for ‘other information’. Some examples include (analyst forecast dispersion 
in the US (Bryan and Tiras, 2007); compliance with Corporate Governance Code in 
Germany (Goncharov et al., 2006); network advantages in the US (Rajgopal et al., 
2003).  
Another stream of (non-relative association) studies has indicated that companies’ 
disclosures affect market prices and/or the predictability of earnings and improve 
analysts’ forecasts (e.g. Lundholm and Myers; 2002; Hope, 2003(a&b); Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009). However, some studies either focus on voluntary disclosures 
alone or use companies’ disclosure ratings published in the report of the Association 
for Investment Management Research (AIMR)13 or the Centre for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). These ratings have the limitation that 
they are based on both mandatory and voluntary disclosure items (Bushman et al., 
2003). 
The final part of this study builds on the two streams of literature and extends them 
in the following two ways. First, it implements the OM by introducing in the above 
equation the level of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (see chapter 4) as 
a proxy for ‘other information’ (i.e. the v term). Second, the valuation differences of 
high compliance versus low compliance companies are explored. 
The contribution of this exploration is threefold. First, it fills the gap in the literature 
regarding the valuation implications of mandatory disclosures (cf. Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008; Bushee and Leuz, 2005). More specifically, it provides direct 
empirical evidence in relation to firm value and level of mandatory disclosures 
(Hassan et al., 2009; Kang and Pang, 2005). Second, the first approach, indirectly 
and in combination with the reference to Nobes and Parker (2008: 195) above, 
                                                 
13 Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Healy and Palepu (2001) provide details about the AIMR-
FAF disclosure ratings. 
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reflects on Hand’s (2001: 125) call for future research where he suggests the 
exploration of inferences regarding the value relevance of v by looking at voluntary 
disclosures. Thus, this thesis also addresses the criticism that omitting v (i.e. ‘other 
information’) from the model leads to a simplistic (Ohlson, 2001) and, arguably, ‘an 
incorrect’ (Lo and Lys, 2000a) implementation of it.14  
Finally, it addresses Verrecchia’s (2001: 174) call for future research who urges 
empirical, disclosure related, research and suggests ‘that researchers consider less 
developed capital markets than those found in the US’(ibid: 175).  
1.5 Ontology and Epistemology 
To address the above mentioned research objectives, the present research follows a 
realist ontological standpoint as it examines ‘how things really are’ and ‘how things 
really work’ and not ‘how things should be’ (Crotty, 1998: 10). In the accounting 
research area, this approach is better represented by a positivistic epistemology 
where explanation and prediction are mainly stressed instead of prescription, which 
is a characteristic of normative research (Ryan et al., 2002).  
More specifically, the study follows the functionalist paradigm15 in accounting 
research by adopting a positivistic epistemology. According to Burrell and Morgan’s 
(1979) accounting research framework, this paradigm views accounting phenomena 
as ‘concrete real-world relations possessing regularities and causal relationships that 
are amendable to scientific explanation and prediction’ (Belkaoui, 1996: 10). This 
view is integrated with the development of positive accounting theory known as the 
‘Rochester School of Accounting’ which supports that theories should explain actual 
                                                 
14 Arguably, compliance with IFRS’ mandatory disclosure requirements is accounting data and thus 
considered not to be suitable proxy for ‘other information’. However, the disclosures required by 
IFRS deal inter alia with ‘revealing events, transactions, judgements and estimates underlying the 
financial statements and their implications’ (Kang and Pang, (2005: 6), with reference to Pownall and 
Schipper, 1999). This information is important for forecasting the future of a company and/or its 
competitors. It also results in ‘real’ or ‘financial’ externalities (Dye, 1990). More discussion is 
provided in section 5.4.2.3. 
15 The remaining three paradigms presented by Burrell and Morgan (1979) are rejected because either 
their ontological and epistemological standpoints contradict with the present study’s research 
objectives or they suffer from major limitations (for further discussion see Belkaoui, 1986). 
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accounting practices, i.e. why accountants behave as they do (Jensen, 1983: 319) in 
terms of goal-oriented, rational and utility-maximizing behaviour.  
However, positive theory has two major limitations. On the one hand ‘theories are a 
simplification of reality and the world is complex and changing’, (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986, cited in Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 19) and on the other hand, even 
close relationships between objective facts and selected variables do not provide 
causality, so positive theory cannot predict perfectly. That is why one major criticism 
of positive accounting theory is that empirical science makes no positive statement of 
‘what is’ (Belkaoui, 1996: 58).  
In the present research, the positivistic epistemology is portrayed in Popper’s hypo-
deductive four-stage model characteristic of scientific knowledge where ‘each of the 
stages contains an inner logical motivation to go on to the next stage’ (Popper, 2007: 
15):  
 The (old) problem or problem situation. Here, the problem situation under 
discussion is the mandatory adoption of IFRS by Greek listed companies. 
 Formation of tentative theories. The mandatory introduction of IFRS in Greece 
(and other EU countries) since 2005 effectively introduces a new era which 
possibly will create new theories with regard to implementation of accounting 
regulation. Illustration of the problem’s background, as well as reviewing the 
relevant literature, illuminates the knowledge we possess prior to the 
investigation (i.e. a priori knowledge, ibid: 69) with regard to the issue under 
examination. However, the discussion of the background to the problem situation 
together with the literature review are not self-sufficient and do not provide 
evidence for developing concrete theories. On that basis, a gap in the literature is 
identified and the relevant hypotheses are formed. 
 Attempts at elimination through critical discussion, including experimental 
testing. At this stage, the hypotheses are tested and effectively idealism is set 
against realism. In particular, it is tested whether the ‘a priori knowledge’ of the 
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subject is only an adaptation to a partly unknown environment i.e. consists of 
potential expectations. 
 The new problems that arise from the critical discussion of our theories. At this 
stage, the ‘a posteriori knowledge’ which is the result of the empirical tests, 
sheds light on and complements the ‘a priori knowledge’ and possibly reveals 
the latter’s weaknesses.  
From the discussion regarding the objectives of this study it becomes apparent that 
quantitative research is chosen as the most appropriate approach for testing the 
tentative theories (where relevant). This is in line with the positivistic approach 
described above and with Wolin (1973) who states that ‘methods and techniques are 
dependent upon epistemological justifications’ (cited in Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 
12). This is also in line with Creswell (2003: 21) who argues that ‘if the problem is 
identifying factors that influence an outcome, or understanding the best predictors of 
outcomes, then a quantitative approach is best’.  
1.6 Data and Sources 
1.6.1.1 Quantitative data 
To provide an answer to the first research question, the present study uses 
information relating to 238 Greek listed companies (section 3.5.3 explains the sample 
selection process). This represents approximately 75% of the Greek listed companies 
in March 2006. This sample consists of 193 companies publishing consolidated 
accounts and 45 publishing individual accounts. As explained in section 4.6.1, to 
provide answers to the remaining 5 research questions, 153 companies (of the 238) 
are utilised. 
The 2004 financial statements (under Greek GAAP), the 2005 and 2006 market 
values, as well as the publication dates of the financial statements, were acquired 
from the ASE in electronic format. The company data contained all line items of the 
statements for each listed company. Then, the 2005 financial statements were 
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downloaded from the ASE website. From these, the comparative figures referring to 
the 2004 accounts under IFRS, the 2005 figures under IFRS and the adjustments 
from the reconciliation statements were captured ‘by hand’ and transferred to a 
spreadsheet for analysis.  
1.6.1.2 Supplementary qualitative data 
In addition to the quantitative analysis, five personal key informant interviews were 
conducted. Four in person in Greece: with a senior employee of the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission (November and December 2006), with a senior credit officer of 
a large bank, and with a member of the Committee of Accounting Standardisation 
and Auditing (ELTE) (both June 2007). One was conducted by telephone with a 
senior manager of Grant Thornton, in December 2006. These were intended to 
provide additional background information to allow for better contextualising of the 
findings. Such information provided is referenced either within the text or by means 
of footnotes. 
1.7 Limitations 
The main limitations16 of this thesis can be summarised as follows.  
The impact reported in the reconciliation statements with regard to the transition to 
IFRS may be affected by creative accounting practices followed before and/or during 
the period of transition. It may also be affected by preparers’ non-familiarity with 
IFRS which may lead to misinterpretation of the standards’ requirements and 
subsequently improper implementation. 
Although the necessary procedures were followed, measuring compliance with 
mandatory disclosures always entails a degree of subjectivity. This may hinder 
replication of the research in a consistent way by other researchers. 
                                                 
16 Each empirical chapter contains a section devoted to discussion related to the limitations attributed 
to the analyses discussed therein. 
 
 23
Chapter 1 – Motivation, Objectives and Overview of the Study 
 
In common with similar value relevance studies, it is assumed that investors 
understand and evaluate the implications and effects of IFRS. This may not be 
(completely) the case where IFRS are introduced for the first time in a country with a 
substantially different accounting tradition. Additionally, selective or incomplete 
reporting/disclosure may mislead investors unfamiliar with the new regime.  
The sample is not randomly selected. Although the necessary controls have been 
followed regarding the value relevance part of this study (i.e. chapter 5), it remains a 
limitation regarding chapters 3 and 4.  
1.8 Organisation of the Study 
The organisation of the study follows the research paths illustrated in Figure 1.1. As 
discussed above, the key issues tackled in this study are informed by different 
streams of literature and theoretical underpinnings. One distinctive characteristic of 
this thesis is that it explores links between these issues (see end of section 1.1). 
Accordingly, all empirical chapters include reviews of the relevant literature and 
theoretical frameworks and no separate chapter ‘literature review’ chapter exists. 
Chapter 2 discusses the Greek socio-economic context as a basis for an 
understanding of the factors which had affected the Greek accounting environment 
and may continue to do so after the adoption of IFRS.  
Chapter 3 discusses the de jure differences between IFRS and Greek GAAP and 
explores the impact from transition to IFRS on Greek listed companies’ first IFRS 
statements. This provides an answer to the first research question (Q1).  
Chapter 4 discusses the analysis of Greek listed companies’ compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosure requirements and identifies the explanatory factors for (non) 
compliance. This analysis and discussion provide answers to the second and third 
research questions (Q2 and Q3).  
Chapter 5 provides answers to the remaining three research questions (Q4, Q5, and 
Q6). It examines the issues relating to the value relevance of accounting information 
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in Greece. In particular, it provides an analysis of the value relevance of accounting 
information before and after IFRS’ implementation. It explores whether the 
adjustments provided in the reconciliation statements were incrementally value 
relevant to the 2005 figures. Additionally, it explores the valuation implications of 
IFRS mandatory disclosures.  
Chapter 6 forms the concluding remarks of the thesis. A summary of the research 
questions, objectives, and methods is initially provided. Then, a summary of the key 
research findings and their implications is discussed. The summary of the limitations 
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Chapter 2 - The Greek Accounting Environment 
2.1 Introduction 
‘Accounting is the process of identifying, measuring and communicating financial 
information about an entity to permit informed judgements and decisions by users of 
the information’ (American Accounting Association, 1966 cited in Weetman, 2003: 
4). An ‘accounting system’ is defined as ‘the set of financial reporting practices used 
by a particular company for an annual report’ (Nobes and Parker, 2008: 25). Several 
studies have examined the influences of specific socio-economic factors on the 
development of the accounting system of a country so as to explain the international 
differences in financial reporting (e.g. Mueller, 1967; Seidler, 1967; Da Costa et al., 
1978; Nair and Frank, 1980; Nobes, 1983; Gray, 1988; Nobes, 1998; D’Arcy, 2001). 
Following along these lines, this chapter reviews the factors that have affected and 
continue to affect the Greek accounting system. It discusses the particular features 
and provides the necessary insights on the ‘national [Greek] accounting traditions 
[that] are likely to continue into consolidated reporting where scope for this exists 
within IFRS rules’ (Nobes, 2006: 235), and which will provide opportunities for ‘the 
survival of accounting differences’ (ibid), at least across the EU. 
Accordingly, this review sheds light on the specific factors that may exert an 
influence on the issues tackled in this study, i.e. impact on transition to IFRS, 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures as well as value relevance of 
accounting information. Thus, in combination with the corresponding theories 
(where relevant), this review forms the basis for the development of the research 
hypotheses in the next chapters as well as the interpretation of the empirical findings. 
It has to be noted that the objectives of this thesis are broader than focusing only on 
disclosure practices. Thus, the analysis is not provided only against a framework 
focusing on the factors determining financial disclosure regulation and its 
environment (e.g. Cooke and Wallace, 1990) or on an ‘international financial 
disclosure model’ (e.g. Jaggi and Low, 2000).  
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2.2 The Country 
Greece is located in the south-eastern part of Europe. It has a population of 
approximately 11 million (official data refers to 2001, General Secretariat of 
National Statistical Service of Greece17) and covers an area of approximately 
132,000km2. Although its roots can be traced back to the 11th century BC, the Greek 
autonomous State was formed in 1828, preceded by approximately 400 years of 
Ottoman rule (1453-1820s). To gain independence from the Ottoman Turks, the 
Greeks sought support from the Western ‘Great Powers’ of that time (Britain, France 
and Russia). These powers exercised significant influence in the development of the 
new State by providing finance as well as imposing a monarch well after the 
assassination of the first elected governor (Ioannis Capodistrias) in 1831. This, 
together with the country’s geographically strategic position, resulted in the socio-
economic context of Greece continuing to be influenced by the ‘Great Powers’ well 
after that period. This was also the case in the 20th century since political and 
economic stability was not feasible in the country for long periods. Greece 
participated in the Balkan Wars and in the 1st World War. The latter was followed by 
a period of dictatorship. During the 2nd World War Greece was under German rule, 
until 1944. This was followed by a five year civil war (late 1944 to 1949) and the 
military dictatorship of the Junta from 1967 to 1974.  
Caramanis (2005) and Ballas (1998) argue that even nowadays Greek culture, 
politics and economics remain affected by a duality of Eastern and Western 
influences; in particular, the contrast remains between ‘a ‘modernising’ reform-
minded, Westward-looking, pro-liberal culture and an ‘underdog’, Eastward-looking, 
anti-reform and pro-statist culture’ with ‘nationalist and xenophobic overtones’ 
(Caramanis, 2005:202-318). During the last two decades, the traditional state 
corporatism has been modified by modernisation and neo-liberal, free market 
influences (Caramanis, 2005). Ballas et al. (1998, with reference to Doukas, 1993) 
stress the political significance of EC membership in 1981 in the transition to 
                                                 
17 http://www.statistics.gr/gr_tables/hellas_in_numbers.pdf, last accessed 03/04/2009. 
18 With reference to prior literature: Diamantouros (1993); Faubion (1993); Herzfeld (1987, 1993); 
Mouzelis (1978, 1986, 1995). 
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democracy in that harmonisation of legislation and institutions limits opportunities 
for diversion from Western norms. However, the ‘underdog’ influence has by no 
means disappeared (Caramanis, 2005).  
2.3 The Legal System 
The legal system belongs to the code (or Roman) law family. Historically, Greek 
accounting and commercial law have been strongly influenced by French precedents 
and developments (Ballas, 1994; Ballas et al., 1998). In 1980, in order to facilitate 
ascension to EU membership, Greece adopted a General Accounting Plan closely 
based on the French Plan Comptablé; this was amended in 1987 in accordance with 
the 4th and 7th EU directives19 (Ballas, 1994; see also Venieris, 1999).20 Ballas et al. 
(1998:278) suggest that ‘the Greek Accounting Plan was addressed to an 
international audience while domestic affairs of taxation and its related bookkeeping 
remained an exclusively Greek domain’. In fact, with regard to accounting 
regulation, ‘the Greek state has demonstrated a remarkable degree of autonomy from 
societal interests’ (Ballas et al., 1998: 274). Interest groups are weak, and 
professional bodies’ interest is indirect, through members with government 
responsibility (ibid.; see also Venieris, 199921).  
Patronage has been a feature of the Greek state, bringing with it a lack of trust and a 
perception that it is pursuing sectional, rather than the public interest. This leads to 
ambivalent behaviour by its citizens: a pursuit of state favour as well as attempts to 
cheat the system (Ballas et al., 1998, with reference to Charalambis, 1996 and 
Tsoukalas, 1993). Thus, Greece represents a low trust society, which is detrimental 
to self-regulation of accounting or trust in the ‘true and fair view’ of financial 
statements, but requires state regulation and extensive rules which, however, increase 
monitoring costs and distrust (Ballas et al., 1998). This leads to ‘formalism’, which is 
                                                 
19 The implementation of the 7th Directive came into force in 1990. There was no previous legal 
requirement for group accounts (Papas, 1993). 
20 Significant differences between Greek and French accounting plans exist in particular in the 
objectives: in France these are still largely the collection of macro-economic data, in Greece fiscal 
objectives (Ballas et al., 1998). 
21 Venieris (1999) provides an overview of the accounting rule-making process and the agencies 
involved in accounting rule-making in Greece.  
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‘defined as an excessive adherence to prescribed forms and the use of forms without 
regard to inner significance’ (Ballas et al., 1998: 279). These characteristics have 
been identified in Greek accountants by Tsakumis (2007) as being representative of 
their national culture (with reference to Hofstede (1980), but see below).  
2.4 Taxation, Creative Accounting and the Role of Culture 
The taxation system in Greece is ‘a nebulous system of conflicting laws, court 
decisions and ministerial decisions, which clearly panders to special interests’ 
(Ballas, 1994: 110). Financial reporting is traditionally closely linked to taxation 
(Michalatos, 2001; Tzovas, 2006) with the major link being Tax Law (Presidential 
Decree 186/9222 - also known as Code of Books and Records).  
The close link between accounting and taxation and the fact that taxes are perceived 
to be unfairly high, result in tax avoidance and evasion as well as creative accounting 
(Baralexis, 2004).23 As an example, Tsakumis et al. (2007) document that Greece’s 
underground economy was estimated to equal approximately 40% of the Gross 
Domestic Product — the largest in the European Union, in 1997. Tsakumis et al. 
(2007) find inter alia that a country’s profile with high tax avoidance is characterised 
by high uncertainty avoidance (cf. Hofstede, 1983, see also below). The most 
common example of tax avoidance is the tendency not to recognise provisions until 
they materialise since they are not deductible for tax purposes (Vlachos 2001, with 
reference to Caseley, 1996).  
Papas (1993) suggests that, for this reason, where company law and tax law are in 
conflict, accountants tend to follow the latter. Another reason for companies 
following the tax law requirements is the strict fines the tax authorities impose for 
non-compliance. In contrast, non-compliance with company law requirements does 
not result in strict penalties. In fact, the penalty is a qualification in the audit report 
                                                 
22 Laws and legal decrees are referred to by their number (e.g. 186) followed by the year in which they 
were originally passed (e.g. 92, which refers to 1992). 
23 See Ballas et al. (1998) for a critical interpretation of the Greek state’s utilisation of accounting 
books for tax collection purposes. 
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(Papas, 1993) which is usually disregarded (see also below). Filios (1995: 94, cited 
in Vlachos, 2001: 81) states:  
‘…since 1920 there has not been a penalty imposed on any 
accountant for failing to comply with the regulations’. 
Greece is the country with the highest score for uncertainty avoidance in Hofstede’s 
(1983) study. Gray (1988) classifies Greece in the group of ‘Near Eastern’ countries 
whose main characteristics are: strong conservatism and secrecy as well as statutory 
control and uniformity. Although Greece is expected to have moved to different 
accounting values (Leventis, 2001 with reference to Loutridis, 1999) uniformity and 
secrecy are still considered to be high (cf. Tsakumis et al., 2007).24 This and the 
above examples relating to tax avoidance may provide some support to Nobes’ 
(1998: 175) argument that culture may ‘be seen as one of the background factors’ 
affecting more direct factors of the development of an accounting system in a 
country in general and in Greece in particular.  
Creative accounting and earnings management practices are indeed well documented 
in the literature (Polychroniadis, 2002; Spathis, 2002; Spathis et al., 2002; Leuz et 
al., 2003; Baralexis, 2004; Caramanis and Spathis, 2006; Burgstahler et al., 2006). In 
fact, Leuz et al. (2003) classify Greece (along with Austria) as the country (out of 31) 
with the highest earnings management.  
While overstatement is more common, understatement also occurs (Baralexis, 2004). 
Ghicas et al. (2008: 514) provide an example of the magnitude of the impact of the 
creative accounting practices. For a sample of 149 firms, if the impact of the audit 
qualifications had been recognised in the prior year, it ‘would have reduced median 
reported earnings by 21% and book value of shareholders’ equity by 4.4%’. This 
becomes particularly relevant when considering the frequency of qualified audit 
reports (see below). 
                                                 
24 Hofstede’s conclusions have to be treated with caution for several reasons. One of those reasons is 
that almost thirty years have passed since the publication of ‘Culture’s Consequences’ (1980) and the 
assumption of stability of cultural differences lacks conviction (Baskerville, 2003). 
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This background explains why banks do not rely on the information reported in the 
financial statements for lending decisions. They are lending on the companies’ 
ability to provide collateral instead (Filios, 1995). 
Ownership concentration is high and owners are directly involved in companies’ 
management. They are therefore able to monitor and motivate staff without the need 
for incentive schemes. There is also less need for financial statements as a means of 
communication with owners (Tzovas, 2006). (This is an important issue in the 
context of IFRS adoption because they require more extensive disclosures than 
Greek GAAP.) As a result, ownership concentration ‘contributes to the adoption of 
an aggressive tax-reducing strategy, since their ownership status does not appear to 
generate significant non-tax costs’. Tax adjustments (such as accelerated 
depreciation) in financial statements (Venieris, 1999) further distort companies’ 
results. In addition (and as is also the case in other code-law countries), the demand 
for accounting income is strongly influenced by the payout preferences of various 
stakeholder groups. Because these stakeholders prefer less volatile earnings, 
companies in code-law countries tend to have greater scope for income smoothing 
(Spathis and Georgakopoulou, 2007, with reference to Ball et al., 2000 and to 
Guenther and Young, 2000). 
Here lies the basis of the contributions of the present study. Many of the creative 
accounting practices applied under Greek GAAP were expected to be curtailed by 
the introduction of IFRS (see section 3.5 for a detailed discussion).25 This, combined 
with the increase (see below) in mandatory disclosures introduced by IFRS, was 
expected to improve financial reporting quality in Greece. According to prior value 
relevance research (e.g. Barth et al., 2008), this improvement should also be reflected 
in the relationship between book values and market values (providing that the 
investors rely on the information reported in companies’ financial statements for 
making their investment decisions). 
                                                 
25 Although, as suggested by Nobes and Parker (2008: 147), some of these tax-driven accounting 
choices might flow through to IFRS financial statements, since unconsolidated financial statements 
are still prepared under national (Greek) GAAP. 
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2.5 The Profession 
As was pointed out earlier, the accounting/audit profession is relatively young and 
weak (Baralexis, 2004). Ballas et al. (1998) suggest that capital was not involved in 
the decision to create the initially ‘quasi-civil service’ (Ballas, 1994: 116-7) auditing 
profession,26 but rather that the state was the main constituency for audit services, 
which were perceived as ‘a technology that could help the state root out dishonest 
business practices and increase tax revenues’ (Ballas, 1998: 716) and as ‘an 
instrument of social control’ (ibid.: 733). Auditing was, until reformed in 1992 not 
effective, with auditors subjected to management pressure (Baralexis, 2004), very 
limited auditor liability (until 2000) (Baralexis, 2004) and qualified audit reports 
being disregarded (Ballas, 1994: 117). Subsequently, the jurisdiction of the statutory 
audit has been opened to private audit firms, including international firms (see 
Ballas, 1994, 1998; Caramanis, 2002). Since then the audit market has grown 
considerably and is subject to fierce competition (Leventis and Caramanis, 2005; 
Leventis et al., 2005). However, the effectiveness of auditing has recently been 
questioned, leading the profession to take new regulatory measures (Leventis and 
Caramanis, 2005).  
In 2003 ELTE was established (Law 3148/03). This Committee reports to the 
Minister of Finance and National Economy and deals inter alia with professional 
ethics, audit quality and accounting regulation implementation guidance. Its activities 
are carried out by the Board of Accounting Standardisation and the Board of Audit 
Quality (Art. 1-5). However, Kontoyannis (2005) argues that the system is still not 
effective.27 For example, nearly half of all listed companies’ audit reports for the 
recent 2006 financial statements were qualified (Grant Thornton, 2007), suggesting 
that a qualified audit report does not constitute an effective sanction. (Although this 
suggests an improvement compared to 2001, when nearly 90% of 185 listed 
companies sampled received a qualified audit report (Caramanis and Spathis, 2006)). 
                                                 
26 In fact, when a statutory audit requirement was introduced for listed companies in 1959, 40 out of 
76 companies delisted (Ballas, 1998).  
27 This was also confirmed by two of the key informant interviewees. 
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In fact, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) demonstrate that earnings management is 
related to audit firm size in Greece.  
2.6 Business Enterprises and Financing System 
Greek company law recognises two main types of company: the Anonymi Etaira 
(AE, approximately comparable to the French Société Anonyme and German AG) 
and the Etairia Periorismenis Efthynis (EPE - approximately comparable to the UK 
Limited Liability Company, French Sarl and the German GmbH) (Ballas, 1994; 
Vlachos, 2001). To be listed on the Stock Exchange a company has to be an AE. The 
Company Law that governs AEs is Law 2190/20. This Law succeeded the 
Commercial law adopted in 1835 which was heavily based on the French Code. 
Since then, this has been updated through several presidential decrees, the Greek 
Accounting Plan and most notably with incorporation of the 4th and 7th Directives 
mentioned above. 
Management performance is poor with losses common, leading to a need ‘to raise 
funds (especially working capital) from the debt-orientated capital market’ 
(Baralexis, 2004: 443, with reference to the Federation of Greek Manufacturing, 
1999). Banks are the main capital providers for Greek companies (Venieris, 1999; 
Tzovas, 2006). In fact, Nobes and Parker (2008: 30) illustrate that Greek companies 
are highly geared (Greece is ranked 4th out of 19 countries). Features of bank lending 
are the importance of collateral, personal relationships, political intervention and 
social criteria (such as number of employees) as well as special rules/advantages for 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (see e.g. Ballas, 1994; Ballas et al. 1998; 
Baralexis, 2004). Debt financing leads to conservatism and an emphasis on historical 
costs: ‘This has torpedoed many attempts to modernise accounting policies, 
especially in the area of disclosure’ (Ballas, 1994: 114). This is confirmed by 
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Further, La Porta et al. (1998) note that French-style civil-law countries - including 
Greece - provide the weakest legal protection for creditors and shareholders and the 
poorest enforcement of legislation; they also note a strong correlation between poor 
legal protection of investors and high ownership concentration (as is also the case in 
Greece). 
2.7 Corporate Governance 
Greek legislation on corporate governance was updated and aligned with 
international corporate governance rules in 2000.28 Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004: 
16), state that at the end of 2001 Greek companies demonstrated ‘a fairly satisfactory 
degree of compliance with OECD guidelines’. The more recent Law 3016/2002, 
inter alia, specifies that the board of directors must be made up of at least 1/3 non-
executive members of which at least two must be independent; covers mandatory 
related parties’ disclosures; and specifies requirements in respect of formalising 
companies’ internal procedures (investors relations, procedures for employing 
managerial staff and the organisation and establishment of audit committees 
(Iliokaftos, 2005)).  
However, Florou and Galarniotis (2007), based on data available on 274 out of 340 
Greek listed companies in 2003, show that the average corporate governance rating 
was 44%. Additionally, in a 2005 survey, Grant Thornton and the Athens University 
of Economics and Business (AUEB) found that listed companies frequently 
complied with the form of the legislation but not with its substance. (These findings 
support Ballas et al.’s observations on formalism in Greek accounting – see above). 
They found instances of inadequate disclosures, directors holding positions on the 
boards of affiliated companies, a lack of independence between executive and non-
executive directors, non-existence of remuneration committees, inadequate 
disclosures of directors’ remuneration and non-compliance with legislation on the 
minimum content of internal regulations. A similar survey in 2006 (Grant Thornton 
                                                 
28 Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) Rule 5/204/2000: ‘Code of conduct for companies 
listed on ASE and their affiliated persons’. 
 
 34
Chapter 2 - The Greek Accounting Environment 
 
and AUEB, 2006) finds that progress has been made but that further improvement is 
required with regard to independence of non-executive directors and the adoption of 
‘Best practices’ policies.  
2.8 The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The ASE was founded in 1876 and since 2000 has been considered a developed 
market (Mandikidis, 2000). It grew rapidly during the 1990s. In 1996, there were 218 
companies listed whereas in 1999 278 companies were listed (Vlachos, 2001). 
Additionally, at the end of 1999, the total annual ASE capitalisation had realised a 
total increase of 194.7% (from €67 billion in 1998 to €197 billion in 1999) (Spanos, 
2005). However, it suffered a decline the years after with the general index realising 
a decrease of 38.8% in 2000, 23.5% in 2001 and a further 32.5% in 2002 (Spanos, 
2005). 
In September 2006, the FTSE classified Greece in the ‘watch list’, meaning it may 
change status to ‘Advanced Emerging Market’ (this is still the case in September 
2009 - latest FTSE update (FTSE, 2009)). At the end of 2006, 317 companies were 
listed with a total market capitalisation of €158 billion of which 46% belonged to 
foreign investors (Central Security Depository, 2006). More specifically, foreign 
investors held 52.31% of the market capitalisation of ASE’s FTSE 20 companies, 
39.80% of FTSE 40, and only 15.63% of Small Cap 80 companies (Central Security 
Depository, 2006). ASE’s major indices are: Main index, FTSE 20, FTSE Mid 40 
and Small Cap 80. In November 2005, the ASE was aligned with the International 
Classification Benchmark (ICB29) and, since 2 January 2006, the Greek listed 
companies have been disaggregated across 17 ‘super-sectors’ (henceforth: sectors). 
This allows comparison of the Greek sectors with the corresponding ones in 
international stock exchanges such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, Euronext and the LSE.  
                                                 
29 ICB distinguishes between four levels of classification consisting of 10 Industries, 18 Super-sectors, 
39 sectors and 104 sub-sectors. The Greek super-sectors are comparable to 17 of the ICB Super-
Sectors (ASE, 2005).  
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2.9 The Capital Market Regulator (HCMC) 
The capital market is regulated and supervised by the HCMC. HCMC is also 
authorised to provide accreditation and professional qualifications to fund managers, 
investment analysts, investment consultants and share traders (Law 2836/00). 
HCMC’s operations are regulated by PD 25/03 and Law 3152/03. The latter 
transferred the supervisory responsibilities of the Ministry of National Economy to 
the HCMC. It now officially operates as an independent body although the influence 
and the supervision of the Ministry of National Economy have been maintained. 
HCMC was one of the founding members of the Forum of European Securities 
Commissions (FESCO) which preceded the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR). It is also member of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO).  
As far as its supervisory role is concerned, in 2006, HCMC had a small team of 
people reviewing listed companies’ accounts in an effort to identify instances of non-
compliance with regard to measurement and disclosure requirements. The 
requirement for companies to produce quarterly reports means that there is an 
increased workload which often results in a superficial ‘audit’ with a focus on the 
measurement issues.30  
When a non-compliance issue is identified, the Commission asks for a clarification 
from the company. If it is needed, a request for a public announcement on behalf of 
the company is required, accompanied with information regarding the issues 
identified in its financial statements and the possible restatements might be needed. 
In serious cases of non-compliance, HCMC imposes fines and/or suspends 
companies’ trading for a period. In very exceptional circumstances a company may 
be de-listed. 
                                                 
30 It was in mid 2007 that HCMC advertised 3 positions for increasing the workforce with regard to 
this function. I am in debt to one key informant interviewee for providing this information. 
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2.10 Financial Reporting and Transition to IFRS  
In August 2000 the HCMC suggested the mandatory adoption of IAS by all Greek 
listed companies (Vlachos, 2001). Subsequently, Law 2992/02 intended to 
implement this from January 2003 (Art. 1). However, this law never came into force 
because of companies’ lack of preparedness (Floropoulos, 2006). Instead, in line 
with EU requirements, Law 3229/04 (amending Law 2190/20) introduced the 
mandatory implementation of IFRS by all Greek listed companies for the accounting 
periods starting on or after 1 January 2005.31  
The transition to IFRS in Greece has been described as a complex and potentially 
problematic process, made more so by a lack of preparedness of companies and 
accountants (cf. Spathis and Georgakopoulou, 2007, with reference to Floropoulos, 
2006). The substantial differences between the two accounting regimes made the 
transition a real challenge. Results of a 2003 survey by Grant Thornton and AUEB 
(2003) suggest that, while approximately half of the companies surveyed expected 
IFRS adoption to affect their financial position positively, many (36%) 
acknowledged lack of adequate expertise among their employees; 30% was going to 
seek for advice from specialised accountants and auditors; and only 17% had formed 
a structured action plan towards IFRS transition (Grant Thornton and AUEB, 2003).  
According to PD 186/92, companies’ fiscal year should be of 12 months, ending 
either on 30 June or 31 December (Art. 26). Legislation (Law 2190/20 and PD 
360/85) also contains detailed regulation on the publication of full and summarised 
financial statements. In February 2006 the HCMC, following auditors’ and 
companies’ requests in relation to the difficulties of providing financial statements 
under IFRS, abolished the early publication date for summarised financial statements 
(two months after the year end) but effectively brought forward the required 
publication date for full annual financial statements (to three months after the year 
end) (Decision 6/372/15.2.06, Law 3461/06). Subsequently, at the end of March 
                                                 
31 Daske et al. (2007) and the sample selection process (3.5.3) indicate that there were very few Greek 
listed companies that had adopted IAS/IFRS prior to 2005 on a voluntary basis. 
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2006, the first annual financial statements of Greek listed companies prepared in 
accordance with IFRS became available.32  
These first IFRS financial statements made a lot of new information available to 
users, as a result of the extensive mandatory disclosures required by IFRS. Greek 
GAAP required substantially less mandatory disclosures. According to Greek 
legislation, financial statements should be accompanied by notes (known as 
Prosartima - i.e. Appendix, in translation). However, although the ‘Prosartima’ had 
to be filed with the Mitroo (Register) of AEs, this was rarely available in the public 
domain. (This is why previous studies relating to Greek companies’ disclosures 
report difficulty in acquiring the necessary data e.g. Leventis (2001) and Vlachos 
(2001)). Additionally, the ‘Prosartima’ had a standardised format with specific 
sections on accounting policies. Therefore, companies did not have to produce a 
detailed set of notes accompanying the financial statements as required by IFRS and 
accordingly investors did not have access to detailed information regarding the 
accounting practices followed.  
Users of the financial statements became also more informed about companies’ 
financial position and performance because the first IFRS financial statements 
incorporated reconciliation statements explaining the adjustments relating to the 
transition to IFRS. Arguably, for some companies, some of this information was 
already in the public domain but this was not the case for the majority of companies. 
In fact, the majority of companies did not publish reconciliation statements before 
the first IFRS financial statements (because they were not well prepared for the 
transition (cf. Floropoulos, 2006). Even when the reconciliations were finally 
produced they were of low quality. HCMC (2006) conducted a survey to capture the 
adjustments reported in the reconciliation statements but did not consider 
adjustments to net income, mainly because of the low quality of disclosures. Similar 
                                                 
32 This refers to the audited set of financial statements as defined by IAS 1 ‘Presentation of financial 
statements’ as well as the directors’ report. It does not refer to the full annual reports which become 
available later - up to 160 days after the year end (Leventis et al., 2005). The former have been used 
for the purposes of the present study. 
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problems were referred to in a study by Grant Thornton (2006) (see section 3.3.2 for 
more details). 
2.11 Conclusion – Focusing on The Greek Environment  
The substantially increased mandatory disclosures, along with the substantial 
differences in measurement requirements between Greek GAAP and IFRS which 
were expected to reduce the creative accounting practices previously followed, make 
Greece an interesting and suitable locus for conducting the present research.  
This chapter highlighted the inefficiencies in auditing, the weak enforcement 
mechanisms as well as the general tendency of people to ‘cheat’ the system and not 
to comply with the accounting rules. These characteristics are reflected in the distrust 
of the reported financial information and in turn are particularly relevant for meeting 
the objectives of this research. Thus, the present study considers several of the Greek 
features mentioned above when the relevant hypotheses are formulated as well as 
when the empirical findings are discussed.  
The objectives of the present study include the exploration of whether the impact on 
transition to IFRS is an explanatory factor of compliance with the mandatory 
disclosures (chapter 4) and whether the reconciliation adjustments provided value 
relevant information (chapter 5). However, testing these hypotheses would not be 
feasible without capturing the impact revealed in the first IFRS financial statements. 
This is the purpose of the next chapter (3). 
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Chapter 3 - Financial Statement Effects and Auditor Size 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an answer to the first research question (Q1). It provides 
analysis regarding the materiality of the changes to the 2004 figures and of specific 
adjustments to 2004 shareholders equity. This highlights the effect of transition on 
the first IFRS financial statements. The analysis carried out in this part of the study is 
descriptive and exploratory in nature since it does not test a theory per se. However, 
the findings provided herein form the basis for the analysis carried out in the next 
two parts of the study which test specific theories and provide motivation for future 
research.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides the 
necessary context regarding the analysis provided herein. Section 3.3 reviews earlier 
literature pertinent to this part of the research. Section 3.4 discusses the de jure 
differences between IFRS and Greek GAAP and introduces the research hypotheses. 
Section 3.5 describes the data and research methods employed. In section 3.6 the 
findings are discussed in depth with reference to the research hypotheses, the prior 
literature and the context of the Greek accounting environment provided in chapter 2. 
Section 3.7 discusses the limitations of this part of the research and section 3.8 forms 
the concluding remarks.  
3.2 The Context 
IFRS 1 requires first IFRS financial statements to provide at least one year’s 
comparatives under IFRS (paragraph 36). Moreover, companies should explain how 
the transition from previous GAAP to IFRS affected their reported financial position, 
financial performance and cash flows (if relevant) by providing reconciliation 
statements (paragraphs 38-43).  
These comparative figures and reconciliation statements provide a unique 
opportunity to examine the impact of IFRS adoption on companies’ financial 
position (shareholders’ equity), key ratios and reported performance (net income) for 
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the financial year 2004, and to examine the effect of individual standards. As pointed 
out by Nobes,33 different results and financial positions are logically to be expected 
when a different set of GAAP is applied for the same accounting period. However, 
what is interesting is whether the change is material and if so, whether the difference 
is positive or negative and why it occurs. Nobes’ (2006) proposes a number of 
hypotheses to be tested by future research. The above is in line with his 7th 
Hypothesis (ibid: 242):  
‘Pre-IFRS differences between national practices have a significant 
effect on IFRS financial statements.’ 
Nobes (2006) argues that pre-IFRS differences will have an impact on IFRS financial 
statements’ starting point. Since Greek GAAP differs significantly from IFRS, it was 
expected that Greek companies’ financial statements should be affected considerably 
by the transition to the new accounting regime. Additionally, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, prior literature has identified several creative accounting practices 
followed under Greek GAAP. These practices are not allowed under IFRS and thus 
the adoption of specific standards was expected to cause a negative impact on Greek 
companies’ shareholders’ equity.  
Finally, the literature indicates that earnings management, as well as audit effort, are 
associated with audit firm size in Greece (e.g. Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). Thus, 
analysis exploring whether the impact revealed in the reconciliation statements was 
significantly different between firms with ‘Big 4’ auditors versus firms with non-
‘Big 4’ auditors could shed more light on the pre-IFRS differences and their effect on 
IFRS financial statements. 
Following along these lines and drawing on the comparative figures and 
reconciliation statements for the financial year ended 31st December 2004, the 
present research examines the impact of IFRS adoption on companies’ financial 
statements (net profit, shareholders’ equity, gearing and liquidity) for the financial 
year 2004. It also examines which accounting standards have the strongest economic 
impact on net assets, with a particular focus on standards expected to curtail creative 
                                                 
33 A comment made during the workshop ‘Accounting in Europe’ (Paris, September 2007). 
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accounting practices. Analysis is also provided across the partition of companies 
with ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ auditors as proxy for accounting quality (DeAngelo, 
1981; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 The impact of transition to IFRS in the EU  
The transition of European companies to IFRS has given rise to studies making use 
of the 2004 financial statements, which were initially prepared on the basis of 
national GAAP and then restated under IFRS as comparatives for the 2005 financial 
statements. These studies attempt to capture the impact of transition. Some, but not 
all, make use of Gray’s comparability index, which is also applied in the present 
study (see below). The fact that not all studies follow the same approach for 
capturing the impact revealed in the reconciliation statements does not allow for 
direct comparisons of their findings. Additionally, and in contrast to the current 
research, very few of the prior studies analyse a large number of companies; their 
sample may thus not be representative of all listed firms in the country under 
examination. Finally, very few of the prior studies test the significance of their 
findings. 
Jermakowicz (2004) focuses on the adoption of IFRS by listed companies in 
Belgium. The study consists of a qualitative part, i.e. a survey of the views of people 
engaged with the issues relating to the transition to IFRS in the 20 most traded listed 
firms; and a quantitative on the impact in the reconciliation statements of three early 
IFRS adopters. Without using Gray’s comparability index and without testing for 
significance of her findings, she concludes that a relatively large negative (positive) 
impact is revealed for two (one) companies both on shareholders’ equity and net 
income when reconciling Belgian GAAP with IFRS.  
Aisbitt (2006) focuses on the FTSE 100 listed companies’ transition to IFRS in 2005 
by using the 2004 reconciliation statements. She also does not employ Gray’s 
comparability index nor does she test the significance of her findings. She finds that, 
for UK companies, there was no overall significant effect on shareholders’ equity, 
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but that the effect varies for different companies, with no apparent industry effects. 
She also argues that ‘the effect of the change ... on individual line items could have 
important consequences for financial analysis and contractual obligations’ (ibid.: 
117). The most affected line items were: Retirement benefit obligations (-15.45%); 
Property, plant and equipment (+10.58%); Cash and cash equivalents (+8.03%); and 
Other financial assets (-7.11%). (Average changes are reported in the parentheses). 
Bertoni and De Rosa (2006) focus on 42 companies listed on the Milan Stock 
Exchange (MSE), the market capitalisation of which represented approximately 80% 
of the market total. However, this represents only 15% of the total number of 
companies listed on MSE. In common with the current study, the authors use Gray’s 
comparability index and test the significance of their findings. They find that Italian 
GAAP is more conservative than IFRS, but they argue this result is not as strong as 
had been expected (see also section 3.6). Shareholders’ equity, profit and return on 
equity under Italian GAAP are, on average, lower than that reported under IFRS. In 
contrast to Aisbitt (2006), Bertoni and De Rosa (2006) do not identify material 
average adjustments as a result of the adoption of individual standards on net assets. 
Cordazzo (2008) provides a more in depth study than Bertoni and De Rosa (2006) by 
analysing 178 companies listed on MSE. This study provides comparable findings to 
those reported here because of the large sample used and because Gray’s 
comparability index has been employed. In line with Berdoni and De Rosa (2006), 
Cordazzo (2008) reports significantly higher net income and shareholders’ equity 
under IFRS than under Italian GAAP.  
Lopes and Viana (2008) analyse the total population of listed companies (44) on the 
Portuguese Stock exchange that had to provide reconciliation statements for the 
transition to IFRS. They (mainly) provide narrative discussion of transition related 
disclosures provided by the Portuguese companies, but focus less on the quantitative 
aspect of the subject matter. They report that more companies were affected 
positively with regard to shareholders’ equity and net profit than negatively. The 
authors employ Gray’s comparability index only with regard to earnings and 
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accordingly their findings are not comparable to those reported here with regard to 
shareholders’ equity.  
Callao et al. (2007) use a sample of 26 listed companies in Spain and examine the 
impact reported in the reconciliation statements of those companies as well as the 
changes in their book-to-market ratios. They find inter alia that long-term and total 
liabilities increased whilst debtors and shareholders’ equity decreased.  
3.3.2 The impact of transition to IFRS in Greece  
Three prior studies, using reconciliation statements, have examined transition to 
IFRS in Greece. Two are non-academic studies published in Greek and not available 
in the English language. None of the three studies examines any relationship of its 
respective findings with audit firm size. Only the two non-academic studies provide 
brief explanations or discussions of the differences between the two accounting 
frameworks. None excludes or discusses outliers, which means that results may be 
distorted by a small number of exceptional cases. All three studies differ from the 
research undertaken here in their methodology for capturing the impact of IFRS. This 
does not allow for comparison of their findings with those of the prior literature 
discussed above. By contrast, the present study also makes use of Gray’s 
comparability index, thereby facilitating such comparison. 
The first study was carried out by the HCMC in May 2006. The results are reported 
across 11 sectors but in accordance with ASE’s industry classification as at 31st 
December 2005 i.e. not the ICB industry classification. Unlike the present study, it 
does not examine the impact on financial indicators and, as it was not intended for an 
international (academic) audience, it also only provides a very brief discussion of the 
differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS. Its analysis follows a transaction and 
not a standards approach (as applied here - see below) for reporting the adjustments 
disclosed in the reconciliation statements. However, like the present study, it reports 
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frequency and significance in value only in respect of adjustments to shareholders’ 
equity.34  
HCMC (2006) finds that on average, under IFRS, shareholders’ equity was 2.44% 
higher and profit after tax 6.16% higher. The strongest impact on shareholders’ 
equity was caused by adjustments to tangible assets, deferred tax assets and 
liabilities, and intangible assets. The most frequent adjustments were recognition of 
deferred tax assets and liabilities, derecognition of start-up costs capitalised as 
intangible assets and recognition of pension liabilities.  
In June 2006, Grant-Thornton published a more comprehensive study which also 
reports the differences on earnings and shareholders’ equity.35 It finds that 54% of 
Greek firms reported a positive adjustment on net assets. The impact on small 
companies (Small Cap 80 index) was negative, that on the two other indices (FTSE 
20 and FTSE Mid 40) positive. Net profit was increased by 4.15%. The most 
significant positive adjustments in net assets related to fixed assets and deferred tax, 
the most significant negative adjustments to the recognition of liabilities for 
employee benefits, impairment losses on loans and receivables and derecognition of 
start-up costs previously capitalised.  
Both studies noted that inconsistent presentation and inadequate disclosures meant 
that subjective judgment was required in assessing the impact of transition.36 In the 
HCMC study, ‘other’ appeared as an adjustment for 52% of companies. This 
included both positive and negative adjustments which cannot be identified by the 
reader (HCMC, 2006). The Grant Thornton study reports 20 key areas where 
companies’ recognition, measurement, and disclosure practices fall short of IFRS. As 
a result some companies had to be (partially) excluded from the analysis. (This also 
applied to the HCMC study.) 
                                                 
34 According to one key informant interviewee, this was for three reasons: Firstly, the HCMC 
attributes higher importance to the impact on shareholders’ equity. Secondly, because of timing and 
resource constraints: the study was published just one month after the publication of companies’ 
annual financial statements. Thirdly, companies’ disclosures with regard to earnings reconciliations 
were not of sufficient quality to allow for objective analysis of the information reported therein. 
35 The findings of this study were later presented to the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group. 
36 This was also confirmed for the HCMC study by the key informant interviewee.  
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Finally, a study by Bellas et al. (2008) is based on a sample of 83 Greek listed 
companies and provides limited descriptive statistics which suggest that fixed assets, 
tangible assets and total liabilities are significantly higher, and that there was greater 
variability for most balance sheet measures under IFRS than under Greek GAAP.  
3.4 Differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS and Research 
Hypotheses 
3.4.1 Differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS  
The Greek accounting framework differs substantially from IFRS and has been 
characterised as stakeholder-oriented, tax-driven (Spathis and Georgakopoulou, 
2007), and conservative (e.g. Ballas, 1994). According to Ding et al. (2007), Greece 
is the country (of 30 examined) with the highest number of issues absent from local 
GAAP but covered by IAS (‘absence score’). Additionally, Greece is the 10th most 
‘diverged’ country (of 28) with regard to differences between national rules and IASs 
(Ding et al., 2007; see also Spathis and Georgakopoulou, 2007).37 
According to Ding et al. (2005) ‘divergence’ is closely related to culture and, as 
argued above, Greece has a distinctive culture. Ding et al. (2007) also identify a 
positive association between ownership concentration and ‘absence’. Ownership 
concentration is a particular feature of the Greek market. Ding et al. (2007) also find 
a negative association between ‘divergence’ and the importance of the equity market 
which, as discussed in the previous chapter, in Greece is low.  
Table 3.1 summarises the main differences between IFRS and Greek GAAP 
measurement and recognition rules as they were at the end of 2005, i.e. at the date of 
transition.38  
                                                 
37 Nobes (2009) inter alia underscores one limitation of the Ding et al. (2007) study. The authors use 
data referring to the de jure differences between IAS and national GAAP as if these lead also to de 
facto differences. However, this may not be necessarily the case in some countries because some 
issues may be anyway irrelevant. Nobes (2009) also criticises the distinction between the categories of 
‘absence’ and ‘divergence’ that Ding et al. (2007) form on the basis of the Nobes (2001) study. 
Although Ding et al. (2009) respond to this criticism, these comments need to be considered when 
discussion about the substantial differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS is made in this study. 
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Table 3:1: Summary of requirements of Greek GAAP that are different from 
IFRS as at 31 December 2005. 
*** This last point refers to a de facto accounting practice which was indeed not in line with the de 
jure accounting rule (i.e. 1st point).  
IFRS Greek GAAP 
IAS 2 ‘Inventories’ 
Paragraphs: 9; 25; 17; 21; 29; 32; 
34. 
Inventories shall be measured item by item at lower 
of cost and net realizable value (Item by item 
lower value rule).  
The cost of inventories can be determined by all 
possible methods (including LIFO).  
The use of the retail method is not permitted.  
The use of different cost formulas for inventories of 
different nature or use is not permitted and in no 
case is the grouping of similar or associated 
goods permitted (this applies also to the case of 
material and other supplies). 
In no case may borrowing costs are included in the 
cost of inventories, even if they need time to 
mature.  
Write-downs of inventories are not recognised but 
disclosed in the notes.*** 
IAS 10 ‘Events after the balance 
sheet date’ 
Paragraphs: 12 and 13. 
Dividends declared after the balance sheet date shall 
be recognised as a liability. Only if these 
dividends are declared for the purpose of an 
increase in capital shall they be recognised in 
equity (Development Law. 148/1967, Art. 3). 
IAS 11 ‘Construction contracts’ 
Paragraph: 22. 
Costs and revenues on construction contracts are not 
necessarily recognised on a stage of completion 
basis. 
IAS 12 ‘Income Taxes’ 
Paragraphs: 5 and 15. 
The concept of deferred tax does not exist and 
accordingly there is no distinction between 
current and deferred tax.  
IAS 16 ‘Property, plant and 
equipment’ 
Paragraphs: 16; 29; 39; 50; 51.  
 
There is no distinction between different 
classifications of assets such as held for sale, 
biological assets or investment properties. 
Only in respect of properties: acquisition costs and 
interest incurred during the construction period 
are capitalised as assets under the heading 
‘expenses of perennial depreciation’. As a general 
rule these should either be expensed in the period 
incurred or amortised in equal tranches over a 
maximum period of 5 years.  
Fixed assets are recognised at cost and revaluation is 
not permitted unless a special law is applicable. 
This is tax law 2065/1992, which introduced a 
system of revaluation for land and buildings only. 
It allows revaluation every 4 years in accordance 
with indices provided by the ministry of finance. 
The increase in value is recognised within equity 
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 The depreciation is based on indices set by the 
Ministry of Finance (most recently in P.D. 
299/2003). These are not in line with the assets’ 
useful lives.  
A provision is recognised for any impairment of 
assets where this is expected to be temporary.  
IAS 17 ‘Leases’ 
Paragraphs: 8; 20 and 33. 
 
There is no distinction between finance leases and 
operating leases. All leases are treated as 
operating leases.  
**However Law 3229/04 (Art. 13), provides 
companies with the option to adopt IAS 17 and thus 
recognise also finance leases. 
IAS 18 ‘Revenue’ 
Standard’s Objective.  
 
Revenue recognition is driven by tax considerations. 
Revenue is recognised as soon as services or 
products have been invoiced which usually takes 
place after the delivery of goods or services. 
However, very limited guidance is provided with 
regard to revenues from services. 
The effective interest method is not used for 
recognising revenue arising from interest. 
IAS 19 ‘Retirement benefits’ 
Paragraphs: 64; 93 and 93A.  
 
Under Greek Law there is no concept of a defined 
benefit plan. A company has the obligation to pay 
a lump-sum to the employees who are made 
redundant or retire. The amount of that sum 
depends on the employee length of service, the 
way of leaving the company (redundancy or 
retirement) and salary upon that date. In the case 
of retirement, the amount of benefit is equal to the 
40% of the amount in the case of redundancy. 
These benefits fall within the defined benefit 
schemes under IAS 19. Such liabilities fall into 
the definition of provisions under Greek law and 
should be recognised in the balance sheet. 
However, in practice most companies follow the 
requirements of a tax law and recognise these 
liabilities only in relation to employees due to 
retire during the year after the period end. 
IAS 20 ‘Accounting for 
government grants and disclosure 
of government assistance’ 
Paragraphs: 7 and 12.  
 
Government grants shall not be recognised until 
there is reasonable assurance that the grants will be 
received. However a company’s compliance with 
the conditions attaching to the grant is not 
considered. 
Government grants are recognised directly within 
shareholders’ equity. They may not be offset 
against the cost of assets.  
IAS 21 ‘The effects of changes in 
foreign exchange rates’ 
Paragraph: 28. 
 
Exchange differences arising on the settlement, or on 
translating of loans or credits in respect of the 
acquisition of properties at rates different from 
those at which they were translated on initial 
recognition during the period or in previous 
financial statements, can be recognised as assets 
 
 48
Chapter 3 – Financial Statement Effects and Auditor Size 
under the heading ‘expenses of perennial 
depreciation’. Non realisable gains from exchange 
differences of current receivables are recognised 
within equity. Gains on foreign currency monetary 
balances are deferred until settlement. 
IAS 23 ‘Borrowing costs’ 
Paragraphs: 11; 17 and 24.  
Borrowing costs directly attributable to the 
acquisition, construction or production of a 
property are either expensed in the period incurred 
or capitalised separately as assets under the 
heading ‘expenses of perennial depreciation’ and 
amortised over a maximum period of five years. 
To the extent that funds are borrowed generally but 
then used for the purpose of obtaining a qualifying 
asset, no amount of borrowing costs is eligible for 
capitalisation. The construction period starts when 
the loan is received and borrowing costs are not 
determined based on the value of the capital 
invested but rather the interest of the loan 
associated with the construction of the qualifying 
asset is capitalised. Capitalisation of borrowing 
costs in relation to inventories is not permitted. 
IAS 27 ‘Consolidated and separate 
financial statements’ 
Paragraph: 20. 
A subsidiary must be excluded from consolidation if 
its business activities are so dissimilar from those 
of the other entities within the group so that the 
true and fair view of the financial statements might 
be distorted. 
**Law 3487/06 does not allow this treatment 
anymore.  
IAS 28 ‘Investments in associates’ 
Paragraphs: 6 and 23. 
Investments in associates are accounted for using the 
equity method but the carrying amount does not 
include any goodwill arising. It is recognised 
separately in the consolidated statements as 
intangible asset and is either expensed in the 
period incurred or amortised in equal tranches over 
a maximum period of 5 years. 
The investor shall hold at least 20% of the 
investment to account for it as an associate. 
IAS 31 ‘Interests in joint ventures’ 
Paragraph: 30. 
Greek Law remains silent in this respect and 
interests in joint ventures are carried at cost. (Their 
treatment is as that of jointly controlled operations 
under IAS 31). 
IAS 36 ‘Impairment of assets’ 
Paragraphs: 6; 8; 9; 10; and 18. 
 
While Greek Law requires a company to recognise 
impairments of assets there is no explicit 
requirement to assess annually whether there is an 
indication of impairment. Additionally, the 
concepts of value in use, recoverable amount and 
the asset’s useful life are not referred to in this 
context. 
Where an asset is considered to be permanently 
impaired, the impairment is recognised so that the 
asset’s value is shown at the lower of cost and fair 
value. The impairment can be reversed. The 
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reversal is optional and is treated as exceptional 
revenue. 
IAS 37 ‘Provisions, contingent 
liabilities and contingent assets’ 
Paragraphs: 10 and 12.  
 
 
Greek Law does not explicitly distinguish between 
provisions and contingent liabilities. In general it 
requires companies to recognise liabilities for any 
risk which can be defined but does not specify 
recognition criteria. This allows plenty of room 
for subjectivity when deciding whether or not to 
recognise provisions (see for example pension 
liabilities). Usually, companies recognise 
provisions relating to tax issues. 
IAS 38 ‘Intangible assets’ 
Paragraphs: 8; 11; 13; 17; 54; 57; 
72; and 88.  
Although the definition of an intangible asset is 
similar to that of IAS 38, there are no specific 
recognition criteria. Intangible assets are 
recognised at cost. Additionally, start-up costs, 
capital expenditure etc. should either be expensed 
in the period incurred or capitalised as intangibles 
under the heading ‘expenses of perennial 
depreciation’ and amortised in equal tranches over 
a maximum period of 5 years (see above).  
Licenses and research and development expenses 
can also be recognised as intangible assets. In 
particularly, licenses of mobile 
telecommunications are amortised over a period of 
20 years and research and development expenses 
are amortised over a period of 3 years. 
The Law does not explicitly distinguish between 
research and development phases and permits 
capitalisation of both.  
The Law does not consider the concept of intangible 
assets with indefinite useful lives. 
Goodwill arising on an acquisition should either be 
expensed in the period incurred or amortised in 
equal tranches over a maximum period of 5 years. 
IAS 32 ‘Financial instruments: 





IAS 39 ‘Financial instruments: 
recognition and measurement’ 







Greek law permits listed companies to hold up to 
10% of their shares in issue with the purpose of 
enhancing  the market value of their shares. Own 
shares are carried at cost as held-to-maturity 
investments. 
 
Greek Law allows only for two types of financial 
instruments which are similar but not identical to 
those referred to in IAS 39: (a) held-to-maturity 
investments and (b) available-for-sale financial 
assets, which are recognised at cost.  
The effective interest method is not considered for 
subsequent measurement of loans and receivables. 
The Law does not specify any recognition and 
measurement requirements for hedge accounting. 
IAS 40 ‘Investment property’ 
Paragraph: 30. 
Greek Law does not recognise the concept of 
investment property. Although a distinction 
between ‘operating’ and ‘non-operating’ 
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Main sources: Nobes (2001), Sakellis (2005) and Company Law 2190/20. 
properties exists, the latter are recognised as such 
only if they have not been used or they are not 
currently in use. Accordingly, properties held to 
earn rentals are considered as “operating”.  
As there is no separate classification of properties 
and investment properties the cost model is 
applied to all. 
IAS 41 ‘Agriculture’ 
Paragraphs: 5; 10; and 13. 
There is not explicit guidance regarding biological 
assets and agricultural produce under Greek Law. 
IFRS 3 ‘Business combinations’ 
Paragraph: 1; 54; and 56. 
 
Greek Law permits both the pooling of interests and 
the purchase method for business combinations. 
However, in most cases business combinations are 
based on the legal form rather than on whether an 
acquirer can be identified. Accordingly, companies 
follow the pooling of interest method and 
subsequently, goodwill rarely is recognised. 
Recognition of negative goodwill is permitted and 
is recognised in consolidated shareholders’ equity 
as ‘difference arising on consolidation’. 
 
As is apparent from Table 3.1, the concepts of deferred tax, assets held for sale, 
investment properties, biological assets and biological produce are not recognised by 
Greek Law. Additionally, the fair value model is not considered. Land and properties 
can be revalued every four years, but only in accordance with government indices. 
Depreciation and amortisation rates for tangible and intangible assets are also 
specified by the government - the estimated useful lives of assets are not considered. 
Start-up costs and interest during the construction period of properties are capitalised 
together with acquisition costs. Government grants are recognised within 
shareholders’ equity, proposed dividends are recognised as liabilities and pension 
deficits are recognised only with respect to employees due to retire during the 
following year. Financial instruments are carried at cost and there are no specific 
requirements for hedge accounting. Finally, several consolidation differences exist 
between the two accounting regimes. Under Greek GAAP, the ‘pooling of interests 
method’ is permitted, interests in joint ventures are treated as jointly controlled 
operations, subsidiaries with different activities may be excluded from consolidation 
and the concept of significant influence is not explicitly referred to in the definition 
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3.4.2 Curtailment of creative accounting39 
Leuz et al. (2003: 525) state that ‘outsider economies with relatively dispersed 
ownership, strong investor protection, and large stock markets exhibit lower levels of 
earnings management than insider countries with relatively concentrated ownership, 
weak investor protection, and less developed stock markets’. They classify Greece 
(along with Austria) as the country with the highest earnings management. Ding et 
al. (2007) find that ‘absence’ creates opportunities for earnings management. 
Considering that Greece has a very high ‘absence’ score (see above), the finding of 
Leuz et al. (2003) is not surprising.  
The Greek GAAP treatments reflecting creative accounting practices which were 
expected to be curtailed, with the introduction of seven IFRS in particular, can be 
summarised as follows: Greek GAAP allows recognition of start-up costs as 
intangible assets. Consistent with the definition of creative accounting used herein, 
Greek companies proceeded with excessive capitalisation of start-up costs. 
Additionally, there is no clear distinction between research and development 
expenses. Similar to the excessive capitalisation of start-up costs, companies were 
even capitalising research expenditure. This is relevant in the Greek context if one 
considers that banks are the main providers of finance (Tzovas, 2006) and that high 
values of assets affect debt covenants. Additionally, by non-expensing research 
expenditure as well as start-up costs companies did not reduce profits. This is in line 
with Baralexis who finds that credit finance is the most important motive for 
companies to overstate profits. These start-up costs and research expenses do not 
meet the recognition criteria of IAS 38, the adoption of which was accordingly 
expected to affect shareholders’ equity negatively.  
The option to recognise pension liabilities only in relation to employees due to retire 
during the following year allowed companies to report higher net assets. 
Additionally, few disclosures were required. This meant companies did not have to 
be explicit with regard to the liabilities recognised. IAS 19 requires recognition of 
                                                 
39 As discussed in the introduction, Baralexis (2004: 440) defines creative accounting or earnings 
management ‘as the process of intentionally exploiting or violating the GAAP or the law to present 
financial statements according to one’s interests’. This definition is followed here.  
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defined benefit liabilities for all employees in service and therefore its adoption was 
expected to reduce net assets and provide a more accurate picture regarding 
companies’ pension liabilities. 
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2, Greek GAAP allows considerable 
subjectivity for recognising provisions; they are frequently recognised only where 
tax advantages can be gained. IAS 37 sets more explicit requirements for the 
recognition of provisions and therefore was expected to have a negative impact on 
net assets. The same applies regarding the adoption of IAS 39, which sets specific 
requirements for the measurement of loans and receivables. Additionally, under 
Greek GAAP there is no requirement about hedge accounting. These differences 
were expected to have a negative impact on net assets. Further, companies are 
permitted to acquire own shares (up to 10%) and recognise them as assets, in order to 
affect market prices.40 This was done frequently in practice. Thus, the requirement of 
IAS 32 for deduction of own shares from shareholders’ equity was expected to 
reduce net assets.  
IAS 36 explicitly requires companies to ‘assess at each reporting date whether there 
is any indication that an asset may be impaired. If any such indication exists, 
companies shall estimate the recoverable amount of the asset’ (paragraph 9). The 
standard provides explicit guidance and requirements regarding the assessment of 
impairment and the estimation of the recoverable amount (paragraphs 12 & 18). 
Greek GAAP, although requiring impairment to be recognised in some 
circumstances, is less explicit in this respect. As a result, Greek companies did not 
recognise impairments of assets in many instances. (Since intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives were not recognised under Greek GAAP, other IAS 36 
requirements are irrelevant).  
Finally, IAS 2 does not permit the use of LIFO (last-in, first out) to measure the cost 
of inventories – however LIFO is commonly used under Greek GAAP. Additionally, 
IAS 2 explicitly requires companies to value inventories at the lower of cost and net 
realisable value and recognise any impairment. Under Greek GAAP, any changes in 
                                                 
40 The latter is explicitly suggested by Company Law 2190/20 (Article 16, paragraph 5). 
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the value of inventories was supposed to be disclosed in the notes but was not 
recognised. IAS 18 introduced different requirements for revenue recognition of 
goods sold and explicit requirements for revenues relating to the provision of 
services. (The latter are absent from Greek GAAP.) The necessary adjustments were 
expected to affect net assets negatively by reducing the value of current assets 
(inventories and receivables). 
3.4.3 Research hypotheses 
3.4.3.1 The impact of IFRS on financial position and reported performance (H3.1) 
As discussed above, there are substantial de jure differences between the two 
regimes. It is therefore expected that the reconciliation statements required as part of 
IFRS implementation will reveal significant differences between the book value of 
shareholders’ equity and net profit produced under the two different regimes (cf. 
Nobes, 2006). Although it is expected that the differences will be significant, it is 
difficult to predict the sign of the net changes. This is because some of the 
accounting practices under Greek GAAP were more, but others were in fact less 
conservative than IFRS–based practices.  
Additionally, several creative accounting practices were expected to be curtailed with 
the introduction of IFRS. It can therefore be argued that the implementation of IFRS 
will improve the reporting quality of Greek financial statements (Polychroniadis, 
2002). Therefore, the first research hypothesis of this chapter is formed as: 
H3.1: The financial position and reported performance of Greek listed companies 
have been significantly affected by the transition to IFRS.  
3.4.3.2 The impact of IFRS on gearing and liquidity (H3.2) 
Bartov and Kim (2004: 354) suggest that ‘the level of accruals may indicate the 
integrity of the reported book value’. Managers may ‘inflate accounting income, and 
thus book values, by inflating accruals [i.e. engaging in earnings management]. Thus, 
low (high) accruals may indicate conservative (aggressive) accounting, which means 
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that the book value is higher (lower) than it appears’ (ibid: 354). As discussed 
previously, prior studies suggest that Greece is one of the countries with the highest 
earnings management.  
The areas of earnings management identified above are also expected to have an 
impact on key ratios such as gearing and liquidity. (This is also supported by Butler 
et al. (2004) who find a positive association between abnormal accruals and 
liquidity.) Therefore, implementation of IFRS which do not allow for the same 
accounting practices would have a significant impact on these ratios. 
These issues are particularly relevant to the Greek context and the transition to IFRS 
since banks are major providers of finance (Venieris, 1999; Tzovas, 2006) and these 
ratios affect contractual obligations and debt covenants (Ormrod and Taylor, 2004). 
Further, with reference to the creative accounting practices followed under Greek 
GAAP, Baralexis (2004) finds that credit finance is the most important motive for 
companies to overstate profits. Accordingly, the second research hypothesis of this 
chapter is formed as: 
H3.2: Key ratios such as liquidity and gearing41 have been affected significantly by 
the transition to IFRS. 
3.4.3.3 The impact of IFRS and audit quality (H3.3) 
DeAngelo (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that big audit firms may 
provide audits of higher quality than small audit firms since the former are more 
independent. Several empirical studies use a dichotomous variable (e.g. ‘Big 4’ vs. 
non-‘Big 4’) to proxy for differences in audit quality. Prior literature suggests that 
this proxy does indeed capture differences in audit quality (see more details about the 
role of audit companies’ size on the quality of companies financial statements in 
4.5.3.1).  
The audit firm proxy has been used by Caramanis and Lennox (2008) to examine 
earnings management and audit quality in Greece.42 They demonstrate that the ‘Big 
                                                 




Chapter 3 – Financial Statement Effects and Auditor Size 
5’ audit firms work more hours than the non-‘Big 5’ firms. They therefore use audit 
hours as a proxy for audit effort and find that ‘abnormal accruals are more likely to 
be positive when audit hours are lower’ and that ‘the magnitude of income-
increasing abnormal accruals is greater when audit hours are lower’ (ibid.: 117). 
These results suggest that ‘low audit effort [i.e. a non-‘Big 5’ auditor] is associated 
with earnings management.’ (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008: 117). (Leventis and 
Caramanis (2005) also provide evidence that audit effort in Greece is correlated with 
audit firm size.) 
Based on these findings and the prior literature relating to creative accounting under 
Greek GAAP, it is expected that the impact from the transition to IFRS is significant 
and significantly greater for companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors than for firms with 
‘Big 4’ auditors, since the latter are less likely to apply creative accounting practices. 
Accordingly, the third research hypothesis of this chapter is formed as follows: 
H3.3: The impact on shareholders’ equity, net profit, liquidity and gearing was 
significant and significantly greater for companies with non-‘Big 4’ audit 
firms than for companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors.  
3.4.3.4 The impact of individual standards on financial position and audit quality 
(H3.4 & H3.5) 
 
When a different set of accounting principles is applied to the same company for the 
same period, different financial results are expected to be reported. It is likely that 
some standards or accounting treatments have a greater impact in this than others. 
This should be revealed by paying particular attention to areas of major de jure 
differences between the two sets of GAAP and to those standards expected to prevent 
prior creative accounting treatments. In other words, do the changes in the bottom 
line figures derive from aggregate adjustments or did the implementation of 
                                                                                                                                          
42 This proxy has also been used by Owusu-Ansah and Leventis (2006) and Leventis et al. (2005) in 
research on timeliness of reporting and audit report lag by Greek companies.  
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particular standards cause distinct and material changes to companies’ financial 
positions?43 Exploring this allows investigating why changes occurred.  
Therefore the materiality of the impact caused by each of the seven standards 
expected to curtail creative accounting previously applied and the frequency with 
which the standards appear in shareholders’ equity reconciliation statements is 
examined. Thus, the fourth research hypothesis of this chapter is formed as follows:  
H3.4: The implementation of standards preventing prior creative accounting 
practices causes a significant impact on shareholders’ equity. 
The above hypothesis is extended by examining the impact these standards cause 
across companies with ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ auditors. Accordingly, the fifth 
research hypothesis of this chapter is formed as: 
H3.5: The standards which curtail previous creative accounting practices have a 
greater impact on shareholders’ equity for companies with non-‘Big 4’ audit 
firms than for companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors. 
Thus, the main focus of the study is on the standards expected to curtail creative 
accounting practices previously followed. However, to allow the reader to have a 
broader picture of the effects on companies’ book values, the significance of other 
standards appearing frequently in the reconciliation statements is also tested. 
Although no expectation was formed with regard to the impact caused by other 
standards and the potential relationship with audit firms for consistency purposes, the 
relevant findings are also presented across this partition.  
3.5 Research Methods and Data 
3.5.1 Research methods 
To address the research objectives of this part of the study, Gray’s comparability 
index is employed. Gray (1980) was the first to quantify the impact of different 
                                                 
43 Because of inconsistencies in presentation and lack of sufficient disclosures within the income 
statement reconciliations (confirmed also by the studies of HCMC (2006) and Grant Thornton 
(2006)), it was not feasible to examine the impact of individual standards with regard to net profit. 
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national accounting practices on profit measurement by means of a ‘conservatism 
index’: 1 - [(RA – RD) / |RA|], where RA = adjusted profits and RD disclosed profits. 
He measured post-tax profits as disclosed in French, German and UK financial 
statements against these profits as adjusted for international financial analysis, i.e. 
the ‘European Method’ developed by the European Federation of Financial Analysts 
Societies.  
Gray’s seminal work has been widely replicated and extended (e.g. Adams et al., 
1993; Cooke, 1993; Hellman, 1993, Norton, 1995; Adams et al., 1999; Street et al., 
2000; Ucieda Blanco and Garcia Osma, 2004; Haverty, 2006; Beckman et al., 2007). 
Breaking the index down into partial indices (Weetman and Gray, 1990, 1991) also 
permitted the measurement of the impact of specific adjustments or reconciling 
items. To emphasise the index’s use as a measure of comparability (without judging 
relative conservatism), Weetman et al. (1998) renamed the index as ‘comparability 
index’, terminology which has been adopted by subsequent studies.44   
Hellman (1993), Whittington (2000) and Bertoni and DeRosa (2006) also employed 
the index to explore differences in Return on shareholders’ Equity. The present 
research expands on previous studies by exploring the impact of IFRS recognition 
and measurement requirements on gearing and liquidity. Where Greek reported 
shareholders’ equity (or other) is compared to that reported under IFRS, the index is 







−      (Eq. 3.1) 
                                                
In parallel to previous studies, a value larger than 1.0 implies that net assets under 
Greek GAAP is higher than shareholders’ equity under IFRS, a value lower than 1.0 
implies that shareholders’ equity under Greek GAAP is lower than net assets under 
IFRS and an index value of 1.0 is neutral. Average index values are calculated as the 
 
44 Traditional definitions of conservatism imply understatement of book values and earnings figures, 
although differences in earnings figures are temporary and will eventually reverse (García Lara and 
Mora, 2004 - but see Weetman (2006) for an example of perpetual conservatism). García Lara and 
Mora therefore distinguish between balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism, the former 
implying understatement of the book value of equity, the latter a desire to require a higher degree of 
verification for recognition of good news than for bad news (García Lara and Mora, 2004).  
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sum of all companies’ indices divided by the number of companies under 
examination.  
One limitation of the index is that it reports extreme values where net assets under 
IFRS approaches zero and shareholders’ equity under Greek GAAP is a relatively 
large amount (cf. Weetman et al., 1998; Street et al., 2000). However, the fact that 
the formula reports changes comparable to those used under the accounting concept 
of materiality outweighs the presence of such outliers (cf. Weetman et al., 1998; 
Street et al., 2000). 
The present research follows the prior studies in using as the denominator the 
‘yardstick’ or benchmark of the adjusted shareholders’ equity (or other), i.e. the net 
assets (or other) as reconciled to IFRS, because it is assumed that IFRS are of higher 
quality than Greek GAAP (cf. Ding et al., 2007), and because application of IFRS is 
now required by EU and subsequently Greek law. Therefore an international investor 
would view any differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS as departures from 
IFRS rather than departures from Greek GAAP. This implies that an investor could 
theoretically compare companies from different European countries on the basis of 
IFRS reported figures (but within the limitations identified inter alia by Ball, 2006; 
Zeff, 2007; Soderstorm and Sun, 2007). Using IFRS as denominator will also aid 
comparison with other studies focusing on other countries (cf. Hellman, 1993; 
Adams et al., 1999 with respect to US GAAP). This may be particularly relevant as 
the current transition period of IFRS implementation in EU member states has given 
rise to comparable studies elsewhere (cf. Bertoni and De Rosa, 2006; Lopes and 
Viana, 2008; Cordazzo, 2008).  
Alternatively, the impact could be captured by adding all companies’ shareholders’ 
equity (or other) under both frameworks and then calculating an average index for 
each case of reference (whole sample, industry etc). However, it is not the focus of 
the study to measure the average change to the aggregate values of shareholders’ 
equity (or other) of all companies (which was the approach followed by the three 
prior Greek studies). Instead, the average percentage change of each company’s 
transition to IFRS is measured, treating each company equally, independent of size, 
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thus, avoiding the distorting effect of the few large companies (see data section 
(3.5.3)).  
Although there is no agreed threshold of materiality, most researchers provide their 
results based on two bands of materiality thresholds: 5% and 10% (e.g. Weetman and 
Gray, 1990; 1991; Weetman et al., 1998; Adams et al., 1999; Street et al., 2000). In 
the present study, because it is expected to find changes of considerable magnitude, 
and to avoid loss of what is considered to be relevant information, information based 
on the 20% band is also provided. In line with prior studies and auditors’ perceptions 
of materiality changes of less than 5% are considered as not material, and changes of 
more than 10% as material, with a ‘grey area’ between 5% and 10%.  
Similar to previous studies, partial indices are used for the adjustments in 
shareholders’ equity reconciliations. The following formula for measuring partial 





−      (Eq. 3.2) 
This formula provides a relative measure of the contribution or, in other words, the 
significance of each reconciling item. Prior literature identifies two ways of 
classifying adjustments reported within the reconciliation statements: a standards 
approach or a transaction approach. The first combines adjustments with reference to 
the standard which requires the adjustments (Weetman and Gray, 1990; Adams et al., 
1993; Weetman et al., 1998; Street et al., 2000; Bertoni and De Rosa, 2006; and 
Aisbitt 2006), while the second does so with reference to the transactions giving rise 
to the adjustment (Ucieda Blanco and Garcia Osma, 2004). 
The present research follows the ‘standards approach’ in clustering adjustments and 
thus examines the effect caused by the adoption of each standard. (For example, 
deferred tax adjustments have been captured as deriving from the adoption of IAS 
12). Accordingly, any reported partial adjustment has been allocated to the relevant 
IFRS(s). This approach is followed because in many cases items are combined and 
may have been netted off, i.e. companies explicitly refer to the impact of a particular 
standard without any further explanation and this does not allow for the identification 
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of the magnitude of several individual adjustments falling within the scope of a 
single standard.  
The value of the partial index may be interpreted as the % difference between net 
assets under IFRS and Greek GAAP because of the effect of each standard. 
Consequently, a value larger than 1.0 suggests that shareholders’ equity under Greek 
GAAP is higher by x% than shareholders’ equity under IFRS because of a particular 
standard, and vice versa. The partial indices or the impact attributed to the adoption 
of each standard add up to the total index (which represents the total impact of the 
adoption of IFRS for each company individually) as follows:  




    (Eq. 3.3) 
                                                
3.5.2 Statistical tests employed 
To avoid distortion through extreme values, cases where the comparability index was 
more than 1½ of the boxplot length (Fielding and Gilbert, 2004: 125 and Pallant, 
2005: 61) are excluded.45 For all tests, the normality of the distribution of the sub-
samples is examined, by employing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Since no 
normally distributed variables are identified (see below), the tests of the significance 
of the impact measured by the use of Gray’s comparability index focus on the 
median, instead of the mean values, with one sample t-test for median as applied by 
Minitab. To examine the differences in the impact measured across the sub-samples 
and across different industries, the Mann-Whitney U Test is employed, since it is 
appropriate for independent samples.  
3.5.3 Data 
In contrast to previous (comparability) studies based on (sometimes) small samples, 
the present research investigated the majority of available Greek listed companies’ 
accounts, thus avoiding sampling bias. 43 companies belonging to the banking, 
insurance and financial services sector were excluded (due to their specific 
 
45 This approach is consistent with Callao et al. (2007). 
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accounting and reporting requirements). 20 companies whose shares were suspended 
from trading or were under supervision by the HCMC were also excluded. The same 
applies for 5 early IFRS adopters and 11 companies with a 30th June balance sheet 
date (because, at the time of data collection, their financial statements were not yet 
available). Thus, from a population of 317 listed companies at the end of March 2006 
(including those under suspension/supervision), 238 companies were utilised in this 
study. As mentioned in section 1.6 this sample consists of 193 companies publishing 
consolidated accounts and 45 publishing individual accounts. Appendix I lists the 
names of the companies used in this study, grouped in the ‘super-sectors’ 
classification provided by ASE at the end of March 2006.46 Table 3.2 provides 
descriptive statistics with reference to the sample. 
Table 3:2: Data descriptive statistics (N=238). 
Values in  








Capitalisation* 291 1,042 2 15 41 145 10,017 
Sales 206 542 0.4 22 55 175 5,475 
Shareholders' Equity 116 340 -10 16 33 87 4,513 
Net profit 13 48 -67 -0.08 1.5 6 458 
* Market Capitalisation as at 1 month after the publication of the 2005 annual results. Data is for 237 
companies as one company was not traded 1 month after the announcement of its annual financial 
results. Financial data are based on IFRS 2005 figures. €1=US$1.2597 and €1=£0.6930 (28/4/06-FT). 
 
As is apparent from Table 3.2, the sample consists mainly of small companies. Given 
the collective importance of small and medium-sized listed companies in Greece and 
the anticipated impact of transition in particular on these companies (Kontoyannis, 
2005), the results are expected to be particularly relevant.  
3.5.4 Categories of transitional information 
Reconciliation statements were not presented uniformly. Therefore, in line with 
Aisbitt (2006), three categories for evaluating the quality of companies’ transitional 
disclosures were created: a) ‘detailed’, for companies which provided both 
reconciliation statements and additional narrative disclosures explaining the 
                                                 
46 The companies in italics are those which have also been used for the purposes of the other two 
chapters of this thesis. 
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transition to IFRS; b) ‘adequate’, for companies which provided reconciliation 
statements for both earnings and shareholders’ equity but did not provide additional 
narrative disclosures; and c) ‘inadequate’, for companies which did not provide 
reconciliation statements or which provided inadequate reconciliations and narratives 
(i.e. which did not enable users to evaluate the impact caused by individual 
standards). Because chapter 4 examines specifically the relationship between audit 
firm and companies’ compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements, no specific 
research hypothesis is formed here. However, the potential relationship between the 
level of transitional disclosures and audit firm is explored by employing a Chi Square 
test for descriptive purposes. 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
3.6.1 Quality of transitional information 
Table 3.3 shows that 42 of the 238 companies in the sample (17.6%) provided 
inadequate reconciliation disclosures. Five of these provided reconciliation 
statements which did not allow identification of the individual standards’ effects, and 
the remaining 37 did not provide reconciliation statements for either shareholders’ 
equity or net income. This also provides an illustration of the ineffectiveness of 
auditing: not one audit opinion contained a qualification regarding non-compliance 
with the requirements of IFRS 1.  
These inadequate disclosures support findings by Ballas (1994) and Tsakumis (2007) 
who argue that Greece represents a high conservatism and high secrecy society, and 
the insufficient enforcement supporting findings by La Porta et al., (1998) (see 
above). In fact, Avlonitis (2007), director of the HCMC’s ‘Listed companies’ 
supervision division’, acknowledged companies’ non-compliance with IFRS 
measurement and/or disclosure requirements. However, the HCMC’s approach taken 
was not to impose strict fines on the basis that this was a transition period.  
As Table 3.3 shows, there is a statistically significant relationship between the 
quality of companies’ transitional disclosures and audit firm size (at 1% level). This 
is also supported by evidence from the interviews. According to one of the 
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interviewees, ‘Big 4’ firms could attract experienced employees from their foreign 
operations to assist in the transition process.  
The presentation and the level of information provided with regard to the transition 
to IFRS may also affected investors’ perception about the overall quality of the 
financial statements. This is likely to have implications for the value relevance of 
accounting information during the first year of IFRS adoption and this is examined in 
chapter 5. 
Table 3:3: Transitional information and auditing firms (N=238). 
Transitional information  
Detailed Adequate Inadequate 
‘Big 4’ 16 34 2 
Auditing firm 
non-‘Big 4’ 56 90 40 
Pearson Chi-Square: 9.441ª, 2df, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.009.  
ª 0 Cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.18. 
 
Nevertheless, the high level of non-disclosure identified is surprising and raises 
concerns about enforcement and the role of regulators and auditors in IFRS 
implementation. The Grant-Thornton (2006) and HCMC (2006) studies reach similar 
conclusions with regard to Greece.  
It is interesting also to note that similar issues were identified by Lopes and Viana 
(2008) for Portugal as well as by Cordazzo (2008) for Italy. Both studies identified 
companies which would fall under the category of ‘Inadequate’ disclosures as this is 
defined here: 8% for Italy and 20% for Portugal.   
The following sections examine the findings relating to each research hypothesis. 
Where relevant, references to prior literature and to the observations on the Greek 
accounting context (i.e. chapter 2) are discussed. The analysis focuses on median 
index values because the outcome of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic suggests 
normal distribution cannot be assumed.  
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3.7 Impact on financial position, performance, financial indicators 
(H3.1 and H3.2) and audit quality (H3.3). 
Table 3.4 presents the distributions of the effect on financial position and 
performance as measured with reference to shareholders’ Equity, Earnings, Gearing 
and Liquidity (H3.1 and H3.2), across the bands of materiality defined above. It also 
shows descriptive statistics and the results of the significance test employed. In the 
same table, evidence relating to H3.3 is also provided.  
Profit after tax was not available for 50 companies under Greek GAAP. Therefore 
impact on earnings is examined only for the 188 companies which did provide this 
information in 2004.  
The median index of 0.97 (significant at 10%) reveals that more companies’ (119) 
shareholders’ equity was affected positively by the transition to IFRS than negatively 
(93). This is broadly in line with the Grant Thornton (2006) study. Similarly, the 
mean index value shows that, on average, shareholders’ equity under Greek GAAP 
was 1% lower than under IFRS (not significant). (Note that the thresholds of 
materiality do not coincide with those of statistical significance).  
There is a broad range of index values. 62 companies faced a material negative and 
70 a material positive impact. A total of 85 companies were affected by more than 
20%. The fact that a similar number of companies were affected negatively and 
positively is in line with the suggestion that it was difficult to predict the sign of the 
overall impact, since not all the accounting practices under Greek GAAP were more 
conservative than IFRS–based practices.  
More specifically, the analysis shows that the majority of the Greek companies 
maintained the cost model after transition to IFRS but used the option of IFRS 1 to 
use fair value as deemed cost.47 This, along with the reversal of dividends (IAS 10), 
was the main driving factor for the positive adjustment on net assets, offsetting the 
                                                 
47 Because of a long tradition of keeping assets at historical cost, companies in Greece (and other 
Continental European countries) were not expected to adopt immediately the fair value model for 
asset valuation (Nobes, 2006) (I am grateful to David Alexander for pointing this out). I am also 
grateful to Monica Veneziani for confirming that in Italy companies also maintained the cost model, 
since mechanisms for regular fair valuations are not yet established. 
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negative effect from other standards on the transition date. The large number of 
companies facing a material negative change suggests that a) overstated 
shareholders’ equity reduced after the introduction of specific standards which 
curtailed creative accounting practices in many firms (see below) and b) Greek 
GAAP is not necessarily more conservative than IFRS with reference to 
shareholders’ equity per se as fewer liabilities are recognised (see also the discussion 
on H3.4). These findings support H3.1, with regard to Shareholders’ Equity. 
Table 3:4: Impact on 238 companies’ shareholders’ equity, gearing and liquidity and on 188 companies’ net profit. 
Greek GAAP Equity  Comparability Index 


















sample ‘Big 4’ 
non-
‘Big-4’ 
< 80% of IFRS 42 14 28 57 17 35 162 26 136 11 4 6 
81-90% of IFRS 28 4 23 16 3 13 16 4 12 21 5 16 
91-95% of IFRS 29 6 23 5 0 5 5 1 4 27 3 24 
96-99% of IFRS 20 4 16 16 3 13 8 2 6 24 5 19 
GR < IFRS Index less than 1 119 28 90 94 23 66 191 33 158 83 17 65 
Index = 1 - No change 5 0 5 7 1 6 2 1 1 12 5 7 
GR > IFRS Index more than 1 93 21 72 55 15 40 38 17 21 128 25 99 
101-104% of IFRS 15 6 9 11 2 9 8 3 5 31 5 26 
105%-109% of IFRS 16 2 14 5 2 3 6 4 2 21 5 16 
110%-119% of IFRS 19 5 14 12 2 10 6 1 5 32 7 25 
> 120% of IFRS 43 8 35 27 9 18 18 9 9 44 8 32 
Count†             217 49 167 156 39 112 231 51 180 223 47 171
Mean             0.99 0.96 1.01 0.88 0.92 0.91 0.58 0.80 0.52 1.06 1.04 1.05
Standard Deviation             0.25 0.28 0.24 0.46 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.41 0.17 0.16 0.16
Minimum 0.37            0.39 0.39 -0.39 0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.76 0.62
Maximum             1.67 1.65 1.67 2.16 2.38 2.07 1.84 1.60 1.84 1.51 1.37 1.51
Median   0.97* 0.97 0.98 0.96*** 0.89 0.96** 0.56*** 0.80** 0.50*** 1.02*** 1.01 1.03***
Mann-Whitney Test††         W=4,913 W=2,853 W=7,787*** W=4,984
†Number of companies excluding outliers. Cases were identified as outliers if they were more than 1.5 of the boxplot of index values length. *Significant 
at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Two-tailed, one sample t-test for median (m≠1) as calculated with Minitab.  
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The findings are in line with those of Lopes and Viana (2008) for Portugal, and of 
Cordazzo (2008) and Bertoni and De Rosa (2006) for Italy (which, according to Ding 
et al., (2007, see above) is also characterised by high ‘absence’ and high 
‘divergence’). All studies found that for the majority of companies the adjustment 
regarding shareholders’ equity was positive on the transition to IFRS.  
No support for H3.3 (companies with ‘Big 4’ vs. non-‘Big 4’ auditors) is identified 
with regard to shareholders’ equity. For none of the two sub-samples is the impact on 
net assets significant nor is the difference in the impact revealed across the two sub-
samples. However, the hypothesis holds for the gearing ratio and partially holds for 
the liquidity ratio, i.e. the two specific categories of the balance sheet related to 
earnings management (see below). 
With regard to net profit, Table 3.4 shows that the overall impact was positive, with a 
mean index of 0.88. The median value of 0.96 (significant at 1% level) supports this 
finding, as does the fact that 94 companies faced a positive change. For the majority 
of these (73) this change was material (≥10%). 39 companies faced material negative 
impact. Hence, these results support H3.1, with regard to net profit. 
These findings suggest that there are, in aggregate, significant differences between 
the de facto application of Greek GAAP and IFRS. They are also in line with Nobes 
(2006) general hypothesis and Kontoyannis’ (2005) expectations with regard to 
Greece that the transition to IFRS would lead to material changes in companies’ 
reported performance. Similarly, Lopes and Viana (2008) and Bertoni and De Rosa 
(2006) report that the change to IFRS led to less conservative accounting practices in 
Portugal and Italy with regard to profit, although (there) the aggregate difference is 
smaller.  
Additionally, some support for H3.3 is identified for earnings, as there is a 
significant non-material impact for companies with a non-‘Big 4’ auditor, but a not 
significant material impact for companies with a ‘Big 4’ auditor. However, the 
difference in the impact revealed across the two sub-samples is not significant. These 
findings are in line with the expectation that the earnings of companies with non-‘Big 
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4’ were creatively adjusted by accounting practices not permitted under IFRS, while 
for companies with a ‘Big 4’ auditor this was not the case or was the case to a lesser 
extent. 
In line with expectations, gearing and liquidity have also been affected significantly 
by the transition to IFRS (H3.2).48 The median index value of 0.56 for gearing is 
significant at 1% level and the average index value is 0.58. Again, a broad range of 
index values is revealed. 212 companies (89%) faced a material change in their 
gearing ratio. For 191 companies, gearing under Greek GAAP was lower.  
Although gearing for both groups of companies was affected materially, the Mann-
Whitney U test reveals that the impact on companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors was 
significantly greater (H3.3). This confirms the expectations discussed above. 
The findings with regard to the liquidity ratio are similar. The ratio under Greek 
GAAP was, on average, 6% higher than that under IFRS. The median was 
significantly higher by 2% (H3.2). It was higher for 128 and lower for 83 companies. 
Fewer companies (108) faced material effects; however almost half of these (55) 
faced a change of more than 20%. Similar to the results regarding net profit, for 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors the impact on liquidity was significant while 
this was not the case for companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors. However, the median 
index values of the two sub-samples are not significantly different (H3.3).  
The fact that, for the majority of companies,’ transition to IFRS led to higher gearing 
and lower liquidity ratios might be expected to be an important issue for Greek 
companies which are largely debt-financed, since as pointed out by Aisbitt (2006), 
such changes to companies’ financial positions may have an impact on contractual 
obligations. However, as indicated in the previous chapter, in Greece ‘… a 
consequence of the close relationship between banks and companies is such that a 
violation of a debt covenant may not have serious consequences for a firm’ (Tzovas, 
                                                 
48 Caution is required when interpreting the gearing comparability index. An index value lower than 
1.0 means that gearing under Greek GAAP was lower, so it needs the opposite interpretation to other 
measures. In general, the results for financial indicators have to be treated cautiously as ratios may be 
close to 0 and a relatively small change, in absolute figures, results in a large percentage change. 
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2006: 375). Lending decisions are not based only on financial criteria, but also on 
other ‘qualitative’ characteristics of the firm.49  
The reasons for the changes in ratios can be inferred by looking at the standards 
affecting assets and liabilities, which are discussed below (H3.4). 
3.8 Individual standards’ effects on shareholders’ equity and audit 
quality (H3.4 and H3.5) 
Of the 42 companies providing ‘inadequate’ transitional disclosures, 20 provided no 
reconciliations or unclear reconciliations for shareholders’ equity. Therefore this 
discussion is limited to 218 companies.  
Table 3.5 shows the significance of the average impact caused by each of the seven 
standards expected to curtail creative accounting practices and to cause a negative 
impact on transition to IFRS (H3.4). It also reports results for companies with and 
without ‘Big 4’ auditors (H3.5). Table 3.6 provides descriptive statistics with regard 
to the remaining standards appearing frequently in companies’ reconciliation 
statements following the same disaggregation (‘Big 4’ vs. non-‘Big 4’), for 
descriptive purposes. As mentioned above, no expectation on the direction of the 
impact of these standards was formed. 
These findings provide further evidence for the suggestion that Greek GAAP may be 
less conservative than IFRS, at least as applied in the context of transition. The 
‘absence’ of requirements relating to the recognition of liabilities or derecognition of 
certain assets in Greek GAAP (Ding et al., 2007; see also Table 3.1) results in fewer 
liabilities being recognised, which effectively gives rise to higher net assets. This 
refers to adjustments regarding IAS 19, IAS 36, IAS 37, and IAS 32/39. 
Additionally, standards not related to recognition of liabilities (IAS 2, IAS 18, and 
IAS 38), as expected, also cause a non-material but significant negative impact 
(H3.4). 
 
49 This was suggested by the key informant interviewee from the banking sector. 
 
Table 3:5: Distribution and materiality of partial index values within shareholders’ equity reconciliation statements, with regard to 
standards expected to curtail creative accounting practices. 
 IAS 38  (Applicable to 197 companies) 
IAS 19  
(Applicable to 188 companies) 
IAS 32 & IAS 39 
(Applicable to 179 companies) 
IAS 37 
(Applicable to 138 companies) 












sample ‘Big 4’ 
non– 
‘Big 4’ 
Count†             168 43 130 173 41 127 155 38 112 121 34 88
Mean & St. Deviation 1.02 (0.03) 
1.02 
















(0.06) 1.03 (0.04) 
Median              1.01*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.015*** 1.02***
Mann-Whitney Test††                  W=3,356.5*                  W=3,903.5                  W=2,364.5**               W=2,119 
Minimum 0.98  0.98 0.98    0.98  0.98 0.98 0.94  0.97 0.94 0.99  1.00 0.99
Maximum             1.13 1.10 1.16 1.07 1.15 1.04 1.20 1.09 1.22 1.18 1.19 1.16
Partial Index 
between 
0.91 - 0.94 
7            3 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Partial Index between 
0.95 - 1.04 130            33 97 156 29 127 106 30 76 95 23 68
Partial Index between 
1.05 - 1.09 26            5 21 17 7 0 29 8 21 11 5 10
Partial Index      ≥ 1.10             5 2 8 0 5 0 17 0 14 15 6 10
†Number of companies excluding outliers. Cases were identified as outliers if they were more than 1.5 of the boxplot of index values length. 







Table 3.5 (continued): Distribution and materiality of most frequent partial index values within equity reconciliation statements, with 
regard to standards expected to curtail creative accounting practices. 
IAS 2 
(Applicable to 64 
companies)  
IAS 36 
(Applicable to 42 companies)  
IAS 18 
(Applicable to 32 companies)   
Full 








sample ‘Big 4’ 
non- 
‘Big 4’ 
Count†          60 15 44 34 10 27 30 10 16














(0.05) 1.01 (0.01) 
Median           1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.03** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.005 1.01**
Mann-Whitney Test††                  W=351.5**                 W=219.5                   W=137.5 
Minimum          0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.99
Maximum          1.09 1.16 1.08 1.27 1.66 1.27 1.17 1.12 1.06
Partial Index 
between 
0.91 - 0.94 
2         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Partial Index between 
0.95 - 1.04 42         46 13 26 6 20 23 7 15
Partial Index between 
1.05 - 1.09 4         14 2 3 0 3 4 2 1
Partial Index      ≥ 1.10          0 0 0 5 4 4 3 1 0
†Number of companies excluding outliers. Cases were identified as outliers if they were more than 1 and ½ of the boxplot  
of index values length. **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Two-tailed, one sample t-test for median (m≠1),  




Table 3:6: Distribution and materiality of other frequent standards’ partial index values within equity reconciliation statements. 
 
IAS 12 
(Applicable to 206 
companies) 
IAS 16 
(Applicable to 194 companies) 
IAS 10 
(Applicable to 147 companies) 
IAS 20 
(Applicable to 129 companies) 
Adjustment ‘Other’ 
(Applicable to 121 
companies) 



















Count†                184 45 139 188 40 146 135 31 104 113 32 82 116 35 80
































Median        1.01* 1.03* 1.00 0.875*** 0.815*** 0.88*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 1.02*** 1.015*** 1.02*** 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mann-Whitney 
Test††         W=4,759*                     W=3,139**                 W=2,451*                   W=1,552*         W=2,058.5 
Minimum                0.88 0.86 0.89 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.88 0.91 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.93 0.91
Maximum                1.15 1.19 1.13 1.35 1.14 1.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.05 1.13 1.25 1.04 1.20
Partial Index ≤ 
0.90 2               2 1 108 25 82 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Partial Index 
between 
0.91 - 0.94 
20               7 13 20 7 13 30 3 27 0 0 0 4 1 3
Partial Index 
between 
0.95 - 1.04 
115               19 96 53 8 46 103 28 75 86 31 55 107 34 73
Partial Index 
between 
1.05 - 1.09 
27               7 20 2 0 2 0 0 0 25 1 22 0 0 0
Partial Index     
≥ 1.10 20               10 9 5 1 4 0 0 0 2 0 5 5 0 4
†Number of companies excluding outliers. Cases were identified as outliers if they were more than 1.5 of the boxplot of index values length.  
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Most of the standards have an impact on the ratios under discussion.50 IAS 19 caused 
a negative effect on gearing by increasing non-current liabilities. IAS 32/IAS 39 also 
significantly affected liquidity and gearing ratios as both current and non-current 
assets and liabilities changed. Both ratios were also (negatively) affected by the 
increase in the recognition of provisions as required by IAS 37 and because of IAS 1 
which requires separate presentation of current and non-current assets and liabilities. 
IAS 2 negatively affected liquidity ratios by reducing current assets. IAS 18 affects 
these ratios because of the increase of payables and/or decrease of receivables.  
With regard to H3.5, IAS 2 and IAS 18 cause a significant impact on companies with 
non-‘Big 4’ auditors but not on the remaining companies. While IAS 38 and IAS 
32/39 caused significant impact in both sub-samples, this was significantly higher for 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors (as was also the case for IAS 2). The 
adjustments relating to IAS 19, IAS 36 and IAS 37 were also significant for all sub-
samples, with no apparent difference in the extent of these adjustments for either 
sub-sample.  
These findings suggest that the specific standards identified above either cause a 
material impact or appear in most companies’ reconciliation statements. Their 
provisions prevent earlier creative accounting methods identified by Polychroniadis 
(2002), Baralexis (2004), Spathis (2002), Spathis et al. (2002) and Caramanis and 
Spathis (2006), such as insufficient bad debt and pension provisions, insufficient 
depreciation and impairment charges, capitalisation of expenses, and valuation of 
inventories at cost (rather than lower of cost and market). As a result, the 
implementation of most of these standards has a negative effect on all (IAS 2 and 
36), virtually all (IAS 37 and IAS 38) or the large majority (IAS 18, IAS 19, IAS 
32/39) of companies to which they are relevant. It can therefore be argued that the 
quality of Greek financial reporting under IFRS has been improved. It also appears 
that for some of these standards the impact was either significant only, or greater, for 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors. This supports the prior evidence suggesting 
                                                 
50 It is acknowledged that the application of other standards (such as IAS 10, IAS 11, IAS 16, IAS 17, 
IAS 21) is expected to have affected these ratios. 
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that creative accounting is more common in these firms. Summarising, it is apparent 
that not only the de jure differences cause a material impact on companies’ financial 
positions, but also the preparers’ de facto behaviour, for example creatively 
exploiting the options under Greek GAAP.  
No prior expectation was formed for the remaining standards with regard to creative 
accounting and audit firm. The findings relating to these standards can be 
summarised as follows. 
Because the concept of deferred tax does not exist under Greek GAAP and deferred 
tax assets and liabilities are not recognised, IAS 12 is the standard appearing most 
frequently in reconciliations, causing an immaterial (but significant at 10%) negative 
impact. It appears that this is greater for companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors. IAS 16 
also occurs frequently and it appears that its adoption caused a material and 
significant impact in the whole sample as well as when examining the two sub-
samples. This is because, as indicated above, the majority of the firms applied the 
option by IFRS 1 and used assets’ fair value as deemed cost. It becomes apparent 
that, similar to IAS 12, the impact is significantly greater to companies with ‘Big 4’ 
auditors. IAS 10 also caused a significant impact but this was not material. 
Additionally, it appears that its impact was greater for companies with non-‘Big 4’ 
firms. The last standard to appear frequently was IAS 20, causing a significant but 
not material negative impact in all firms. The impact was significantly greater for 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors.  
It is found that 55.5% of the companies in the sample present adjustments under the 
category ‘Other’. Although the impact of these adjustments, in aggregate, does not 
appear to be significant, their frequent presentation in companies’ reconciliation 
statements reveals an important issue in relation to less transparent disclosures 
(which is examined in detail in the next chapter). Similar findings are reported by 
Lopez and Vianna (2008) with reference to Portugal. 
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3.9 Limitations 
Prior literature notes a number of limitations of using reconciliation statements, most 
notably poor compliance with disclosure requirements and inconsistent and 
incomplete presentation of reconciliations (Weetman and Gray, 1990, 1991; Adams 
et al., 1993, 1999, Street et al., 2000; Ucieda Blanco and Garcia Osma, 2004; Aisbitt, 
2006). These limitations also apply to the present study. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that the results reflect short-term timing differences, 
which may reverse in later accounting periods (Street et al., 2000; Norton, 1995). 
The current studies examining compulsory transition to IFRS can only make use of 
the 2004 financial statements and thus cannot assess the impact of timing differences 
(cf. also Bertoni and De Rosa, 2006). Furthermore, this period may not reflect a 
typical economic environment and typical accounting policies (cf. Norton, 1995). 
Since the EU Regulation was passed in 2002, the latter makes it likely that at least 
some companies’ accounting policy choices were influenced by anticipation of the 
change.  
An additional problem for studies using prior period comparatives is the risk of 
‘noise’ being introduced by prior period adjustments (Ucieda Blanco and Garcia 
Osma, 2004), or by non-specific (‘big bath’) adjustments which may not relate to 
IFRS transition at all (see also Lopes and Viana, 2008). In this study (see also 
HCMC, 2006), 121 companies (55.5% of the companies examined) provided 
adjustments under the category ‘Other’ which may have contained several 
adjustments netted off but resulting in a mean index value of 1.01 and a median of 
1.00. Although such adjustments may cause a material change to shareholders’ 
equity, it is impossible for a user of the financial statements to capture or assess these 
adjustments.  
Further, de jure rules may differ from de facto accounting practice (Hellman, 1993; 
Norton, 1995). This needs to be taken into account when differences in de jure 
accounting regulation are examined and discussed in order to explain or 
contextualise empirical (comparison index) findings. Given the problems of creative 
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accounting and weak enforcement outlined above, it is quite likely that some 
distortion is introduced by this in the Greek case (cf. Vroustouris, 2007; Avlonitis, 
2007).  
3.10 Conclusions 
In this part of the study, the impact of transition to IFRS on the financial statements 
of Greek listed companies is examined. Given the substantial de jure differences 
between Greek GAAP and IFRS it was assumed that Greek companies’ financial 
position and results would have been affected considerably.  
The first two objectives of this chapter were to identify and evaluate the impact and 
materiality of IFRS adoption on companies’ financial position, performance and key 
ratios and to examine individual standards’ effects on shareholders’ equity. Based on 
prior evidence regarding the relationship between audit effort and earnings 
management with auditor type in Greece, the third objective was to test the 
potentially different findings across sub-samples of companies with ‘Big 4’ and non-
‘Big 4’ auditors.  
It is found that implementation of IFRS did indeed have a significant impact on the 
financial position and reported performance as well as on gearing and liquidity ratios, 
of Greek listed companies. On average, the adjustment on shareholders’ equity and 
net income was positive (immaterial and material respectively). With regard to 
gearing and liquidity, the impact was, negative (material and immaterial respectively, 
on average).  
These findings are important because such a significant (and in some cases material) 
impact might a) have acted as a driving factor for companies’ compliance with IFRS 
overall mandatory disclosure requirements and b) have affected investors’ perception 
about the quality of the financial information (i.e. has an impact on the value 
relevance of the book values). 
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Only companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors faced significant impact on net profit and 
liquidity on transition to IFRS. They also faced a significantly greater impact on 
gearing than companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors. However, the large number of 
companies materially affected with reference to all measures examined is somewhat 
surprising.  
With respect to shareholders’ equity, the findings do not support the notion that 
Greek GAAP is more conservative than IFRS as applied (de facto) in this context of 
transition. A large number of companies with material negative changes is identified 
and explanations support this finding. Seven standards which cause a significant 
negative impact on companies’ net assets and which appear to be reducing certain 
creative accounting practices previously followed under Greek GAAP 
(Polychroniadis, 2002; Spathis, 2002; Spathis et al., 2002; Baralexis, 2004) are 
identified. For some of these standards, the impact was either significant only, or 
greater, for companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors. This suggests that reporting quality 
has improved under the new accounting regime. Similarly, the findings regarding the 
impact caused by individual standards may have an effect on the overall value 
relevance of accounting information. 
While expecting a level of non-compliance with disclosure requirements in the Greek 
context (‘low trust’ society, low importance of the ‘true and fair view’, high 
ownership concentration, etc.), the high level of non-compliance with IFRS 1 
requirements is still surprising. This appears to be related to the type of audit firm. 
This also supports previous research suggesting low enforcement in Greece (La Porta 
et al., 1998; Baralexis, 2004), as well as Ball’s (2006) and Nobes’ (2006) concerns in 
relation to uneven implementation of IFRS across different jurisdictions. The next 
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Chapter 4 - Level of Compliance with IFRS Mandatory Disclosures 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides answers to research questions Q2 and Q3. More specifically, 
the analysis explores: Greek listed companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures (Q2) and the corporate characteristics that explain Greek 
listed companies’ compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (Q3).  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a 
discussion on the difference between mandatory and voluntary disclosures and the 
different theoretical underpinnings for and against mandatory disclosures. Section 
4.3 outlines the theoretical framework regarding companies’ disclosures. (The 
implications arising from the differences between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures and the theoretical framework discussed here are also relevant for the 
purposes of the analyses carried out in the next chapter (section 5.4.2) relating to the 
valuation implications of mandatory disclosures (i.e. Q6)). Section 4.4 reviews prior 
literature examining companies’ levels of compliance with disclosures mandated by 
national standards (4.4.1) and IFRS (4.4.2). Section 4.5 links the theoretical 
framework and the findings of prior literature for developing the relevant testable 
hypotheses. Section 4.6 describes the research design for testing these hypotheses. 
Section 4.7 discusses the research findings against the background of the research 
hypotheses, the prior literature and the context of the Greek accounting environment 
provided in chapter 2. Section 4.8 discusses the limitations of this part of the research 
and section 4.9 forms the concluding remarks.  
4.2 Accounting Disclosures: Voluntary vs. Mandatory  
Owusu-Ansah (1998a: 154) defines voluntary disclosure as ‘any disclosure by 
companies that is not mandated by law and/or self-regulatory bodies’. However, 
mandatory disclosure is the minimum standard of financial or non-financial 
information which accounting standards or other national promulgations require from 
a ‘reporting entity’.  
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Thus, mandatory disclosures differ from voluntary disclosures because the former 
force companies to ‘talk about current cash flows, profits, net assets and ownership 
claims rather than firms’ aspirations for future success’ (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008: 
68). Hence, mandatory disclosures bind the companies to disclose both ‘good news’ 
and ‘bad news’ (Verrecchia, 2001).  
In the case of voluntary disclosures, the level and quality of information provided by 
companies is a result of the rational decision of the managers based on the perceived, 
direct and indirect, costs and benefits (Gray et al., 1990). As far as mandatory 
disclosures are concerned, if companies comply with the accounting standards’ 
requirements, the information provided is a result of what the accounting standards 
and other regulations mandate.  
However, if the enforcement mechanisms are inefficient, the levels of the mandatory 
disclosures provided are, similar to the case of voluntary disclosures, again heavily 
dependent on managers’ decisions. Thus, the cost/benefit considerations influencing 
whether managers provide voluntary disclosures can also apply in this case. 
Therefore, researchers engaged with measuring compliance with accounting 
standards’ mandatory disclosures do not deal only with actual disclosures. They also 
examine companies’ attitudes towards compliance with the regulation, i.e. they 
engage with companies’ ‘compliance culture’ (Jenkinson, 1996). Adams (1994: 279) 
defines compliance as ‘the management of regulatory risk — the risk that a rule or 
regulation will be broken’ and explains that this risk has many elements (e.g. 
financial risk, litigation risk, risk of regulatory engagement and reputation risk). 
Accordingly, managers observe and assess these before making decisions on 
compliance. 
On that basis, companies’ levels of mandatory disclosures are determined by the 
forces of demand and supply (see below) as well as the regulatory risk that managers 
bear. The latter of course is influenced by the regulatory and the enforcement 
mechanisms in the countries in which companies operate. Voluntary disclosures, on 
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the other hand, are less subject to regulation and enforcement mechanisms, and more 
to the forces of supply and demand. 
4.2.1 Regulatory and Free Market theories 
In most countries, large numbers of accounting regulations exist, covering a broad 
range of issues, including disclosures. However, as Admati and Pfeiderer (2000) 
explain, there is no universal agreement on the optimal level of mandatory 
disclosures that companies should provide. In fact, there is long debate in the 
literature on whether regulation is needed. Deegan and Unerman (2008) describe the 
two opposite ‘schools of thought’ on the subject. On the one hand, there are parties 
who argue that regulation is necessary (Regulatory Theory) whilst others argue that it 
is not (Free Market Theory). 
Proponents of the first view argue that ‘regulation is supplied in response to the 
demand of the public for the correction of inequitable market practices’ (Posner, 
1974: 335). This implies that the regulatory body interferes in order to protect the 
public and maximise social welfare (Scott, 2003). This ‘public interest’ approach 
assumes that capital markets are not efficient and thus users of the financial 
statements with scarce resources are unable to secure information about a company. 
Accordingly, information asymmetries, which may lead to the ‘moral hazard’ and 
‘adverse selection’ problems (see discussion regarding agency theory below), are 
mitigated with the introduction of regulation.  
The main criticism of regulatory mechanisms is that they may be controlled 
(captured) by particular interest groups. Thus, the ‘regulated’ capture the ‘regulator’ 
resulting in regulation having different impacts across different groups because it 
acts for the interest of specific social or economic groups (Deegan and Unerman, 
2008). Additionally, regulation generates direct costs for the preparation and 
dissemination of the information mandated but the regulator is not a stakeholder 
incurring these costs (cf. Benston, 1985). 
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Thus, according to the Free Market Theory, disclosure levels could be determined 
solely by forces of demand and supply (i.e. without regulation), as is the case for all 
other goods. ‘Consumers’ of that good (i.e. disclosures) will be prepared to pay for it, 
if it has any use. Additionally, the market will ‘penalise’ any companies that do not 
provide the necessary information by treating them as ‘lemons’,51 especially if other 
companies do provide such disclosures. This process will eventually lead to an 
optimal level of information disclosed. (Free Market Theory is closely related to 
signalling theory which is discussed in more detail below.) However, proponents of 
regulatory theory argue that, as soon as the information is made available to the 
public, there will be many individuals who will obtain it without incurring any costs 
(Cooper and Keim, 1983). (See 5.4.2.3 for a discussion regarding ‘externalities’). 
This is known as the ‘free rider problem’ (Coffee, 1984) which violates the market-
forces arguments and leads to non-functional pricing mechanisms of a market.  
The above discussion informs the present study in the following two ways. First, the 
present study engages with disclosures which were introduced by new regulation 
(albeit not directly by the Greek regulatory regime). Therefore, elements of ‘capture 
theory’ should be observed in the Greek case. This is supported by the following. 
The regulator intended to introduce IFRS from 2000 (cf. Valchos, 2001) and issued a 
law (2992/02) intended to implement IFRS from January 2003. However, this law 
never came into force because of companies’ lack of preparedness (Floropoulos, 
2006). When IFRS were finally implemented, the government changed financial 
reporting law by providing an extension to the publication date of these (first IFRS) 
financial statements. This was in response to ‘lobbying’ by audit firms and listed 
companies. Furthermore, the regulator accepted openly that it was lenient towards 
companies’ levels of non-compliance with IFRS requirements during the first year of 
implementation (cf. Avlonitis, 2007; Vroustouris, 2007). This is also confirmed by 
the absence of sanctions for non-compliance with the requirement for reconciliation 
statements. 
                                                 
51 The term ‘lemon’ is used by Akerlof (1970) as a reference to ‘bad’ cars in the US. See below 
discussion about the ‘market for lemons’. 
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Second, since regulatory requirements were neglected by listed companies in the 
period under investigation, the incentives for providing or not providing required 
disclosures could be heavily influenced by factors related to the provision of 
voluntary disclosures (see discussion in the previous section). Thus, the present study 
draws upon voluntary disclosure theories for providing explanatory grounds for the 
levels of compliance identified. This is in line with Dye (2001: 184), who explains 
that ‘there is, presently, no received theory on mandatory disclosures in accounting’. 
It is also in line with the approach followed by previous researchers engaging with 
similar types of research (e.g. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Hodgdon et al., 
2008; Hassan et al., 2006; Ali et al., 2004).  
Following from the above, the next section analyses, in more detail, the theoretical 
framework employed to explain the compliance levels identified in this study. 
However, not all theories relating to voluntary disclosures appear to be equally 
relevant. Those theories considered to be relevant for the objectives of the present 
research can be grouped into three categories: costs based theories; agency theory; 
and capital market based theories.52  
4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Costs based theories 
It was argued above that management considers the trade-off between the direct and 
indirect costs and benefits of voluntary disclosures (cf. Gray et al. 1990). This issue 
has more profound implications when managers make a rational decision on whether 
                                                 
52 Legitimacy theory is also an insightful theory for disclosures. Lindblom (1994: 2, cited in Deegan 
and Unerman, 2008: 271), defines legitimacy as ‘…a condition or status which exists when an entity’s 
value system is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a 
part.’ On that basis, legitimacy theory is more relevant to explain a company’s disclosures as a 
response to society’s expectations on how a company conducts its operations. Tinker and Neimark 
(1987) explain that society increasingly expects companies to ensure the health and safety of 
employees and to repair or prevent damage to the environment. Since these types of disclosures are 
not mandated by IFRS they tend to appear within companies’ social responsibility reports and not 
within the notes accompanying the financial statements. On that basis, legitimacy theory is not 
considered of relevance in the present study. Considering that stakeholder and institutional theories 
are overlapping with legitimacy theory (Deegan and Unerman, 2008) they are also not perceived 
relevant in the present study. 
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to comply with mandatory disclosures. Thus, information and political costs 
approaches are particularly relevant for the present study. 
4.3.1.1 Information costs 
Direct information costs are increased with the introduction of disclosure regulation 
Benston (1985). Companies have to incur expenses for staff training, employing 
consultants, and gathering the information needed, processing it and presenting it. 
These costs are quantifiable, and assuming that it knows the marginal benefits arising 
from providing the mandatory information, management will provide the information 
to the point that the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2008). Hence, direct information costs become very influential during the 
rational decision making process on whether to comply. This is particularly relevant 
to the present research since IFRS were substantially different from Greek GAAP 
and there is evidence that companies did expect high direct information costs to arise 
as a result of the implementation of IFRS (cf. Grant Thornton and AUEB, 2003).  
Indirect costs include those arising from the impact of disclosures on companies’ 
activities and/or decisions (Leventis, 2001 with reference to Lev, 1992). This is 
mainly referred to as disclosure of ‘proprietary’ information. ‘Proprietary 
information is defined as information whose disclosure reduces the present value of 
cash flows of the firm endowed with the information’ (Dye, 1986: 331). High 
compliance with accounting standards’ requirements may result in a higher amount 
of ‘proprietary’ information being disclosed. This is based on the argument that 
mandatory disclosures bind the companies to disclose both ‘good news’ and ‘bad 
news’ (cf. Verrecchia, 2001). This can provide more incentives for non-compliance 
because ‘a value maximising manager will be unlikely to make potentially damaging 
[to the company’s value] disclosure’ (Dye, 1986: 333). However, a counter argument 
could be that of Skinner (1994), who argues that, in order to avoid litigation, 
managers may be willing to disclose ‘bad news’. Thus, to avoid ‘litigation costs’, a 
company may be tempted to comply with all disclosures mandated by IFRS, even if 
they lead to disclosure of proprietary information.  
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Although a strong relationship between information costs and mandatory disclosures 
is expected, the above discussion and the mixed findings in the literature (e.g. 
Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985) do not allow for predicting the direction of this 
relationship. 
4.3.1.2 Political costs 
Political costs theory may provide additional theoretical grounds that explain levels 
of compliance with mandatory disclosures. As argued by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978), companies, particularly large ones or those with excessively large profits, are 
sensitive to the public eye. This means that they are under the scrutiny of various 
groups, for example, the government, employee unions and environmental lobby 
groups (Deegan and Unerman, 2008). Politicians could act against large or highly 
profitable companies with the argument that it is in the ‘public interest’ while they 
actually act in their own interest, to gain more votes (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). 
This leads companies to apply tax-driven accounting policies (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979) and provide high voluntary 
disclosures (Lim and McKinnon, 1993).  
Not complying with mandatory disclosures could provide an extra motivation for 
politicians to scrutinise companies’ financial statements. In addition, the regulatory 
body may identify instances of non-compliance by politically sensitive companies 
and inform the government. Accordingly, even if companies do not face the risk of 
regulatory engagement in the period under examination, they may face the risk of 
attracting the government’s attention, with the latter acting against companies in 
relation to other matters, e.g. conducting tax audits resulting in tax penalties.  
This is of particular relevance in the present context. As explained above, although 
the regulatory body in Greece is now considered to be independent, it still operates 
under the government’s influence. Additionally, Greek companies apply tax-driven 
policies (Baralexis, 2004; Tzovas, 2006; Tsakumis et al., 2007) and are sensitive to 
any actions which may result in tax penalties (cf. Papas, 1993).  
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This allows one to expect a positive relationship between political costs theory and 
levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures (in order to avoid providing 
motivation which may trigger political action). This has been hypothesised in the 
literature of voluntary disclosures (e.g. Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Leventis, 
2001; Raffournier, 1995).  
However, Wallace (1987), Wallace et al. (1994) and Wallace and Naser (1995) hold 
the view that, because comprehensive disclosure may trigger political action, 
politically sensitive companies may disclose less information in an attempt to limit 
such attacks (Vlachos, 2001). On that basis, the sign of the relationship between 
levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures and political costs is difficult to 
predict. 
4.3.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory is concerned with the relationships between agents and principals, i.e. 
companies’ managers and shareholders respectively (Morris, 1987). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976: 308) provided the clear foundations of the agency relationships:  
‘a contract under which one or more persons (principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent’. 
This assumes that a corporation is ‘a set of contracts among various parties who have 
a claim to a common output’ (Smith and Watts, 1983: 3). However, separation of 
ownership and control creates conflicts between the agents and the principals, 
especially if one assumes that any individual’s main purpose is the maximisation of 
his or her personal wealth. The latter is a fundamental assumption of agency theory 
which is concerned with the mechanisms that ensure that actions that benefit the 
managers also benefit companies. 
Agents are relatively autonomous in taking decisions. This and the fact that there is 
differential risk aversion on the part of the agent constitute two fundamental 
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elements within the agency framework. From these, two important implications arise. 
First, principals are faced with the outcomes of the agents’ actual actions without 
being able to monitor and evaluate them fully. This results in the ‘moral hazard’ 
problem i.e. the principal is exposed to risks that he/she cannot control and that 
possibly do not lead to outcomes which are in his/her best interest. Second, the 
optimality of management’s decision is unknown to the principal. This results in the 
‘adverse selection’ problem i.e. leading to the prices of ‘good’ companies being sub-
optimal. These information asymmetries generate ‘agency costs’, which can be 
disaggregated across agency costs of equity and agency costs of debt (Morris, 1987).  
Agency costs of equity relate to the decline in the company’s value when the 
principals believe that the agents do not pursue optimal decisions (i.e. adverse 
selection problem). They also relate to the costs of monitoring and bonding managers 
to assure that they act on the principal’s interest. Agency costs of debt refer to the 
likelihood of agency costs that the debt holders incorporate in the price they pay for 
debt. Some examples include: distribution of excessive dividends, unprofitable 
investments, reorganisation or bankruptcy costs as well as monitoring and bonding 
costs (Morris, 1987). Similar implications arise from the excessive borrowing from 
banks. The latter may well increase monitoring costs (cf. Watson et al., 2002). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agency costs could be eliminated if 
incentives, including bonding and compensation plans, are provided to managers. 
Additionally, monitoring procedures, including the production of accounting reports, 
could facilitate this purpose (Morris, 1987). 
While these are considered to be internal mechanisms of reducing agency costs, 
Fama (1980) argues that agency costs can be reduced to zero by market forces within 
and external to the company (Morris, 1987). In fact, Fama and Jensen (1983a and 
1983b) suggest three market-related safety measures – known as ‘market discipline’: 
the market for managerial skills; the market for corporate control; and the market for 
corporate securities (Leventis, 2001).  
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The first relates to the reputation of management which in the long-run will ‘pay off’ 
managers for being trustworthy and efficient. This motivates managers to act in the 
interest of principals (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). Second, Jensen and Ruback, 
(1983: 5) describe the market for corporate control as ‘an arena in which managerial 
teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources’. Thus, Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985) explain that poorly managed and inefficient companies can become 
targets for take-over bids. The threat of hostile acquisitions may act as an incentive 
for managers to pursue shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Finally, Benston (1982) 
argues that share prices reflect managerial effectiveness and this is rewarded when 
companies seek finance from securities markets. This also results in managers 
pursuing the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. 
Based on the above, it may be argued that increased mandatory disclosures reduce 
agency costs deriving from information asymmetries and strengthen the reputation of 
the management. Thus, management has incentives to provide a high level of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures.  
Although being very influential and extensively employed in the literature, agency 
theory has been heavily criticised (e.g. Puxty, 1985; Amstrong, 1991; Ogden, 1993). 
For example, Tinker et al. (1985) have stressed that agency theory ignores socio-
economic context and institutional background. In support of this, one could argue 
that agency theory may not be relevant for the purposes of the present study because 
of the particular institutional background of Greece. As discussed above, there is 
high ownership concentration in Greece and family owners tend to be involved in the 
management of companies, thus reducing the separation of ownership and control.  
However, ASE is considered to be a developed market with many foreign investors 
following Greek companies. Thus, agency theory explanations are expected to apply 
in the context of the present study.  
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4.3.3 Market based theories 
Agency and free market theory make strong assumptions about the way that stock 
markets operate. For example, the market principle of agency theory argues that 
managers want to signal that they pursue shareholders’ wealth maximisation and that 
they are efficient. This assumes that there are ways managers can transmit such 
signals and that there are investors who ‘receive’ these signals. Market based theories 
have been developed in an attempt to provide further explanations for the provision 
of such disclosures. The theories falling into this category, i.e. signalling, capital 
need and efficient market theories, are discussed below. 
4.3.3.1 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory is concerned with problems relating to information asymmetries in 
markets and illustrates how these asymmetries can be reduced by the party with more 
information signalling it to others (Morris, 1987). Akerlof (1970) illustrates that, in 
the existence of uninformed buyers, all products are valued at an average price based 
on buyers’ perceptions about the quality of the products, but not their actual quality. 
This implies an opportunity loss for the sellers of higher quality products because the 
latter could have been sold at a higher price, i.e. the adverse selection problem 
discussed above. However, this loss can be reduced by communicating the higher 
quality of the products.  
As far as corporate disclosures are concerned, managers with information that 
implies higher companies’ valuations than those assigned by the market will increase 
their disclosures with the intention that share prices will be revised upwards (Lev and 
Penman, 1990). In contrast, managers with information that implies values lower 
than those set by the market will remain silent. The absence of disclosures will be 
interpreted by the market as the company being a ‘lemon’, i.e. no information is 
perceived as bad information (cf. Akerlof, 1970). This will result in those companies’ 
shares being re-valued downwards. Subsequently, this downward price revision of 
non-disclosing companies will encourage even further those companies with ‘good 
news’, to ‘screen’ themselves out of the group by disclosing this information. This 
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process continues ‘until the positions of all firms in the valuation hierarchy are 
identified’ (Lev and Penman, 1990: 49).  
This ‘market for lemons’ perspective provides an incentive for managers to release 
available information as failure to do so may lead to an increase of agency costs. 
Thus, ‘non-lemon owners have an incentive to communicate’ (Spence, 1974: 93).53 
However, some studies which model signalling effects (e.g. Teoh and Hwang, 1991; 
Skinner, 1994) argue that managers of good companies may withhold the ‘good 
news’ for a short period of time. 
Signalling theory is considered to be particularly relevant for the purposes of the 
present study. The transition to IFRS and the increase in disclosures required provide 
‘good’ Greek companies with the opportunity to ‘screen’ themselves from those 
perceived to be of lower quality.  
4.3.3.2 Capital need theory 
Capital need theory posits that a primary motivation for companies to increase 
disclosures is the need to raise capital (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). Higher levels of 
financial disclosures may be perceived by managers as leading to lower cost of new 
capital because they reduce information asymmetries (Choi, 1973; Firth, 1980; 
Cooke, 1993). 
The literature regarding the provision of voluntary disclosures illustrates that there is 
indeed a relationship between disclosures and companies’ risk and thus cost of 
capital (e.g. Welker, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 1997; Sengupta, 1998; 
Rashid, 2000; Hail, 2002; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Kothari and Short, 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005).  
Although the relationship is negative in the majority of cases, Spero (1979) argues 
that, depending on the type of information disclosed, the relationship may be positive 
                                                 
53 Mostly with reference to voluntary disclosures, it could be added that signalling may result in 
companies disclosing unreliable or misleading information (Coffee, 1984). However, the benefit will 
be short-term (Bird and Locke, 1981) because the signal should be confirmable with the actual quality 
of the ‘product’ and thus the market will revise market values accordingly (Morris, 1987). 
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or that there may not even be any relationship. Information which increases market 
uncertainty will lead to an increase in the cost of capital (Leventis, 2001).  
Even though there is little empirical evidence about the economic consequences of 
mandatory disclosures (Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008), it is 
assumed that capital need theory is also relevant for the objectives of the present 
study. In fact, Al-Shiab (2003) reports that compliance with IAS mandatory 
disclosures in Jordan, has a cumulative effect on cost of capital. Hence, considering 
that the objective of a company for being listed is to attract finance and that 
companies ‘compete’ in stock markets (Leventis, 2001), managers have the incentive 
to provide enhanced mandatory disclosures so as to attract more finance from 
investors. (section 5.4.2.3 explains in more detail how information required by IFRS 
mandated disclosures could provide investors with more information regarding a 
company’s risk and future prospects). 
4.3.3.3 Efficient market  
A key factor for the applicability of the above theories is the level of market 
efficiency in the country in which disclosure issues are explored. Market efficiency is 
concerned with the way that information is absorbed and processed by market 
participants. Thus, financial information holds a key role for the level of market 
efficiency. Fama (1970: 388) defines three forms of market efficiency. The weak 
form implies that the price of a share at a particular point of time is a reflection of the 
sequence of its historical prices. The semi-strong form posits that the price of a share 
reflects all the publicly available information about a company (including any 
information provided in annual reports). The strong form asserts that a price of a 
share reflects all the information being available for a company, even the information 
being available to a group of individuals who have monopolistic access to it.  
According to Keane (1993), prerequisites for a market to be informationally efficient 
are: a relatively strongly regulated accounting and auditing profession; clear and 
distinct information needs of the market participants; and quick and wide 
dissemination of the information provided by companies. These should also be 
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supported by an efficient ‘institutional infrastructure’ (e.g. sophisticated and well-
informed investors and analysts, effective investor protection mechanisms, 
systematic and rigorous monitoring of insider trading). 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 19) and Deegan and Unerman (2008: 
259), the available evidence is generally consistent with the existence of the semi-
strong form of market efficiency. Although there is no research which has directly 
tested the market efficiency of the Greek stock-market, it could be argued that 
characteristics of the semi-strong form of efficiency apply.  
On the one hand, the accounting and auditing profession is relatively young and 
weak, and there is low investor protection. On the other hand, ASE has been 
considered to be a developed market for almost ten years and there are large numbers 
of foreign investors following Greek companies (see chapter 2). Moreover, there are 
studies indicating that current accounting data are value relevant (e.g. Dimitropoulos 
and Asteriou, 2009; Karathanassis and Spilioti, 2005; Hevas, 2005; Hevas and 
Papadaki, 2001; Hevas et al., 2000) and that quantifiable qualifications in audit 
reports are valuable to investors (Ghicas et al., 2008). This implies that currently 
available information is reflected on share prices. This allows for hypothesising that 
market based theories do provide a grounded framework for the purposes of the 
present study. 
4.4 Prior Empirical Studies 
This section highlights the findings of prior research which has explicitly examined 
companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures as it is relevant to the objectives 
of the present study. Section 4.4.1 highlights prior findings regarding companies’ 
compliance with national standards and regulations. Section 4.4.2 highlights findings 
regarding compliance with IFRS in particular. The majority of these studies have 
explored the potential characteristics that may be related to the companies’ extent of 
compliance. However, because of differences in the research design and the different 
institutional settings (including enforcement), the explanatory factors of compliance 
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identified are not consistently significant. The findings of prior research regarding 
this aspect are discussed in section 4.5.  
4.4.1 Compliance with national standards’ mandatory disclosures 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the reviewed disclosure studies that examined 
compliance with national standards and regulations. These studies are classified 
according to the chronological order of the financial year examined (i.e. not year of 
publication). Various inferences can be drawn from the findings of these studies.  
From the 16 studies identified, four examine companies’ compliance during the late 
1980s, 11 studies are based on samples during the 1990s and only one study 
examines compliance after 2000. In contrast to the present study, none of those is 
focused on a developed country, based on a recent sample. Additionally, with the 
exception of Ali et al. (2004) which is a multi-country study and Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh (2005) who examine a sample of 50 companies over a four year period, the 
remaining studies use significantly smaller samples than the present study. Only the 
study of Craig and Diga (1998) employs a sample of a similar size (145 companies) 
although it is a multi-country study.  
Furthermore, and of particular relevance for the objectives of the present research is 
the fact that, 14 out of the 16 studies employ only one disclosure index method (the 
commonly used dichotomous approach, see 4.6.2) for measuring compliance. Naser 
and Nuseibeh (2003) employ the commonly used dichotomous approach and a 
weighted index based on the mean and median responses of seven users of financial 
statements in the country which the study focuses (i.e. Saudi Arabia). Instead, Patton 
and Zelenka (1997) follow the commonly used dichotomous approach with two more 
alternatives. In particular, they construct a disclosure index which includes only 
those items which were expected to apply to most companies (referring to it as the 
'narrow' index). The other two indices ‘include the initial index as well as items that 
may be more subject to the 'not applicable' problem; i.e. a 'somewhat broader' index 
and a 'broad' index’ (Patton and Zelenka, 1997: 609). 
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The studies reviewed focus on companies operating in significantly different 
institutional settings (including enforcement) and thus caution is needed when one 
tries to compare their findings and draw conclusions. In fact, Craig and Diga (1998) 
identify significantly different compliance levels across countries in the ASEAN 
region. Additionally, the samples refer to different periods, and all studies employ 
self-constructed indices54 which may increase subjectivity of the scoring process.55 
However, it is notable, that these studies reach similar conclusions. It is common that 
companies do not comply fully with national accounting standards’ disclosure 
requirements. In particular, compliance levels are very rarely close to or even higher 
than 90%, with the majority of studies reporting average compliance levels of 
approximately 70% to 80%. Great variability in the compliance scores is also 
documented. 
 
                                                 
54 The exception is the study of Tai et al., 1990 which uses an index provided by an audit firm. 
55 An indication of the potential impact of the structure of the research instrument and different sample 
is provided if one examines the findings of Ali et al. (2004) and Akhtaruddin (2005). The latter 
focuses explicitly on Bangladesh and examines the extent of mandatory disclosures by 94 listed 
companies in 1999. Ali et al. (2004) inter alia examine a sample of 118 companies from Bangladesh 
with refernce to 1998. Akhtaruddin’s (2005) research instrument includes fewer items than that of Ali 
et al. (2004) and he finds substantially lower levels of compliance. More specifically, he finds that 
companies, on average, disclose 44% of the items of information mandated by the accounting 
standards whilst Ali et al. (2004) report a compliance score of 78%. This example illustrates that 
researchers need to be cautious when making comparisons of findings of studies having implemented 
different research design. 
 
Table 4:1: Prior research on compliance with national standards’ mandatory disclosures. 
Authors  Country Year Sample Research instrument No. of disclosure index methods employed Findings 
Tai et al. (1990) Hong Kong 1986 76 
Disclosure checklist 
provided by a (then) 
‘Big 8’ audit firm 
1 
Average compliance: 78%. Very low 
compliance levels regarding specific 
areas (e.g. 49% in relation to 
depreciation) 
Cooke (1992) Japan     1988 35 Self-constructed index 1 Average compliance: 95%. Standard deviation: 3%. 
Solas (1994) Jordan     1988 45 Self-constructed index 1 Average compliance: 46.35%. Standard deviation: 1%. 
Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1994) Bangladesh     1988 63 Self-constructed index 1
Only four companies exhibit 
compliance above 90%. 37 companies 
are to be found in the range of 60-80%. 
Abayo et al. 
(1993) Tanzania   1990 51 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 53%. Range 
between 31% and 72%. 
Wallace and 
Naser (1995) Hong Kong 1991 80 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 73%. Range 
between 55% and 87% 
Wallace et al. 
(1994) Spain     1991 50 Self-constructed index 1
Average compliance: 59%. Range 
between 29% and 80%. 
Naser and 




67   Self-constructed index 2
In contrast to other studies, they inter 
alia report a high degree of compliance 
(average: 89%). 
Owusu-Ansah 





50   Self-constructed index 1
Compliance levels increased throughout 
this period from an average of 78% in 
1992 to an average of 88% in 1997. The 
standard deviation of the scores has 
dropped as well (from 4.3% 1992 to 
2.87% in 1997). 
Patton and 
Zelenka (1997) Czech Republic 1993 50 Self-constructed index 3 
They report large variability in the 




Authors  Country Year Sample Research instrument No. of disclosure index methods employed Findings 







1993    145 Self-constructed index 1 Relatively low mean levels of disclosures, ranged from 51% - 61%. 
Owusu-Ansah 
(1998b) Zimbabwe   1994 49 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 74%. Relatively 
small standard deviation (5%). 
Vlachos (2001) Greece Cyprus 1996 
74 
50 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 89% Small 
standard deviation of 2.3%. (With 
reference to the 74 Greek companies) 
Ali et al. (2004) India, Pakistan & Bangladesh 1998    566 Self-constructed index 1
Average compliance approximately 
80% for each country. Relatively large 
average standard deviation of 8% 
Akhtaruddin 
(2005) Bangladesh     1999 94 Self-constructed index 1
Average compliance: 44% Small 
standard deviation (1.2%). 
Aljifri (2008) United Arab Emirates 2003    31 Self-constructed index 1
Average compliance: 67% Small 
standard deviation (11%). 
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With reference to Greece, there is only one study (that of Vlachos (2001)) which 
examines listed companies’ compliance with the disclosure items mandated by the 
Greek GAAP. The sample consists of 74 companies’ financial statements with 
reference to the year 1996. He finds an average compliance level of 89% with a 
small standard deviation of 2.3%.  
The findings of this study have to be treated with caution because they may be biased 
towards companies that provided high levels of disclosures. At that time, very few 
companies provided in public notes to the financial statements thus, those that 
provided an annual report might have been ‘committed’ to higher disclosure levels. 
Another feature of Vlachos’ (2001) research is that:  
‘the study also captures an element of voluntary disclosure (as in 
the case of Wallace et al., 1994 and Wallace and Naser, 1995). This 
is because the information items required to be disclosed 
(mandatory information) have been disaggregated into sub-
elements of information that should or could have been disclosed; 
usually the disclosure of those sub—elements of information is 
essentially a matter of managerial choice (Barrett, 1976)’ (Vlachos, 
2001: 9) 
Finally, at that period ASE was an emerging market which implies that financial 
statements were of less importance compared to 2005 which is the year under 
investigation in the present research.  
4.4.2 Compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the reviewed disclosure studies examining 
compliance with IFRS (referred to as IAS before 2001).56 This summary also allows 
for several inferences to be drawn.  
 
                                                 
56 A multi-country study which also measures compliance with IAS mandatory disclosures is that of 
Hodgdon et al. 2008. However, the focus of the study is the relationship between compliance levels 
and analysts’ forecasts errors. Thus, its findings are discussed in section 5.4.2.1 and reference to the 
methods used is provided in 4.6.2.  
 
Table 4:2: Prior research on compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures. 













Self-constructed index 1 
Compliance of 76% in the first period with 
a standard deviation of 5%. Compliance 
increase in the second period (84%) but 




Egypt 1995/1996 72   Self-constructed index 1
Average compliance: 83%. This was 73% 
when referring to the newly introduced 
disclosure items. It was even lower (36%) 
when referring to items which hadn’t been 
translated to the Arabic language. 
Hassan et al. 
(2006) Egypt 
1995-
2002 77   Self-constructed index 1





2000 50   Self-constructed index 1
Companies’ level of compliance ranged 
between 45% and 56%. (Also relevant to 
the purposes of the present study (next 
chapter): this research also examines the 
valuation implications of mandatory 
disclosures. A cumulative effect on 
companies’ cost of capital is reported with 
regard to companies’ levels of 
compliance.) 
Street et al. 
(1999) 
12 Different 
countries 1996    49 Self-constructed index 1
20 companies complied in full. For the 
remaining companies, compliance with 
individual standards was relatively low. 
Al-Shammari 




2002 137   Self-constructed index 1
Compliance increased over time, from 
68% in 1996 to 82% in 2002. Significant 
variation of compliance levels across 
different countries is reported. 
 
 
Table 4.2 (Continued): Prior research on compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
Authors   Country Year Sample Research instrument 
No. of disclosure index 
methods employed Findings 







1997   60 Self-constructed index 2 





countries 1998  82
Self-constructed 
index 1 
The results indicate that the overall level of 
compliance was less than 75%. Large variability in 
the compliance levels is also identified in this 
study with companies exhibiting low levels of 




countries 1998  279
Self-constructed 
index 2 
Companies’ level of compliance ranged from 60% 
to 93%. 





79 Self-constructed index 1 
Companies exhibit a relatively high compliance 
with the items mandated by Chinese GAAP (97% 
for both years). The compliance with IAS 










A significant degree of non-compliance is 
reported. None of the companies fully complied 




(mainly in EU) 
1999-
2000 165   Survey Survey
The study reveals that only 62% of the companies 
examined fully complied with the IAS. 
Glaum and 








Levels of compliance with IAS ranged from 41.6% 
to 100%, with an average of 81%. This was 
significantly lower compared to the compliance 




















countries 2005    100 Survey Survey
With regard to disclosures in particular, some of 
the areas identified include the following: revenue 
recognition, goodwill and intangible assets, 










2005    200 Survey Survey
This survey inter alia identifies some compliance 
issues regarding disclosures relating to: business 
combinations, goodwill and impairment testing. 
Fekete et al. 
(2008) Hungary   2006 17
Self-constructed 
index 1 
Average compliance: 62%. 5 companies exhibiting 
compliance levels lower than 50% and 2 exhibiting 
full compliance. 
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Interestingly, the levels of compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures 
identified look very similar to those regarding disclosures mandated by other national 
standards, as illustrated in the previous section. It is common that companies do not 
comply fully with IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements and low compliance levels are 
not rare. A great variability in the compliance scores is also documented.57  
In line with Craig and Diga (1998), Tower et al. (1999), Street and Gray (2001) and 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that this depends on the 
companies’ country of domicile, i.e. compliance levels depend on the particular 
financial reporting system of each country. This allows for the conclusion that 
adoption of IAS/IFRS does not necessarily lead to higher provision of mandatory 
disclosures. 
Cairns (2001) also points out that few of the companies examined in his study were 
actually required to comply with IAS (this also applies to some earlier studies (e.g. 
Street et al., 1999)). Arguably, many companies could have adopted IFRS as a 
symbol of legitimacy but without fully complying with their requirements. This 
phenomenon is called ‘formal compliance’ (McBarnet, 1984); i.e. companies’ 
financial reports claim compliance with certain accounting standards while managers 
do not implement them completely (Touron, 2005: 853). On that basis, the above 
mentioned issue of formal compliance (or ‘IAS lite’ compliance’ as Cairns refers to 
it) was expected. 
Another feature of the studies reviewed is that their samples refer, mainly, to the late 
1990s and early 2000s. With the exception being the working paper of Fekete et al. 
(2008), none of the academic studies examines compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures after their implementation in the EU in 2005. Even those studies that 
include companies from the early 2000s examine compliance with older versions of 
IAS, i.e. not the revised IAS and newly introduced IFRS which were intended to 
provide a ‘stable platform’ regarding the first years of IFRS mandatory 
implementation in the EU. Fekete et al. (2008) focus on compliance with the 
                                                 
57 The argument about caution needed when comparing findings of such studies also applies here. 
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requirements of four standards (IFRS 3, IAS 27, IAS 28 and IAS 31) and the sample 
consists only of 17 Hungarian companies.  
The two surveys of SEC and of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) provide also some preliminary evidence regarding EU 
companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures after 2005. 
However, their findings are mainly descriptive in nature. Thus, the SEC reported that 
they ‘have not yet reached any comprehensive conclusions about companies' overall 
compliance with, or consistency in application of, IFRS’.58 
A further finding of this review is that Al-Shiab (2003) reports low average 
compliance scores compared to other studies examining compliance with IAS 
disclosure requirements in emerging markets in a similar period (e.g. Hassan et al. 
(2006) with regard to Egypt). More specifically, companies’ level of compliance 
ranged from 45% to 56%. Although this may depend on the specific characteristics 
of the financial reporting system in Jordan, it is also attributable to the different 
method used for measuring compliance. This tends to produce more ‘conservative’ 
(i.e. lower) compliance scores (see 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 for more details).  
Additionally, similar to the studies discussed in the previous section, the majority of 
studies employ only one disclosure index method for measuring compliance with 
IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures (the commonly used dichotomous approach). Street 
and Gray (2001) use both this method and the one that Al-Shiab uses but do not test 
the significance of the differences in the compliance scores identified. It is worth 
mentioning that they find different significant associations under each method 
between the dependent variable (compliance score) and a number of independent 
variables.59  
Finally, there is very little evidence regarding Greek listed companies’ compliance 
with IAS/IFRS. In particular, only Cairns (2001) includes financial statements of 
                                                 
58 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ifrs_staffobservations.htm (last accessed on 8 June 2009) 
59 Tower et al. (1999) is the only other study employing two methods for measuring compliance with 
IAS mandatory disclosures. They follow a similar approach to that of Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
discussed above. 
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Greek listed companies (three) which claimed that they had adopted IFRS in addition 
to Greek GAAP.60 He reports that only one of the three companies provided full 
IFRS consolidated financial statements. The other two did not provide cash flow 
statements and accounting notes. 
4.4.2.1 General observations – the present study 
The consistent findings of low compliance with mandatory disclosures IFRS or other 
national accounting standards’ allow for the conclusion that, although companies are 
expected to comply with the mandated disclosures, they rarely do so in full. 
Therefore, these findings provide solid grounds for the concerns regarding the 
‘quality’ of financial statements after the adoption of IFRS in the EU (e.g. Nobes, 
2006; Weetman, 2006; Ball, 2006; Schipper, 2005). With regard to the present study, 
they suggest that compliance levels with IFRS mandatory disclosures may also be 
low for Greek listed companies.  
From a methodological point of view, the present study also claims more robust 
findings compared to those provided by prior studies. In particular, the present 
research employs two methods for measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures and tests the significance of the differences in the compliance scores 
identified. Additionally, this study considers as valid findings only those factors that 
appear to be significant under both methods. 
Finally, these reviews also illustrate that there is no recent large scale academic study 
exploring companies’ compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosures after 2005 (or 
other national standards’ mandatory disclosures in general). The present study 
addresses this gap in the literature and contributes to the recent calls for this type of 
research.  
                                                 
60 As discussed previously, very few Greek companies had adopted IAS/IFRS before 2005. 
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4.5 Development and Formulation of Testable Hypotheses 
The discussion in section 4.3 provides the theoretical framework facilitating 
identification of the corporate characteristics which may explain companies’ level of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures in 2005. This approach perceives 
disclosures as an endogenous choice that is related to companies’ fundamentals or 
other characteristics. Forming and consequently testing specific hypotheses regarding 
the relationship of those characteristics and companies’ level of compliance provides 
an answer to the third research question of this thesis (Q3).  
Prior studies have suggested and tested several variables as explanatory factors for 
compliance with mandatory disclosures. The variety of the variables examined is, 
mainly, a result of the objectives of each particular study and the availability of data 
examined. In this study, the following criteria were applied for selecting the variables 
to be tested (cf. Leventis, 2001; Vlachos, 2001; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b): First, the 
existence of theoretical frameworks and/or the results of empirical studies should 
indicate the association of a particular characteristic and compliance with mandatory 
disclosures. Second, testing a particular variable should meet the objectives of the 
present research. Third, the variables selected should be able to be measured reliably 
and obtainable from dependable sources. Fourth, the variables tested should be of 
particular importance/relevance to the Greek setting.  
As was indicated in 1.4.4 the present research complements and extends prior 
literature in the following way. The unique setting, i.e. measuring compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures during the first year of implementation, allows also for 
examination of the possibility that the change in the 2004 shareholders’ equity and 
net income, as a result of the adoption of IFRS, constitute also explanatory factors 
for compliance. Thus, this study hypothesises that inter alia not only financial 
measures can be proxies for explaining compliance as derived by relevant theories. It 
argues that, in addition, a significant change in fundamental financial measures, 
because of the change in the accounting regime, may also explain compliance. 
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More specifically, research has indicated that information reported in reconciliation 
statements is perceived as meaningful by investors (e.g. Christensen et al., 2007), 
who are considered to be among the main users of financial statements by the IFRS 
Framework. Therefore, the behaviour of managers regarding the amount of overall 
disclosures provided may be influenced by the impact of IFRS on company key 
measures, as this can be assessed through the reconciliation statements and the 2004 
restated comparative figures. 
This context is of particular relevance for the present study since the extent of 
companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures is examined for the same period 
(i.e. 2005) in which the impact caused by the adoption of IFRS became known to 
users of the financial statements. 
On that basis, eight variables have been chosen for the purposes of the present 
research. In accordance with Camfferman and Cooke (2002) (with reference to Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993) these are classified as: structure-related; performance-related; 
and market-related variables. The development of hypotheses with regard to the 
variables within these categories is provided below. The surrogates employed for 
those variables are discussed in 4.6.4. 
4.5.1 Structure-related variables  
This first category of variables includes characteristics that usually are stable over 
time. Consistent with prior literature, the first two considered here are size and 
gearing. In addition, the findings of the previous chapter suggest that a structural 
change in the financial position of Greek companies took place on transition to IFRS. 
Shareholders’ equity, and in turn gearing and liquidity, were affected significantly. 
Thus, the present research also considers, as a third structure-related variable, the 
impact on shareholders’ equity as a result of the transition to IFRS. 
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4.5.1.1 Size  
Size has been tested by almost all studies that have explored factors which may be 
associated with companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures. Although, in 
most cases, size is found to be significantly associated with levels of disclosures, it 
offers limited theoretical insight. This is because it can be used for testing the 
applicability of almost all disclosure theories (Leventis, 2001) and hence it is 
correlated with other variables (Hossain et al., 1994). 
First, size can be a proxy for information costs as it is more likely that large 
companies have the resources and expertise to provide higher compliance levels with 
mandatory disclosures (Ali et al., 2004). Large organisations are more complex and 
produce detailed information for internal consumption which results in them 
possessing superior information systems and thus incurring lower direct costs 
(Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Additionally, large 
companies can be attractive to highly skilled employees (in the present case with 
knowledge of IFRS) who may be more capable in applying the Standards’ 
requirements in full. Furthermore, Verrecchia, (1983) argues that proprietary costs 
(i.e. indirect costs) are smaller as company size increases. Finally, the discussion 
provided by Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) regarding the ongoing debate prior to the 
Australian equivalents to IFRS on the cost/benefits for smaller companies is of 
particular relevance to the present research. 
Second, as discussed above, size can be a proxy for political costs. Larger 
companies, being more visible, have greater incentives than smaller companies to 
comply with mandatory disclosures in order to avoid triggering government 
intervention (cf. Watts and Zimmerman, 1979; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). However, as was indicated above, Wallace et al. 
(1994) and Wallace and Naser (1995) posit the exact opposite relationship between 
compliance with mandatory disclosures and political costs.  
Third, because of lower ownership concentration, monitoring procedures become 
more difficult and costly in larger companies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, 
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larger companies incur higher agency costs compared to smaller companies (Cooke, 
1991) and, accordingly, size can also be used as a proxy for agency costs.  
Fourth, small companies are not followed by investment analysts and the media to 
the same extent as large firms (Barry and Brown, 1986; Schipper, 1991; Hussain, 
2000). As a result, in line with capital need theory, compliance with mandatory 
disclosures may lead to higher analyst following and lower cost of capital. (This 
argument derives from the overwhelming evidence regarding voluntary disclosures). 
A positive association between companies’ size and compliance with mandatory 
disclosure is more often documented in prior literature (e.g. Cooke, 1992: Wallace et 
al. 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Craig and Diga, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Ali 
et al., 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Shammari et al., 2008). However, Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1994), Tower et al. (1999), Street and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray 
(2001), (Vlachos, 2001-with regard to Cyprus), and Glaum and Street (2003) find no 
significant relationship. Interestingly, Vlachos (2001) finds a significant but negative 
association between Greek listed companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures 
and size.61 
Based on the mixed findings of the prior literature, although a significant association 
between size and companies’ levels of compliance is hypothesised, no prediction 
regarding the sign of the relationship is attempted. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
formed: 
H4.1 There is a significant association between the extent of companies’ compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures and companies’ size. 
4.5.1.2 Gearing 
An important market force, potentially associated with companies’ compliance with 
mandatory disclosures, is gearing. It can be a proxy for agency costs or signalling 
effects. With regard to agency costs, companies with higher gearing are more likely 
                                                 
61 Leventis and Weetman (2004a) find a positive association between levels of voluntary disclosures 
and size in Greece. However, this association is not significant for companies reporting only in Greek. 
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to be subject to higher equity risk. This results in shareholders demanding more 
information on whether the company is able to meet its debt obligations and on the 
level of risk of its investments. Further, agency costs of debt increase with company 
borrowing. A divergence of concerns between lenders and management results in the 
introduction of covenants into debt contracts and additional monitoring (Watson et 
al., 2002). Highly geared companies should therefore exhibit higher levels of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures to try and reduce monitoring costs (but see 
below).  
However, a negative relationship could be hypothesised on the grounds of signalling 
theory (Watson et al., 2002). Companies with low gearing would provide high levels 
of mandatory disclosures to ‘screen’ themselves (Leventis, 2001; Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003).  
Additionally, a negative or even no relationship between gearing and compliance 
with mandatory disclosures could be the outcome of the particular features of the 
reporting system of the country in which companies operate. For example, this may 
be the case in code-law countries where banks are the main providers of finance (as 
is the case in Greece) (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). In these cases, high levels of 
disclosures are redundant as companies have regular communication with the 
lenders. This is also argued by Zarzeski (1996) who finds lower debt ratios to be 
associated with higher levels of disclosures. Similar arguments are raised by Ali et al. 
(2004) with reference to South Asian countries where companies frequently have 
private communication with banks and debtors. Accordingly, this might well be the 
case in the present context since Greek companies are highly geared (Nobes and 
Parker, 2008: 30) and features of bank lending include close personal relationships 
between banks and companies (Ballas, 1994; Ballas et al. 1998; Baralexis, 2004, 
Tzovas, 2006). 
As with size, prior literature reports mixed findings regarding the association 
between gearing and compliance with mandatory disclosures. Ahmed and Nicholls 
(1994), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
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Tower et al. (1999), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), Al-Shiab (2003) and Ali et 
al. (2004) find no statistical association. Al-Shammari et al. (2008) and Craig and 
Diga (1998) find a positive association. 
Therefore, although a significant association between gearing and companies’ level 
of compliance is hypothesised, no prediction regarding the sign of the relationship is 
attempted. 
H4.2 There is a significant association between the extent of companies’ compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures and companies’ gearing. 
4.5.1.3 Changes in 2004 shareholders’ equity, as a result of the transition to IFRS 
As has been argued above, significant differences exist between IFRS and Greek 
GAAP. As a result, Greek companies’ financial statements were affected 
significantly by the transition to IFRS. On that basis, the assumption that, a 
company’s structure, as this expressed in the balance sheet, may stay stable over time 
may not be valid when companies moved to IFRS. This has particular relevance for 
the present study as it was expected that several intangible assets would be 
derecognised, treasury shares would be derecognised, whilst inventories and other 
assets would be impaired. Additionally, deferred tax assets would be recognised and 
land and buildings would be revalued. Furthermore, it was expected that liabilities 
would increase, as a result of the recognition of provisions for example. Hence, 
companies’ shareholders’ equity (and thus size and gearing as discussed above) 
would be affected considerably. This is supported by the findings in the previous 
chapter. 
Prior literature indicates that companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures are associated with shareholders’ equity (e.g. Tai et al., 1990). Thus a 
significant change in that measure, as a result of the introduction of IFRS could have 
profound implications on managers’ ‘compliance behaviour’, with reference to 
mandatory disclosures. This change was easily observable to users of the financial 
statements by looking at the reconciliation statements. There was no need for a user 
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to have the previous year’s financial statements to compute the impact on the 
difference between the two measures. On that basis, managers may be very sensitive 
to how users of the financial statements would interpret a large difference in the two 
figures. 
Accordingly, considering the implications deriving from the assumptions of agency 
and signalling theory discussed above, managers would have strong incentives to 
assess the trade-off between agency costs or signalling effects and the impact on their 
companies’ financial positions as this caused by the transition to IFRS.  
Companies which faced a significant positive impact could provide higher levels of 
mandatory disclosures, in accordance with signalling theory. It is highly probable 
that managers would try to ‘exploit’ this positive change by arguing that their 
companies’ financial position was not reflected accurately in the past because of the 
low quality of Greek GAAP. Thus, a positive relationship between the impact on 
shareholders’ equity (as a result of the transition to IFRS) and companies’ 
compliance with mandatory disclosures may be identified.  
In contrast, under agency theory, managers may well be under pressure to 
‘communicate’ why such an improvement on companies’ financial position arises, to 
pre-empt allegations of a significant change being due to fraudulent accounting 
practices. Additionally, companies with a significant negative impact will be under 
more pressure to explain why companies’ financial position appears to be worse 
under the higher quality accounting standards (i.e. IFRS) which are believed to 
reflect companies’ assets and liabilities more accurately. 
Accordingly, the present research also considers, as a third structure-related variable, 
the impact on shareholders’ equity as a result of the transition to IFRS. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
H4.3 There is a significant association between changes in shareholders’ equity (as a 
result of the transition to IFRS) and the extent to which companies comply with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
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4.5.2 Performance-related variables 
A company’s performance is sensitive to time conditions. Hence, management holds 
information that should be transmitted to investors in order to reduce information 
asymmetries regarding companies’ performance within the period (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). The variables which can be proxies for performance are liquidity 
and profitability. In addition to those two variables and consistent with the arguments 
raised above, a further hypothesis regarding performance-related variables is tested 
in this study. This relates to the change in profitability as a result of the transition to 
IFRS. 
4.5.2.1 Profitability and changes in net income as a result of the transition to IFRS 
Similar to other corporate characteristics, profitability can be used as a proxy in 
several theories. As indicated above, as well as large companies, companies with 
excessive profits are assumed to be sensitive to political costs. Thus, a profitable 
company may have more incentives to provide higher levels of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures so as to avoid government intervention. However, as is the 
case for size, profitable companies may act in the exact opposite way, i.e. provide as 
little information as possible so as not to attract the public eye (Wallace et al., 1994).  
Consistent with capital need theory and, mainly signalling theory companies with 
good performance may feel more comfortable being more transparent. This would 
provide them with the opportunity to signal their good performance and, arguably, 
good future prospects (cf. Inchausti, 1997) and avoids the ‘adverse selection’ 
problem. Finally, consistent with the ‘market discipline’ approach within agency 
theory, managers’ may have more incentives to be more transparent about their 
companies’ performance. The latter could be interpreted as the result of their 
personal efforts and ability to manage companies successfully and subsequently in 
seeking for further rewards (Singhvi and Desai, 1971) (either in the same company 
or by moving to another company which will offer them higher compensation).   
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However, profitability shares a similar limitation with size. Although it can serve as a 
proxy in several theoretical frameworks, the direction of its relationship with 
companies’ levels of disclosures cannot be hypothesised. This is justified by the 
inconclusive findings of prior research. For example, Owusu-Ansah (1998a), Ali et 
al. (2004), Akhtaruddin (2005), and Hassan et al. (2006) find a positive association 
between profitability and companies’ compliance. In contrast, Wallace et al. (1994) 
and Wallace and Naser (1995) identified a negative relationship between these two 
variables. Additionally, Street and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001), Al-Shiab 
(2003), and Glaum and Street (2003) find no association between companies’ 
profitability and compliance with mandatory disclosures. H4.4 is therefore stated as 
follows: 
H4.4 There is a significant association between the extent of companies’ compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures and companies’ profitability. 
As discussed above, one major problem of the relationships between managers and 
shareholders is the fact that what investors may perceive as an optimal level of 
performance may differ from what is perceived by managers. In fact, managers may 
be in favour of a satisfactory but not an optimal level (Smith, 1976; Leventis, 2001).  
In the Greek environment, where findings of earnings management have been 
consistently reported, the difference between management and shareholders on what 
is perceived to be optimal levels of performance might be more distinct. The 
introduction of IFRS was expected to cause a significant impact on companies’ 
restated absolute values of net income regarding 2004. The impact identified in the 
previous chapter across a large number of companies confirms this expectation.  
A significant difference in the restated figure might have a profound effect on 
managers’ rational decision with regard to the extent to which they would comply 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures. A significant positive change would allow them to 
claim that previous year’s performance was low, not because of their inefficiency but 
because Greek GAAP was of poor quality, i.e. it produces conservative reported 
performance. Thus, in line with signalling theory, high provision of mandatory 
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disclosures would be expected. This would encourage them to provide as much 
information as possible to claim that the company was performing well but the 
accounting rules did not allow for this to be reflected on the financial statements.  
Drawing on agency theory, such an approach would be used to provide convincing 
information to the users of the financial statements that low profitability was not a 
result of creative accounting practices. However, also within the framework of 
agency theory, reporting substantially improved restated income values may trigger 
the suspicion of shareholders under the rationale that this improvement is a result of 
a ‘transitional big bath’. Hence, again, more disclosures might be provided but not 
necessarily with the intention to signal better performance. This would also facilitate 
the minimisation of agency costs. In contrast, a significantly negative restated 
performance would raise concerns of shareholders. This would imply that the 
performance last year was actually worse than had been reported originally and thus 
management would have to explain, through the provision of increased disclosures, 
why this was the case. 
Additionally, it has been argued that companies with excessive profits may attract 
government’s attention. Thus, those companies where the restated profit levels were 
affected substantially would consider the political costs that may derive from such a 
change. Accordingly, this might have affected their ‘compliance behaviour’ in 2005. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures is associated with the impact caused on the restated net income values 
regarding 2004. On that basis, the following hypothesis is formed: 
H4.5 There is a significant association between changes in net income (as a result of 
the transition to IFRS) and the extent to which companies comply with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. 
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4.5.2.2 Liquidity  
As discussed above, agency theory predicts that the greater a company’s debt, the 
higher the agency costs should be. Watson et al. (2002) argue that the proportion of a 
company’s debt could also be reflected on liquidity ratio. It is also argued that 
liquidity can be seen as a measure of a company’s risk (Wallace at al., 1994). This 
would imply that companies with low liquidity ratios would incur higher agency 
costs. The managers of a company with weak performance regarding working capital 
management (i.e. proxied by liquidity) will be under more pressure to provide higher 
levels of information, to justify the company’s weak performance and to reduce 
agency costs. Hence, this would suggest a negative relationship between liquidity 
and compliance levels with mandatory disclosures.  
However, within the framework of signalling theory, a company with strong working 
capital management, and thus strong liquidity, would be willing to provide higher 
compliance levels with disclosure requirements to ‘screen’ its good performance. 
That would suggest a positive relationship between compliance levels and liquidity 
(Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978). 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) report a positive association between liquidity and level of 
disclosures whilst Wallace et al. (1994), Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005), and Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman (2007) find a negative association. Wallace and Naser (1995) 
and Owusu-Ansah (1998b) find no significant relationship. This is also Vlachos’ 
(2001) finding with regard to Greece. 
Considering the mixed findings of the prior literature, the sign of the relationship is 
not predicted in the present study. Hence, the relevant hypothesis tested is formed as 
follows:  
H4.6 There is a significant association between the extent of companies’ compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures and companies’ liquidity. 
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4.5.3 Market-related variables 
The present study employs two market-related variables: audit firm size and industry 
type. Taking into consideration the data collection process of this study, they are 
relatively stable over time and more within companies’ control, for the sample of 
companies examined. 
4.5.3.1 Audit firm size 
As discussed in section 3.4.3, DeAngelo (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
suggest that large audit firms perform higher quality audits. Having clients with poor 
quality financial statements jeopardises an auditor’s reputation. Thus, audit 
companies that are larger and more sensitive to the public eye have higher incentives 
to assure that their clients’ financial statements do not breach accounting standards’ 
requirements (DeAngelo, 1981; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Qualifying an audit report may antagonise the client’s management and result in a 
loss of this client. However, this may not have severe implications for large audit 
companies as they usually have a large portfolio of clients and thus are more 
independent. The benefits of a good reputation outweigh the loss of the client. This is 
consistent with the argument that large and reputable audit companies press their 
clients for higher levels of disclosure (Firth, 1979; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). On 
that basis, auditing could be perceived as a means of minimising agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983) 
Large and international audit companies have greater competence and expertise on 
IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). This is particularly relevant to the 
objectives of the present study since this expertise and competence should result in 
their clients’ financial statements to exhibit higher levels of compliance with IFRS. 
As discussed above, (according to one of the interviewees), ‘Big 4’ audit companies 
could indeed attract experienced employees from their foreign operations to assist in 
the transition process in Greece. Accordingly, companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors 
should exhibit higher compliance levels with IFRS mandatory disclosures. (The 
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findings regarding the instances of non-compliance with IFRS 1, i.e. no provision of 
reconciliation statements (see previous chapter), and the relationship with audit firm 
size provide some further support for this proposition.) Additionally, greater audit 
effort by large audit firms is well documented in Greece. Finally, higher earnings 
management is well documented in Greece for companies with small auditors (see 
3.4.3 for more details). Thus, Greek managers may also intentionally employ a ‘Big 
4’ audit firm as a signal of high accounting quality62 (which in turn may indeed result 
in higher compliance with mandatory disclosures).  
Several studies (e.g. Tai et al. 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 
1995; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003) 
document that audit firm size has a positive relationship with mandatory disclosures. 
A few studies (e.g. Wallace et al. 1994; Vlachos, 2001) find no significant 
association between companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures and audit 
firm size. Wallace and Naser (1995) find a negative association.  
Considering the above discussion about the relevance of audit firm size in Greece 
and the results of the previous chapter, the following hypothesis is formed: 
H4.7 There is a significant and positive association between the extent of companies’ 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures and audit firm size. 
4.5.3.2 Industry 
The industry in which a company operates can be employed as a proxy for signalling 
effects, political costs as well as for ‘follow the leader’ effect. With regard to 
signalling theory, Malone et al. (1993) and Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that it is 
common for companies in the same industry to follow similar accounting and 
reporting practices. Thus, when a company deviates from what is considered to be 
the norm within the industry it can transmit different signals to market participants. 
Higher compliance levels can be interpreted as companies trying to ‘screen’ 
themselves from their peers. On the other hand, lower levels of compliance (i.e. 
                                                 
62 I am in debt to Martin Walker and Mark Clatworthy for pointing this out. 
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being silent) can be interpreted as companies being ‘lemons’, resulting in lower 
market values.  
Additionally, differential exposure to political costs may apply for companies being 
in different industries (cf. Ball and Foster, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). In fact, Ball and Foster (1982) hold the view that industry type 
can capture political-cost sensitivity in a more appropriate way than size could do. 
(Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that size is in fact related to industry type.) 
Finally, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) argue that in economic environments where 
few major companies exist, companies in the same industry as ‘leaders’ may try to 
follow their disclosure practices. Accordingly, industry type can have a more acute 
effect in those countries compared to countries such as the UK, where the market has 
greater breadth. 
Similar to the other proxies discussed, association between companies’ level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures and industry type has not been consistently 
reported in the prior literature. Cooke (1992), Wallace and Naser (1995), Street and 
Gray (2001), and Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) find industry is associated with 
compliance with accounting standards’ requirements. However, Wallace et al. 
(1994), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Tower et al. (1999) and Owusu-Ansah (1998b) 
provide no evidence of this association. The present study posits a significant 
association between companies’ industry type and levels of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures.  
H4.8 There is a significant association between the extent of companies’ compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures and industry type. 
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4.6 Data and Research Methods  
4.6.1 Data 
The seventh objective of this research is to make a contribution regarding the 
valuation implications of IFRS mandatory disclosures. The analysis conducted with 
regard to this issue is provided in the next chapter. However, as illustrated in Graph 
1, the research findings of this part of the study will also be used in the part that 
follows. Hence, the companies analysed here should also meet the criteria for being 
appropriate for inclusion in the next part.  
Starting from the 238 companies used in the previous part, 50 companies for which 
the net profit after tax figure was not available for 2004 had to be eliminated.63 Six 
more companies which switched auditor from the one year to the other were also 
excluded.64 Additionally, seven companies for which the market value one month 
after the publication of the 2004 financial statements was not available had to be 
excluded. These companies were either not listed or were suspended from trading.65 
This would leave 175 companies. However, as discussed previously, 42 companies 
did not present adequate reconciliation statements. 20 of those also meet the above 
‘exclusion’ criteria. The remaining 22 have to be eliminated since the next part of the 
study examines the incremental value relevance of the information provided in the 
reconciliation statements. Hence, the sample of companies used in this as well as the 
next part of the study is consisted of 153 companies.  
4.6.2 The two disclosure index methods employed 
The most common approach for determining compliance with disclosure 
requirements by a company is that of the unweighted disclosure index (e.g. Ali et al., 
2004; Craig and Diga, 1998; Patton and Zelenka; 1997; Cooke, 1996; Ahmed and 
                                                 
63 For testing the change in the value relevance of accounting information between 2004 and 2005 
(Q4), the book value of equity and the book value of net income are required for both years. 
64 The partition of ‘Big 4’ versus non-‘Big 4’ is also used in the next part of the study. Thus including 
the companies changed auditors would add ‘noise’ to the pre-and post IFRS analysis of value 
relevance as the sample would not be the same in both years. 
65 The value relevance tests would not be feasible for companies’ not traded. 
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Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Spero, 1979). If a required item is disclosed, it 
is scored as 1 and if it is not, it is scored as 0. This is commonly known as the 
‘dichotomous’ method. However, Cooke (1991) suggests that it is not strictly 
‘dichotomous’ because some items may not be applicable to every company, and are 
therefore scored as ‘not applicable’ (NA).66 The disclosure index for each company 
is then calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed to the maximum possible 


















1       (Eq. 4.1) 
Where Cj is the total compliance score for each company and 0 ≤ Cj ≤ 1. T is the total 
number of items disclosed (di) by company j where M is the maximum number of 
applicable disclosure items for company j that could have been disclosed.  
The index is described as an unweighted index because each item is treated equally.67  
It was initially developed for measuring compliance with voluntary (or a 
combination of voluntary and mandatory) disclosures (cf. Marston and Shrives, 
1991). In that case the researcher exercises judgement on what should be included in 
                                                 
66 This is why the term ‘Cooke’s method’ is used in this study as a reference to this method. (Aljifri 
(2008: 95) uses the same name as a reference to this method. 
67 By contrast, a weighted disclosure index methodology also exists, although it has not been applied 
for examining compliance with IAS/IFRS requirements. This method attaches a weighting (value) to 
each disclosure item, e.g. ‘from 1 = of no importance at all to 7 = utmost importance’ (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987: 535). Companies may not comply with a substantial number of items but, if these 
items have been given a low weight this is not considered to be an issue of great importance. This 
method entails a great degree of subjectivity in deciding on the criteria which make an item important. 
Prior researchers surveyed financial statement user groups, such as financial analysts (Firth, 1979) so 
as to allocate weights more objectively. However this approach raises further questions with regard to 
the user groups to include, sampling issues, etc.; additionally, not all users have the same needs 
(Benjamin et al., 1977). An alternative method of weighting, which aims to measure the quality rather 
than quantity of disclosures, has been employed by Hodgdon et al. (2008) and Hodgdon (2004). This 
is the “Saidin” index, which ‘weights each disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample 
that do not comply with the item’ Hodgdon et al. (2008: 6, with reference to Spetz and Baker, 1999). 
Therefore, less common disclosures receive a greater weighting. Hodgdon et al. (2008) employ this 
method in parallel to the commonly used dichotomous approach. 
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the disclosure checklist and accordingly each item should be considered 
independently. 
This method has also been applied by many prior studies in measuring compliance 
with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures (i.e. by Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; and 
Hodgdon et al., 2008). However, this kind of disclosure index entails an important 
limitation: the number of disclosure items required by different standards varies 
considerably. Some standards require a large number of items to be disclosed (e.g. 
IAS 1) while some others require only a few (e.g. IAS 2). As a result,  
‘standards which require more items to be disclosed or, in other 
words, standards with more items included in the index are 
unintentionally and indirectly not treated equally with those that 
require fewer items to be disclosed’ (Al-Shiab, 2003, 222).  
An alternative method, avoiding this problem, is the ‘Partial Compliance (PC) 
unweighted approach’ employed by Street and Gray (2001) and Al-Shiab (2003, 
2008). According to this approach,  
‘the degree of compliance for each company is measured by adding 
the degree of compliance for each standard and then dividing this 
sum by the number of standards applicable to each company. This 
implicitly gives equal weighting to each applicable standard and 
avoids the problem of unintentionally giving more weight to a 
standard with a larger number of items in the index’ (Al-Shiab 
2003: 223).  








                                                
=       (Eq. 4.2) 
 
68 I am grateful to David Alexander for pointing this out. 
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Where PCj is the total compliance score for each company and 0 ≤ PCj ≤ 1. Xi is the 
level of compliance with each standard’s mandatory disclosures. This means that, 
initially, using the ‘dichotomous’ approach, the researcher calculates the compliance 
with each standard separately. Subsequently, the sum of these compliance scores (X) 
is divided by the total number of relevant/applicable standards for each company j 
d, arguably, the compliance score 
identified may be misleading (depending on the objective of the study) as it is 
ethod, would be PCx = [(3/3+4/5+3/9)/3] = 0.74 i.e. 74%. This 
example illustrates that the PC method measures compliance with the Standards 
i.e. Rj.   
The following examples illustrate the computation of the compliance scores in 
accordance with the two methods. Let us assume that three standards are applicable 
to company X and that Standard A requires three items to be disclosed, Standard B 
requires five items to be disclosed and Standard C requires nine items to be 
disclosed. Company X discloses one item required by Standard A, two items 
required by Standard B and seven items required by Standard C. The compliance 
score as calculated by means of the dichotomous approach would be Cx = (10/17) = 
0.59 i.e. 59%. The score according to the PC unweighted method, on the other hand, 
would be PCx = [(1/3+2/5+7/9)/3] = 0.50 i.e. 50%. The example illustrates that, with 
the ‘dichotomous’ approach, the low compliance with standards A and B is obscured 
by the high compliance with Standard C an
affected by compliance with only one standard. 
On the other hand, let us assume that company X discloses all three items required 
by Standard A, four out of the five items required by Standard B and three out of the 
nine items required by Standard C. Under the dichotomous approach the compliance 
score would again be Cx = (10/17) = 0.59, i.e. 59%. However, the score according to 
the PC unweighted m
under examination.  
The study of Street and Gray (2001) is the only identified to have employed the 
above methods simultaneously. However the researchers employ both methods, 
without commenting or comparing the respective advantages or disadvantages. 
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Additionally, whilst their results indicate different compliance scores, the study does 
not discuss or test the significance of this difference. This is particularly important 
since their research instrument consists of a range of items which were required by 
IAS at that time: from potentially 1 item required by IAS 23 to potentially 12 items 
by IAS 12.69 Finally, they find different significant associations under each method 
between the dependent variable (compliance score) and a number of independent 
 Europe. Street and Gray (2001) also use both methods of calculating a 
compliance index for measurement requirements, and find a similar variation in their 
ing of the complete annual 
report is needed prior to proceeding with examining compliance (Cooke, 1992).70 
                                                
variables.  
More specifically, when the dependent variable of compliance score has been 
calculated by the PC unweighted method they find, inter alia, a significant positive 
association with being domiciled in China and Switzerland and a negative 
association with the size of the domestic capital market. However, when the 
dependent variable of compliance score has been measured by Cooke’s dichotomous 
approach, they do not find significant associations with these variables. They find 
instead a negative association with being domiciled in Germany, France or Other 
Western
results. 
Nevertheless, both methods share some limitations. The first is that irrespective of 
the method employed, the investigator needs to exercise judgement on whether a 
disclosure requirement is not complied with by, or not applicable to, a specific 
company. In order to avoid penalising a company for non-compliance with a 
standard which might not be applicable, a thorough read
(This approach has been followed in the present study.)  
The second is that judgement is needed in deciding how to treat partial compliance 
with disclosure requirements relating to multiple information elements. For example, 
 
69 In a private conversation, Donna Street confirmed that the reason for using both methods in this 
study was the substantial differences in the items required by the standards examined.  
70 In addition, Tower et al. (1999) and Taplin et al. (2002) compute two compliance ratios: One that 
assumes non-disclosure as non-compliance and a second one assuming non-disclosure as non-
applicability. A similar (but not identical) approach is followed by Patton and Zelenka (1997).  
122 
Chapter 4 – Level of Compliance with IFRS Mandatory Disclosures 
 
IAS 1 paragraph 76 (sub-paragraph a) requires, inter alia, the following disclosure: 
‘for each class of share capital: (i) the number of shares authorised and (ii) the 
number of shares issued and fully paid, and issued but not fully paid’. The question 
arises as to whether partial compliance constitutes compliance or non-compliance. 
Buzby (1975), Inchausti (1997) and Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) allocate a 
proportion of 1 to each component of such multiple disclosure requirements, which 
‘is expected to reduce subjectivity of the scoring process and produce a more reliable 
compliance score’ (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004, 355). However, Inchausti (1997) 
 PC method may be more sensitive to the researchers’ skills 
to score complex standards. This problem will be less apparent under the 
earchers employ, they have to ensure the 
content validity and the reliability of their research instrument. Both issues have been 
                                                
acknowledges that this procedure also relies on the researcher’s judgement.  
The third one is that the
dichotomous approach. 
4.6.3 Developing the disclosure checklist: validity and reliability 
Irrespective of which of the two methods res
considered in the present research.  
Initially, a scoring sheet based on the IFRS requirements which specifically deal with 
mandatory disclosures was constructed.71 This required judgment in determining 
what constituted a disclosure item, as the disclosure sections typically also include 
several paragraphs which explain the required disclosures or encourage, but do not 
require, specific disclosures. Further, some standards make reference to disclosures 
required by other standards and accordingly there is the risk of duplication. To 
address this problem and avoid arbitrariness in allocating identical disclosure 
requirements to specific standards, it was decided to include items under the standard 
 
71 The ‘Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu IFRS Presentation and disclosure checklist 2005’ and the 
corresponding PricewaterhouseCoopers checklist were also consulted in this process. However, 
neither was adopted because they had been structured according to categories (e.g. disclosures related 
to the balance sheet).  
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which mainly dealt with the issue being regulated.72 (For example, the specific 
requirements relating to the presentation of property, plant and equipment were 
included under IAS 16. However, the corresponding requirements in IAS 1 were not 
scoring sheet employed in this study. Additionally, as is 
ce have not 
been aw
T ble 4 raph 76 (sub-paragraphs a&b). 
76 n ent  on the face of the balance sheet or in e not
included (paragraphs 74&75)).   
Another issue to be considered is that many standards incorporate paragraphs 
disaggregated across sub-paragraphs into two to four levels. To address this problem, 
it was decided that disclosures required up to the 1st level of disaggregation should 
constitute disclosure items. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide an example of the disclosures 
required by IAS 1 paragraph 76 and sub-paragraphs a and b and the corresponding 
extract from the disclosure 
also the case in most prior studies, fractional scores for partial complian
arded (see above). 
a :3: Extract from IAS 1 – Parag
A ity shall disclose the following, either
th es: 
 (a) for each class of share capital: 
  (i)   the number of shares authorised; 
  (ii) ed and fully paid, and issued but not fully paid;  the number of shares issu
  (iii) par value per share, or that the shares have no par value; 
  (iv) at the end of the period; 
 a reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the beginning and 
  (v)  the rights, preferences and restrictions attaching to that class including restrictions on the distribution of dividends and the repayment of capital; 
  associates; and 
(vi) sidiaries or shares in the entity held by the entity or by its sub
  (vii) shares reserved for issue under options and contracts for the sale of shares, including the terms and amounts; and 







                                                 
f course be an element of randomness introduced by the standard setting p72 There may o rocess or the 
standard setters’ agenda.  
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Table 4:4: sub-
76  Score (1, n/a, 0) 
Extract from the disclosure checklist: IAS 1 - Paragraph 76 (
paragraphs a&b). 
An entity shall disclose the following, either on the face of the 
balance sheet or in the notes: 
 
g and at the end of the period; (v) the rights, preferences 
 
(a) and restrictions attaching to that class including restrictions on 
the distribution of dividends and the repayment of capital; (vi) 
shares in the entity held by the entity or by its subsidiaries or 
associates; and(vii) shares reserved for issue under options and 
contracts for the sale of shares, including the terms and amounts; 
and 
(i) the number of shares authorised; (ii) the number of shares 
issued and fully paid, and issued but not fully paid; (iii) par 
value per share, or that the shares have no par value; (iv) a 
reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the 
beginnin
 a description of the nature and purpose of each reserv(b) e within equity. 
 
On that basis, the researcher constructed an initial scoring sheet which included 509 
se, the initial 
disclosure checklist was reviewed independently by the first supervisor and by a 
                                                
items required to be disclosed by the standards extant at the end of April 2006 
(excluding 6 standards73). The scoring sheet was constructed in a way that would 
allow for calculation of compliance scores under both methods. 
4.6.3.1 Content validity 
Content validity indicates whether the instrument ‘adequately measures the concept 
of interest’ (Vlachos, 2001, 184 with reference to Sekaran, 1992) (i.e., in this case, 
compliance with disclosure requirements). It is usually established when the items 
which are supposed to measure the concept are evaluated by a group of expert judges 
to ensure that they in fact do so (Kidder and Judd, 1986). In this ca
 
73 These standards represented the IASB’s ‘stable platform’ and were the standards required to be 
implemented in 2005. The 6 standards excluded are: IAS 26 ‘Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans’; IAS 29 ‘Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies’; IAS 30 
‘Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions’; IAS 34 ‘Interim 
Financial Reporting’; and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’. These standards do not apply to the Greek 
sample companies. IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ is also excluded as 
it covers only the recognition and measurement aspects of financial instruments; disclosure and 
presentation are covered by IAS 32 (which is included in the research instrument). 
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senior financial accounting and reporting analyst.74 A similar approach has also been 
followed by other researchers (e.g. Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Vlachos, 2001; and Cooke, 1992). After receiving their comments and suggestions, 
any remaining ambiguities were discussed with the second supervisor.  
After this verification process, the final disclosure checklist included 481 mandatory 
items, required by 31 standards, as at extant in April 2006. Table 5.5 shows the 
number of items identified by each researcher, and the final ind 75ex.  The differences 
in the number of items initially identified for some standards (IAS 8, 14 and 38) 
ber of items required by each standard vary 
substantially: from 3 (IFRS 6, IAS 23, IAS 20, and IAS 18) to 72 (IAS 1). As 
iscussed above, this is particularly important, for this type of research, when it 
comes to choosing the methodology which is applied to measure compliance with 




                                                
illustrate the need for carrying out this verification process. These differences arose 
because (i) the same disclosure items required by multiple standards (i.e. 
duplication), which should have only been included once, and (ii) different 
judgements relating to the level of disaggregation (see above).  









74 T pervisor i fessor of Accou  and a Chartered ountant. Her area pertise is 
fina porting. Th volved ha re than 12 years erience in the field or to this 
he was employed in the banking industry for more than 20 years. 
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Table 4:5: Ensuring the validity of t denti  by 
each researcher and in the final index. 







by the analyst 
Final index  
(after 2nd 
supervisor’s advice) 





IAS 1 74 76 72 72 
IAS 2 9 8 8 8 
IAS 7 10 10 10 10 
IAS 8 6 21 8 16 
IAS 10 5 4 4 4 
IAS 11 9 8 8 8 
IAS 12 14 11 11 11 
IAS 14 26 25 21 20 
IAS 16 17 15 15 15 
IAS 17 23 19 19 19 
IAS 18 4 3 3 3 
IAS 19 23 23 23 23 
IAS 20 3 3 3 3 
IAS 21 9 8 8 8 
IAS 23 3 3 3 3 
IAS 24 18 17 17 17 
IAS 27 11 11 11 11 
IAS 28 13 11 13 13 
IAS 31 7 8 8 8 
IAS 32 31 31 31 31 
IAS 33 8 8 7 7 
IAS 36 38 38 39 39 
IAS 37 17 15 15 15 
IAS 38 18 16 14 14 
IAS 40 19 19 20 21 
IAS 41 23 23 23 23 
IFRS 1 17 14 14 14 
IFRS 2 15 12 12 12 
IFRS 3 25 20 20 20 
IFRS 5 11 10 10 10 
IFRS 6 3 3 3 3 
Total 509 493 473 481 
4.6.3.2 Reliability of the research instrument 
Apart from validity, reliability of the research instrument needs to be ensured. 
Reliability is concerned with the accuracy of measurement, i.e. how well the concept 
under investigation is being measured (Vlachos, 2001 with reference to Sekaran, 
1992), and the precision, stability and consistency of measurement. Stability refers to 
the ability of the instrument to measure the concept of interest consistently, 
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independent of timing and conditions. The main threat to reliability derives from the 
subjective judgment exercised in completing the research instrument (Vlachos, 
2001).  
To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the researcher, the first 
supervisor as well as the senior financial accounting and reporting analyst 
ilcoxon 
Matched Pairs Test’) was used. The Wilcoxon Test ranks the differences of repeated 
Table 4.6 shows the compliance scores calculated under both measures by all three 
investigators individually. Based on the Kruskall-Wallis Test and irrespective of the 
method used, the compliance scores across the three investigators are not 
significantly different. It was therefore concluded that content validity of the research 
instrument was ensured and the research instrument was reliable.  
independently scored 10 companies, as a pilot study. Considering the findings of 
Street and Gray (2001) as well as the fact that this study examines also compliance 
with standards which require substantially different number of items to be disclosed, 
it was decided this pilot study to employ both methods simultaneously and explore 
whether the two methods do produce significantly different compliance scores.  
To test the reliability of the research instrument, it was examined whether there is a 
statistically significant difference in the scores computed between the three 
researchers. This was done by employing the ‘Kruskall-Wallis H test’. Given that the 
final research instrument had been agreed by all investigators, differences in the 
compliance scores across the investigators were not expected to be significant.  
To examine whether the two scoring methods produce significantly different 
compliance scores, the ‘Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test’ (also known as the ‘W
measurements on the same sample and then tests the significance of these 
differences. Therefore, it effectively tests the significance in the different ranking 
score order of the companies under examination. Identifying statistically significant 
compliance across the two methods (i.e. different ranking order) would indicate the 
need for using both methods simultaneously in the overall study. 
Table 4:6: Testing the reliability of the research instrument and comparing the compliance scores under both methods. 
Researcher Supervisor Financial reporting analyst 
PC1 Dichotomous2 PC1 Dichotomous2 PC1 Dichotomous2 Company 
Score Ranking      Ranking Score Score Ranking Ranking 
 
 
Score Score Ranking Ranking Score
A     0.66 6 5 0.75 0.66 6 5 0.78 0.62 6 4 0.71 
B      0.82 1 1 0.84 0.84 1 1 0.86 0.79 1 1 0.80 
C        0.57 9 8 0.68 0.61 8 9 0.67 0.51 9 7 0.62 
D      0.60 8 9 0.66 0.60 9 8 0.68 0.52 8 8 0.58 
E      0.71 5 7 0.71 0.69 5 7 0.71 0.66 5 6 0.63 
F      0.76 2 2 0.82 0.77 2 2 0.84 0.74 2 1 0.80 
G      0.73 3 4 0.78 0.74 3 4 0.79 0.72 3 2 0.74 
H     0.51 10 10 0.62 0.51 10 10 0.63 0.49 10 9 0.57 
I     0.72 4 3 0.79 0.73 4 3 0.80 0.68 4 3 0.72 
J      0.64 7 6 0.72 0.65 7 6 0.74 0.58 7 5 0.66 
Median 0.69           0.74 0.68 0.76 0.64 0.69
Mean 0.67           0.74 0.68 0.75 0.63 0.68
Wilcoxon signed 
rank test† Z: -2.670*** Z: -2.809*** Z: -2.501** 
PC1 
Kruskal Wallis Test Chi-Square: 1.091 
Dichotomous2 
Kruskal Wallis Test Chi-Square: 3.167 
1Compliance scores calculated with the ‘Partial Compliance’ unweighted approach, 2Compliance scores calculated with the commonly used ‘dichotomous’  
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However, the financial accounting and reporting analyst took a more conservative 
approach when scoring compared to the other two members, more frequently 
assuming non-compliance with a requirement rather than non-applicability. 
Additionally, the same investigator, in some cases and in contrast to the other two 
researchers, tended to give a non-compliance score when a part of a 
multiple/complex requirement was missing. Had the three investigators followed the 
approach applied by Inchausti (1997) and Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) in the 
design of the research instrument (i.e. allowing for partial compliance with 
multiple/complex requirements) the scores are likely to have been even closer. 
However, the fact that the results are not significantly different illustrates that this 
approach would not have changed the findings substantially.  
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test illustrates that the two methods under comparison 
produce significantly different compliance scores. More specifically, the 
‘dichotomous’ approach produces consistently higher compliance scores than the PC 
unweighted approach when applied to the data. Accordingly, Cooke’s dichotomous 
approach produces significantly different compliance scores from the PC method. It 
is also shown that the relative scores (i.e. companies’ ranking order) differ under the 
two methods. 
Considering the variability in the items required by the standards included in the 
disclosure checklist, the significance of the disclosures mandated by IAS 1 with 
regard to these findings was examined as a potentially indicative example. In contrast 
to the majority of standards, IAS 1 deals more with presentation issues rather than 
technical accounting issues. However, it requires the largest number of items to be 
disclosed and subsequently affects significantly the number of items included in the 
research instrument. The alternative findings (i.e. having excluded IAS 1) are 




Table 4:7: Testing the reliability of the research instrument and comparing the compliance scores under both methods, excluding IAS 1. 
 
1Compliance scores calculated with the ‘Partial Compliance’ unweighted approach, 2Compliance scores calculated with the commonly used ‘dichotomous’  
Researcher Supervisor Financial reporting analyst 
PC1 Dichotomous2 PC1 Dichotomous2 PC1 Dichotomous2 Company 
Score Ranking      Ranking Score Score Ranking Ranking Score Score Ranking Ranking Score
A         0.65 6 5 0.66 0.64 6 4 0.69 0.61 6 4 0.63 
B         0.82 1 1 0.80 0.83 1 1 0.81 0.79 1 2 0.75 
C         0.55 9 8 0.55 0.59 7 9 0.51 0.49 9 7 0.45 
D         0.58 8 9 0.53 0.58 8 8 0.53 0.51 8 7 0.45 
E         0.70 5 6 0.62 0.68 5 7 0.62 0.65 5 6 0.54 
F         0.76 2 2 0.79 0.76 2 2 0.79 0.73 2 1 0.76 
G         0.72 3 4 0.68 0.72 3 5 0.68 0.71 3 3 0.65 
H         0.49 10 10 0.46 0.49 9 10 0.46 0.47 10 8 0.43 
I         0.71 4 3 0.70 0.71 4 3 0.70 0.67 4 3 0.65 
J         0.62 7 7 0.61 0.64 6 6 0.64 0.57 7 5 0.55 
Median 0.68          0.64 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.59
Mean 0.66          0.64 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.59
Wilcoxon signed  
rank test† Z: -1.785* Z: -1.483 Z: -2.204** 
PC1 
Kruskal Wallis Test Chi-Square: 0.905 
Dichotomous2 
Kruskal Wallis Test Chi-Square: 1.583 
approach. †Two tailed tests. *Significant at 10% and **Significant at 5%. 
 
Chapter 4 – Level of Compliance with IFRS Mandatory Disclosures 
 
Table 4.7 shows that: a) the compliance scores under the dichotomous approach are 
approximately 10% lower after excluding the requirements of IAS 1 (This finding is 
significant at the 1% level across all three investigators.); b) the compliance scores 
under the PC method are also lower but only by approximately 1%. (Likewise, this 
finding is also significant at 1% level across all three investigators). These results 
indicate the significance of one standard for the compliance scores identified under 
the dichotomous approach and how, depending on the research objectives, this may 
provide a misleading perception about companies’ compliance. 
The significantly lower compliance score under the dichotomous approach, after 
having excluded IAS 1, affects the significance of the difference of the scores across 
the two methods.76 However, the relative compliance score (i.e. companies’ ranking 
order) continues to differ under the two methods, but less significantly. 
Following this pilot study, the reliability of the research instrument was confirmed 
and it was decided that both methods should be employed for the purposes of this 
study. Considering the perplexing finds of Street and Gray (2001) it was decided that 
only the explanatory factors that appear to be significant under both methods are 
considered to be as valid and robust findings. Finally, it is noted that only 4 of the 
companies used in the pilot study are included in the full sample, so no bias is 
assumed in the overall results of the study. 
4.6.4 Measurement of variables 
As indicated in the development of the testable hypotheses (4.5), specific corporate 
characteristics will be tested as explanatory factors of the compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. There is a wide variation among prior studies on the 
surrogates selected for corporate characteristics that may be related to compliance 
                                                 
76 More specifically, with regard to the researcher, the two methods continue to produce significantly 
different compliance scores but at 10% and not 1% as was the case previously. For the supervisor, the 
two methods do not continue to produce significantly different results, and for the financial reporting 
analyst the findings do not change. 
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with companies’ disclosures.77 This variation mainly depends on the data being 
available and may be also a reason for the mixed findings in the prior literature 
regarding the corporate characteristics related to companies’ levels of compliance 
with mandatory disclosures. This section, illustrates, first, what measures have been 
used in prior studies with reference to the three groups of variables under 
consideration in this study. Then, the surrogates employed in this study and the 
corresponding descriptive statistics of those measures are presented. 
4.6.4.1 Structure-related variables 
As indicated above, the structure-related variables chosen for the purposes of this 
study are size and gearing as well as the impact on 2004 shareholders’ equity arising 
from implementation of IFRS. Table 4.8 illustrates the various measures employed in 
prior studies as surrogates regarding structure-related corporate characteristics.  
Table 4:8: Structure-related variables tested in mandatory disclosure studies. 
*Measures 
of Size Study 
*Measures of 
Gearing Study 
Total assets  
Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, 2007; 
Hassan et al., 2006; Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Ali et al., 
2004; Al-Shiab, 2003; Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Taplin et al., 2002; Vlachos, 
2001; Street and Gray, 2001; 
Street and Bryant, 2000; Tower et 
al., 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; 
Craig and Diga, 1998; Patton and 
Zelenka, 1997; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 1994; 
Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994. 
Long term debt 
to equity  
Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003; Taplin 
et al., 2002; Tower et al., 
1999; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Wallace et 
al., 1994.  
Total sales  
Peng et al., 2008; Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman, 2007; Hassan et 
al., 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; 
Street and Gray, 2001; Vlachos, 
2001; Craig and Diga, 1998; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994. 
Total debt to 
(Market 
Capitalisation + 
Book Value of 
total debt) 
Al-Shiab, 2003. 
                                                 
77 It is acknowledged that there is vast literature regarding the corporate characteristics related to 
companies’ voluntary levels of disclosures. However, the references here focus on studies examining 
the explanatory factors of compliance with mandatory disclosures as they are more relevant to the 
purposes of the present study. 
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and Total debt 
Glaum and Street, 2003. 
Total debt to 
total tangible 
assets 
Ali et al., 2004. 
Market 
capitalisation 
Street and Gray, 2001; Vlachos, 
2001; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995. 






employed Akhtaruddin, 2005. 
Total liabilities 
to equity  
Craig and Diga, 1998; 
Patton and Zelenka, 
1997. 
Shareholders’ 
equity Tai et al., 1990. 
Total debt to 
total assets Hassan et al., 2006. 
Total debt Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994.  
Total debt to 
equity 
Al-Shammari et al., 
2008. 
*In the majority of cases, the original variables shown are transformed by using several alternatives 
(e.g. natural logarithms, percentile ranks or normal scores) for bringing them closer to a normal 
distribution. 
 
With reference to size, Cooke (1989) argues that although total assets, sales and 
number of shareholders are important variables, there is no theoretical underpinning 
as to why one should select one variable rather than another. Drawing on the above 
table, it becomes apparent that many studies use two or more measures as a size 
surrogate (e.g. Street and Gray, 2001; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Vlachos, 2001). However, 
it is common that, when multivariate analyses are conducted these variables tend to 
be highly correlated and thus only one is tested (cf. Street and Gray, 2001). Like 
Street and Gray (2001), Vlachos (2001), Owusu-Ansah (1998b) and Wallace and 
Naser, (1995), the present study employs companies’ market value as a measure for 
size in order to test H4.1.78  
As far as gearing is concerned, like Hassan et al. (2006), the ratio of total debt to 
total assets has been employed in this study in order to test H4.2. This selection 
serves the following two purposes. Had the alternative of using total debt to total 
shareholders’ equity been employed, three companies reported net liabilities and 
consequently negative gearing would have been excluded from the analyses. 
Additionally, this alternative would also cause high multicollinearity between 
gearing and impact on 2004 shareholders’ equity which is the third structure-related 
                                                 
78 It is acknowledged that this surrogate has the limitation of being sensitive to periodic share prices 
fluctuations (cf. Vlachos, 2001).  
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variable tested in this study.79 The latter is measured by using Gray’s comparability 
index as a surrogate for testing H4.3. (Gray’s comparability index is also a ratio and 
thus any scale effects are eliminated.) 
Table 4.9 provides the descriptive statistics regarding the three structure-related 
variables. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that only gearing is normally 
distributed. 
Table 4:9: Descriptive statistics of the structure-related variables employed. 
Statistics *Market capitalisation  Gearing  
‡EquCoI 
Mean             274 0.29 1.11 
SD 934 0.17 0.74 
Min. 2 0 0.35 
Max. 10,016 0.68 8.86 
Median 46 0.29 0.99 
Skewness 8.191 -0.025 8.180 
Kurtosis 79,584 -0.589 84.465 
Kolmogorov- Smirmov (Sig) 0.000 0.200* 0.000 
Normality rejected Yes No Yes 
*€ millions. €1=US$1.2597 and €1=£0.6930 (28/4/06-FT). ‡It is noted that a value larger than 
1.0 implies that the measure examined (i.e. shareholders’ equity) is higher under Greek 
GAAP than under IFRS. This indicates a negative impact as a result of the adoption of IFRS. 
Similarly, a value lower than 1.0 implies that the measure examined is lower under Greek 
GAAP than under IFRS, implying a positive impact.  
4.6.4.2 Performance-related variables 
Profitability is a fundamental measure of a company’s performance and is concerned 
with the financial inputs compared to the financial outputs. Depending on the 
objective of the analysis carried out at each particular point of time, profitability can 
be measured and expressed in several ways. The three most common approaches are: 
return on capital employed, expressed as profit before tax to shareholders’ equity 
plus long-term debt; net profit margin, expressed as net profit to net sales; and return 
on assets, expressed as profit before (or after tax) to total assets. 
                                                 
79 The use of this alternative was explored and high multicollinearity was reported. 
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Table 4.10 reports the different surrogates that have been employed in prior literature 
for performance related variables. It is interesting to note that although liquidity has 
been heavily tested in the voluntary literature (cf. Leventis, 2001) it has not been 
explored so often in the literature examining compliance with mandatory disclosures. 





Net profit to total 
assets 
Taplin et al., 2002; Tower et 
al., 1999. Quick ratio 
Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2007; Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998b. 
Net profit to 
equity 
Peng et al., 2008; Hassan et 
al., 2006; Patton and 
Zelenka, 1997. 
Liquidity 
Vlachos, 2001; Wallace 
and Naser, 1995; Wallace 
et al., 1994.  
Net operating 
profit to total 
assets 
Ali et al., 2004. 
Pre-tax profit to 
Equity 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 
2003; Glaum and Street, 
2003; Vlachos, 2001; Street 
and Gray, 2001; Street and 
Bryant, 2000; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 
1994.  
Pre-tax profit to 
Sales 
Vlachos, 2001; Owusu-
Ansah, 1998b; Wallace and 





after tax to 
capital employed) 
Al-Shiab, 2003. 
Net profit on 
capital employed 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 
2005; Akhtaruddin, 2005; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998b;  
Net profit on 
sales Akhtaruddin, 2005. 
 
*In the majority of cases, the original variables shown are transformed by using several alternatives 
(e.g. natural logarithms, percentile ranks or normal scores) for bringing them closer to a normal 
distribution. 
 
The present study, like Vlachos (2001), Owusu-Ansah (1998b) and Wallace and 
Naser, (1995), employs pre-tax profit to net sales as a surrogate for profitability in 
order to test H4.4.80 The difference between 2004 net income under Greek GAAP 
                                                 
80 Pre-tax profit to total assets has also been tested with no difference in findings in both the univariate 
and multivariate analyses. 
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and the corresponding figure, as restated under IFRS, measured by using Gray’s 
comparability index is used as a surrogate for testing H4.5. Current assets to current 
liabilities are employed as a surrogate for liquidity in order to test H4.6.  
Table 4:11: Descriptive statistics of the performance-related variables employed. 
Statistics ROS  ‡EarCoI Liquidity  
Mean 0.04 1.29 2.13 
SD 0.17 3.81 5.17 
Min. -0.97 -20.60 0.15 
Max. 0.66 32.05 61.43 
Median 0.05 0.96 1.40 
Skewness -2.228 3.629 10.416 
Kurtosis 12.975 42.103 116.883 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Sig) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Normality rejected Yes Yes Yes 
‡It is noted that a value larger than 1.0 implies that the measure examined (i.e. net income) is 
higher under Greek GAAP than under IFRS. This indicates a negative impact as a result of 
the adoption of IFRS. Similarly, a value lower than 1.0 implies that the measure examined is 
lower under Greek GAAP than under IFRS, implying a positive impact.  
Like the two of the three structure-related variables above, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests indicate that none of these variables is also normally distributed. 
4.6.4.3 Market-related variables 
The first market related variable employed in this study relates to audit firm size. 
Considering the previous discussion regarding the influence of the type of auditor in 
Greece, a dichotomous variable where 1 represents the companies having a ‘Big 4’ 
auditor and 0 all other companies is employed for testing H4.7. Beyond being of 
particular relevance for the purposes of the present study, this categorisation is also 
consistent with the majority of the prior studies.  
The second market related variable refers to the industry categorisation. Drawing on 
Table 4.12 it becomes apparent that there is no consistent way of classifying 
companies across industry grouping in the relevant literature. The present research 
follows Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), Street and Bryant (2000) and Wallace et 
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al. (1994) who differentiate companies across manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
to test H4.8. Accordingly, a dichotomous variable where 1 represents manufacturing 
companies and 0 represents all other companies.  
Table 4:12: Industry categorisation in mandatory disclosure studies. 
Industry classifications Study 
1) Resources 2) Manufacturing  
3) Financial 4) Services Taplin et al., 2002; Tower et al., 1999 
1) Manufacturing or financials 2) Other Patton and Zelenka, 1997 
1) Manufacturing 2) Services Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Street and Bryant, 2000; Wallace et al., 1994  
1) Machinery and metal industry 2) Mining and 
building equipment 3) Textiles 4) Chemical  
5) Food and other services  
Al-Shiab, 2003 
1) Finance 2) Utilities 3) Property  
4) Consolidated enterprises 5) Industrials 6) Hotels Tai et al., 1990 
1) Manufacturing1 2) Manufacturing2  
3) Transportation and Commerce  
4) Wholesale 5) Services 6) Other 
Street and Gray, 2001 
1) Diversified holding 2) Natural resources  
3) Banks and financial institutions  
4) Manufacturing 5) Real estate and property 
development 6) Utilities 7) Other services 
Craig and Diga, 1998 
1) Conglomerates 2) Manufacturing 3) Others Vlachos, 2001 
1) Conglomerates 2) Others Wallace and Naser, 1995 
1) Financial 2) Others Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
1) Conglomerate 2) Manufacturing 3) Agriculture 
4) Others  Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005 
 
Table 4.13 summarises the information with regard to the surrogates for corporate 
characteristics employed in this study and the expected signs of their relationships 
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Table 4:13: Summary of the determinants of compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures.  
Variable Measurement Expected Sign 
Structure-related   
Size Market value + - 
Gearing Total debt to total assets + - 
Change in the 2004 
shareholders’ equity 
figure as a result of 
the adoption of IFRS,  
Gray’s comparability index with regard to 2004 
shareholders’ equity (EquCoI) 
+ 
- 
Performance-related   
Profitability Pre-tax profit to net sales (ROS) + - 
Change in the 2004 
net profit figure as a 
result of the adoption 
of IFRS 
Gray’s comparability index with regard to 2004  
net profit (EarCoI) 
+ 
- 
Liquidity Current assets to current liabilities + - 
Market-related   
Audit firm size Dummy variable: 1 if the audit firm is a ‘Big 4’, 0 otherwise + 
Industry Dummy variable: 1 if a company is manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
+ 
- 
4.6.5 Univariate analyses 
Answering research question three (Q3) implies that the correlation of the 
compliance scores and the corporate characteristics selected as proxies for the factors 
explaining compliance with mandatory disclosures will be statistically tested. This 
examination can be performed by conducting univariate and multivariate analyses.  
The above descriptive statistics reveal that the continuous independent variables 
under examination are not normally distributed (the exception being gearing). This is 
normal in relatively large samples (Pallant, 2005) and suggests that the relationship 
between compliance scores and potential explanatory factors should be examined 
with a non-parametric test (e.g. Kendall rank correlation coefficient (tau)) (cf. 
Leventis, 2001), in a univariate analysis setting. However, non-parametric tests are 
not powerful as the parametric ones. ‘They may not detect differences or 
relationships [between variables] even when they actually exist’ (Pallant, 2005: 82).  
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As an alternative, a ‘transformation’ of the variables can be undertaken in order that 
they can be brought closer to normality (cf. Maddala, 2002; Fielding and Gilbert, 
2004; Pallant, 2005; Hassan et al., 2006). As indicated above, this is normal practice 
in the relevant literature and allows the use of parametric tests which are more 
powerful. On that basis, the square root of the independent variables is utilised in this 
study as a transformation method for the independent variables that are not normally 
distributed (cf. Pallant, 2005; Fielding and Gilbert, 2004).81 Hence, the parametric 
test ‘Pearson correlation coefficient’ is employed as a univariate test for examining 
the relationship between compliance scores and the potential explanatory factors. 
However, univariate analyses are simplistic since they do not take into consideration 
the simultaneous impact of other factors that may explain compliance (Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh, 2005; Vlachos, 2001). As Fielding and Gilbert (2004: 168) explain, 
correlation ‘is simply a measure of association that tells us whether two variables 
vary together’. Instead, if one is interested to ‘explain’ the behaviour of one variable, 
the dependent variable, using the predictive power of two or more independent 
variables (as is the case here), multiple regression analyses should be employed 
(Fielding and Gilbert, 2004). Accordingly, multivariate analyses are considered 
necessary for the purposes of the present study and consequently more weight is 
given on their findings.82  
                                                 
81 Irrespective of the transformation of the independent variables, considering that the analyses carried 
out are based on a sample of 153 observations, parametric tests are considered to be more relevant. 
This argument is based on premises of the Central Limit Theorem which assumes normal distribution 
of the observations within a relatively large sample. More specifically, Fielding and Gilbert (2004: 
231) explain that by the ‘fundamental theorem of statistics, called the central limit theorem, it can be 
proved that the distribution of sample means always approximates to the bell-shaped normal 
distribution, provided that it is based on a sufficient number of samples each large enough in size’. A 
sample having more than 100 observations is suggested as large enough (ibid: 232).  
82 In fact, it is common only multivariate analyses to be used in the disclosures literature (e.g. Leventis 
and Weetman, 2004a&b; Ali et al., 2004; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007). 
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4.6.6 Multivariate analyses 
4.6.6.1 Transformation of the dependent variable 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most commonly used technique in disclosure 
studies (Leventis, 2001) where the dependent variable is the compliance/disclosure 
score and the independent variables include the factors discussed above. However, 
using a ratio in a regression model may result in the model producing prediction of 
probabilities greater than one (Al-Shiab, 2003). This problem may arise because the 
dependent variable is bounded (i.e. lies between 1 and 0) (Cooke, 1998). 
Additionally, the compliance score may not be normally distributed and thus the 
major assumption of the classical OLS regression, i.e. that the dependent variable is 
normally distributed, is violated.  
To mitigate this problem, it is common, researchers to employ transformations of the 
dependent variables in disclosure studies. This is in line with Cooke (1998: 211) who 
explains that in these types of studies ‘the dependent variable is a metric ratio and 
therefore can be legitimately transformed, where necessary, and used in regression 
analysis’. 
These transformations include regressions based on: the log odds ratio of the 
dependent variable (e.g. Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Inchausti, 1997); on 
ranks/percentile ranks (e.g. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004a; Lang and Lundholm, 1996); and on normal scores (e.g. Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004a; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
Other methods of transformation include using the natural logarithm of the 
dependent variable (i.e. a log-lin model, as employed by Hodgdon et al. (2009) and 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007)) and rank regressions where only the dependent variable 
is transformed to percentiles ranks (as employed by Botosan (1997) and Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006)). 
Cooke (1998) compares and contrasts some of these methods by employing them in 
two case studies so as to explore the implications for research in disclosure studies. 
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For one case study the log of the odds ratio of the dependent variable provided the 
best fit, whereas for the second case study the rank data provided the best fit. Thus he 
concludes that the ‘success’ of each method depends on the structure of the data 
(ibid: 223) and that ‘no one procedure is best but that multiple approaches are helpful 
to ensure the results are robust across methods’ (Cooke, 1998: 209).  
Following this proposition, the present research employs two regressions to control 
for problems that may rise because of the data structure. It follows prior studies 
which have transformed the dependent variable to percentiles ranks (e.g. Botosan, 
1997; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006)83 and also those that have employed the log of 
the odds ratio (e.g. Al-Shammari et al. 2008; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Al-Shiab, 
2003; Inchausti, 1997; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994).84  





)     (Eq. 4.3) 
where Y = the transformed level of compliance and p = the ratio of companies’ 
compliance computed with the disclosure methods explained above. These two 
techniques are applied with regard to both methods for measuring compliance 
employed here (i.e. the PC method and Cooke’s dichotomous approach). It is 
acknowledged that although this transformation surpasses the problem of having a 
                                                 
83 This is not a non-parametric percentile ranks regression (e.g. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Leventis and Weetman, 2004a; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). (The independent variables have not been 
transformed into to ranks. As discussed above, their transformation is based on their square root. This 
avoids the use of non-parametric regression which produces less powerful results (cf. Leventis, 
2001)). Only each company’s compliance score is transformed into percentile ranks. This 
transformation of the dependent variable effectively measures the relative levels of disclosure of the 
companies within the sample (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). It also allows for the comparison of the 
results with those of the OLS regression using the log of the odds ratio as a dependent variable. 
84 Two more types of OLS regressions have also been conducted: one with using the actual 
(untransformed) compliance score as the dependent variable (e.g. Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Ali et al., 2004; Glaum and Street, 
2003; Tower et al., 1999); and one which uses the natural logarithm of the compliance score as the 
dependent variable (i.e. a log-lin model, cf. Hodgdon et al. (2009) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007)). 
The results are similar to those identified by the two main techniques presented herein so their 
presentation is suppressed for reasons of economy. 
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bounded dependent variable it is not always able to correct for kurtosis and skewness 
(Cooke, 1998). 
Percentile ranks are computed in the following way: 
      (Rank-1) / (Sample size – 1)    (Eq. 4.4) 
This yields the percentile of a firm’s rank within the sample where percentiles range 
from 0 (for the lowest ranking firm) to 1 (for the highest-ranking firm). In line with 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), companies are ranked in ascending order, so that 
companies with higher level of compliance receive higher rank. Rank 
transformations have the advantage to be distribution free (McCabe, 1989) and they 
correct for kurtosis and skewness; they ‘are also relatively insensitive to outliers’. 










‘Big 4’ auditor and 0 otherwise and IND  is a dummy variable where 1 represents 
manufacturing companies and 0 otherwise; and εj is the mean zero disturbance term. 
where CSj is the transformed compliance score, measured either with the PC method 
or Cooke’s method; SIZEj is the square root of market value; GEAj is the square root 
of total debt to total assets in 2005; EQUCOIj is the square root of the difference 
between shareholders’ equity in 2004 under Greek GAAP and the restated figure 
under IFRS, measured by Gray’s comparability index; ROSj is the square root of pre-
tax profit on sales in 2005; EARCOIj is the square root of the difference between net 
income in 2004, under Greek GAAP, and the restated figure under IFRS, measured 
by Gray’s comparability index; LIQj is the square root of current assets to current 
liabilities in 2005; AUDj is a dummy variable where 1 represents companies with a 
j
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4.6.6.2 Interpreting the results of the multivariate analyses 
The coefficient determination (commonly known as R2) is the most commonly used 
measure of the goodness of fit of a regression line (Gujarati, 2003: 84). More 
specifically, it is the adjusted R2 that is commonly reported because it is adjusted for 
the ‘degrees of freedom (df)’ of the model (Gujarati, 2003: 218). However, Cooke 
(1998: 215) argues that ‘perhaps R2 is not the ideal measure of best fit for judging 
differences in right-hand-side variables because it is not invariant to changes in 
parameterizations of left-hand side variables.’ Thus, he suggests that in the case of 
dealing with transformed dependent variables, as is the case here, it is preferable for 
the mean square error (MSE) to be minimised.  
Consistent with Cooke (1998), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Leventis and 
Weetman (2004a) perceive the minimisation of the MSE as the best criterion for 
selecting a model in disclosure studies.85  
In line with these studies, herein, the interpretation of the findings of the multivariate 
analyses is primarily based on the significance of the independent variables as these 
are reported in the regression with the lowest MSE. Thus, when the MSE of a 
regression is substantially higher than the others, such a regression is not considered 
providing a good fit for the data. 
However, Cooke (1998: 215) argues that ‘in most disclosure studies prediction is not 
the purpose of the study, but rather an explanation of the variability of the disclosure 
scores is sought’. As mentioned above, multivariate analysis allows for an 
examination of the relationship between the dependent variable (transformed 
compliance score in this case) and ‘each of the corporate characteristics (independent 
variables), while simultaneously controlling for the effects of other independent 
variables in the model’ (Vlachos, 2001: 190). Thus, the best fir for the data may not 
be of a major concern (Al-Shiab, 2003). 
                                                 
85 For value relevance research the R2 is the crucial measure. Thus, the next chapter focuses on the 
adjusted R2 of the regressions performed and, consistent with prior literature, specific tests measuring 
differences in the R2 and adjusted R2 are applied. 
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4.6.7 Econometric considerations 
One of the main assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that there is 
no multicollinearity among the independent variables. A degree of collinearity is 
normal within independent variables used in a regression model. However, when 
high collinearity exists the regression coefficients possess large standard errors 
resulting in their inaccurate estimation. Gujarati (2003, paragraph 10.7) discusses the 
ways that multicollinearity can be detected. The two most commonly used ways in 
prior studies are: the inspection of a matrix of bivariate correlations and the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF).  
The first test indicates the correlations among all the independent variables and is 
performed by conducting the ‘Pearson correlation coefficient’ in the present study. 
The second (VIF) shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the presence 
of multicollinearity and is estimated as follows: VIF = 1/(1-R2). The R2 in this case is 
the determination coefficient when one regresses each independent variable on all 
other variables.  
There appears to be a unanimous agreement in the econometrics literature regarding 
the cut off point of VIF. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable exceeds 10 (VIF 
>10) it is considered to be highly collinear (Gujarati, 2003: 262). However, there is a 
debate regarding the determination of the cut off point in bivariate correlations 
(Pallant, 2005). Gujarati (2003: 359) suggests that an r higher than 0.8 (r>0.8) 
indicates serious multicollinearity. Leventis (2001) adopts a stricter approach with 
the acceptable cut-off value being r≤0.7. This measure is also applied in the present 
research. Overall, it has to be noted that this test has been criticised because a) high 
bivariate correlations may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the 
existence of multicollinearity. Thus multicollinearity may exists even if r is lower 
than 0.5 (Gujarati, 2003).  
A further important assumption of the classical linear regression is that the variance 
of the random error term (u) is assumed to be constant. This is commonly known as 
the assumption of homoscedasticity. However, it is possible for the variance to 
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increase as the independent variable(s) increase. This means that there is 
heteroscedasticity. Gujarati (2003: 399) argues that ‘if we persist in using the usual 
testing procedures despite heteroscedasticity, whatever conclusions we draw or 
inferences we make may be very misleading’.   
In order to address the concerns relating to heteroskedasticity, the present study 
employs ‘Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 3 (HC3)’. This 
alternative method tends to produce better results than White’s (1980) basic method 
because it produces confidence intervals which tend to be even more conservative 
(MacKinnon and White, 1985).  
Heteroscedasticity can arise as a result of the presence of outliers (Gujarati, 2003: 
390). This issue is also considered in the present study and outliers are defined and 
excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure (Fielding and Gilbert, 2004; 
Pallant, 2005). 
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4.7 Results and Discussion 
4.7.1 Introduction 
This section (4.7) provides the analyses and discussion regarding the second and 
third research questions (Q2 and Q3) of this thesis. On that basis, the findings 
regarding the extent which Greek companies complied with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures during 2005 are provided herein. Additionally, analyses exploring the 
factors that explain the levels of compliance identified are also provided herein.  
It is highlighted that, although no specific research question has been set for 
examination, one of the main objectives of this study is to contribute to the literature 
regarding the methods used for measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures. Thus, this section draws also on the implications of the two methods 
employed in this study. 
Section 4.7.2 provides descriptive analyses regarding companies’ level of 
compliance (Q2). Section 4.7.3 provides descriptive analyses regarding companies’ 
level of compliance with each standard separately. Section 4.7.4 presents descriptive 
information regarding companies’ levels of compliance across different categories, 
based on the surrogates selected as determinants for companies’ levels of disclosures. 
Sections 4.7.5 and 4.7.6 report the results of the univariate and multivariate analyses 
respectively, exploring the explanatory factors of compliance (Q3). All these sections 
provide evidence regarding the implications arising from the use of different methods 
for measuring compliance (the exception being 4.7.3). Additionally, the findings are 
discussed along with those of prior studies and the Greek setting. 
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4.7.2 Extent of Greek companies’ compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures 
4.7.2.1 Main findings 
The findings regarding the extent to which Greek companies complied with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures in 2005 are presented in Table 4.14. Additionally, the 
compliance scores under both the PC method and Cooke’s approach are shown 
separately.  
Table 4:14: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores (N=153). 
Compliance Score PC method Cooke’s method 
50 - 59 6 3.9% 0 0.0% 
60 - 69 18 11.8% 8 5.3% 
70 - 79 56 36.6% 42 28.0% 
80 - 89 46 30.1% 70 46.7% 
90 - 100 27 17.6% 33 22.0% 
N 153 100.0% 153 100.0% 
Mean 0.79  0.83  
SD 0.10  0.08  
†Paired sample t-test -12.267*** 
Min 0.50  0.62  
Max 0.95  0.97  
Skewness -0.43  -0.51  
Kurtosis -0.51  -0.49  
Kolmogorov 0.013  0.001  
Normality rejected Yes  Yes  
Median 0.78  0.83  
‡Wilcoxon -9.416*** 
†Compares the mean differences across the compliance scores measured by the two 
different methods. ‡Compares the median differences across the compliance scores 
measured by the two different methods. 
 
Arguably, a relative degree of non-compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements 
might have been expected in countries with substantially different financial reporting 
regimes compared to IFRS, during the first year of IFRS implementation. However, 
the findings in Table 4.14 illustrate a relatively low average level of compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures in 2005 by Greek listed companies. This approximates 
to 80% (actual levels depend on the method employed for measuring compliance). 
Table 4.14 also indicates that there is considerable variation in the compliance scores 
identified: standard deviations are 10% or 8%, depending on the method employed 
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for measuring compliance. Additionally, approximately, only 20% of the companies 
examined complied at a level higher than 90%.  
This high variability of compliance scores indicates that substantially different levels 
of information reached the users of financial statements. This is exacerbated when 
one looks at the levels of compliance with individual standards (see next section). 
(This has particular relevance for the purposes of the analysis discussed in the next 
chapter (5) regarding the valuation implications of mandatory disclosures.) 
These findings are consistent with the discussion in chapter 2 regarding the low 
enforcement mechanisms in Greece in general and, in particular, the lenient approach 
taken by the regulator regarding compliance with IFRS during the first years of their 
implementation. They also reflect on the tendency of Greek companies not to provide 
high levels of disclosures (cf. Vlachos, 2001; Tsakumis, 2007). Possibly, they also 
indicate the low familiarity of Greek accountants and auditors regarding IFRS 
requirements.  
The relatively high non-compliance levels identified confirm the concerns expressed 
in the literature regarding the role that enforcement mechanisms play in the 
achievement of a successful level of comparability across jurisdictions that adopt 
IFRS (e.g. Ball, 2006; Nobes; 2006; Weetman, 2006; Giner and Rees, 2005; 
Schipper, 2005). In fact, the findings of the present study are in favour of the 
argument raised by Nobes and Parker (2008) that low enforcement mechanisms may 
result in de facto voluntary compliance with IFRS. 
Although caution is needed, if one makes the ‘heroic’ assumption that results of 
studies measuring compliance with mandatory disclosures in different countries are 
comparable, these findings are similar to prior studies investigating compliance with 
mandatory disclosures in emerging capital markets (e.g. Hong Kong (Tai et al., 
(1990); Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994); Spain (Wallace et al. 1994); Czech 
Republic (Patton and Zelenka, 1997); Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 1998b)). It is 
notable that these studies refer to samples relating to the late 1980s or early/mid 
1990s and in countries where low enforcement has been indicated. Additionally, 
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these findings are significantly lower than the results of Vlachos (2001) who 
examined Greek listed companies’ compliance with Greek law requirements 10 years 
before the period covered in the present study. (However, as discussed above, 
Vlachos’ (2001) results might be biased upwards). Thus, these compliance levels do 
not reflect the compliance levels that would be expected to be identified in a 
developed market (as is ASE) nowadays. 
4.7.2.2 Methodological considerations 
Consistent with the findings of the pilot study, it is shown that the two methods 
employed produce significantly different compliance scores. Both the ‘paired sample 
t-test’ and the ‘Wilcoxon test’ indicate that Cooke’s method produces significantly 
higher scores than the PC method. Thus, care is needed when one reads the findings 
of a study examining compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements, if only one 
method has been used.  
This is further supported when one looks at the frequencies regarding the compliance 
scores below the threshold of 80%. When compliance has been measured with the 
PC method, approximately 50% of the companies belong to this category. However, 
when the commonly used method is employed, approximately 30% of the companies 
appear in this category. Al-Shiab (2003) implements only the PC method and this 
might be a reason for reporting substantially lower compliance scores compared to 
studies in other emerging markets for a similar period (e.g. Hassan et al. (2006) with 
reference to Egypt.) At the same time, the findings of prior studies using only 
‘Cooke’s method’ may report relatively inflated scores (depending on the number of 
items from each accounting standard included in the research instrument). As 
discussed above, only the study of Street and Gray (2001) uses the two methods 
simultaneously and their findings provide preliminary support for this argument. 
However, they do not test statistically the differences between the scores produced 
under the two different methods. 
In line with the approach taken in the pilot study, to illustrate the potential of 
misleading results under Cooke’s method, the corresponding findings are provided in 
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Table 4.15, after having excluded the compliance score with the disclosure 
requirements of IAS 1. As was indicated previously, IAS 1 contains the larger 
number of items required to be disclosed. Additionally, it deals mainly with 
presentational issues and not with measurement and recognition issues. (In fact, as 
shown in the pilot study, the results in the next section indicate that the majority of 
companies tend to comply with its requirements and thus driving the overall 
compliance score upwards). 
Table 4:15: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores, excluding IAS 1 
(N=153). 
Compliance Score PC method Cooke’s method 
40-49 1 0.7% 1 0.7% 
50 - 59 9 5.9% 12 7.8% 
60 - 69 24 15.7% 30 19.6% 
70 - 79 48 31.4% 43 28.1% 
80 - 89 46 30.1% 57 37.3% 
90 - 100 25 16.3% 10 6.5% 
N 153 100.0% 153 100% 
Mean 0.78  0.76  
SD 0.10  0.11  
†Paired sample t-test 5.644*** 
Min 0.48  0.46  
Max 0.94  0.95  
Skewness -0.45  -0.50  
Kurtosis -0.49  -0.46  
Kolmogorov 0.013  0.081  
Normality rejected Yes  Yes  
Median 0.78  0.78  
‡Wilcoxon -5.659*** 
†It compares the mean differences across the compliance scores measured by the two 
different methods. ‡It compares the median differences across the compliance scores 
measured by the two different methods. 
 
The results in Table 4.15 are in line with the findings of the pilot study. The average 
score reduces by only 1% for the PC method and median score remains the same. 
However, the average score for Cooke’s method reduces dramatically by 7% and the 
median by 5%.86 Thus, the results of the two methods now become very similar. 
However, although the absolute difference between the scores produced by the two 
methods is smaller it continues to be significantly different. More specifically, the 
                                                 
86 Wilcoxon signed rank tests and Paired sample t-tests were conducted and illustrated that these 
changes (decreases) are significant at 1%. 
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average compliance scores under Cooke’s approach are marginally lower than those 
of the PC method.  
Most importantly, the frequencies regarding the companies found under the 80% 
threshold remain the same for the PC method whereas they change dramatically for 
the scores under Cooke’s approach: from being 33.3% previously, they increase to 
56.2% after excluding IAS 1. Similar is the case for the percentage of companies 
being in the range between 90-100%. From representing 22% previously, they 
represent only 6.5% after excluding IAS 1, as far as Cooke’s method is concerned. 
The corresponding figure reduces only by 1.3% with reference to the PC method.  
These findings illustrate how sensitive the scores produced under Cooke’s method 
might be to the number of items mandated by the standards included in the research 
instrument. Thus, arguably, misleading conclusions about the extent to which 
companies comply with mandatory disclosures may be drawn. Accordingly, these 
findings strengthen the proposition for researchers to employ both methods when 
conducting this type of research, so as to avoid producing misleading findings. As 
discussed in 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 this may also have econometric implications regarding 
the findings relating to the factors explaining compliance. (The findings of Street and 
Gray (2001), as well as those provided in 4.6.5 and 4.7.6 below, support this 
argument.) 
4.7.3 Compliance with the disclosure requirements of each standard separately 
As was indicated in 4.6.3, the research instrument was designed in such a way as to 
capture the compliance scores for each standard separately. Table 4.16 provides the 
descriptive statistics regarding these findings. Compliance scores across standards 
have been ranked in a descending order on the basis of the average score. N indicates 
the number of companies for which each standard was relevant. The standard 
deviation of compliance scores is also of relevance for the purposes of this study. 
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Table 4:16: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores for each standard 
separately. 
Standards  N Mean SD Minimum Maximum Median 
IAS 10 153 0.96 0.13 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 1 153 0.95 0.05 0.69 1 0.96 
IAS 33 153 0.92 0.22 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 16 152 0.92 0.11 0.55 1 1.00 
IFRS 2 12 0.90 0.26 0.14 1 1.00 
IAS 7 153 0.90 0.16 0.44 1 1.00 
IAS 18 153 0.89 0.22 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 38 133 0.89 0.18 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 27 120 0.88 0.21 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 2 153 0.87 0.20 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 20 106 0.86 0.24 0.00 1 1.00 
IFRS 1 153 0.86 0.13 0.40 1 0.80 
IAS 11 16 0.81 0.24 0.25 1 0.88 
IAS 32 150 0.80 0.19 0.25 1 0.83 
IAS 24 153 0.77 0.25 0.00 1 0.80 
IAS 12 153 0.74 0.18 0.17 1 0.83 
IAS 41 11 0.73 0.22 0.25 1 0.70 
IAS 23 149 0.73 0.44 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 40 40 0.72 0.22 0.17 1 0.73 
IFRS 3 49 0.72 0.31 0.00 1 0.80 
IAS 21 115 0.71 0.42 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 14 95 0.71 0.25 0.00 1 0.75 
IAS 37 106 0.70 0.24 0.13 1 0.71 
IAS 31 18 0.64 0.27 0.20 1 0.67 
IAS 19 152 0.64 0.27 0.00 1 0.78 
IAS 28 71 0.63 0.31 0.00 1 0.67 
IFRS 5 13 0.61 0.40 0.00 1 0.67 
IAS 17 93 0.51 0.29 0.00 1 0.50 
IAS 8 153 0.51 0.43 0.00 1 0.60 
IAS 36 52 0.50 0.35 0.00 1 0.50 
IFRS 6 1 0.50 - 0.50 0.5 0.50 
 
Some key observations worth discussion. IAS 10 is the standard with the highest 
average compliance score. This is because the majority of companies complied with 
the relatively straight-forward requirement of disclosing ‘the date when the financial 
statements were authorised for issue and who gave that authorisation’ (paragraph 
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17). However, measuring compliance with this standard may entail high subjectivity 
because it is not always evident if a post-balance sheet event has incurred. Hence, it 
is not always evident whether disclosure is omitted or there is no event to be 
disclosed.  
IAS 1 follows with an average compliance score of 95%. It is noted that compliance 
with this standard exhibits the lowest standard deviation (5%). This illustrates that 
the majority of companies have complied with almost all of its requirements. A 
possible explanation is that it is easier for companies to comply with the disclosures 
it mandates since some of the information required is very basic (e.g. name of the 
entity, description of operations, provision of financial statements, and the key items 
to be included in the financial statements). Accordingly, complying with the 
requirements of this standard does not lead to high proprietary costs (Al-Shammari, 
2005).  
A relatively high compliance score is observed with regard to IAS 18. However, a 
very high standard deviation is shown (22%). This derives from the fact that many 
companies did not disclose ‘the amount of each significant category of revenue 
recognised during the period’ (paragraph 35b). This non-disclosure indicates the 
proprietary costs involved with disclosing this kind of information. This is similar to 
the case of IAS 20 with reference to government grants. On the one hand, the policy 
adopted with regard to government grants was disclosed. On the other hand, a large 
proportion of the companies remained silent regarding ‘the nature and extent of 
government grants recognised in the financial statements and an indication of other 
forms of government assistance from which the entity has directly benefited’ 
(paragraph 39b). 
Finally, it is observed that standards that introduced new measurement and/or 
recognition requirements compared to Greek GAAP, exhibit very low average levels 
of compliance. They also exhibit significantly high variability of compliance scores. 
Similar is the case for the standards require disclosures that involve high proprietary 
costs. Some examples include the following: IAS 40 (72%, sd: 22%); IFRS 3 (72%, 
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sd: 31%); IAS 14 (71%, sd: 25%); IAS 37 (70%, sd: 24%); IAS 19 (64%, sd: 27%); 
IAS 28 (63%, sd: 31%); IAS 17 (51%, sd: 29); and IAS 36 (50%, sd: 35%).  
The figures in Table 4.16 also indicate that there were companies which did not 
provide any of the information required by these standards (i.e. compliance score is 
zero). In fact, these instances were not few (e.g. 10 regarding IAS 17; five regarding 
IAS 36; five regarding IAS 19). On a more positive note, there were some companies 
that exhibited full compliance with the requirements of those standards (e.g. 11 
regarding IAS 17 and 11 regarding IAS 36 but only one regarding IAS 19). It is 
noteworthy that, although the instances of qualified reports were not few, none of the 
qualifications was referring to non-compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Overall, these findings illustrate significant variability in the information reaching 
users of the first IFRS financial statements in Greece. This is more noticeable 
regarding standards which reflect on companies’ wealth and obligations as well as 
their future prospects.  
4.7.4 Comparisons across categories of companies 
One of the main objectives of this study is the identification of the company 
characteristics associated with observed compliance levels with mandatory 
disclosures (i.e. providing an answer to Q3). Before proceeding with the univariate 
and multivariate analyses (sections 4.7.5 and 4.7.6 respectively) which provide an 
answer to this question, similar to Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), the tables 
below present the mean values of the disclosure scores with reference to the various 
company characteristics examined in this study.87 These categories of companies 
have been disaggregated on the basis of the following characteristics: the median 
values with regard to size, gearing, profitability and liquidity; the value of one with 
regard to Gray’s comparability index (indicating no change); and the dummy 
variables regarding their market-related characteristics defined above. Thus, the 
                                                 
87 The discussion focuses on the mean values in order to provide consistent information with the 
parametric tests that follow. 
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disaggregated information provides some background information regarding the 
findings of the univariate and multivariate analyses that follow. 
The information provided in Table 4.17 suggests that large companies and 
companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors comply, on average, most with IFRS disclosure 
requirements. Additionally, companies with a negative change in shareholders’ 
equity and a positive change in net income, as a result of the adoption of IFRS, also 
seem to comply with marginally higher levels with IFRS requirements. Similar is the 
case for non-manufacturing companies. However, no other clear evidence is 
provided when considering the results based on both methods for measuring 
compliance.  
Consistent with the previous discussion, the compliance scores under Cooke’s 
method are higher with regard to every sub-sample. However, the direction of the 
differences between the average scores across the sub-samples is the same. (The 
exception is the scores with reference to gearing.)  
Table 4:17: Average values of compliance scores across categories of companies.  
PC Method Cooke’s Method Variable 
Average Compliance Average Compliance 
Structure-related 
   Size (Larger) 0.81 0.84 
   Size (Smaller) 0.77 0.81 
   Gearing (Higher) 0.79 0.82 
   Gearing (Lower) 0.78 0.83 
   Positive change in (2004) 
   Shareholders’ equity (N=79) 0.78 0.82 
   Negative change in (2004) 
Shareholders’ equity (N=74) 0.79 0.83 
Performance-related 
   ROS (Higher) 0.78 0.83 
   ROS (Lower) 0.79 0.83 
   Positive change in (2004) NI (N=68) 0.79 0.83 
   Negative change in (2004) NI (N=85) 0.78 0.82 
   Liquidity (Higher) 0.78 0.83 
   Liquidity (Lower) 0.79 0.83 
Market-related 
   Auditor ‘Big 4’ (N=38) 0.88 0.90 
   Auditor non-‘ Big 4’ (N=115) 0.76 0.80 
   Industry: manufacturing (N=59) 0.77 0.82 
   Industry: non-manufacturing (N=94) 0.80 0.83 
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To be consistent with the discussion in relation to the influence of IAS 1, the 
corresponding figures are presented in Table 4.18 after having excluded the 
compliance scores related to IAS 1. The observations regarding the groups of 
companies exhibiting higher compliance levels do not change. However, as was 
expected, the average scores under the commonly used dichotomous approach are 
substantially lower.  
Table 4:18: Average values of compliance scores across categories of companies, 
excluding IAS 1. 
PC Method Cooke’s Method Variable 
Average Compliance Average Compliance 
Structure-related 
   Size (Larger) 0.80 0.79 
   Size (Smaller) 0.76 0.74 
   Gearing (Higher) 0.78 0.76 
   Gearing (Lower) 0.78 0.76 
   Positive change in (2004) 
   Shareholders’ equity(N=79) 0.77 0.76 
   Negative change in (2004) 
Shareholders’ equity(N=74) 0.79 0.76 
Performance-related 
   ROS (Higher) 0.77 0.76 
   ROS (Lower) 0.78 0.76 
   Positive change in (2004) NI(N=68) 0.78 0.77 
   Negative change in (2004) NI(N=85) 0.77 0.76 
   Liquidity (Higher) 0.78 0.76 
   Liquidity (Lower) 0.78 0.76 
Market-related 
   Auditor ‘Big 4’ (N=38) 0.88 0.86 
   Auditor non-‘ Big 4’ (N=115) 0.75 0.73 
   Industry: manufacturing (N=59) 0.76 0.75 
   Industry: non-manufacturing (N=94) 0.79 0.77 
4.7.5 Univariate analyses 
4.7.5.1 Descriptive statistics of the transformed variables 
As discussed in 4.6.5 and 4.6.6, the dependent and independent variables have been 
transformed for the purposes of the univariate and multivariate analyses. The 
dependent variables (i.e. compliance scores) have been transformed into percentile 
ranks and by using the ‘log of the odds’ ratio. The purpose of these transformations 
is mainly to bring the observations of the compliance scores closer to a normal 
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distribution. Table 4.19 presents the descriptive statistics regarding the transformed 
dependent variables. In line with Cooke (1998), it is shown that the transformation 
by using the log of the odds ratio it is not always able to perfectly correct for kurtosis 
and skewness. The compliance scores as measured by employing the PC method, 
transformed with the log of the odds ratio, are not normally distributed. However, as 
expected, they are substantially less skewed compared to the raw scores presented in 
Table 4.14. All other transformed scores are normally distributed.88 
Table 4:19: Descriptive statistics on transformed dependent variables. 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Statistics Percentile 
Ranks Log of the Odds 
Percentile 
Ranks Log of the Odds 
Mean 0.50 1.42 0.50 1.67 
SD 0.29 0.65 0.29 0.58 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Max. 1.00 2.88 1.00 3.44 
Median 0.50 1.28 0.50 1.61 
Skewness 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.226 
Kurtosis -1.200 -0.774 -1.200 -0.456 
Kolm. Smirnov 0.200* 0.005 0.200* 0.200* 
Normality rejected No Yes No No 
*This is the lower bound of true significance. 
 
4.7.5.2 Main findings 
Table 4.20 reports on the univariate (parametric) analyses testing the hypotheses 
formed in this part of the study (i.e. H4.1 – H4.8). The findings with regard to these 
analyses show a consistently significantly positive association between companies’ 
size and the extent of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (at 1%). The 
evidence is similar regarding the association between the size of audit firm and levels 
of compliance. These associations confirm the descriptive information provided in 
the previous section regarding the compliance levels of the companies in these 
groups. Based on these findings, H4.1 and H4.7 are accepted.  
Additionally, there is evidence that the difference between 2004 net profit as reported 
under Greek GAAP and the corresponding restated figure under IFRS is associated 
                                                 
88 The transformations of the independent variables resulted in significantly less skewed but not 
normal distributions. 
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with companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Thus, 
hypothesis H4.5 is also accepted. It is to be remembered that, the higher the value of 
Gray’s comparability index, the more negative the effect on transition to IFRS. 
Hence, the negative association between earnings comparability index and 
compliance levels implies that the more positive the change in net income reported in 
the reconciliation statements the higher the compliance levels provided. It is notable 
that, although being significant when the dependent variable has been transformed 
into percentile ranks, there is evidence that the change in 2004 shareholders’ equity, 
as a result of the transition to IFRS, is also significantly associated with companies’ 
levels of compliance. However, the sign of the relationship is opposite to that relating 
to the change in net income. 
Table 4:20: Univariate analyses: associations between corporate characteristics and 
levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H4.1 - H4.8). 
PC Method Cooke’s Method Variables 
Percentile Ranks Log of the Odds Percentile Ranks Log of the Odds
Size 0.233*** 0.237*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 
Gearing 0.077 0.096 0.027 0.021 
EquCo_I 0.013* 0.019 0.037* -0.041 
Profitability 0.050 0.060 0.093 0.101 
Ear_Co_I -0.145* -0.124* -0.159* -0.141* 
Liquidity -0.102 -0.092 -0.093 -0.086 
Auditor 0.571*** 0.589*** 0.540*** 0.535*** 
Industry -0.133* -0.147* -0.094 -0.094 
*Significant at 10%, ***Significant at 1%. 
4.7.5.3 Methodological considerations 
Before proceeding with the findings regarding the multivariate analyses carried out, 
the following observations based on the findings reported in 4.20 need to be 
discussed. The results illustrate that potentially misleading findings would have been 
reported if only one of the two methods has been followed for measuring compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures. As was speculated in the pilot study, those 
corporate characteristics that appear to be significantly associated with the extent of 
companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures when one method has been 
employed, differ from that appear to be significant when the alternative method is 
employed. 
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In particular, following the PC method only, would have reported a negative 
association between industry type and levels of compliance. Thus, acceptance of 
H4.8 would have also been claimed. However, this finding would not be valid if 
Cooke’s method had only been employed.  
Table 4.21 below provides preliminary evidence that these differences are not 
eliminated even if IAS 1 is excluded. In fact, acceptance of H4.3 could be claimed 
with all other findings being the same if one had measured compliance only with the 
PC method. This is because, in this case, the change in 2004 shareholders’ equity, as 
a result of the transition to IFRS, is also significantly associated with companies’ 
levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures under both transformations of the 
dependent variable.These findings do not seem unexpected if one considers that, 
when IAS 1 (i.e. the standard acting as an outlier) is excluded from the analyses, the 
two methods continue to produce significantly different compliance scores (albeit 
less diverged). 
Table 4:21: Univariate analyses: associations between corporate characteristics and 
levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H4.1-4.8), 
excluding IAS 1. 
PC Method Cooke’s Method Variables 
Percentile Ranks Log of the Odds Percentile Ranks Log of the Odds 
Size 0.240*** 0.219*** 0.263*** 0.236*** 
Gearing 0.070 0.160* 0.044 0.090 
EquCo_I 0.026* 0.121* -0.014 0.037* 
Profitability 0.093 -0.026 0.119 0.015 
Ear_Co_I -0.122* -0.068* -0.127* -0.036* 
Liquidity -0.092 -0.079 -0.122 0.012 
Auditor 0.542*** 0.637*** 0.535*** 0.594*** 
Industry -0.145* -0.150* -0.090 -0.145* 
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4.7.6 Multivariate analyses 
4.7.6.1 Main findings 
This section reports the findings of the multivariate analyses for testing H4.1 – H4.8 
As was indicated above, multivariate analysis provides more reliable findings, than 
the univariate analysis. This is because it also considers the interaction between the 
independent variables. These are ignored in the univariate analysis setting (Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Vlachos, 2001).   
Appendix III provides the Pearson correlation matrix reporting the levels of 
collinearity between the independent variables employed in these analyses. It is 
shown that there is no concern of collinearity. No association higher than 0.5 exists; 
whilst the threshold had been set at 0.7.  
Focusing on the findings reported in Table 4.22, it can be seen that all regression 
models are significant at 1% level (F values). This indicates that the proposed 
corporate characteristics explain a significant part of the variation of the levels of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Additionally, it is observed that all of 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) are lower than two, confirming that there is no 
concern of multicollinearity between the independent variables.  
Moreover, it is indicated that the regressions where the dependent variable is the 
compliance scores transformed by using the log of the odds ratio, report a high mean 
square error (MSE). In fact, it is substantially higher than that of the regression 
where the dependent variable has been transformed into percentile ranks. Consistent 
with the prior literature (e.g. Cooke, 1998; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Leventis and Weetman, 2004a) and with the criterion set in 4.6.7 (i.e. minimum 
MSE), the discussion that follows concentrates on the regression models with the 
percentile ranks as the dependent variable.89 Finally, it is highlighted that the analysis 
regarding the regression referring to the PC method is based on 146 observations 
whereas that using Cooke’s method is based on 145 observations. This is because 
                                                 
89 It is noted that the regressions with the log of the odds ratio as the dependent variable tend to report 
very similar results. 
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there is an additional observation appearing to be influential and has been treated as 
an outlier with regard to Cooke’s method.  
Table 4:22: Multivariate analyses: associations between corporate characteristics 
and levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H4.1-4.8). 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Variables Percentile 
Ranks VIF 




Log of the 
Odds VIF 
Intercept 0.202  0.935*  0.383  1.752***  
Size 0.006 1.51 0.004 1.50 -0.005 1.53 -0.023 1.51 
Gearing -0.088 1.30 -0.131 1.28 -0.090 1.30 -0.082 1.27 
EquCo_I 0.165*** 1.20 0.331*** 1.18 0.114** 1.18 0.150* 1.18 
Profitability -0.127 1.44 -0.068 1.41 0.135 1.47 0.250 1.41 
Ear_Co_I -0.022*** 1.18 -0.049*** 1.18 -0.018*** 1.09 -0.032*** 1.18 
Liquidity 0.006 1.22 0.008 1.21 0.026 1.20 0.018* 1.21 
Auditor 0.392*** 1.35 0.920*** 1.36 0.407*** 1.03 0.821*** 1.36 
Industry -0.087** 1.02 -0.191** 1.03 -0.059 1.02 -0.090 1.02 
F 20.82***  20.42***  18.43***  16.96***  
Adj. R2 0.39  0.41  0.35  0.36  
MSE  0.050  0.239  0.054  0.203  
N 146  145  145  144  
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
 
The adjusted R2 indicates that the corporate characteristics selected for the purposes 
of this study explain at 39% (PC method) or 35% (Cooke’s method) the variation in 
companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures. The findings of these 
analyses confirm the findings regarding the association between type of audit firm 
and levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures identified with the univariate 
analyses. A significantly positive association (at 1%) is reported. Additionally, the 
findings are in line with the evidence that the difference between 2004 net profit, as 
reported under Greek GAAP, and the corresponding restated figure under IFRS is 
associated with companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
A significantly negative association (at 1%) is identified.  
Beyond these findings, a significantly positive association (at 1% or at 5%) between 
the difference of 2004 shareholders’ equity, as reported under Greek GAAP, and the 
corresponding restated figure under IFRS and companies’ levels of compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures is reported. Such a positive association indicates that 
more negative the impact from the adoption of IFRS in this measure the higher the 
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compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Focusing on the coefficients, it is 
indicative that the highest weighted variable is audit firm type. This is followed by 
the change in 2004 shareholders’ equity and the change in 2004 net profit, as a result 
of the transition to IFRS.  
On that basis, H4.3, H4.5 and H4.7 are accepted. It is concluded that companies with 
a ‘Big 4’ auditor, exhibited more positive changes in their restated IFRS 2004 net 
profit figure and exhibited more negative changes in their restated IFRS 2004 
shareholders’ equity figure, comply most with IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
4.7.6.2 Methodological considerations 
The results in Table 4.22 confirm the findings illustrated in the previous section 
regarding the different significant associations between corporate characteristics and 
compliance levels, because of the use of different methods for measuring 
compliance. 
In particular, use of the PC method only, would have reported that industry type is 
also a factor associated with the extent to which companies comply with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. Thus, acceptance of H4.8 would have also been claimed. In 
contrast, this would not have been the case if Cooke’s method had followed only.  
One could argue that these differences, identified in the multivariate analyses, may 
be attributed to the fact that one additional observation is included in the tests with 
reference to compliance scores being measured by using the PC method. To explore 
if this is the case, the previous analyses have been repeated by excluding this 
observation. The results (not tabulated) indicate that although the size of the 
coefficients change slightly the overall findings do not change. Industry type 
continues to be significantly negatively associated with the extent of companies’ 
compliance under the PC method. However, it remains insignificant under Cooke’s 
method. These results allow for the conclusion that the influential observation does 
not affect the overall findings, i.e. the fact that different corporate characteristics 
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appear to be significant having followed a different method for measuring 
compliance.   
To be consistent with the previous discussion, further explorations have been carried 
out by excluding IAS 1. The corresponding findings are presented in Table 4.23 and 
refer to the same companies that the main findings refer to (i.e. Table 4.22). 
Table 4:23: Multivariate analyses: associations between corporate characteristics 
and levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H4.1-4.8), 
excluding IAS 1. 








the Odds VIF 
Intercept 0.175  0.841  0.194  0.954*  
Size 0.008 1.51 0.006 1.50 0.006 1.53 -0.002 1.51 
Gearing -0.090 1.30 -0.129 1.28 -0.102 1.30 -0.078 1.27 
EquCo_I 0.171*** 1.20 0.343*** 1.18 0.129*** 1.18 0.206** 1.18 
Profitability -0.143 1.44 -0.082 1.41 0.064 1.47 0.107 1.41 
Ear_Co_I -0.022*** 1.18 -0.050*** 1.18 -0.017*** 1.09 -0.034*** 1.18 
Liquidity 0.005 1.22 0.006 1.21 0.015 1.20 -0.004 1.21 
Auditor 0.389*** 1.35 0.926*** 1.36 0.408*** 1.03 0.886*** 1.36 
Industry -0.090** 1.02 -0.196** 1.03 -0.062 1.02 -0.106 1.02 
F 21.18***  20.32***  18.80***  17.56***  
Adj. R2 0.40  0.42  0.38  0.40  
MSE  0.050  0.244  0.051  0.216  
N 146  145  145  144  
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
Consistent with the corresponding findings when the univariate tests were conducted, 
it is shown that the results do not change when IAS 1 is excluded. Industry type 
continues to be significant under the PC method but insignificant under Cooke’s 
method. Accordingly, although excluding the ‘influential’ standard (i.e. IAS 1) leads 
to more similar scores between the two methods (see Table 4.15) the corporate 
characteristics associated with compliance levels differ when the two methods 
employed simultaneously. 
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4.7.7 Discussion of the results 
4.7.7.1 Interpretation of the findings 
Drawing upon the findings of the univariate and multivariate analyses provided 
above (Tables 4.20 and 4.22), Table 4.24 summarises the factors associated 
significantly with Greek companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures in 2005. It also reports the sign of the association identified.  
Table 4:24: Summary of results: univariate and multivariate analyses. 
PC Method Cooke’s Method Variables 
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate 
Size Supported (+) NS Supported (+) NS 
Gearing NS NS NS NS 
EquCo_I NS Supported (+) NS Supported (+) 
Profitability NS NS NS NS 
Ear_Co_I Supported (-) Supported (-) Supported (-) Supported (-) 
Liquidity NS NS NS NS 
Auditor Supported (+) Supported (+) Supported (+) Supported (+) 
Industry Supported (-) Supported (-) NS NS 
NS: Not supported 
 
Structure-related variables 
The descriptive analysis in Table 4.17 (Average values of compliance scores across 
categories of companies) indicates that larger companies disclose more information 
than smaller companies. The univariate analyses confirm this, by showing that, when 
size is tested independently from other factors, it is significantly and positively 
associated with compliance levels. This is in line with what the majority of prior 
literature and theoretical underpinnings suggest. However, the multivariate analyses 
report no significant association between size and the extent of companies’ 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. This is in line with the findings of 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Tower et al. (1999), Street and Bryant (2000), Street 
and Gray (2001), and Glaum and Street (2003) who also find no significant 
relationship between size and the extent to which companies comply with mandatory 
disclosures. 
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As was indicated previously, size can be used as a proxy in several theoretical 
frameworks (e.g. information and political costs, agency theory, and capital need 
theory). Thus, it is correlated with other variables (Hossain et al., 1994) and can 
provide limited theoretical insights. In fact, Appendix III indicates that the size of 
companies used is correlated with both profitability and auditor size. Thus, when the 
multivariate tests are conducted, the significance of size as an explanatory factor for 
companies’ compliance is possibly obscured by the significance of audit firm size. 
However, size is used as a proxy for the structure of a company which is assumed to 
stay stable over time. The findings of the previous chapter indicate that companies’ 
shareholders’ equity was significantly affected on transition to IFRS. Accordingly, 
companies’ ‘financial structure’ (i.e. the proportion of shareholders’ equity to other 
balance sheet items) changed significantly. Accordingly, it is more probable that the 
significance of size is also obscured in the present study because of the strong 
relationship between the impact reported in companies’ reconciliation statements 
with regard to shareholders’ equity and levels of compliance.  
More specifically, the univariate analyses with reference to the compliance scores 
transformed into percentile ranks illustrate a positive and significant relationship 
between the shareholders’ equity comparability index and compliance levels. In 
particular, strong evidence supporting this finding is reported with the multivariate 
analyses. Irrespective of the transformation or the method employed for measuring 
compliance, this measure is positively associated with the levels of compliance with 
disclosure requirements.90 These results confirm the preliminary evidence shown in 
Table 4.17 that companies with a negative impact on shareholders’ equity exhibit 
higher compliance levels. 
This finding can be interpreted in the following way. The descriptive statistics in 
Table 4.9 indicate that, for the companies used in this part of the study, shareholders’ 
                                                 
90 As mentioned in 4.6.5, multivariate analysis allows for an examination of the relationship between 
the dependent variable (transformed compliance score in this case) and ‘each of the corporate 
characteristics (independent variables), while simultaneously controlling for the effects of other 
independent variables in the model’ (Vlachos, 2001: 190). Hence, multivariate analyses provide more 
powerful results and thus they are considered as more robust (cf. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). 
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equity under Greek GAAP was, on average, materially higher (11%) than the 
restated figure under IFRS. The same Table indicates however that more companies 
faced a positive impact on transition to IFRS with regard to this measure (median 
being 0.99-confirmed in Table 4.17). This indicates that there are several companies 
where the negative impact is material which drives the average score (of the index) 
upwards. In fact, an analysis of the frequencies of this variable (not tabulated) 
indicates that, out of the 74 facing a negative impact, only 26 companies faced a non-
material change. The remaining 48 faced a change of more than 10%.  
This significant change in shareholders’ equity, as a result of the introduction of 
IFRS, could have profound implications on managers’ ‘compliance behaviour’. 
Considering prior evidence that companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures are associated with shareholders’ equity (cf. Tai et al., 1990), this finding 
is in line with what agency theory posits. Within that framework, company managers 
may well be under pressure to ‘communicate’ and explain why their financial 
position appears to be worse under the higher quality accounting standards (i.e. 
IFRS) which are believed to reflect companies’ assets and liabilities more accurately. 
This would also pre-empt allegation of such a significant change being due to 
fraudulent accounting practices under Greek GAAP. Additionally, such a negative 
impact would indicate poorly managed companies and this, according to the ‘market 
discipline’ perspective, would jeopardise management’s reputation. Hence, higher 
levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures facilitate minimisation of 
agency costs.  
As far as gearing is concerned, it appears not to be significant under both the 
univariate and the multivariate analyses. This finding is in line with some of the prior 
literature (e.g. Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Tower et al., 1999; Al-Shiab, 2003; Ali et 
al., 2004) which also finds no relationship between gearing and compliance with 
mandatory disclosures. This finding may not be surprising if one considers Greece’s 
particular features. As explained by Camfferman and Cooke (2002), in code-law 
countries (as is Greece) where banks are the main providers of finance, high levels of 
disclosures are redundant as companies have regular communication with lenders. 
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This close relationship between Greek companies and banks is well documented in 
the literature (e.g. Ballas et al. 1998; Baralexis, 2004, Tzovas, 2006).91 This is also 
why Ballas (1994: 114) argues that attempts to modernise accounting policies, 
especially in the area of disclosures, had been torpedoed in the past.  
Thus, creditors may receive the information which would be provided in the notes to 
the financial statements through personal communication and so companies decide 
not to incur the necessary information costs involved in preparing detailed notes for 
IFRS financial statements. This is particularly relevant if one considers the timing of 
the examination of companies’ compliance levels (i.e. first year of IFRS 
implementation). From the managers’ point of view, understanding and 
implementing the measurement and recognition requirements of IFRS might be 
considered more important than producing notes to the accounts which, arguably, 
may be redundant anyway. 
Performance-related variables 
The difference between 2004 net profit as reported under Greek GAAP and the 
corresponding restated figure under IFRS appears to be the second factor consistently 
associated with companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures in 
2005. Both the univariate and multivariate tests indicate a significantly negative 
association between the earnings comparability index and the extent to which Greek 
companies comply with mandatory disclosures. Considering that the higher the value 
of the index the more negative the difference between the two figures, this finding 
suggests that the more positive the change the higher the disclosures provided. 
However, the coefficient of this variable is relatively low in the multivariate analyses 
indicating a lower weight compared to other variables.  
Table 4.17 illustrates that the majority of companies in the sample (85) faced a 
negative change in this measure. Additionally, Table 4.11 illustrates that, on average, 
net income was 29% higher under Greek GAAP compared to the restated figure 
under IFRS, suggesting that a large number of companies faced a material negative 
                                                 
91 This was also mentioned by the interviewee from the banking sector. 
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change in this measure. In fact, an analysis of the frequencies of this variable (not 
tabulated) indicates that, out of the 85 facing a negative impact, only 20 companies 
faced a non-material change. The remaining 65 faced a change of more than 10%.  
On that basis, the present finding (i.e. that the more positive the change the higher 
the compliance levels) can be interpreted with the propositions of signalling theory. 
Within this framework, it could be suggested that management provides extended 
levels of compliance to communicate that previous year’s performance was low, not 
because of their inefficiency but because Greek GAAP was of poor quality, i.e. the 
previous accounting regime produced conservative reported performance. This meets 
the objective of signalling that their companies had performed well in terms of 
profitability but the accounting rules did not allow this to be reflected on the 
financial statements. Accordingly, in this way, the managers of these companies try 
to ‘screen’ their companies from those remaining (i.e. the majority) which faced a 
negative change. Thus, ‘non-lemon owners have an incentive to communicate’ 
(Spence, 1974: 93) in order to avoid the adverse selection problem. 
Furthermore, this finding can also be consistent with the propositions of agency 
theory. Managers may well be under pressure to ‘communicate’ the reasons for such 
an improvement in companies’ restated profitability. This would pre-empt allegation 
that such a significant change is due to fraudulent accounting practices. In particular, 
reporting substantially improved restated profitability may trigger the suspicion of 
shareholders under the rationale that this improvement is a result of a ‘transitional 
big bath’ leading to misleading perceptions about companies’ profitability levels and, 
potentially, good future prospects (Inchausti, 1997). Hence, higher disclosures 
facilitate the minimisation of agency costs in this respect.  
Finally, in line with the premises of political costs theory, a positive change could 
well be interpreted as companies intentionally reporting lower profits under Greek 
GAAP so as not to attract the public eye. Accordingly, companies whose restated 
profitability was affected significantly positively might be more concerned that this 
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change may trigger political action with reference to past performance. Thus, higher 
compliance levels may reflect management’s efforts to minimise political action. 
The other two performance related variables (i.e. liquidity and profitability) are not 
significantly associated with companies’ compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures. Liquidity has also been found by Wallace and Naser (1995) and Owusu-
Ansah (1998b) not to be associated with companies’ levels of disclosures. Vlachos 
(2001) reports the same finding with regard to Greece.92  
A reason for this lack of association may be the puzzling signal that high liquidity 
may transmit. Companies with excessive liquidity may be accused of not turning into 
investments the excessive cash. Thus, they may not be willing to provide high 
disclosures.93 At the same time, companies with low liquidity may not be willing to 
provide extensive levels of disclosures that would highlight their poor performance 
with regard to working capital management. Hence, liquidity may not be able to 
capture signalling effects. As far as agency costs of debt are concerned, similar to the 
results regarding gearing, increased levels of mandatory disclosures may be 
perceived as redundant because of the frequent communication between banks and 
companies.  
As far as profitability is concerned, this also appears not to be significantly 
associated with levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures. This finding is in 
line with prior literature examining compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements (e.g. Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003). An interpretation of this 
finding might be the potential overlap between this variable and the earnings 
comparability index.  
                                                 
92 Leventis (2001) also reports no significant association between liquidity and Greek companies’ 
levels of voluntary disclosures. 
93 The evidence provided in Table 4.11 may support this argument even further. The mean for this 
measure is 2.13 and the median is 1.40, indicating that the companies included in the sample exhibit 
high levels of liquidity. 
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The transitional effects may be considered to be more important than current period’s 
profitability levels (as they reveal the good or bad aspects of companies’ financial 
positions and performance). Thus, managers’ focus for compliance may be driven by 
the transitional effects. Accordingly, it appears that the signalling effects, as well as 
political and agency costs that could be captured by the use of current year’s 
profitability are reflected in the impact reported in companies’ reconciliation 
statements with regard to profitability. 
Market-related variables 
Table 4.17 provides descriptive evidence that companies with a ‘Big 4’ auditor 
exhibit substantially higher average compliance levels (between 12% and 10%, 
depending on the method employed for measuring compliance). Both the univariate 
and multivariate analyses confirmed such a positive association between audit firm 
size and the extent to which Greek companies comply with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures. As indicated above, positive associations have also been documented in 
prior literature pertinent to this study (e.g. Tai et al. 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Street and Gray, 2001; 
Glaum and Street, 2003). In the present research, all tests indicated that the 
coefficient of audit firm size was consistently the highest among the corporate 
characteristics employed suggesting that audit firm size is the strongest explanatory 
factor for the levels of compliance identified.  
Several inferences can be drawn from this finding. First, these results confirm the 
preliminary evidence shown in the previous chapter regarding the instances of non-
compliance with IFRS 1, i.e. no provision of reconciliation statements, and the 
relationship with audit firm size. Second, these findings are in line with the 
proposition that large and international audit companies may have greater 
competence and expertise on IFRS (cf. Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). As 
discussed above (according to one of the interviewees) ‘Big 4’ audit companies 
could attract experienced employees from their foreign operations to assist in the 
transition process in Greece. This is of particular relevance for the objectives of the 
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present study since this expertise and competence should result in higher levels of 
compliance.  
As far as theoretical considerations are concerned, these findings indicate strong 
evidence of the applicability of agency and signalling theories with regard to Greek 
listed companies’ compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. As discussed above 
(3.4.3), higher earnings management as well as lower audit effort are well 
documented in Greece for companies with small audit firms. Thus, employing a ‘Big 
4’ audit firm acts as a monitoring mechanism and satisfies the need for transparency 
and better quality financial statements. This leads to a reduction of agency costs. 
Additionally, considering this context in Greece, managers may also intentionally 
employ a ‘Big 4’ firm as a signal of high accounting quality. This would allow them 
to ‘screen’ their companies from those employing small audit firms which are 
associated with higher earnings management as well as lower audit effort. At the 
same time, employing a ‘Big 4’ auditor would indeed result in higher compliance 
with mandatory disclosures (see discussion above). In fact, Hodgdon et al. (2009) 
illustrate in a multi-country study that compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
is positively associated with auditor choice. 
As far as industry type is concerned, Table 4.17 provides descriptive evidence that 
companies classified as non-manufacturing exhibit higher average compliance levels 
(between 3% and 1%, depending on the method employed). As discussed above, all 
multivariate and univariate analyses with regard to the scores measured by using the 
PC method indicate a significant association between non-manufacturing companies 
and the extent to which Greek companies comply with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures.94 However, such an association is not supported by the results related to 
the compliance scores as these have been measured with Cooke’s method.  
Accordingly, being supported only by the results based on the one method for 
measuring compliance, it is concluded that there is no clear evidence that industry 
                                                 
94 In fact, this variable appears to have larger weight in the multivariate analyses (as indicated by the 
size of the coefficients) from the earnings comparability index.  
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type is associated with companies’ levels of mandatory disclosures. Neither the 
finding with reference to the PC method nor the corresponding one with regard to 
Cooke’s method are considered as robust for making generalisations and drawing 
conclusions. 
4.7.7.2 Methodological considerations for future research 
This section draws upon the implications deriving from the simultaneous use of the 
PC method and Cooke’s method in this study. The findings of this research should be 
of particular interest to researchers aiming to conduct studies on compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. They should also be of particular interest 
to practitioners reading studies reporting compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosure requirements.  
This study suggests that, when researchers include in their research instrument 
standards with a great range of required items, the PC method may produce less 
misleading results. In fact, if compliance with all IFRS is examined (as is the case in 
the present study), the dichotomous approach produces significantly higher 
compliance scores. This may provide a misleading perception of the extent to which 
companies are compliant with the disclosure requirements of accounting standards.  
Additionally, the different findings with regard to industry type indicate that the 
corporate characteristics being significantly associated with companies’ mandatory 
disclosures, when compliance is measured with the PC method, are different from 
those that appear to be significantly associated with companies’ mandatory 
disclosures when Cooke’s method is employed. Accordingly, the present study 
concludes that applying both methods simultaneously provides more informative and 
robust findings. 
If, however, the emphasis of a research is on compliance with each disclosure item, 
irrespective of their grouping in accounting standards, Cooke’s dichotomous 
approach may be more appropriate. This would be the case, for example, when 
examining compliance with voluntary disclosures. In that case the researcher 
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exercises more judgement on what should be included in the disclosure checklist and 
accordingly each item should be considered independently.  
However, if the research instrument consists of items belonging to different 
‘groupings’ of information (e.g. financial information and disclosures related to 
corporate social responsibility), researchers may need to make explicit whether or 
not they treat each item in the index or each ‘grouping’ equally.  
Additionally, the findings of the present study, as well as those of Street and Gray 
(2001), raise questions about the findings of prior studies examining compliance with 
IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures and employing only one method (see section 4.4.2). 
More specifically: would the adoption of the PC method have led to significantly 
different compliance scores in these studies? And, would the corporate 
characteristics previously identified as being correlated with mandatory compliance 
be the same?  
The results of the present study suggest that: the answer to the first question is 
‘possibly yes’ i.e. the adoption of the PC method is likely to have led to significantly 
different compliance scores in previous studies. Furthermore, the answer to the 
second question is ‘possibly no’, i.e. the corporate characteristics identified in 
previous studies as being correlated with mandatory compliance may not be the same 
under the PC method. This might also be relevant to other studies that have examined 
compliance with national accounting standards in countries where the disclosure 
requirements are to be found in separate ‘standards’/categories and that employed 
only one method (see section 4.4.1). 
4.8 Limitations 
The findings of the present part of the study are subject to several limitations that 
should be taken into consideration. 
A major strength of the study is that the results are time specific, i.e. focusing on the 
first year of mandatory implementation of IFRS. However, this might also present a 
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limitation. It may give a misleading perception about companies’ compliance 
behaviour. Prior research indicates that companies’ disclosures increase overtime 
(e.g. Hassan et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2008). Thus, the relatively low levels of 
disclosures identified might be an outcome of preparers’ low familiarity with the 
disclosure requirements of the new standards. Consequently compliance levels may 
improve in the future.  
Additionally, the findings of the present research suggest that the impacts reported in 
companies’ reconciliation statements with regard to shareholders’ equity and net 
income are associated with compliance levels in 2005. However, in the years to 
follow companies will not have to produce reconciliation statements and thus these 
explanatory factors will not be testable.  
A further limitation of the study is that it may suffer from omitted variables. More 
specifically, the corporate characteristics employed were collected from accessible 
and reliable sources. It is shown that they explain at 39% (PC method) or 35% 
(Cooke’s method) the variation in companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures. Yet, other variables could shed more light on the corporate 
characteristics associated with mandatory disclosures. Some examples include the 
following but are not exhaustive: listing status, ownership concentration, 
management compensation and other corporate governance characteristics. Non 
accessibility to this data did not allow for their examination in this study. 
The measurement of the characteristics employed may also be subject to limitations. 
For example, in order for the impact on 2004 shareholders’ equity to be testable, 
gearing was defined as total debt to total assets. Arguably, this surrogate may not be 
as appropriate as total debt to shareholders’ equity could be as a proxy for agency 
costs. 
Finally, although the necessary procedures and specific criteria were followed, 
measuring compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements always entails a 
degree of subjectivity. This may hinder replication of the study and comparability of 
the present findings with those reported in other studies.  
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4.9 Conclusions 
This part of the study provides answers to two of the six research questions of this 
thesis, namely Q2 and Q3. The study builds on and contributes to literature 
examining compliance with national accounting standards and/or IAS/IFRS. It 
contributes to this literature in the following three ways. First, it adds a large scale 
academic study examining compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosures after 
2005 in the EU. Second, it provides evidence regarding the implications of the use of 
different methods for measuring compliance with mandatory disclosures. Third, it 
provides evidence regarding the explanatory factors of compliance levels with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures, during the first year of IFRS implementation.  
With regard to Q2, the findings of the present study illustrate a relatively low average 
level of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures in 2005 by Greek listed 
companies. This approximates to 80% (actual levels depend on the method employed 
for measuring compliance). It is also indicative that there is considerable variation in 
the compliance scores identified: standard deviations are 10% or 8%, depending on 
the method employed for measuring compliance. These compliance levels, which 
may be considered low for a developed market, reflect on the lenient approach of the 
regulator regarding compliance with IFRS during the initial period of their 
implementation. 
Further analyses, on a standard by standard basis, indicate that standards that 
introduced new measurement and/or recognition requirements compared to Greek 
GAAP, exhibit very low average levels of compliance. They also exhibit 
significantly high variability of compliance scores. Similar is the case for the 
standards require disclosures that involve high proprietary costs. Additionally, there 
were instances where companies did not provide any of the information required by 
specific standards. 
Overall, the relatively high non-compliance levels identified confirm the concerns 
expressed in the literature regarding the role that enforcement mechanisms play in 
the achievement of a successful level of comparability across jurisdictions that adopt 
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IFRS (e.g. Ball, 2006; Nobes; 2006; Weetman, 2006; Giner and Rees, 2005; 
Schipper, 2005). In fact, the findings of the present study are in favour of the 
argument raised by Nobes and Parker (2008: 195) that ‘weak legislation, lack of 
resources and ineffective audit profession in some EU countries make compliance 
with IFRS in practice voluntary’. 
As far as Q3 is concerned, the present study provides strong evidence that companies 
having the following characteristics comply most with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
in 2005: those having a ‘Big 4’ auditor; those exhibited more positive changes in 
their restated IFRS 2004 net profit figure; and those exhibited more negative changes 
in their restated IFRS 2004 shareholders’ equity figure. It is also shown that larger 
companies exhibit higher compliance levels. However, this association between size 
and compliance levels is found to be significant only in the univariate analyses.  
With regard to the two restated measures, as discussed above, there have been 
consistent findings of earnings management by Greek listed companies. The areas of 
creative accounting practices followed under Greek GAAP were expected to be 
curtailed with the introduction of IFRS. Accordingly, the latter was expected to cause 
a significant impact on companies’ financial statements. The findings of chapter 
three indicate that implementation of IFRS inter alia did indeed have a significant 
impact on the financial reported position and performance of Greek listed companies. 
In many instances this significant impact appears to be material. The findings of the 
present chapter indicate that such a significant change, in companies’ restated 
measures, has acted as a driving factor for companies’ compliance with IFRS overall 
mandatory disclosure requirements in 2005. On that basis, the results of this study 
indicate that the compliance risks that managers bear are heavily dependent on the 
impact caused on their companies’ financial position and performance, as a result of 
the adoption of IFRS. 
Propositions of agency and signalling theories can provide the basis for interpreting 
these findings. With reference to agency theory, company managers may well be 
under pressure to ‘communicate’ and explain why their financial position appears to 
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be worse under the higher quality accounting standards (i.e. IFRS) which are 
believed to reflect companies’ assets and liabilities more accurately. They would also 
be under pressure to ‘communicate’ the reasons for such an improvement in 
companies’ restated profitability. This would pre-empt allegation that such a 
significant change is due to fraudulent accounting practices (i.e. ‘transitional big 
bath’) leading to misleading perceptions about companies’ profitability levels. 
As far as signalling theory is concerned, this would suggest that management 
provides extended levels of compliance to ‘communicate’ that previous year’s 
performance was low because Greek GAAP was of poor quality. Accordingly, low 
profitability was not because of their inefficiency because the previous accounting 
regime produced conservative reported performance. In this way, the managers of 
these companies try to ‘screen’ their companies from those remaining (i.e. the 
majority) which faced a negative change. Finally, in line with the premises of 
political costs theory, a significantly positive change in profitability could well be 
interpreted as companies intentionally reporting lower profits under Greek GAAP so 
as not to attract the public eye. Accordingly, companies facing a positive change in 
profitability might be more concerned that this change may trigger political action 
with reference to past performance and thus provide higher compliance levels to 
avoid political action. 
As far as audit firm size is concerned, these findings support the argument that large 
and international audit companies may have greater competence and expertise on 
IFRS (cf. Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998), resulting in higher levels of 
compliance. They may also suggest that larger audit firms conduct higher audits in 
order to avoid jeopardising their reputation. Considering the particular context of 
Greece, higher earnings management as well as lower audit effort are well 
documented for companies with small auditors. Thus, employing a ‘Big 4’ audit firm 
acts as a monitoring mechanism and satisfies the need for transparency and better 
quality financial statements. This leads to a reduction of agency costs.  
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Additionally, managers may also intentionally employ a ‘Big 4’ audit firm as a signal 
of high accounting quality. This would allow them to ‘screen’ their companies from 
those employing a small audit firm which are associated with higher earnings 
management as well as lower audit effort. At the same time, employing a ‘Big 4’ 
may indeed result in higher compliance with mandatory disclosures (as a result of the 
auditors’ expertise). 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, the findings of this study provide 
strong evidence that using only one method for measuring compliance with 
mandatory disclosures may produce misleading perception about the extent to which 
companies comply with the standards’ requirements. Beyond this, using only one 
method may also have implications with regard to the explanatory factors that appear 
to be significantly associated with the levels of compliance identified. Accordingly, 
this study suggests simultaneous use of both the commonly used dichotomous 
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Chapter 5 - Value Relevance of Accounting and ‘Other Information’ 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides answers to research questions Q4, Q5 and Q6. More 
specifically, it provides analysis exploring: any change in value relevance of 
accounting information after the adoption of IFRS in Greece (Q4); the incremental 
value relevance of individual adjustments to 2004 shareholders’ equity of Greek 
companies (Q5); and the valuation implications of compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures (Q6). The analysis regarding Q4 is disaggregated across the partitions of 
small and large companies and of companies having ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ 
auditors. The analysis regarding Q5 is disaggregated across the partition of small and 
large companies only.95 The analysis regarding Q6 is disaggregated across the 
partition of high and low compliance companies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the 
concept of accounting quality as expression of value relevance and the applicability 
of the latter for the purposes of the present study. Section 5.3 discusses the Ohlson 
(1995) Model (OM). Section 5.4 reviews the relevant literature regarding the main 
research questions and develops the relevant testable hypotheses. Section 5.5 
describes the research design for testing these hypotheses. Section 5.6 discusses the 
research findings against the background of the research hypotheses, the prior 
literature and the context of the Greek accounting environment provided in chapter 2. 
Section 5.7 discusses the limitations of this part of the research and section 5.8 forms 
the concluding remarks.  
5.2 Accounting Quality and Value Relevance 
A number in companies’ financial statements is deemed to be ‘value relevant’ if it is 
significantly related to its market value (Beaver, 2002) i.e. it ‘maps’ onto the 
                                                 
95 The analysis with regard to companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors cannot be examined because of the 
relatively small number of observations in this sub-sample (see 5.5.4 for details). 
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company’s market value nontrivially. Lo and Lys (2000b: 6) illustrate that this can 
be generally described by the following equation: 
jtjtjt IgP η+= )(      (Eq. 5.1) 
where Pjt stands for the share price of a company, Ijt is the information item and ηjt, is 
the mean zero disturbance term. Ijt is value relevant if and only if g is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  
Beaver (2002) highlights two distinctive characteristics of value relevance research. 
First, compared to other types of capital market research, it demands more 
comprehensive knowledge of accounting institutions, accounting standards, and the 
specific characteristics which underlie the reported figures. This gives a comparative 
advantage to accounting researchers to examine relations between market values and 
book values. Second, the timing of information is not of primary importance as is in 
the case of event studies. Levels studies provide the opportunity to examine the 
drivers of (market) value that may be reflected in price at a point of time as a 
function of a set of accounting items.  
Holthausen and Watts (2001) explain that the greater the R2 in the above equation, 
the more value-relevant the accounting number is assumed to be. Prior literature 
suggests that the higher the association (i.e. the higher the value relevance), the 
higher the accounting quality that is reflected (Barth et al., 2008). This argument is 
based on the rationale that higher quality results better reflect a company’s 
economics (Barth et al., 2001). This is achieved if the accounting standards applied 
‘require recognition of amounts that are intended to faithfully represent a firm’s 
underlying economics’ (Barth et al., 2008: 477). Additionally, when the accounting 
standards applied minimise opportunistic discretion, they result in higher accounting 
quality and, in turn, higher value relevance (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005).  
Because of the characteristics of value relevance research and its usefulness for, 
partly, determining accounting quality, Barth et al. (2001: 77) argue that value 
relevance research inter alia ‘provides insights into questions of interest to standard 
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setters.’ This is particularly relevant to this study because mandatory implementation 
of IFRS in Europe has meant to increase accounting comparability among EU 
companies and accounting quality in general. This was expected as IFRS are 
considered to be high quality standards. More specifically, IFRS expected to curtail 
the ‘discretion afforded managers to manipulate provisions, create hidden reserves, 
‘smooth’ earnings and hide economic losses from public view’ (Ball, 2006: 9).  
On that basis, the expectations for higher accounting quality in Europe and the above 
features of value relevance research suggest that value relevance provides an 
appropriate framework for the examination of the research objectives of this study.96 
Although value relevance research has a long history (Beaver, 2002 with reference to 
Miller and Modigliani, 1966), it became very popular in the early 1990s (Easton et 
al., 1993). A key factor for the advancement of value relevance research is the 
development of Ohlson’s (1995) model, which is employed in this study. Its main 
features are discussed below. 
5.3 Theoretical Framework - Residual Income Valuation (RIV) and 
The Ohlson (1995) Model (OM) 
Lo and Lys (2000a) suggest that one of the main contributions of the OM to 
valuation theory is that the model provides a testable hypothesis for accounting and 
non-accounting information. This is because the OM can be disaggregated across 
two components: the predecessor of the OM model (the RIV) and Ohlson’s (1995) 
‘linear information dynamics’, represented by the variable v, meaning ‘other 
information’ not yet captured by the accounting figures (Hand, 2001; Lo and Lys, 
2000a).  
More specifically, RIV is based on the fundamental hypothesis that asset prices 
represent the present value of all future dividends (PVED): 
                                                 
96 Other researchers have examined other aspects of accounting quality including market liquidity, 
cost of equity, Tobin’s Q, timely loss recognition, and earnings management (see Platikanova and 
Nobes, 2006; Daske et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2008; Capkun et al., 2008; and 
Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). 
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ttft dERP     (Eq. 5.2) 
First, an 
‘accounting system’ that satisfies a clean surplus relation (CSR) is assumed: 
b  = b + x  – d        (Eq. 5.3) 
dition is imposed, namely that the book 
value of equity grows at a rate less than R . 
as a function of book value and 
discounted expected abnormal earnings (i.e. RIV): 
    (Eq. 5.4) 
n valuation research at a time when the approach could be 
                                                
 
where Pt, is market price of equity at date t, dt is net dividends paid at date t, Rf is the 
risk free rate plus one and Et, is the expectation operator based on the information set 
at date t. To derive RIV from PVED, two additional assumptions are made. 
t t-1 t t
where, bt represents the book value of equity at date t, and xt denotes the earnings in 
period ending at date t.97 However, CSR does not require that the accounting system 
be of the form that we typically imagine (Lo and Lys, 2000a). Any two variables 
satisfying CSR will do. That is, CSR is merely used to substitute x and b for d in 
PVED (Eq. 5.2). Second, a regularity con
f












ttftt xERbP  
where 1* −−= ttt brxx . Given the two assumptions, PVED and RIV are 
mathematically equivalent.  
Here lies one of the contributions of Ohlson (1995) to the accounting literature. 
Equation 5.4 was originally reported in the late 1930s (Lundholm (1995) and Lo and 
Lys (2000a) with reference to Preinreich (1938)) but has been largely ignored. 
According to Lundholm (1995: 751) ‘its revival constitutes a major contribution to 
modern financial accounting’. Lo and Lys (2000a: 354) add that ‘Ohlson (1995) 
revived the use of RIV i
a
 
97 In order this assumption to hold, all gains and losses affecting book value of equity are also 
included in earnings (Lee, 1999). 
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more readily implemented’. This was because of the availability of data and 
technological resources. 
explained by Hand (2001: 121), assuming that markets are semi-strong efficient so 
that Pt fully reflects mΦ  (i.e. all licly available inform tion at t (Fama, 1976)) 
one can distingu m  into two distinct and additive subsets: all publicly available 
financial accounting information m
In addition, Ohlson’s (1995) main contribution arises from the following: As 
 pub a
ish tΦ
and everything else . Ohlson (1995) 
models components of  and as predictive of future abnorma
through the following linear information dynamics: 






tFΦ mtNFΦ  l earnings 
111 , ++ ++= tttat ενωχχ α  
and 
12 , ++= tt εγν1ν      (Eq. 5.6) 
where, as discussed previously, ‘v should be thought of as summarising value 
relevant events that have yet to have an impact on the financial statements’ (Ohlson, 
normal earnings 
(Hand, 2001). 
1995: 668), i.e. the subset of mNFΦ  that helps predict future abt
Considering these two equations, RIV (Eq. 5.4) then is restated as:  
jtjtitjtjt vbXbBbaP ε++++= 3210     (Eq. 5.7) 
where Pjt stands for the value of a company, Bjt is the book value of shareholders’ 
equity, Xjt net profit and vjt is ‘other information’ being available to the market 
participants not yet captured by accounting, and εjt is the mean zero disturbance term. 
Lundholm (1995) explains that the difference between vjt and εjt is that the former is 
partially forcastable but the latter is completely nonforcastable. Although this 
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assumption is ‘by far the most controversial’ (ibid: 751) it allows for a simultaneous 
testable hypothesis for accounting and non-accounting information. 
Ohlson (1995) and Lundholm (1995) do stress that the original empirical 
implications of OM depend critically on the third and final assumption regarding the 
abnormal earnings information dynamics (Dechow et al., 1999). However, many 
it severely reduces the model's empirical content’ (Ohlson, 2001). It effectively 
servable. Pursuing the 
model by omitting v is based on the assumption that book value of equity and 
a
cal accounting numbers. Thus, Lee (1999: 420) 
adds that ‘several rather strong assumptions about the way past earnings and book 
values map into future payoffs are necessary’ to move from the one equation (5.4) to 
researchers who employed the model during the first years after its publication 
ignored the term v (e.g. Collins et al., 1997; Collins et al., 1999; Francis and 
Schipper, 1999), with only few exceptions (e.g. Amir and Lev 1996; Ittner and 
Larcker 1998; Myers 1999) (Hand, 2001).  
The same criticism had been raised by Ohlson (2001) and by Lo and Lys (2000a). 
Ohlson (2001: 112) argued that ‘equating v to zero may be of analytical interest, but 
means that the outcome is little more than tests or implementations of RIV (Lo and 
Lys, 2000a). This is why Lo and Lys (2000a: 365) argued that ‘most studies [at that 
time] implement the model incorrectly’. Apparently, to a large extent, this is the case 
until today (e.g. Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008). 
The main argument for excluding the v term is that it is not ob
earnings are not correlated with the unobserved v. Thus, the explanatory power of 
Equation 5.7 can be considered as a measure of the materiality of v. Accordingly, a 
high level of R2 suggests that investors use accounting information in their decisions 
(Sami and Zhou (2004) with reference to Eichenseher, 2000). 
Lee (1999: 420) explains that care is needed when comparing Eq. 5.4 and 5.7 without 
v, i.e. RIV and the Ohlson model in the most commonly employed form. The former 
consists of the current book value of shareholders’ equity and the present value of a 
stream of expected future abnorm l earnings. However, the independent variables of 
Eq. 5.7 consist of reported histori
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the other (5.7). For example, all companies have identical discount rates and that 
‘non-accounting information (v) is either value irrelevant or affects all firms in 
exactly the same way’ (ibid: 420). 
However, few researchers have addressed this issue and have incorporated proxies 
representing ‘other information’ in their tests. These papers are discussed in detail in 
5.4.2.2. The present study first implements the model in its ‘conventional’ form, in 
line with the relevant literature (e.g. Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 
).  using companies’ level of compliance with IFRS 
ture is classified into three 
broad categories: value relevance of IFRS in pre-2005 national contexts; pre and post 
2005 IFRS adoption in several countries; and post-2005 on a single country level. It 
 uses a relative and/or an 
Following an incremental association research design, Harris and Muller (1999) use 
a sample of companies reporting under IFRS in their home countries which, because 
2008  Then, it proceeds by
mandatory disclosures as a proxy for ‘other information’. 
5.4 Literature Review  
5.4.1 Adoption of IFRS: relative and incremental value relevance 
As discussed previously, IFRS are supposed to be high quality standards. 
Additionally, IFRS have a more shareholder orientation than national accounting 
standards in several countries. On the basis of that premise, several researchers have 
examined the differences in the value relevance of accounting information produced 
under IFRS and compared to national GAAPs. It is common in the literature for 
researchers to conduct relative as well as incremental association studies 
simultaneously. Prior literature has produced inconsistent and mixed findings. Since 
the focus of the present research is the adoption of IFRS and accounting quality in 
terms of value relevance, discussion of the prior litera
is indicated within the review below whether a study
incremental association research design.  
5.4.1.1 Pre-2005 IAS/IFRS on a single country level 
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they are also listed in the US, had to publish Form 20-F reconciliation statements. 
They find ‘limited evidence that reconciliations to US-GAAP, even under IAS, 
provide useful information to the market’ (Harris and Muller, 1999: 309) as both IAS 
ere IFRS statements are 
produced is more value relevant’ (Sami and Zhou, 2004: 424). Using a very similar 
 IFRS and HGB98 
include Leuz (2003), Bartov et al. (2005), Schiebel (2007), Beckman et al. (2007), 
                                                
earnings and book values of equity are value relevant.  
In China, separate markets have been created for domestic and international 
investors. Companies are required to report to domestic investors using local Chinese 
accounting standards and to international investors using IFRS (Eccher and Healy, 
2000). Thus, a company may produces two sets of accounts for the same financial 
year with a different share price to be traded in the two different markets. Looking at 
the relationship between cash flows and returns under the two accounting regimes, 
Eccher and Healy (2000: 27) find that ‘IAS financial reports do not provide material 
benefits to either international or domestic investors over local Chinese standards’. 
Lin and Chen (2005) use an incremental association research design and their 
findings confirm those of Eccher and Healy (2000). However, Sami and Zhou (2004) 
follow a different research design and find contradictory results. The authors use the 
OM and compare the explanatory power of the model across the two samples. They 
find that ‘the accounting information in the capital market wh
research design, Liu and Liu (2007) report similar findings.  
Germany also provided a suitable setting for comparison of the value relevance of 
accounting information under IFRS and national accounting rules, prior to 2005. This 
was because a large number of companies had voluntarily adopted IFRS. 
Additionally, companies listed on the ‘Neuer Markt’ (a segment of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange at that time) were required to publish financial statements prepared 
in accordance with either IFRS or US GAAP (Beckman et al., 2007). Prior studies 
which examine the differences in the value relevance between
Jermakowicz et al. (2007) and Hung and Subramanyam (2007).  
 
98 Handelsgesetzbuch – the German commercial code. 
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Hung and Subramanyam (2007) use both a relative as well as an incremental 
association research design. They inter alia find that ‘(2) book value (net income) 
plays a more (less) important valuation role under IAS than under HGB, although 
there is no evidence suggesting that IAS has improved the relative value relevance of 
book value and net income; (3) the IAS adjustments to book value are value relevant, 
while the adjustments to net income are value irrelevant’ (Hung and Subramanyam, 
2007: 652). No improvement in the relative value relevance of book value of 
shareholders’ equity under IFRS has also been reported by Schiebel (2007), who 
ance (cf. Cairns, 2001 and Street and Gray, 2001) 
which may have negatively affected investors’ perceptions of the accounting 
to IFRS is not significant 
whilst individual components of the aggregate reconciliation relating to untaxed 
                                                
finds that equity book values under German GAAP revealed higher value relevance. 
As far as the relative association of earnings is concerned, Bartov et al. (2005) find 
higher value relevance of IFRS earnings over those prepared under German GAAP.99 
Similar results are reported by Jermakowicz et al. (2007). Examining the incremental 
value relevance of individual adjustments reported in the reconciliation statements, 
Beckman et al. (2007) do find that a number of individual adjustments were 
incrementally value relevant. One could argue that the contradictory and mixed 
findings with regard to Germany may derive from the fact that, at that time, IFRS 
were adopted on a voluntary basis by some of the companies under examination. As 
discussed in 4.4.2, voluntary adoption was associated with a high incidence of non-
compliance or incomplete compli
measures produced under IFRS.  
In a different setting, Niskanen et al. (2000) examine the reconciliations, between 
1984 and 1992, of 18 Finnish companies which disclosed both local GAAP and IFRS 
earnings. They find that the bottom line reconciliation 
reserves and consolidation differences are value relevant. 
 
99 The authors compare also the difference in the value relevance between IFRS and US GAAP 
earnings and conclude there is no significant difference. 
188 
Chapter 5 – Value Relevance of Accounting and ‘Other Information’ 
 
5.4.1.2 Pre-and post-2005 IFRS adoption in several countries 
Barth et al. (2008) use a sample of companies from 21 different countries. These 
companies had adopted IFRS voluntary between 1994 and 2003. Barth et al. find 
inter alia that companies reporting under IFRS exhibit higher value relevance than 
non-adopters of IFRS in the same country. Capkun et al. (2008) use companies from 
nine EU countries after mandatory IFRS implementation. They find that the bottom 
line adjustments of IFRS earnings are incrementally value relevant, but not those on 
book value of equity. Clarkson et al. (2008) use companies from 15 countries 
(including Australia) and explore potential changes in the relative value relevance of 
accounting information, in the pre – and post IFRS period. They report minor 
changes to value relevance for code law countries and a decrease in common law 
countries. Horton and Serafeim (2007) find that UK, French and Italian companies’ 
mplementation are 
after the adoption of IFRS. They report no 
ges in the quality of 
earnings reconciliations on transition to mandatory IFRS i
incrementally value relevant, but not those of Spanish companies.  
5.4.1.3 2005 Mandatory IFRS adoption on a single country level 
Callao et al. (2007) interpret the difference between book value of shareholders 
equity and market values as value relevance. They examine the book-to-market ratio 
of Spanish companies before and 
improvement in Spanish reporting quality after IFRS adoption. Although using a 
different research design, this finding is in line with Horton and Serafeim (2007) 
with reference to Spain (see above).  
Paananen (2008) uses 4 years’ data (2003-2006) to examine chan
financial reporting in Sweden after IFRS mandatory implementation. She measures 
financial reporting quality as smoothing of earnings, timely loss recognition, and 
relative value relevance. She documents a decrease in the latter.  
Horton and Serafeim (2009) explore the value relevance of IFRS relative to UK 
GAAP using the IFRS reconciliation statements, reported separately from other 
announcements. Inter alia, they report that ‘earnings reconciliation adjustment is 
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value relevant and has incremental price relevance over and above the UK GAAP 
numbers’ (Horton and Serafeim, 2009: 36), but this is not confirmed for the 
shareholders’ equity reconciliation adjustment. (A corresponding finding is reported 
by Capkun et al. (2008) with regard to the UK.) Furthermore, the authors examine 
the value relevance of individual adjustments reported within the reconciliation 
 to IFRS in Finland. In line with 
prior research, they find that IFRS earnings and net assets’ reconciliation adjustments 
n after the adoption of IFRS in Greece. They find 
book value of equity to be more value relevant under IFRS, but this is not the case 
l. (2008) use 
deflated variables as a control for heteroscedasticity, they do not employ any further 
of the robustness tests employed by Hung and Subramanyam (2007). This is 
statements. Their findings illustrate that, with reference to the price per share model 
tested, adjustments to earnings related to leases, tax and goodwill are incrementally 
value relevant.  
Schadewitz and Markku (2007) examine the incremental value relevance of the 
bottom line reconciliation adjustments on transition
are value relevant. However, they report a significant and negative coefficient with 
regard to shareholders’ equity reconciliation adjustment. This finding indicates that 
the market reverses the reconciliation adjustments. 
The study of Bellas et al. (2008) is the only one which examines the issue of value 
relevance of accounting informatio
for profit after tax. Additionally, they find that the reconciliation of bottom line 
adjustments to net profit appear to be incrementally value relevant, but not those with 
reference to shareholders’ equity.  
The present study is different from that of Bellas et al. (2008). The latter use 83 
companies compared to 153 companies used here. Although Bellas et a
test as suggested in the literature. The present study controls for heteroskedasticity 
and conducts further sensitivity tests by using different deflators. Bellas et al. (2008) 
do not account for outliers whereas this issue is considered here (5.5.2). 
Additionally, although Bellas et al. (2008) follow Hung and Subramanyam’s (2007) 
research design (which is different from that applied here), they do not perform any 
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important because the research design they use might produce biased inferences as it 
does not account for the effects on stock prices resulting from the adoption of IFRS 
(Hung and Subramanyam (2007), with reference to Karamanou and Nishiotis, 
2005).100 Furthermore, Bellas et al. (2008) do not examine the incremental value 
relevance of the individual adjustments reported in the reconciliation statements. The 
present study does this. Additionally, the authors provide little discussion on the 
particular features of Greece. Neither Bellas et al. (2008) do examine their findings 
across the partitions of large versus small firms and firms with ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 
4’ auditors as the present study does. As they use only 83 companies their sample 
may be biased by these factors. In fact, they remain silent on the characteristics of the 
lection 
ies). As discussed above, the Greek accounting framework has many 
features in common with the other Continental European countries and thus the 
ves, ‘smooth’ earnings and 
hide economic losses from public view’. Additionally, as discussed above, IFRS are 
                                                
companies used in these respects. Finally, the authors do not control for se
bias as suggested by the literature (done in the present study). 
5.4.1.4 Pre-and post-2005 relative value relevance: Hypotheses development 
Lower value relevance has been reported for debt-oriented and tax influenced 
accounting systems (Ali and Hwang, 2000; King and Langli, 1998), including those 
of continental European countries that exhibit these features (in contrast to Anglo-
Saxon countr
adoption of IFRS was expected to provide more ‘decision-useful’ financial 
statements.  
Barth et al. (2008) (with reference to Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001) argue that IFRS 
are more restrictive than national accounting standards in limiting managers’ 
discretion in determining accounting results. This is in line with Ball (2006: 9) who 
argues that implementation of IFRS is expected to curtail the ‘discretion afforded 
managers to manipulate provisions, create hidden reser
 
100 The present research has also followed Hung and Subramanyam’s (2007) research design and the 
corresponding robustness checks. The results between the two sets of tests are indeed different. 
Therefore this study does not follow the research design adopted by Hung and Subramanyam, (2007)). 
Accordingly, one of the contributions of this study lies in the fact that current prices are compared 
with current information for both years under examination in order to avoid mispricing effects. 
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also supposed to increase transparency by mandating higher levels of disclosures (cf. 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). 
In line with these propositions and with regard to Greece in particular, 
Polychroniadis (2002) argues that reporting quality would improve under IFRS. This 
would be the case because areas of creative accounting, with respect to overstating 
shareholders’ equity, would be eliminated under the new regime. As discussed in 
chapter 3, the adoption of seven standards did indeed caused significantly negative 
impact on shareholders’ equity, reflecting the curtailment of creative accounting 
practices previously identified by other researchers (e.g. Spathis, 2002; Spathis et al., 
2002; Baralexis, 2004; Caramanis and Spathis, 2006). Additionally, the level of 
on shift in the coefficients of both book value of equity 
and net income of Greek companies. Therefore, the following research hypotheses 
stated 
mandatory disclosures is lower under Greek GAAP and thus Greek GAAP leads to 
less transparent financial statements. 
Taking into consideration a) the fact that IFRS consider investors as the main users 
of financial statements (IASC Framework, paragraph 10) and are not debt and tax 
oriented as is Greek GAAP; and b) the anticipation of improved financial reporting 
under IFRS as well as the evidence reported in chapter 3, it is expected that the 
change from Greek GAAP to IFRS should increase the accounting quality in Greece 
(i.e. relative value relevance). In particular, it was expected that the curtailment of 
creative accounting practices relating to balance sheet and smoothing of earnings, as 
well as the focus of IFRS on more timely recognition of assets and liabilities, would 
result in an upward valuati
regarding the adoption of IFRS and value relevance of accounting information are 
as follows: 
H5.1: The value relevance of book value of equity and net income increase after the 
switch from Greek GAAP to IFRS.  
H5.2: The relative value relevance of accounting information (i.e. R2) increases after 
the switch from Greek GAAP to IFRS. 
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However, there are also several social, political and institutional factors of relevance 
which may affect value relevance, and may do so to a greater extent than accounting 
standards (Damant, 2006; Ball, 2006). Additionally, ‘the inherent flexibility in 
principles-based standards could provide greater opportunity for firms to manage 
earnings’ (Barth et al., 2008: 468). If investors do believe that even under IFRS 
e accounting practices to the extent they did 
101
with reference to these sub-samples. The 
analyses across these sub-samples will indicate whether the changes in the value 
nvestors who ‘are less likely than investment professionals to be able to 
anticipate financial statement information from other sources’ (Ball, 2006: 11). 
                                                
Greek companies would apply creativ
before (but perhaps in different areas), the hypotheses may not hold.   
5.4.1.5 Firm size and audit quality102 
Apart from the accounting regime (IFRS or Greek GAAP), the respective value 
relevance of accounting information can be influenced by several firm specific 
factors which may affect the perceived quality of this information. Therefore, the 
influence of firm size and audit quality is explored, as proxies for information 
quality, by providing separate analyses 
relevance hypothesised above is driven by changes in the value relevance of 
companies with specific characteristics.  
Previous research has indicated differences in value relevance across firm size 
(Bartov et al., 2005; Collins et al., 1997; Hayn, 1995). As discussed previously, small 
firms are not followed by investment analysts and the media to the same extent as 
large firms (cf. Barry and Brown, 1986; Schipper, 1991; Hussain, 2000). This leads 
to small firms not being followed by large institutional and/or foreign investors (due 
to lack of available information). Instead, small firms are followed mostly by small 
individual i
 
101 One of the interviewees did suggest that Greek companies would identify ways of applying 
creative accounting practices under IFRS as well. However, his personal opinion was that, it would 
take a while for companies to become familiar with all the options offered under IFRS and thus 
creative accounting might be minimal during the first few years following IFRS implementation. 
102 The development of hypotheses regarding the partition of companies with ‘Big 4’ or non-‘Big 4’ 
auditors should be read with the development of hypotheses in 3.4.3 and 4.5.3.1 which also examine 
the influence of audit firm size in other aspects. 
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Accordingly, the value of a small firm may not incorporate all the information 
available.  
Additionally, previous research has shown that the weight placed on book value of 
equity and net income is not consistent across firms (Collins et al., 1997). The 
weights depend on the explanatory power of current earnings as a good proxy for 
future earnings and/or on the potential liquidation of a firm. These two aspects can be 
particularly relevant to small firms (Collins et al., 1997), who tend to report losses 
more often than large firms (Hayn, 1995). Furthermore, smaller firms can be 
characterised as less mature, having high growth potential and being less diversified. 
This increases the ‘noise’ in current earnings and their values are ‘driven by their 
future earnings growth potential (i.e. abnormal earnings)’ (Collins et al., 1997: 44). 
Consistent with Ohlson (1995), this leads to increased importance of the book value 
of equity for small firms and/or increased importance of earnings for large and more 
mature firms (Xu et al., 2007). Studies that have documented the differential 
 
IFRS’ (Kontoyannis, 2005: 26 - translation). Although in a different setting, 
specifically, the investor focus of IFRS should further enhance the value relevance of 
small firms’ financial statements more than large companies. Drawing on finance 
weighting of book value of equity and earnings across small and large companies 
include Xu et al. (2007), Collins et al. (1997) and Hayn (1995). 
An interesting issue is whether the switch to IFRS modifies the small firm-large firm 
valuation differences. These issues are particularly relevant to the current study since 
the sample includes a variety of firm sizes. Additionally, foreign investors hold 
substantially lower percentages of shares in small firms than in large firms in Greece 
(2.8). It was expected that ‘the financial statements of many small and medium size 
listed companies will [would] reveal large and unfavourable surprises on transition to
Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) do document different impacts across companies with 
different size regarding the transition to Australian equivalents to IFRS.  
Accordingly, different perceptions of the value relevance of accounting information 
are expected for small firms and for large firms after IFRS adoption. More 
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literature (e.g. Fama and French, 1993), the median value of the 2006 market 
capitalisation is used as a benchmark for distinguishing small vs. large firms.103 
Thus, the following hypotheses are developed. 
H5.3: e increase more for 
small firms, after the switch from Greek GAAP to IFRS.  
H5.4: T ) increases more 
for small firms, after the switch from Greek GAAP to IFRS.  
er and the forecast dispersion is smaller’ for companies audited by large audit 
firms. 
roduce more relevant accounting information (i.e. of 
higher quality). On that basis: 
                                                
The value relevance of book value of equity and net incom
he relative value relevance of accounting information (i.e. R2
Hussainey (2009) finds that investors are able to better anticipate future earnings 
when companies have a ‘Big 4’ auditor. Similar results are also reported by Lee et al. 
(2007). Dang (2004) documents that the value relevance of companies facing audit 
failures is lower, arguing that market participants are able to assess audit quality ex 
ante. Finally, Behn et al. (2008: 327) show that ‘analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
is high
Based on the above and the prior findings regarding earnings management and the 
type of auditor in Greece (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008) (see 3.4.3 for detailed 
analysis), it is assumed that the presence of a ‘Big 4’ auditor reflects higher 
accounting quality (i.e. more value relevant accounting figures) under any set of 
accounting standards. As suggested in the previous chapter, Greek managers may 
also intentionally employ a ‘Big 4’ audit firm as a signal of high accounting quality. 
Accordingly, reporting quality (i.e. relative value relevance) may not change when 
companies (with a ‘Big 4’ auditor) move from national GAAP to IFRS, or any 
increase should not be as significant as for companies with a non-‘Big 4’ auditor. On 
the other hand, an increase of the relative value relevance of accounting information 
is expected for the remaining companies, as the implementation of the new 
accounting standards should p
 
103 Bartov et al. (2005) also partitioned companies across large versus small when looking at the 
relative association of earnings reported under German GAAP compared to those reported under IFRS 
or US GAAP. 
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H5.5: The value relevance of book value of equity and net income increase more for 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors, after the switch from Greek GAAP to 
IFRS.  
H5.6: The relative value relevance of accounting information (i.e. R2) increases more 
for companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors, after the switch from Greek GAAP 
to IFRS.  
5.4.1.6 Incremental value relevance of reconciliation adjustments: Hypotheses 
development 
As discussed above, the first IFRS financial statements published in 2005 
incorporated a set of reconciliation statements detailing the changes in the reported 
financial position (shareholders’ equity) and performance (net profit) in the 2004 
financial statements under Greek GAAP and under IFRS. Additionally, the restated 
comparative figures thus derived show what the 2004 financial statements would 
have been if they had been prepared in accordance with IFRS rather than Greek 
GAAP.  
Because of the substantial differences between IFRS and Greek GAAP the impact 
revealed within these statements was expected to be significant. Indeed, a statistically 
significant impact on equity and net income was identified and a surprisingly large 
number of individual companies were affected materially (3.7).  
Considering this significant impact, it is expected that these bottom line 
reconciliation adjustments should be incrementally value relevant. This expectation 
is in line with prior literature (cf. Capkun et al., 2008; Horton and Serafeim, 2007). 
However, as stated by Nobes,104 ‘different results and financial positions are 
logically to be expected when a different set of GAAP is applied for the same 
accounting period’. Also, net reconciliation changes may be small whilst significant 
individual adjustments may offset each other. Therefore, the individual adjustments 
(rather than the bottom line net adjustments) are likely to provide better information. 
                                                 
104 A comment made during the workshop ‘Accounting in Europe’ (Paris, September 2007). 
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That explanations of how and why accounting value changes provide additional 
information benefits is also noted in a different context by Alciatore (1993).105  
Therefore, the present study focuses on the individual adjustments reported within 
shareholders’ equity reconciliation statements (cf. Niskanen, 2000; Beckman, 2007; 
Horton and Serafeim, 2009).106 This promises to be interesting also because specific 
areas of creative accounting identified by prior research (e.g. Spathis, 2002; Spathis 
et al., 2002; Baralexis, 2004; Caramanis and Spathis, 2006) were expected to be 
curtailed under IFRS (Polychroniadis, 2002). The findings of chapter 3 support this 
proposition. With the exception of IAS 18, which was relevant to very few 
companies in the present sample, the present study examines the incremental value 
relevance of all these standards.  
Additionally, although not related to creative accounting practices, the incremental 
value relevance of the adjustments relating to three more standards, namely IAS 10, 
IAS 12 and IAS 16 is examined. This is because they affect most companies in the 
sample.  
Accordingly, it is tested whether the information provided within the reconciliation 
statements in 2004 shareholders’ equity provides additional value relevance over just 
the 2005 book values. Similar studies in other countries have also indicated that 
some individual adjustments are value relevant (e.g. Niskanen, 2000; Beckman et al., 
2007; Horton and Serafeim, 2009). Therefore, the following research hypothesis is 
stated:  
H5.7: Adjustments reported within the 2004 shareholders’ equity reconciliation 
statements are incrementally value relevant.  
                                                 
105 With regard to the change in the ‘standardised measure’ required by SFAS No. 69 to be disclosed 
by oil and gas producers for reserves. 
106 As discussed in sections 2.10 and 3.4.3.4, because of inconsistencies in presentation and lack of 
sufficient disclosures within the income statement reconciliations (confirmed also by the studies of 
HCMC (2006) and Grant Thornton (2006)), it was not feasible to examine the impact of individual 
standards with regard to net profit. 
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A positive relationship of these adjustments with companies’ market values is 
predicted since investors may perceive them as reflecting companies’ real financial 
position, i.e., improvements of the financial reporting quality. However, the sign of 
the relationship with regard to IAS 38 is difficult to predict. On the one hand, the 
market may indeed perceive these adjustments as curtailment of prior 
overstatements, i.e. as improvements, leading to a positive relationship with market 
values. On the other hand, investors may perceive these adjustments as unnecessary 
write-offs of intangible assets which would produce future economic benefits to the 
companies, leading to a negative relationship with market values. The latter may be 
particularly relevant to small companies for which high growth is expected. (Since 
some of the adjustments are negative, an inverse relationship between the 
adjustments and market values is implied above). 
5.4.1.7 Incremental value relevance of reconciliation adjustments and firm size 
Drawing on the previous discussion about small versus large firms and the potential 
difference in the respective value relevance of their accounting information, the same 
rationale is applied with respect to incremental value relevance of the reconciliation 
adjustments. Given that more weight is generally placed on book value for small 
firms and significant was expected on smaller companies (Kontoyannis, 2005), the 
following hypothesis is formulated:  
H5.8: Adjustments reported within the 2004 shareholders’ equity reconciliation 
statements are more incrementally value relevant for small firms.  
5.4.2 Value relevance of disclosures using the Ohlson (1995) Model (OM) 
5.4.2.1 Valuation implications of corporate (mandatory and voluntary) disclosures  
As was indicated in 1.4.5.3, there is lack of direct empirical evidence in relation to 
firm value and level of mandatory disclosures (Hassan et al., 2009; Kang and Pang, 
2005). One of the main objectives of this thesis is to fill the gap in the literature 
regarding in this regard. This review illustrates that there is large amount of studies 
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showing that disclosures do matter for investors but these findings are heavily based 
on voluntary disclosures. Thus, the lack of empirical examination of the importance 
of mandatory disclosures is highlighted. Another issue indicated from this review is 
the lack of literature regarding the implications of disclosures (either mandatory or 
voluntary) in Greece.  
The most closely related stream of literature to the present study, is that of examining 
companies’ level of disclosures and their relationship with share returns and 
earnings. First, Frazier et al. (1984) use a computerised package and conduct content 
analysis of MD&A disclosures of a small sample of US companies. They find that 
the disclosures score is associated with future earnings. Bryan (1997) also focuses on 
the US market and, after constructing a disclosure index based on the MD&A 
disclosures, he examines the ‘information content’ of companies’ disclosures. The 
study reports a significantly positive association between forward looking 
information and one-period ahead change in sales, earnings and capital expenditure.  
Healy et al. (1999) use the AIMR ratings for a sample of US companies to examine 
the valuation implications of disclosures. They find that companies which increase 
disclosure levels over time experience improvement in their shares performance. In a 
similar vein, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) also use the 
AIMR ratings for a sample of US companies. They report that increased levels of 
disclosures are associated with share prices that are more informative about changes 
of future earnings.  
In contrast, but focusing also in the US and using the AIMR ratings, Haw et al. 
(2002) report that share price anticipation of earnings does not vary with the 
informativeness of annual or quarterly reports. Douthett et al. (2003) also concentrate 
on the US but they examine the valuation effects of foreign companies’ disclosures. 
They report that the earnings response coefficient is higher for companies with 
higher levels of disclosures. 
Several studies have examined this issue for companies outside the US with the 
majority focusing on the UK. Schleicher (1996) was the first to examine the level of 
199 
Chapter 5 – Value Relevance of Accounting and ‘Other Information’ 
 
voluntary disclosures on the share price anticipation of earnings by using a self-
constructed index. His results do not show such an association. Schleicher and 
Walker (1999) revisited this issue by using a small scale expansion of the sample. 
They document that future oriented information does inform share prices.  
Hussainey et al. (2003) use a text analysis software package to automate disclosure 
scores. Although they report similar findings to Schleicher and Walker (1999), the 
authors do not find significant results when using a disclosure metric based on all 
types of forward-looking statements (cf. Hussainey, 2004). Schleicher et al. (2007) 
also find that disclosure levels affect the anticipation of future earnings. In fact, they 
find a different association between levels of annual report disclosures and share 
price anticipation of earnings between profitable and non-profitable firms. Hussainey 
and Walker (2009) also find that increased levels of voluntary disclosures improve 
share price of anticipation of earnings in the UK.  
Beyond the US and the UK, Kanto and Schadewitz (2000) use a self-constructed 
disclosure index regarding information provided in interim reports of Finish 
companies. They document that this type of information is value relevant.  
Shuqing et al. (2006) also use a self-constructed index looking at the levels of 
disclosure and returns-earnings association in Singapore. They find that companies 
‘with higher voluntary disclosure levels contain more information about future 
performance in their current stock return’ (ibid: 501). The association is weaker, 
however, when: management has high ownership interests; government ownership 
exists; and/or if proprietary costs exist.  
Although not related to predictability of earnings, Hassan et al. (2009) examine the 
relationship between company value and levels of voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures in Egypt. They use self-constructed indices and report that compliance 
with IAS’ mandatory disclosures is negatively related to market value. They find a 
positive but not significant relationship regarding voluntary disclosure. 
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Inferences 
Several inferences can be drawn from the above studies. Companies’ disclosures are 
consistently reported to have significant implications for valuation purposes. 
However, these findings are mainly based either on voluntary, or on a mixture of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures. There exists, therefore, a gap in the literature 
regarding the valuation implications of mandatory disclosures (Hassan et al., 2009; 
Bushee and Leuz, 2005; and Kang and Pang, 2005). Additionally, the above prior 
studies were conducted before the mandatory implementation of IFRS in the EU. 
This why Leuz and Wysocki (2008), call for future research that would focus on the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, the aggregate changes in the quality of mandatory 
disclosures and the possible capital market effects. Because the majority of prior 
studies focused on examining the valuation effects of disclosures in the US or in the 
UK, Verrecchia (2001: 174) calls for empirical research on disclosures in ‘less 
developed capital markets than those found in the US’ (ibid: 175). This part of the 
thesis considers these propositions and contributes to this stream of literature. 
5.4.2.2 Other information and the Ohlson (1995) Model 
As discussed in 1.4.5.3 one of the contributions of the present research is that it 
contributes to valuation theory by implementing the OM with LID, i.e. by 
introducing Greek companies’ level of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
as a proxy for ‘other information’. This section highlights what proxies have been 
used in prior studies as a control for ‘other information’ in OM.  
An early example of the complementarity between financial and non financial 
information is the study of Amir and Lev (1996). The authors examine the value 
relevance of accounting information of independent cellular companies in the US. 
They first find that ‘on a stand-alone basis, financial information (earnings, book 
values, and cash flows) (sic) are largely irrelevant for security valuation’ (ibid: 3). 
They show that these firms exhibited 4 to 6 times higher book-to-market ratios than 
other industrial companies indicating high growth expectations from investors, 
despite low profitability and cash flows. They then examine the value-relevance of 
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non financial indicators, such as population coverage in the companies’ areas of 
operation as well as penetration rate (ratio of subscribers to population size) as 
indicators of future success. Their results indicate that these non financial measures 
are highly value relevant. In fact, the coefficient for population coverage is 15.49 and 
for penetration rate is 5.92. Additionally, combined with non financial information, 
earnings do become value relevant. 
Ittner and Larcker (1998) introduce customer satisfaction measures as a proxy of 
‘other information’ to the OM. They examine inter alia ‘whether customer 
satisfaction measures provide information to the stock market beyond the 
information contained in current accounting book values’ (ibid: 2). Their analysis is 
focused on 138 companies in 1994 and 140 companies in 1995 for which the 
American Customer Satisfaction Index scores where available. Their findings show 
that this score was highly value relevant. (For 1994 the coefficient is 243.20 and for 
1995 is 235.67.) 
Myers (1999) also uses US data and compares 4 linear information models: the RIV; 
the Feltham and Ohlson model (1995); the Clean Surplus Effects of Conservatism; 
and the OM with non accounting information. Focusing on the last one, in line with 
prior literature, he mentions that information affecting expectations for future income 
is relevant for valuation and can be directly incorporated into the analysis. He 
introduces order backlog in the OM representing other information. However, his 
analysis illustrates that the proxy for other information employed does not appear to 
be value relevant. 
Dechow et al. (1999) evaluate the empirical implications of OM by focusing on the 
incorporation of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for other information. They also use 
annual financial statements from US companies. They find support for the 
information dynamics indicating that analysts’ forecasts are highly value relevant 
(coefficient being 5.79). 
Belkaoui (1999) investigates the relationship between the degree of 
internationalisation and market values of US companies. More specifically, he 
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examines all companies included in Forbes’ annual ranking as the ‘Most 
International’ 100 American manufacturing and service firms on the basis of total 
foreign revenues. The degree of internationalisation is measured as either foreign 
revenues/total revenues (FRTR) or foreign assets/total assets (FATA). He introduces 
these variables to the OM model (Belkaoui runs two separate regressions) as a proxy 
for ‘other information’. This is a unique research design because these proxies 
consist of items already recognised in the financial statements. His results indicate 
that these variables are highly value relevant. (As an example, the coefficient for 
FRTR for the undeflated pooled model was 70.53.) 
Similar to Amir and Lev (1996), Rajgopal et al. (2003) examine inter alia the value 
relevance of network advantages of e-commerce firms in the US. They define 
network advantages as the average monthly unique visitors to the companies’ virtual 
communities and they introduce it to the OM as a proxy for ‘other information’. 
They also find that their proxy is highly value relevant (coefficient being 20.46).  
Wang et al. (2005) investigate the usefulness of notional and fair value derivative 
disclosures by commercial banks under SFAS Nos. 119 and 133 in the US. Their 
analysis is based on the OM and they include a ‘sales growth’ variable, employing it 
as other information representing future growth potential. (‘Sales growth’ is used as a 
control variable in this study and is not the main focus of the analysis). In both their 
primary and secondary tests, ‘sales growth’ is value relevant but with a very small 
coefficient. 
A recent study, examining a very similar issue to what is examined in the present 
research, is that of Goncharov et al. (2006). Since 2002, company law in Germany 
requires listed companies to discuss their degree of conformity to the German 
Corporate Governance Code. The authors choose 61 large companies (listed in the 
DAX 30 and MDAX) for the years 2002 and 2003. They then examine whether the 
degree of compliance is value relevant by introducing it to the OM as a proxy for 
‘other information’. The authors do find that the degree of compliance with the Code 
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is value relevant, with a very high coefficient (22.34), after controlling for an 
endogeneity bias.  
Kohlbeck and Warfield (2007) examine the impact of unrecorded intangible assets 
on the valuation of publicly traded banks in the US. The authors use discounted cash 
flow techniques similar to those used by valuation experts to estimate unrecorded 
intangible assets (mortgage servicing rights, credit card intangible, core deposit 
intangible, and trust operations intangible). Their main analysis is based on the OM 
but they provide the results of the conventional form of the model across 4 sub-
samples, based on the quartiles of the unrecorded intangible assets. As a robustness 
check, they introduce the unrecorded intangible assets to the model as ‘other 
information’. These appear to be significant (estimated coefficient being 0.347). 
In his critique of the omission of v, Ohlson (2001) proposed consensus analyst 
forecasts as a proxy for other information. Bryan and Tiras (2007) followed this 
proposition and examined the influence of analyst forecast dispersion on OM 
valuation. Their analysis is based on a sample of US companies (excluding financial 
institutions and utilities and firms with negative book value). Their findings validate 
those of Dechow et al. (1999): consensus analyst forecasts residuals of next year’s 
earnings are highly value relevant. 
Inferences 
Drawing upon the discussion of the prior literature regarding the role of ‘other 
information’, the following inferences can be made. There is no significant body of 
literature which has explored the role of ‘other information’ in general and with data 
outside the US in particular. Of the 10 studies identified, only that of Goncharov et 
al. (2006) uses other than US data. This is perplexing because the findings of the 
studies discussed indicate that the proxies observable (to market participants) 
selected as ‘other information’ prove to be consistently highly value relevant. (The 
exception being the study of Myers (1999)). Thus, such consistent findings indicate 
that omitting v from the model leads indeed to a simplistic (Ohlson, 2001) and, 
arguably, ‘an incorrect’ (Lo and Lys, 2000a) implementation.  
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Additionally, the findings of Goncharov et al. (2006) and Belkaoui (1999) are very 
important for, and relevant to, the present study. The former employ a proxy which is 
related to information disclosed in the financial reports and to compliance with 
regulation (albeit in this case not accounting standards). The proxies used by 
Belkaoui (1999) are also observable by market participants through the notes to the 
financial statements, providing that companies comply with the mandatory 
disclosures requirements.  
In summary, this review highlights that the OM with LID provides an effective 
framework for examining value relevant information that has not yet been captured 
in the financial statements. This, and the findings of Goncharov et al. (2006) in 
particular, as well as the lack of a direct empirical investigation of the valuation of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures after 2005 (see previous section), 
suggest that there is merit in exploring the value relevance of compliance with IFRS’ 
mandatory disclosures by employing the OM with LID. 
5.4.2.3 Other information and the Ohlson (1995) model: Hypotheses development107 
As discussed previously, v should be thought of as summarising value relevant 
events that have yet to have an impact on the financial statements’ (Ohlson, 1995: 
668), i.e. the subset of  that helps predict future abnormal earnings (Hand, 
2001). The present research considers companies’ compliance with (i.e. quantity of) 
IFRS mandatory disclosures as a potential proxy for other information that helps 
predict future abnormal earnings. The rationale behind this investigation and the 
corresponding hypotheses tested are discussed in this section. 
m
tNFΦ
Notes, including those on accounting policies, comprise an integral part of a 
complete set of financial statements (IAS 1, paragraph 8). It could be argued that the 
notes to the accounts include information about accounting events have been 
recognised and thus this information is already incorporated in the book values of 
                                                 
107 When reading this section you may wish to refer back to the discussions on the difference between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures (4.2) and the theoretical explanations for corporate disclosures 
(4.3). 
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shareholders’ equity and net income. This may indeed be the case for some items. 
However, Gigler and Hemmer (1998) argue that the mandatory disclosures do not 
provide value relevant information if they only establish the credibility of a 
company’s voluntary disclosures. In Greece, the level of voluntary disclosures is low 
(Leventis and Weetman, 2004b) and Greek companies do not provide detailed annual 
reports (Vlachos, 2001). Thus, it is expected that IFRS mandatory disclosures should 
provide value relevant information to the market participants.  
Beyond this, findings of the following studies provide further support for the 
argument that the quantity of mandatory disclosures is a suitable proxy for other 
information assisting in predicting future earnings.  
Hope (2003a) explains that the level of detail of mandatory disclosures can provide 
insights for assessing a company’s sustainability of earnings. Hope (2003b) argues 
further that disclosures of accounting policies can be of help to financial analysts. 
Thus, he uses the CIFAR scores, but only with regard to disclosures of accounting 
policies, to test whether they relate to / affect forecast dispersion and forecast errors. 
He reports that the level of accounting policy disclosure significantly reduces 
forecast dispersion and forecast errors. Additionally, he reports that ‘accounting 
policy disclosures are incrementally useful to analysts over and above all other 
annual report disclosures’ (ibid: 295). Furthermore, the univariate analysis (albeit not 
the multivariate analysis) he carries out indicates that accounting policy disclosures 
are particularly helpful to analysts in environments where options between a larger 
set of accounting methods are available.  
Hope’s (2003b) study follows the arguments of Dye (1985) that on the basis that 
accounting policies are chosen by a company’s manager, companies reveal 
information through their choice of accounting techniques. Dye (1985) refers to 
Ricks (1982) who suggests that LIFO-adopting firms tend to be different from FIFO 
firms and to Foster (1980) who illustrates that oil and gas exploration companies that 
use ‘successful efforts’ accounting techniques differ from their ‘full-costing’ 
counterparts. Thus, he concludes that the users of financial statements take into 
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account the procedure a company elects, as well as the outcomes of these policies, 
and that they make inferences about the company’s private information.  
These examples (and in turn the arguments) refer to options of accounting policies 
within the mandatory accounting principles in the US at that time. However, they are 
particularly relevant to this research as IFRS also allow for a variety of options 
regarding the accounting policies to be followed.  
Even more relevant, Hodgdon et al. (2008) measure companies’ compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of IFRS for the years 1999 and 2000 by using two self-
constructed disclosure indices (see 4.6.2 for more details regarding the methods 
employed). They then examine the relationship between the levels of compliance 
identified and analysts’ forecast errors. They find that compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirements is negatively associated with individual analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors. 
The findings of these studies are not surpising if one considers that there are many 
mandatory disclosures which provide information relating to, or potentially affecting, 
future events (and thus future earnings). Similar arguments are raised by Dye (1990). 
Omission or provision of mandatory disclosures may affect investors’ perceptions 
about a company’s and/or its competitors’ prospects i.e. they may cause ‘real’ and/or 
‘financial’ externalities (Dye, 1990).  
A ‘real’ externality is created when a company’s disclosure relates to its own and/or 
alters other companies’ cash flows (Dye, 1990). An example is the detailed 
disclosure of a company’s contingent liabilities. A ‘financial’ externality is created 
when the disclosures of a company in one industry affect investors’ perceptions 
about the profitability of other companies in the same industry and consequently 
affect the latter’s market values (Dye, 1990 with reference to Foster (1981)). 
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Some examples of IFRS mandatory disclosures which could provide value relevant 
information to investors and thus have valuation implications include the following 
but are not exhaustive:108  
 Segmental reporting and the different risks faced and returns expected by 
different business segments (cf. Belkaoui, 1999), as required by IAS 14.  
 The number and weighted average exercise prices of share options outstanding at 
the end of the period together with the range of exercise prices and weighted 
average remaining contractual life, as required by IFRS 2.  
 The dividends announced to be distributed as well as information about other 
post balance sheet events (e.g. investments, decisions for restructuring), as 
required by IAS 10. 
 Business combinations (those referring to post balance sheet date acquisitions 
relate to the requirements of IAS 10 as well), as required by IFRS 3. 
 Contingent assets and contingent liabilities (cf. Dye, 1990) (This is particularly 
relevant here since there is evidence that accountants do not disclose contingent 
liabilities under Greek GAAP (Tsakumis, 2007)), as required by IAS 37. 
 The amount that best represents a company’s maximum credit risk exposure at 
the balance sheet date, as required by IAS 32. 
 Relationships between related parties, as required by IAS 24. 
Many standards require disclosures regarding the assumptions used for the company 
to determining accounting items recognised in the financial statements. Some 
examples include but are not limited to the following:  
 The principal actuarial assumptions used as at the balance sheet date, as required 
by IAS 19. 
                                                 
108 Consistent with chapters 3 and 4, the references here are related to the standards in force in April 
2006. 
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 The assumptions used for measuring the recoverable amount of a cash generating 
unit, as required by IAS 36. 
 Significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, timing and certainty 
of future cash flows of financial instruments, as required by IAS 32.  
The provision of such assumptions enhances transparency (Pownall and Schipper, 
1999) and provides the users of financial statements with information regarding how 
the company perceives its prospects. This subsequently affects the users’ of the 
financial statements perceptions regarding companies’ prospects (Hope, 2003a).  
These arguments are particularly relevant to the present study if one considers the 
findings of the previous chapter regarding companies’ levels of compliance with the 
requirements of each standard separately (section 4.7.3). More specifically, there was 
substantial variation and, in fact, low average compliance with the standards would 
force companies to disclose proprietary information (e.g. IAS 36 (50%), IAS 8 
(51%), IAS 17 (51%), IAS 19 (64%), IAS 37 (70%), IAS 14 (71%), IAS 40 (72%) 
and IFRS 3 (72%)).   
To summarise, the present research syntheses the findings of the prior literature, the 
propositions for future research and posits a strong relationship between the level of 
compliance with (i.e. quantity of) IFRS mandatory disclosures and market values. To 
the extent that mandatory disclosures are informative about a company’s prospects 
levels of disclosures should be associated with market values. 
This anticipation is supported by the findings of relevant prior literature: share price 
anticipation of earnings improves with increasing levels of disclosures (e.g. 
Hussainey and Walker, 2009); increased levels of disclosures (voluntary and 
mandatory) improve the predictability of earnings and reduce analysts’ forecasts 
errors (e.g. Hodgdon et al., 2008); and proxies used as ‘other information’, when 
employing the OM, are usually highly value relevant (e.g. Goncharov et al., 2006).  
However, no attempt to predict the sign of the relationship between market value and 
compliance with mandatory disclosures is made. On the one hand, the findings of the 
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prior literature suggest positive valuation implications of increased levels of 
disclosures. Nevertheless, these studies mainly focus on voluntary disclosures. As 
argued by Bushee and Leuz (2005: 234), the implications of mandatory disclosures 
are ‘theoretically far from clear and heavily debated’. As discussed above, higher 
compliance leads to higher levels of disclosure of both proprietary and non-
proprietary information and/or both good and bad ‘news’ (cf. Leuz and Wysocki, 
2008; Verrecchia, 2001). Accordingly, higher compliance may have a positive 
impact on one company’s market value but a negative impact on another.  
Further, complying with the detailed IFRS mandatory disclosures, especially during 
their first year of adoption, would require high direct costs for companies. Non-
compliance costs would include monetary fines, market pressure and the threat of de-
listing from ASE. However, the latter are not expected to be high in the period under 
examination because there is evidence that HCMC acknowledged companies’ non-
compliance with IFRS measurement and/or disclosure requirements (Avlonitis, 
2007) but the imposition of strict fines was avoided because this was a transition 
period. This would allow managers to be more ‘flexible’ on deciding whether to 
disclose proprietary information (cf. Dye, 1986). 
Accordingly, if the costs of compliance with mandatory disclosures were high and 
the non-compliance costs negligible, non-compliance companies might be better off 
not disclosing all the information required (cf. Hassan et al., 2009). More 
specifically, investors may be suspicious of a company with high compliance. Within 
a regime where enforcement is low, incurring high direct costs for achieving high 
compliance may place a company ‘at a competitive disadvantage relative to its 
competitors who failed to publish such mandatory details’ (Hassan et al., 2009: 85). 
Thus, examining companies’ level of compliance with IFRS’ disclosure requirements 
and its importance for valuation purposes provides more insights regarding the 
valuation implications of mandatory disclosures. On that basis, the following 
research hypothesis is tested: 
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H5.9 Companies’ levels of compliance with (quantity of) IFRS mandatory 
disclosures are value relevant.109 
Further, provision of mandatory disclosures (i.e. high compliance) provides insights 
assumptions and accounting policies choices used to determe the recognition and 
measurement of accounting items. Thus, it provides more transparent financial 
statements (cf. Pownall and Schipper, 1999) and, in turn, greater transparency may 
reduce the uncertainty of companies’ economic situations, as this is reflected in the 
financial statements (Anctil et al. 2004; Hope, 2003a).  
These arguments are particularly relevant to Greece (i.e. to the present study). As 
was indicated above, the literature indicates that under Greek GAAP there was a high 
level of earnings management (especially with regard to the balance sheet (Spathis, 
2002; Spathis et al., 2002; Baralexis, 2004)). Additionally, the mandatory disclosures 
under Greek GAAP were minimal compared to those required by IFRS. This enabled 
companies to be secretive regarding the accounting policies and practices followed. 
However, the mandatory disclosures required by IFRS ‘could constrain some 
potentially harmful managerial actions’ (Hope, 2003b: 317). Thus, companies which 
want to signal less earnings management have the opportunity to communicate their 
practices in a more transparent way under IFRS. This would lead to a closer 
relationship between book values and market values. As noted above, according to 
Barth et al. (2008) the higher the value relevance of one accounting item implies 
higher acccounitg quality. On that basis, the following two hypotheses are tested: 
H5.10 The relative value relevance of accounting information (i.e. R2) is higher for 
companies exhibiting higher levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures. 
                                                 
109 No attempt to test the value relevance of compliance with mandatory disclosures before and after 
the implementation of IFRS in Greece is made. This research hypothesis explicitly examines the value 
relevance of compliance with mandatory disclosures (those mandated by IFRS in this case) at a 
particular point of time. 
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H5.11 The value relevance of book value of shareholders’ equity and net income is 
higher for companies exhibiting higher level of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. 
In line with Hussainey and Walker (2009), the median value of the compliance score 
is used to partition the sample across companies with low and high levels of 
compliance.  
5.5 Research Design 
5.5.1 Controlling for sample selection bias110 
As indicated in section 4.6.1, for the purposes of the present research a maximum of 
175 companies could have been used, instead of the 153 currently examined. The 
decision not to examine 22 companies was based on the fact that either, they did not 
produce reconciliation statements for shareholders’ equity and/or income, or the 
quality of the reconciliations provided did not allow for clear identification and 
evaluation of the information provided therein. Thus, ignoring the non-randomness 
of the sample may result in potential coefficient bias in the regressions employed 
(Maddala, 1991).  
Francis and Lennox (2009: 4) emphasise that ‘accounting researchers need to find 
credible and convincing exclusion restrictions’. There is an increasing tendency in 
the market-based accounting literature to employ a two-step procedure developed by 
Heckman (1979), known as the selection model (Gujarati, 2003), in order to mitigate 
such a potential problem. Francis and Lennox (2009: 2) ‘identify 30 studies that use 
selection models out of 545 empirical papers published from 2000 through 2007’ in 
three high quality accounting journals,111 20 of which were published after 2004. 
This process has also been employed by recent studies with similar focus of this part 
of the present research (e.g. Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Jermakowicz et al., 
2007; Goncharov et al., 2006; Harris and Muller, 1999). 
                                                 
110 I owe debt to an anonymous referee for considering the procedure followed here. 
111 The Accounting Review, Journal Accounting and Economics, and Journal of Accounting Research. 
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In step 1, the researcher estimates a probit model where the dependent variable is 
either 0, representing the observations excluded, or 1, representing the observations 
used. The independent variables are those which would be considered in the research 
design anyway and at least one exogenous variable known as ‘instruments’. In this 
type of model goodness of fit measures (pseudo R2, similar to R2 of OLS regressions) 
are of secondary importance. ‘What matters is the signs of the regression coefficients 
and their statistical and/or practical significance’ (Gujarati, 2003: 606). Most 
important is that the estimation of this probit model results in estimation of an 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio (IMR). Step 2 is the estimation of the primary model of interest 
which also includes the IMR as a control for the effects of selection.  
Francis and Lennox (2009) highlight the fact that choice of ‘instruments’ plays a 
crucial role for a correct implementation of the selection model. Considering that the 
relationship between book values and market values of the companies selected may 
be biased compared to the 22 not included, the present research employs a selection 
model in accordance with Heckman’s (1979) two stage approach.  
Omission to provide or provision of very low quality reconciliation statements is 
identified as non-compliance with IFRS 1 disclosure requirements. Thus, based on 
the findings of the prior literature and those reported in the previous chapter 
regarding the explanatory factors of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures, 
the following selection (probit) model was employed:  
it 54
 
ititititititititit NIChbEqChbGeabLiqbIndbAudbNIbBVEbaS ε+++++++++= 8763210
(Eq. 5.8) 
where Sit is the indicator variable equal to 1 for the sample firms and 0 otherwise; 
BVEit is the book value of equity at the end of 2005, deflated by the number of shares 
outstanding one month after the publication of the financial statements relating to the 
end of 2005 (t); NIit is the book value of net income at the end of 2005, deflated by 
the number of shares outstanding one month after the publication of the financial 
statements relating to 2005 (t); Audit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies 
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with a ‘Big 4’ auditor and 0 otherwise; Indit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
manufacturing companies and 0 otherwise; Liqit is the ratio of current assets divided 
by current liabilities at the end of 2005; Geait is the ratio of total debt divided by total 
assets at the end of 2005; EqChit is the difference between the book value of 
shareholders equity at the end of 2004 under Greek GAAP and the restated figures 
under IFRS, measured by using Gray’s comparability index (see chapter 3); NIChit is 
the difference between the book value of net income at the end of 2004 under Greek 
GAAP and the restated figures under IFRS measured by using Gray’s comparability 
index (ibid); and ε  is the mean zero disturbance term.  
 of 
shareholders’ equity. Panel B of Table 5.1 shows the results of the probit model.  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of co ies inc and co ies ex
it
Panel A of Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics regarding the companies 
included in and excluded from this study. These statistics indicate that, in all 
financial measures, the companies excluded underperform those included. More 
specifically they exhibit lower book values of equity and net income per share, 
higher gearing and lower liquidity ratios. Additionally, they faced more negative 
change in the 2004 restated net income figure because of the transition to IFRS. They 
only faced a marginally more positive change in the 2004 restated book value
Table 5:1: Controlling for sample selection bias (N=175). 
mpan luded mpan cluded 
V  C  M  ariable ompanies N Mean SD Min Max edian
Included 153 3.14 5.03 -0.09 55.78 2.06 Equity Excluded 22 2.14 1.18 0.45 5.50 1.93 
Included 153 0.28 1.16 -3.26 11.56 0.11 N  et income
Excluded 22 0.22 0.37 -0.15 1.34 0.09 
Included 153 2.13 5.17 0.  15 61.43 1.40 Liquidity 
Excluded 22 1.88 1.71 0.23 7.47 1.13 
Included 153 0.29 0.17 0 0.68 0.29 Gearing 
Excluded 22 0.54 0.24 0.06 0.86 0.55 
Included 153 1.11 0.74 0.35 8.98 0.99 Equity 
Co y mparabilit
Index Excluded 22 1.02 0.48 0.43 2.87 0.97 
Included 153 1.29 3.81 -20.60 32.05 0.96 E  
Com
Index Excl ded 22 2.17 -0.11 00 
arnings
parability u 1.70  8.68 1.
  Manu uring Non-Ma cturing fact nufa
Included 59 94 Industry Excluded 8 14 
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  ‘Big 4’ non-‘Big 4’ 
Included 38 115 Auditor Excluded 2 20 
Panel B: Results of the probit model 
itititititititititit NIChbEqChbGeabLiqbIndbAudbNIbBVEbaS ε+++++++++= 876543210
Int. BVEit NIit Audit Indit Liqit Geait EqChit NIChit Pseudo R2 N 
0.469 0.114 -0.202 0.573 0.091 0.006 -0.010 0.339 -0.033* 0.06 175 
*Significant at 10%.Variable definitions: Sit is the indicator variable equal to 1 for the sample firms 
and 0 otherwise; BVEit is the book value of equity at the end of 2005, deflated by the number of shares 
outstanding one month after the publication of the financial statements relating 2005 (t); NIit is the 
book value of net income at the end of 2005, deflated by the number of shares outstanding one month 
after the publication of the financial statements relating to 2005 (t); Audit is a dummy variable equal to 
1 for companies having a ‘Big 4’ auditors and 0 otherwise; Indit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
manufacturing companies and 0 otherwise; Liqit is the ratio of current assets divided by current 
liabilities at the end of 2005; Geait is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets at the end of 2005; 
EqChit is the difference between the book value of shareholders equity at the end of 2004 under Greek 
GAAP and the restated figures under IFRS, measured by using Gray’s comparability index; NIChit is 
the difference between the book value of net income at the end of 2004 under Greek GAAP and the 
restated figures under IFRS measured by using Gray’s comparability index.  
 
These results indicate that there is an economically very small but significant 
relationship between the sample companies selected and the change in their 2004 net 
income, as restated under IFRS.112 As discussed previously, when Gray’s 
comparability index exhibits a value larger than 1 a negative change is indicated (see 
3.5.1). Accordingly, this finding confirms that the companies excluded exhibited 
more negative impact on their 2004 net income figure. 
5.5.2 The main model  
As has been indicated, this study is based on the fundamental Ohlson (1995) model 
(OM). Additionally, the IMR calculated following the above selection (probit) model 
(denoted as Lambda) is used as control for selection bias: 
itititit LambdabNIbBVEbaMV ε++++= 3210    (Eq. 5.9) 
                                                 
112 The comparison between the measures of these two groups has to be treated with caution because 
the sample sizes differ substantially. Additionally, the pseudo R might seem quite low but this is 
common in this type of regressions (e.g. Bushee and Leuz, 2005). Also, its role is not crucial for 
drawing conclusions (cf. Gujarati, 2003). 
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• MVit is the market value of a company i one month after the publication of the 
financial statements relating to the end of the financial period under examination 
(t) (This means approximately four months after the year end date. It ensures 
that the accounting information is in the public domain and has been ‘absorbed’ 
by investors, cf. Barth et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2004; Harris and Muller, 
1999);113 
• BVEit is the book value of net assets of company i at the end of the financial 
period under examination (t); 
• NIit is the net profit after tax of company i for the financial period under 
examination (t); 
• Lambda is the IMR calculated through the selection model above; and εit is the 
mean zero disturbance term.  
5.5.2.1 Levels specification and econometric considerations 
Easton (1999) argues that the OM provides obvious motivation for levels (price) 
models, without prohibiting the motivation for changes (returns) specifications. 
However, Barth et al. (2001: 95) remark that ‘for the most part, valuation models that 
form the basis for tests in the value relevance literature are developed in terms of the 
level of firm value (e.g. Miller and Modigliani, 1966; Ohlson, 1995)’.  
In particular, several researchers (e.g. Barth et al., 2001; Beaver, 2002; Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007) highlight an important difference between the two alternative 
specifications which, lies in the definition of value relevance research. As mentioned 
above, value relevance research examines what is reflected in a company’s value at a 
particular point of time. It does not examine what is reflected in changes of the value 
of a firm over a period of time. This is why Barth et al., (2001: 95) explain that ‘if 
the research question involves determining whether the accounting amount is timely, 
                                                 
113 Choosing one month after the announcement of the annual results also avoids any ‘noise’ that 
might be caused by the publication of the quarterly reports. 
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examining changes in value is the appropriate research design choice’. They continue 
by arguing that ‘non-academic accounting constituents are interested in a wide 
variety of questions, most of which do not involve timeliness’ (ibid: 95). The 
identification of timeliness as an ‘ancillary aspect of relevance’ by the FASB (SFAC 
No. 2, FASB, 1980) is a particular example.  
From Ohlson and Shroff (1992), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) to Gu (2005), 
authors have been unable to demonstrate the superiority of one specification over the 
other on econometric grounds. With relevance to the current research, neither Hung 
and Subramanyam (2007) nor Barth et al. (2008) use return specifications. In 
particular, Hung and Subramanyam (2007: 639) further point out that ‘an additional 
advantage of the price specification is that it is possible to examine the value 
relevance of both the stock (book value) and flow (net income) variables’. This is 
especially important if there is a trade-off between the value relevance of book value 
and net income, that is, if the new standards improve the value relevance of book 
values at the expense of net income. Additionally, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995: 
157) suggest that the price specification ‘gives more economically sensible earnings 
response coefficients’. On the basis of the above, a levels specification is considered 
more appropriate for the purposes of this study. 
However, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) highlight that this specification ‘more 
frequently reject[s] tests of heteroskedasticity and/or model misspecification than 
return models’. They therefore suggest that, when possible, researchers should use 
both types of research design. Alternatively, to mitigate concerns regarding 
heteroskedasticity, they suggest that researchers should use White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors when employing price models.  
In order to address the concerns relating to heteroskedasticity, ‘Heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator 3 (HC3)’ is also employed here. 
Heteroskedasticity can also arise as a result of the presence of outliers (Gujarati, 
2003: 390). This issue is also considered in the present part of the study and outliers 
are defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure (Fielding and 
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Gilbert, 2004; Pallant, 2005). Similarly, the presence of multicollinearity is 
considered with a variance inflation factor (VIF)>10 as a threshold (Gujarati, 2003: 
362).  
An alternative technique for dealing with outliers could be to exclude cases for which 
the standardised residuals lie outside the range of +/-2 standard deviations (Belsley et 
al., 1980). This technique was considered and although it would exclude fewer 
observations it produced results with high multicollinearity and thus it was 
abandoned. The same applied to the findings when the DFBETAS statistic (Belsley et 
al., 1980) was used as a method for identifying and excluding outliers.  
Another common problem in value relevance research is the scale bias which may 
introduce heteroskedasticity. The problem arises because firm size can vary 
substantially. There is debate in the literature regarding whether a scale factor should 
be used and, if so, which scaling factor results in less biased coefficients (e.g. Barth 
and Kallapur, 1996; Easton, 1998; Akbar and Stark, 2003; Easton and Sommers, 
2003; Barth and Clinch, 2009). These papers use the Ohlson model to illustrate the 
effects of different scale factors. For example, Barth and Clinch (2009) test six 
different ways for controlling for scale bias: undeflated, share-deflated, equity book 
value-deflated, lagged price-deflated, returns, and equity market value-deflated. They 
conclude that those generally performing best are the share-deflated and non-deflated 
specifications.  
In line with Barth and Clinch (2009) and with what is common in the relevant 
literature (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Collins et al., 1997; 
Barth and Clinch, 1996) the present study initially employs a per share specification. 
As a robustness measure, the non-deflated specification was initially used (Barth and 
Clinch, 2009; Beckman et al., 2007; Harris and Muller, 1999; Barth and Kallapur, 
1996).  
However, the results for the decomposed model in relation to the incremental value 
relevance of the adjustments reported in the reconciliation statements (5.6.3) 
indicated high multicollinearity when this technique was implemented. Thus, the 
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alternative measure of using equity market value as a deflator was finally employed 
as a robustness measure testing the first eight hypotheses H5.1 - H5.8 (e.g. Dechow 
et al., 1999; Easton and Sommers, 2003; Xu et al., 2007).  
Deflating by equity market value results in ‘a regression of a column of ones on the 
inverse of the market capitalisation and each variable deflated by market 
capitalisation’ (Easton and Sommers, 2003: 29). In contrast to an OLS regression, 
this is a weighted least squares (WLS) one and ‘testing of inferences and 
interpretation of coefficients and t-statistics can then be performed in the usual 
(weighted least squares) manner’ (ibid: 29).  
Findings which are significant under both specifications are considered to be valid 
for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses tested. 
5.5.3 Pre-and post-IFRS relative value relevance (H5.1 - H5.6) 
In order to provide an answer to research question 4 (Q4), this study assesses 
whether there is any change in the value relevance of accounting information before 
and after the adoption of IFRS by Greek listed companies. This objective can be 
explored in two dimensions. The first is to examine the shift in the valuation 
coefficients of book value of equity and net income between the two periods (i.e. 
H5.1). The second is to examine the change in the relative value relevance of 
accounting information measured as the R2 of (Eq. 5.9) between the two periods 
under examination (i.e. H5.2). These two issues are tested with different methods. 
In order to address the first one (i.e. H5.1), this study uses panel data analysis based 
on 2004 and 2005 for each company. Since the objective is to test if there is any 
difference (structural change) in the above model between the two periods, a dummy 
variable is introduced indicating the two different periods under examination 
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• itV  is the market value of a company i one month after the publication of the 
financial statements relating to the end of the financial period under examination 
(t) (This means approximately four months after the end of 2004 & 2005); 
M
•  is the dummy variable where 1 refers to the 2005 IFRS financials and 0 
refers to the 2004 Greek financials; 
DV
• IFRSGRitVE
&  is the year end book value of shareholders’ equity (2004 Gr GAAP 
& 2005 IFRS); 
B
•  is the year end book value of shareholders’ equity multiplied 
by the dummy variable, testing the change in the coeeficient of this variable 
between the two periods; 
DVBVE IFRSGRit *
&
•  is the net profit (2004 Gr GAAP & 2005 IFRS); 
• & le, testing the 
change in the coeeficient of this variable between the two periods; 
•  is the IMR calculated through the selection model; 
• e IMR calculated through the selection and multiplied by the 
dummy variable;  
• εit is the mean zero disturbance term.  
ill indicate the average shift in the market price per share between the 
two periods.  
IFRSGR&
itNI
DVNIit *  is the net profit multiplied by the dummy variab
IFRSGR
Lambda
DVLambda*  is th
This method allows for comprehensive analysis of whether and how much the 
coefficients of BVE and NI (i.e. b3 and b5), referring to the 2005 financials, differ 
from those referring to 2004 (see further in Gujarati, 2003: 308) and whether this 
difference is significant. This allows for identifying not only a potential shift to the 
value assigned to the individual bottom line figures produced under the new 
accounting regime but also the direction of the shift. The dummy variable coefficient 
and its sign w
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In order to address the second hypothesis (i.e. H5.2), first, each regression is run 
separately for each period. Then, the present study employs Cramer’s (1987) Z-
statistic to compare the R2 of the two regressions with regard to both years. This 
needs estimation of the standard deviation of estimated R2's, which Cramer (1987) 
shows is a function of sample size, the number of independent variables and the true 
R2. As discussed by Kothari (2001) this method enables researchers to compare the 
explanatory power (R2) of two models without the same dependent variable. 
Accordingly, this approach is helpful in making comparisons across countries, across 
industries or across periods and has been employed by Harris et al. (1994), Ball et al. 
(2000), Arce and Mora (2002), Alsalman (2003) and Sami and Zhou (2004) among 
others. The Z-statistics are computed as: 
)()( 222212 RR σσ +
where σ2 is the standard deviation of (R2).  
The above two approaches are followed for each sub-sample (large vs. small 
companies and companies with ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ auditors) separately. Thus, it 
can be inferred whether there is any shift in the valuation coefficients and/or the 
relative value relevance of each sub-sample across the two periods (i.e. testing H5.3 
and H5.6). Finally, to provide additional information to the reader, the differences in 
the coefficients across two sub-samples are measured by introducing a dummy 
variable partitioning the sample across each sub-sample. The design is similar to Eq. 
5.10. 1 represents companies with
2
21 RR −    (Eq. 5.11) 
 ‘Big 4’ auditors or large firms and 0 represents 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors and small firms.114 The Cramer Z-statistic is 
h 
sub-s ithin each partition. 
                                                
2
also computed testing the difference in the R2 (i.e. relative value relevance) of eac
ample w
 
114 As an alternative, a two-step regression and t tests (Arce and Mora, 2002; Hung and Subramanyam, 
2007) have also been employed and the results do not change. 
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5.5.4 Incremental value relevance of the reconciliation adjustments (H5.7 and 
H5.8) 
In order to examine the incremental value relevance of the reconciliation adjustments 
(i.e. providing an answer to Q5) the bottom line differences revealed by the restated 
2004 figures are introduced into equation 5.9 (resulting in Eq. 5.12 below). More 
specifically, the 2005 book value of shareholders equity is decomposed back to the 
2004 Greek numbers and is broken down across three components: the 2004 closing 
values under Greek GAAP; the difference revealed by restating the 2004 figures 
under IFRS; and the difference between opening and closing 2005 IFRS book value 
of equity. Similarly, the 2005 book value of net income is broken down into three 
components in the spirit of a time series view of current net income (Brown, 1993; 
by breaking down the change in the bottom line balance sheet net assets 
into ten components: impact from IAS 2 and IAS 36 (aggregate because they both 
                                                
Capkun et al., 2008): the 2004 closing values under Greek GAAP; the difference 
revealed by restating the 2004 figures under IFRS; and the difference between the 
reported 2004 and 2005 net income under IFRS.115 This is the first step of the 
decomposition applied and it is not empirically tested.  
This decomposition assists in examining the incremental value relevance of specific 
reconciling items (H5.7) because Eq. 5.12 is further decomposed (resulting in Eq. 
5.13 below) 
deal with impairment of assets); IAS 10; IAS 12; IAS 16; IAS 19; IAS 20; IAS 32/39 
(joint as companies tended to disclose this impact jointly); IAS 37; IAS 38; and the 
sum of the impact from all other standards (Other).116 (It is noted that Eq. 5.13 is the 
one tested.) 
As shown in 3.8, these adjustments were relevant to the majority of companies 
examined in this study. It is acknowledged that, in 3.8, adjustments relating to further 
standards were identified to be relevant to some of the companies examined 
(nevertheless not many) and thus it may be worth examining their incremental value 
 
115 This decomposition is in line with the notion that annual earnings follow ‘a random walk with 
drift’ (Brown, 1993). 
116 See 3.4.2 for more details regarding the relevance of these adjustments with regard to the Greek 
context in particular. 
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relevance as well. However, the decomposition could not be expanded further for the 
following reason. Since the study intends to examine the incremental value relevance 
of these adjustments across the partition of small versus large firms, it would be 
ple) from an econometrics point of view. This would reduce 
substantially the degrees of freedom and it might result in high multicollinearity (cf. 
Gujarati, 2003).   
Eq. 5.12 and the description of the d ns examined within Eq. 5.13 are as 
follows: 
+
lating to the end of 2005 (t) (This means approximately 
four mont
• hareholders’ equity, under Greek GAAP; 
∆ ’ equity, revealed by the 
restated 200
•  the opening and closing 2005 book value of 
sh
• 
• NI −∆  is the change in the 2004 net profit after tax, revealed by the 
restated 2004 comparative figures; 
•  is the difference between the reported net profit after tax in 2004 (as 
restated under IFRS) and the 2005 net profit after tax (this is in line with the 
impracticable to test a model with so many variables in a small sample of around 75 
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 in aggregate;  
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08); 















four months after the end of
• GRit  is the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity, under Greek GAAP; BVE
• it  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS 2 and
IAS 36_2
• it  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS
IAS 10_
•  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS 12; 
itIAS 12_
• itS 16_  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS 16;  
IA
•  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS 19;  
itIAS 19_
• itS 20_  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS
IA
• it39_  is the impact on 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by 
the adoption of IAS 32 and IAS 39, as captured
IAS
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• itS 37_  is the impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused 
by the adoption of IAS 37;  
IA
• it38  is the impact on the 2004 book value of sharehIAS _ olders’ equity caused 
by
•  impact on the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity 
caused b
• 
•  is the 2004 net profit after tax under Greek GAAP;  
•  is the change in the 2004 net profit after tax, revealed by the 
un et al., 
2008); 
As Arce and Mora (2002: 596) explain ‘under the assumption of independence and 
                                                
 the adoption of IAS 38;  
itOther  the aggregate
y the adoption of all other standards; 
IFRS
itBVE∆  is the difference between the opening and closing 2005 book value of 




restated 2004 comparative figures; 
• IFRSitNI∆  is the difference between the reported net profit after tax in 2004 (as 
restated under IFRS) and the 2005 net profit after tax (this is in line with the 
spirit of a time series view of current net income (Brown, 1993; Capk
• εit is the mean zero disturbance term.117  
The transformation of equation 5.9 will maintain or increase its explanatory power 
(R2) because more variables are introduced (Eq. 5.13). Accordingly, any difference 
between the explanatory power (R2) of equations 5.9 and 5.13 are examined with the 
Vuong (1989) test statistic. The Vuong test compares the fit of two non-nested 
models. A condition is that both models have the same dependent variable.  
normality of the errors of both models Vuong develops the joint density function of 
the observations in the sample and the log-likelihood function.’ Then, the likelihood 
ratio test is employed for comparing the explanatory power of the models. In the 
 
117 Using the actual adjustments (deflated by the number of shares or equity market value) is in line 
with prior literature (e.g. Harris and Muller, 1999).  
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present case the Vuong test answers the question: which of the two models, the basic 
model (i.e. Eq. 5.9) or the decomposed model (i.e. Eq. 5.13), has better explanatory 
power? This test has also been used by Dechow (1994), Arce and Mora (2002), and 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007), among others. 
the coefficients across the two sub-samples are measured by introducing a dummy 
5.5.5 Value relevance and compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H5.9 
– H5.11) 
One of the main research questions of this study is to examine the potential value 
e
disc is study is that it 
p  IFRS’ 
n nformation’, resulting in 
Eq. 5.14: 
Finally, similar to the previous tests and to test hypothesis H5.8, the differences in 
variable partitioning the sample across each sub-sample. The design is similar to Eq. 
5.10. 1 represents large firms and 0 represents small firms.118 The Cramer Z-statistic 
is also computed to explore the difference in the R2 of large versus small companies 
with regard to the decomposed model (i.e. Eq. 5.13). 
rel vance of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Additionally, as 
ussed in 1.4.5.3 and 5.4.2.3, one of the contributions of th
em loys the OM with LID. Thus, in Eq. 5.9 the level of compliance with
ma datory disclosures is introduced, representing ‘other i
ititititit LambdabCSbNIbBVEbaMV ε+++++= 43210  (Eq. 5.14) 
it  
ancial period (t);  
2005 (t);  
• Lambda is the IMR calculated through the selection model above; 
                                                
• MV  is the market value of a company i one month after the publication of the
financial statements relating to the 2005 fin
• BVEit is the book value of net assets of company i at the end of 2005 (t);  
• NIit is the net profit after tax of company i in 2005 (t);  
• CSit is the compliance score with IFRS mandatory disclosures of company i in 
 
118 A two-step regression and t-tests have also been employed and the results do not change. 
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• and εit is the mean zero disturbance term.  
This transformation of Eq. 5.9, i.e. adding the compliance score as a further 
explanatory variable, will maintain or increase its explanatory power (R2). 
Accordingly, CS’s incremental (or marginal) contribution to the model is tested by 
following an F test procedure (commonly known as ANOVA technique).119  
To avoid any biased inferences because of the method measuring compliance scores 
used as a proxy for ‘other information’, two separate regressions have been tested: 
one where CS is the compliance score under the PC method and one where CS is the 
compliance score under Cooke’s dichotomous approach. The results for both 
regressions are provided and the inferences are made for the instances where the 
To examine whether the relative value relevance (i.e. R2) of high compliance 
companies compared to that of low compliance companies (i.e. testing H5.10), first, 
Eq. 5.9 is employed for each sub-sample separately. Then, the Cramer Z statistic is 
employed. 
To test research hypothesis H5.11, a dummy va
employed f
it aV
compliance score proves to be significant (or insignificant) under both methods.120  
riable is introduced in Eq. 5.9 and is 
or the full sample. This results in the following:  




•  is the market value of a company i one month after the publication of the 
2005 financi
• to high compliance (i.e. above median) 
an panies; 
                                                
itε+
itMV
al statements (t) (This means approximately four months after the 
end of 2005); 
DV  is a dummy variable where 1 refers 
d 0 refers to low compliance com
 
119 I am grateful to Hannu Schadéwitz and Paul André for pointing this out. 
120 Instead of using the raw compliance scores, tests based on the ranked scores which resulted from 
both methods were also conducted. The results were similar to those presented thus they are 
suppressed for economy reasons. 
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• e 2005 book value of shareholders’ equity; 
DVBVEit *  is the 2005 book value of shareholders’ equity multiplied by the 
itBVE  is th
• 
dummy variable, testing the difference in the coefficient of this variable between 
th
is the 20
y variable, testing the 
difference in the coefficient of this variable between the two groups of 
com
•  is the IMR calculated through the selection model; 
 calculated through the selection and multiplied by the 
e value relevance of 
accounting information before and after the adoption of IFRS in Greece. It also 
lso 
                                                
e two groups of companies; 
• 05 net profit; itNI  
• DVNIit *  is the net profit multiplied by the dumm
panies; 
Lambda
• DVLambda*  is the IMR
dummy variable;  
• εit is the mean zero disturbance term.121  
5.6 Results and Discussion 
5.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 reports bottom line figures relating to the relativ
provides information on the market values in both periods. These descriptive 
statistics indicate that market values have increased significantly between the two 
years. The mean (median) market value of the sample firms is 273.9 (46.1) million in 
2005 and 183.9 (33.3) million in 2004. The average value of net assets has a
increased significantly from 2004 to 2005 but the median value has not changed 
significantly. The change in net income is also not significant.  
Table 5.3 reports information in relation to the variables used for testing H5.7 and 
H5.8. More specifically, it provides descriptive statistics on the net changes revealed 
 
121 A two-step regression and t-tests have also been employed and the results do not change. 
228 
Chapter 5 – Value Relevance of Accounting and ‘Other Information’ 
 
229 
by the restated 2004 figures and the individual adjustments reported in companies’ 
reconciliation statements relating to the individual standards under examination.  
parability index is not employed 
here, the majority of the findings are consistent with those reported in 3.8. The 
i  lin sures is sign  the impact o olders’ 
equ f th ivi han trodu  spe standa he ag te 




Although a smaller sample is used and Gray’s com
mpact on both bottom e mea ificant, as is n shareh
ity o e ind dual c ges in ced by cific rds. T grega
mpact from all the remaining standards is aterial a d not statistica
ignificant. 
able 5:2: Descriptive st  (N=153).  atistics
Panel A: N defl les 
Vari les N Mean Deviati edian ab  St. on M
  2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 
MV 153 273.9 3.9 93 9 66 2 46.1 33.3  18 3. 6.  
T iffere 0.000) 0.000) est of d nces (    (
BVE 153 1 1 104.6 87.4 9 1 8. 4 6 7. 30.7 31.7 
Test of differences (0.018)   (0.106) 
NI 153 12.9 10.8 49.3 44.2 1.84 2.11 
Test of differences (0.259)   (0.197) 
Panel B: Variables deflated by the number of outstanding shares 
Variables N Mean St. Deviation Median 
  2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 
MV 153 5.21 3.77 9.34 6.45 2.74 1.86 
Test of differences (0.000)   (0.000) 
BVE 153 3.14 2.93 5.03 3.73 2.06 2.06 
Test of differences (0.177)   (0.546) 
NI 153 0.28 0.24 1.16 0.84 0.11 0.12 
Test of differences (0.427)   (0.136) 
Financial data in €millions. €1=US$1.2597 and €1=£0.6930 (28/4/06-FT). Two-tailed p-values are in 
parentheses. The means tested with the ‘paired-samples t-test’ and the medians tested with the 
‘Wilcoxon signed rank test’. Variable definitions: MV- Market Capitalisation as at 1 month after the 
publication of the annual results (i.e., approximately 4 months after the year end date); BVE- Book 




Panel A: Non-deflated Variables 
Impact on 2004 book 
values Decomposed impact on 2004 book value of Equity 
Changes of 05 book 
values 
 
∆BVEIFRS-GR ∆NIIFRS-GR IAS2_36          IAS_10 IAS_12 IAS_16 IAS_19 IAS_20 IAS32_39 IAS37 IAS_38 Other ∆BVEIFRS ∆NIIFRS 
Mean       9.58* 1.62** -1.38*** 5.05** -3.09** 22.9*** -1.59*** -2.94*** -3.25*** -2.02*** -3.23*** -0.84 7.65** 0.45
St. Dev.               69.5 9.05 5.74 24.98 18.7 85.39 4.47 13.32 8.85 5.08 9.64 14.2 44.5 24.0
Lower 
Quartile -4.39              -0.56 -0.32 0.00 -1.42 0.11 -1.09 -1.08 -2.11 -1.57 -1.63 -1.16 -0.42 -2.15
Median      3.25*** -0.29*** -0.24*** -0.40*** -0.19*** -0.50*** 0.01 0.66** -0.27 0.25 0.15** 0.00 0.68*** -0.07**
Upper 
Quartile 5.01 1.36 0.00 2.81 0.91 12.27 -0.01 0 0 0 -0.50 -0.38 4.27 0.93 
% Pos. 53.6 56.9 0.70 70.6 43.1 11.8 12.0 0 9.20 3.90 3.90 52.3 65.4 41.2 
% Neg. 46.4 43.1 37.9 0 51.6 77.1 75.8 62.7 73.2 60.1 88.2 47.7 34.6 58.8 
%  
Non-zero 100 100 38.6 70.6 94.7 88.9 87.8 62.7 82.4 64.0 96.1 100 100 100 
Panel B: Variables deflated by the number of outstanding shares 
Impact on 2004 book 
values Decomposed impact on 2004 book value of Equity 
Changes of 05 book 
values 
 
∆BVEIFRS-GR ∆NIIFRS-GR IAS2_36 IAS_10 IAS_12 IAS_16 IAS_19 IAS_20 IAS32_39 IAS37 IAS_38 Other ∆BVEIFRS ∆NIIFRS 
Mean 0.09 0.03* -0.06*** 0.01*** -0.06*** 0.53*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.70*** -0.09*** -0.04 0.19* 0.01 
St. Dev. 0.98 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.25 1.01 0.10 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.31 1.26 0.56 
Lower 
Quartile -0.23 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 
Median 0.01 0.01** 0.00** 0.04** -0.01** 0.15** -0.02*** -0.10** -0.20** -0.01*** -0.03** 0.01 0.03* -0.02 
Upper 
Quartile 0.28 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.16 -0.07 
Financial data in €millions. €1=US$1.2597 and €1=£0.6930 (28/4/06-FT). Two-tailed tests. One sample t-test for mean (m≠0). One sample Wilcoxon signed rank test for 
median (m≠0). *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Variable definitions: ∆BVEIFRS-GR=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity; 
∆NIIFRS-GR=Change in the 2004 net profit after tax; IAS2_36=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 2&IAS36; 
IAS_10=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 10; IAS_12=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by 
the adoption of IAS 12; IAS_16=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 16; IAS_19=Change in the 2004 book value of 
shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 19; IAS_20=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 20; IAS32_39=Change 
in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 32&39; IAS_37=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption 
of IAS 37; IAS_38=Change in the 2004 book value of shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of IAS 38; and Other=aggregate change in the 2004 book value of 
shareholders’ equity caused by the adoption of all other standards; ∆BVEIFRS=Change between opening and closing 2005 book value of shareholders’ equity; and 
∆NIIFRS=Difference between 2004 and 2005 net income under IFRS.  
Table 5:3: Changes according to reconciliation statements – descriptive statistics (N=153). 
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5.6.2 Pre-and post-IFRS relative value relevance (H5.1 – H5.6) 
5.6.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Table 5.4 shows the results of the OLS regression of book value of net assets (BVE) 
and net profit after tax (NI) on market values per share (MV) for both periods with 
regard to the basic model (i.e. Eq. 5.9) as well as the structured model using panel 
data (Eq. 5.10). The main results are also disaggregated across the two categories 
controlling for the perceived quality of the reported data: small and large firms (H5.3 
and H5.4) and ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ firms (H5.5 and H5.6).  
The table also includes two separate sections showing the difference in the valuation 
coefficients of book values of equity and net income as well as in the overall relative 
value relevance of the two partitions when these are examined for each year 
separately. For example, this illustrates how different was the valuation coefficient of 
book value of equity of small firms compared to large firms in 2004. 
With regard to the full sample, the results refer to 135 observations as 18 outliers 
were removed. The number of outliers is relatively large since a company that was 
considered to be an outlier in one year was also excluded from the sample with 
regard to the other year.122  
The adjusted R2 of 0.49 and 0.44 show that book values are strongly associated with 
the market price under both years. In addition, both coefficients of book values of 
equity and net profit are statistically significant. However, in line with the prior 
literature in general (Collins et al., 1997) and with regard to Greece in particular 
(Karathanassis and Spilioti, 2005), they indicate that the market gives substantially 
more weight (higher coefficients) to earnings than to book value of equity. This is the 
case irrespective of the accounting standards applied.  
                                                 
122 I am in debt to one anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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In line with expectations, increases in the valuation coefficients of equity and in 
earnings are revealed. However, in the panel data regression, both coefficients of the 
book values multiplied by the dummy variable are not significant.  
This is interpreted as no change in the attitude towards any of the two specific 
measures; i.e. after the adoption of the new standards, neither net assets nor net profit 
after tax are viewed significantly differently by the investors. Additionally, the 
anticipated higher relative value relevance of book values (i.e. higher R2) is not 
confirmed. In fact, a decrease in R2 is identified but the results of Cramer’s Z statistic 
reveal that this is not significant. This means that the expected higher accounting 
quality after adoption of IFRS, as expressed by higher relative value relevance, is not 
identified in the case of Greek companies.  
Similar findings appear in both panels in relation to all four sub-samples for which 
this hypothesis is tested. After excluding the observations identified as outliers, no 
significant change in the way the market weights book value of equity or reported 
earnings after the adoption of IFRS is identified across the two partitions. The 
expected positive shift in the valuation coefficient of book value of equity is found 
across all sub-samples. However, the expected greater increase in the book value of 
small companies and companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors is not identified. In fact, 
the increase is smaller compared to that in larger companies and companies with ‘Big 
4’ auditors. However, nowhere are these changes significant.  
The findings regarding the coefficient of net income are conflicting across the sub-
samples. When the sample is partitioned across small versus large companies, a 
decrease is observed in the coefficients of net income that is relatively greater for 
large companies. An increase in the coefficients is also observed when the sample is 
partitioned across companies having ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ auditors. This is 
relatively greater for companies having non-‘Big 4’ auditors. However, again, for 
none of the sub-samples is the shift significant.  
Additionally, no significant change in the R2 of the sub-samples is identified by the 
results of Cramer’s Z statistic. In particular, with the exception of the sub-sample of 
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companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors, where the R2 increases marginally, all other sub-
samples exhibit a reduction in their relative value relevance.  
5.6.2.2 Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression 
Table 5.5 provides the results regarding the same tests with the alternative 
specification of weighted least squares regressions i.e. where the deflator is the 
market value of equity. The majority of the findings discussed above are confirmed.  
The expected positive shift in the valuation coefficient of book value of equity is also 
shown here. Although not significant for the full sample, large companies and 
companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors, for small companies and companies with ‘Big 
4’ auditors, this increase is significant at 10% (0.178 and 0.348 respectively). As 
discussed in 5.5.2, since this finding is not confirmed by both regressions, it is not 
considered robust enough for generalisations. However, it provides weak evidence 
that the book value of equity is more value relevant under IFRS (for a sub-set of 
companies at least).  
Similar to the previous regression, the results regarding the valuation coefficient of 
net income are somewhat conflicting. For the large companies, a negative shift is 
observed whilst a positive shift is observed for the full sample and for all other sub-
samples. However, none of these changes are significant.  
On that basis, an indication of a decrease of the relative value relevance is also 
observed. Additionally, no significant change in the relative value relevance of the 
full sample or the sub-samples in the two partitions is identified.  
In conclusion, the null hypotheses, i.e. of no change between the value relevance of 
Greek GAAP and IFRS overall or for the weighting of equity and income, cannot be 
rejected. This holds for the full sample (i.e. H5.1 & H5.2) and for the sub-samples 
partitioned on the basis of size and auditor (i.e. H5.3 – H5.6).  
 
Table 5:4: Pre and post IFRS relative value relevance of accounting information: H5.1 – H5.6 (N=153). OLS Regression. 
(5.9):
(5.10):














Sample Period Intercept BVE NI Lambda F Adj. R  R  Max VIF N 2 2
2004 GR (5.9) 1.723*** 0.369** 5.153*** -3.913* 12.67*** 0.49 0.50 1.32 135 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 1.777* 0.558*** 6.520*** -1.571 14.02*** 0.45 0.45 1.32 135 Full sample 
Dif (5.10) 0.054 0.189 1.363    -0.06   
2004 GR (5.9) 1.398** 0.379* 5.080*** 0.604 10.51*** 0.35 0.38 1.23 68 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 2.205 0.513*** 4.343*** 3.567 10.88*** 0.33 0.36 1.48 68 Above MV Median 
Dif (5.10) 0.807 0.134 -0.736    -0.02   
2004 GR (5.9) 1.233** 0.273** 3.865*** -2.646 12.39*** 0.62 0.64 1.44 68 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 0.410* 0.354*** 3.456*** 1.501* 30.54*** 0.59 0.61 1.33 68 Below MV Median 
Dif (5.10) -0.823 0.081 -0.409    -0.03   
2004 GR (5.9) 0.165 0.106 1.215    -0.26   
Large vs. Small 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 1.795** 0.159 0.887    -0.25   
2004 GR (5.9) -0.173 0.667* 8.807*** 3.631 38.32*** 0.79 0.81 1.38 36 
2005 IFRS (5.9) -1.266 1.042*** 9.144*** 14.759 25.21*** 0.80 0.82 2.15 36 ‘Big 4’ 
Dif (5.10) -1.093 0.375 0.337    0.01   
2004 GR (5.9) 1.513** 0.265* 3.759 -2.090 19.22*** 0.40 0.42 1.76 105 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 1.064 0.420** 5.034*** 1.241 14.37*** 0.35 0.37 1.35 105 non-‘Big 4 
Dif (5.10) -0.450 0.155 1.275    -0.05   
2004 GR (5.9) -1.686 0.402 5.048***    0.39   ‘Big 4’ vs. 
non-‘Big 4’ 2005 IFRS (5.9) -2.324 0.621 4.110**    0.45   
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Outliers have been defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure.  
Variable definitions: DV=dummy variable where 0 indicates 2004 Greek financials and 1 indicates 2005 IFRS financials; BVEGR&IFRS=panel data values of book 
value of shareholders’ equity; BVEGR&IFRS * DV=panel data values of book value of shareholders’ equity multiplied by the dummy variable; NIGR&IFRS- panel data values 
of net profit after tax; and NIGR&IFRS * DV=panel data values of net profit after tax multiplied by the dummy variable. All variables have been deflated by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
 
able 5:5: Pre and post IFRS relative value relevance of accounting information: H5.1 – H5.6 (N=153). WLS Regression. 
(5.9):
(5.10):

















Sample Period Intercept BVE NI Lambda F Adj. R  R  Max VIF N 2 2
2004 GR (5.9) 2.581*** 0.341** 2.518** -7.612*** 10.13*** 0.38 0.39 1.84 135 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 2.043 0.533** 3.612** -4.721 7.55*** 0.36 0.38 1.72 135 Full sample 
Dif (5.10)  0.192 1.094    -0.01   
2004 GR (5.9) 5.481 0.223 3.375** -8.341 2.92** 0.25 0.28 1.92 68 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 6.634* 0.474 3.052 -1.593 2.19* 0.25 0.28 1.80 68 Above MV Median 
Dif (5.10)  0.251 -0.323    -   
2004 GR (5.9) 1.283*** 0.158** 1.950*** -2.504** 16.82*** 0.37 0.40 1.22 68 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 1.580 0.336*** 2.038 2.790 43.26*** 0.46 0.48 1.04 68 Below MV Median 
Dif (5.10)  0.178* 0.088    -0.08   
2004 GR (5.9)  0.065 1.425    -0.12   
Large vs. Small Firms 
2005 IFRS (5.9)  0.139 1.014    -0.20   
2004 GR (5.9) 2.341 0.570*** 5.446** -1.197 26.48*** 0.65 0.68 1.44 36 
2005 IFRS (5.9) -3.045 0.918*** 7.555*** 3.391 35.49*** 0.76 0.78 1.64 36 ‘Big 4’ 
Dif (5.10)  0.348* 2.109    -0.10   
2004 GR (5.9) 1.811 0.164 2.735*** -3.752* 3.86** 0.23 0.25 2.22 105 
2005 IFRS (5.9) 1.554 0.347 3.364*** 1.601 3.02** 0.23 0.25 1.84 105 Non-‘Big 4 
Dif (5.10)  0.183 0.629    -   
2004 GR (5.9)  0.571* 4.192*    0.43   
‘Big 4’ vs. Non-‘Big 4’ 
2005 IFRS (5.9)  0.405** 2.711    0.53   
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Outliers have been defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure. Variable 
definitions: DV=dummy variable where 0 indicates 2004 Greek financials and 1 indicates 2005 IFRS financials; BVEGR&IFRS=panel data values of book value of 
shareholders’ equity; BVEGR&IFRS * DV=panel data values of book value of shareholders’ equity multiplied by the dummy variable; NIGR&IFRS=panel data values of net 
profit after tax; and NIGR&IFRS * DV=panel data values of net profit after tax multiplied by the dummy variable. All variables have been deflated by the market value of 
equity. 
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5.6.2.3 Discussion of the findings regarding H5.1 – H5.6 
The evidence of no change in the relative value relevance, although surprising, is in 
line with Clarkson et al. (2008) who report minor changes in the relative value 
relevance of accounting information in code law countries after the adoption of 
IFRS. It is also in line with Hung and Subramanyam (2007) with regard to 
Germany.123 
This finding, as well as no significant increases in the valuation coefficients of book 
values, support the arguments of Ball et al. (2000) and Ball (2006) that adopting high 
quality accounting standards does not necessarily lead to an improvement of the 
accounting quality (at least when accounting quality is defined as the association 
between book values and market values). Instead, a country and market specific 
context may continue to affect the perception of accounting quality.  
Barth et al. (2008) specifically spell out the importance of enforcement with regard 
to the implications this may have in the relative value relevance of accounting 
information. This is of particular relevance to the present research if one considers 
the evidence of low enforcement and high earnings management in Greece. 
Additionally, Barth et al. (2008) argue that principles-based accounting systems may 
offer preparers the flexibility to apply creative accounting practices and they explain 
that this may also hinder the quality of accounting information provided under IFRS. 
Given the prevalence of creative accounting under the old regime, as well as the 
evidence of non-compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements (see previous 
chapter), Greek investors may not know whether, how, or to what extent, the new 
IFRS figures have been creatively adjusted. Therefore, they may not assume IFRS 
financial statements to be of higher quality.  
For example, Kontoyannis (2005) provides the following strong quote attributed to a 
senior manager of a large Greek trading company: ‘I find it difficult to believe that 
somebody who is used in speaking lies under one accounting regime will not do so 
                                                 
123 Callao et al. (2007) also report no change in the value relevance of accounting information in 
Spain. However, they use a different research design which makes their results less comparable. 
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under another’. Such concerns in respect of compliance with the measurement and 
recognition rules were also expressed by Vroustouris (2007), member of ELTE and 
of the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC) in the European Commission. He 
thought it likely that ‘a systematic audit of financial statements, by experienced and 
specialised auditors, would reveal many and significant problems in relation to IFRS’ 
implementation’. Avlonitis (2007), director of the HCMC’s ‘Listed companies 
supervision division’ states that in addition to non-compliance with IFRS disclosure 
requirements some companies inter alia violated the standards’ measurement and 
recognition requirements. 
Furthermore, the results presented in Table 5.4 may well suggest that investment 
decisions in the Greek market are influenced by the characteristics of the preparer (or 
provider) of the financial statements, irrespective of the accounting standards 
applied. It is shown that under both periods, the coefficient for earnings is 
significantly higher when the company has a ‘Big 4’ auditor (5.048*** in 2004 and 
4.110** in 2005). This finding is not surprising, since, as discussed above, there is 
evidence of less earnings management (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008) and higher 
audit effort (Leventis and Caramanis, 2005; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008) (i.e. more 
reliable earnings) in companies with large auditors.  
Additionally, the findings discussed in chapter 3 indicate that the impact on net profit 
was not significant for companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors (3.7); companies with non-
‘Big 4’ auditors faced a significantly greater impact on gearing than companies with 
‘Big 4’ auditors and, for some of the standards expected to curtail creative 
accounting, the impact was either significant or greater for companies with non-‘Big 
4’ auditors. Furthermore, the findings of chapter 4 indicate that in 2005 compliance 
with IFRS disclosure requirements is lower for firms with non-‘Big 4’ auditors and 
this may affect the perceptions of the market participants regarding companies’ 
fundamentals. However, no difference in the relative value relevance is observed 
when one looks at each year individually.  
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For the partition of small versus large firms, no statistically significant difference 
with regard to the book values of earnings and/or equity is identified when one looks 
at each year separately. The coefficient of earnings is higher for larger companies 
(1.215 in 2004 and 0.887 in 2005) as the literature suggests (e.g. Collins et al., 1997; 
Hayn, 1995; Xu et al., 2007) but not significantly higher. Neither the relative value 
relevance is higher for large firms.  
Although the results provided in Table 5.5 are not equally significant, they provide 
weak evidence that, in 2005, investors continue to weight higher earnings from 
companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors. More specifically, they confirm that in 2004 there 
was higher weight in earnings of companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors (4.192*). With 
regard to 2005, the difference in the coefficient is indeed higher (2.711) but not 
significantly higher as appeared to be under the previous specification (4.110***). 
Additionally, the results under the WLS regression reveal that under both periods the 
book value of equity is weighted significantly higher for companies with ‘Big 4’ 
auditors (0.571* in 2004 and 0.405** in 2005). This appeared to be the case under 
the previous type of regression (i.e. OLS) as well but was not statistically significant 
(0.402 and 0.621 respectively). Thus, weak evidence that the book value of equity is 
also perceived of higher quality for companies having a ‘Big 4’ auditor is provided.  
The findings regarding the partition of small versus large companies do not change. 
Large companies exhibit higher, but not significantly so, coefficients of earnings 
under both periods. 
Overall, these findings suggest that investors perceived earnings of companies with 
‘Big 4’ auditors as of higher quality under Greek GAAP. There is also weak 
evidence that this is also the case under IFRS. Additionally, weak evidence is 
provided indicating that, consistent with the literature, earnings of large companies 
exhibit a higher valuation coefficient compared to small companies.  
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5.6.3 Incremental value relevance of reconciliation adjustments (H5.7 and 
H5.8)124 
5.6.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
The information concerning H5.7 in relation to the total sample as well as the two 
sub-samples, based on the OLS regression, is presented on Table 5.6. This 
disaggregation (Eq. 5.13) facilitates the examination of the incremental value 
relevance of material individual adjustments on shareholders’ equity and the 
difference in the restated 2004 book value of net income.  
Focusing on the results concerning the full sample, it is shown that the adjustments 
regarding IAS 10, IAS 12, IAS 16, IAS 32&39 and IAS 38 are incrementally value 
relevant. Incrementally value relevant also is the (small) aggregate adjustment with 
regards to the remaining standards. It is observed that the coefficients related to all 
the adjustments have a positive sign. The exception is the coefficient with respect to 
the adjustment in relation to IAS 38 which is negative. The adjustment relating to the 
bottom line difference between net income under Greek GAAP and the restated 
under IFRS is not significant. The Vuong test comparing the adjusted R2 of the basic 
(Eq. 5.9) and the decomposed model (Eq. 5.13) shows significantly higher 
explanation of the variance between book and market values from the latter. This 
further indicates that disaggregating the book value of equity in 2005 across several 
components does improve the mapping of the book values on market values. 
Turning on the findings for the sub-sample of large companies, it is shown that none 
of the adjustments is value relevant. However, the signs of the coefficients have the 
same direction with those regarding the full sample. The Vuong test indicates that the 
8% difference between the adjusted R2 of the decomposed model and the basic 
model is not significant. 
                                                 
124 Since this analysis focuses only on 2005, fewer companies could have been treated as outliers. 
However, to facilitate comparison with the findings regarding the previous hypotheses, the same 
observations used in the previous section are used here. 
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As far as the sub-sample of small companies is concerned, it is shown that the 
adjustment concerning the IAS 10 is significant with a positive coefficient. The 
adjustment with regard to IAS 38 is also significant but with a negative coefficient 
indicating that this affects the results regarding the full sample. Similar to the full 
sample findings, the Vuong test comparing the adjusted R2 of the basic (Eq. 5.9) and 
the decomposed model (Eq. 5.13) shows significantly higher explanation of the 
variance between book and market values from the latter. This supports the 
disaggregation of the book value of equity in 2005 across the reconciliation 
adjustments.  
5.6.3.2 Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression 
The findings of the same tests when a weighted least squares regression is employed 
are presented in Table 5.7.  
Focusing on the full sample results, it is shown that, similar to the previous 
specification the adjustments regarding IAS 10, IAS 16, and IAS 38 are 
incrementally value relevant. The sign of the coefficients is also the same. 
Additionally, under this specification the adjustment with regard to IAS 37 is 
significant with a negative coefficient. The adjustment relating to the bottom line 
difference between net income under Greek GAAP and the restated under IFRS is 
again not significant. With fewer adjustments being significant under this 
specification, the Vuong test comparing the adjusted R2 of the basic (Eq. 5.9) and the 
decomposed model (Eq. 5.13) shows that the explanation of the variance between 
book and market values from the latter is not significantly higher. 
The findings for the sub-sample of large companies show that the adjustments with 
regard to IAS 16 (at 10%) and IAS 37 (at 1%) are value relevant. Their 
corresponding coefficients are positive and negative respectively. However, the 
result with regard to IAS 37 should be interpreted with care. This variable exhibits 
high multicollinearity with other variables: 18.85. Being well above the threshold of 
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10, its interpretation is not straight forward.125 Additionally, similar to the previous 
specification, the Vuong test indicates that the 2% difference between the adjusted R2 
of the decomposed model and the basic model is not significant. 
As far as the sub-sample of small companies is concerned, it is shown that the 
adjustment with regard to the IAS 10 is again significant with a positive coefficient 
(at 1%). Significant is also the adjustment with regard to IAS 38 (at 5%) with a 
negative coefficient. In addition to the OLS specification, this regression shows that 
the adjustments regarding IAS 16 and IAS 32&39 are also significant (both at 5%) 
with positive coefficients. Similar to the corresponding findings based on the OLS 
specification, the Vuong test comparing the adjusted R2 of the basic (Eq. 5.9) and the 
decomposed model (Eq. 5.13) shows significantly higher explanation of the variance 
between book and market values from the latter. This further supports the 
disaggregation of the book value of equity in 2005 across the reconciliation 
adjustments with concerning small companies. 
Summarising the findings of the two specifications with regard to the full sample, it 
is concluded that the adjustments with regard to IAS 10, IAS 16 and IAS 38 are 
incrementally value relevant (IAS 38 with a negative coefficient). Additionally, as 
they appear to be significant under one of the two specifications, there is weak 
evidence that the adjustments with regard to IAS 12, IAS 32&39 and IAS 37 are also 
incrementally value relevant (IAS 37 with a negative coefficient). Finally, there is 
weak evidence that the decomposed model (Eq. 5.13) shows significantly higher 
explanation of the variance between book and market values from the basic (Eq. 5.9), 
supporting the disaggregation of the book value of equity in 2005 across the 
reconciliation adjustments. On that basis, hypothesis H5.7 is accepted. Adjustments 
reported in the reconciliation statements regarding shareholders’ equity are value 
relevant.  
As far as H5.8 is concerned, this is rejected. It is shown that the difference in the 
coefficients across the two sub-samples is not significant. Thus, it cannot be claimed 
                                                 
125 This regression has also been conducted by excluding the variable regarding IAS 37. The 
significance and the signs of the coefficients of the remaining variables do not change. 
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that the adjustments with reference to small companies are more value relevant from 
the corresponding regarding large companies. However, there is strong evidence that 
the adjustments regarding IAS 10 and IAS 38 are value relevant only for small 
companies. These are significant under both specifications. Additionally, there is 
weak evidence that the adjustments regarding IAS 16 and IAS 32&39 are also 
incrementally value relevant for small companies as these are significant under the 
WLS regression. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that the difference in the 
adjusted R2 between the basic (Eq. 5.9) and the decomposed model (Eq. 5.13) is 
positive and significant. This shows significantly higher explanation of the variance 
between book and market values from the latter. This is not the case for large 
companies.  
Arguably, these results are in line with the proposition that, the adjustments with 
regard to large companies do not add any valuation relevant information to investors. 
In contrast the reconciliation adjustments convey value relevant information to 





Table 5:6: Incremental value relevance of the impact disclosed in the reconciliation statements: H5.7 & H5.8 (N=153). OLS Regression. 
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109876543210 38_37_39_3220_19_16_12_10_36_2  
Large vs. Small  Full sample 
Above MV Median Below or Equal MV Median 
Variables (5.9) (5.13) (5.9) (5.13) (5.9) (5.13) 
Difference between Large and Small 
(5.13) 
Intercept 1.777* 2.757*** 2.205 1.830 0.410* 0.768 1.062 
BVEIFRS 0.558***  0.513***  0.354***   
NIIFRS 6.520***  4.343***  3.456***   
BVEGR  0.416**  0.632**  0.298** 0.334 
IAS_2_36  1.839  2.978  -1.154 4.132 
IAS_10  8.114*  -7.765  8.906* -16.670 
IAS_12  5.427**  6.682  0.861 5.821 
IAS_16  0.968*  1.209  0.311 0.898 
IAS_19  2.060  1.499  2.139 -0.641 
IAS_20  -0.120  2.315  0.414 1.900 
IAS_32_39  3.337***  3.331  0.596 2.735 
IAS_37  -2.714  -6.302  0.396 -6.698 
IAS_38  -2.491*  -0.498  -2.113*** 1.614 
Other  3.119*  2.390  0.750 1.639 
∆BVEIFRS  -2.207**  -1.781  1.011 -2.792 
NIGR  7.591***  10.076**  1.811 8.264* 
∆NIIFRS-GR  -2.664  4.769  0.684 4.086 
∆NIIFRS  5.176***  3.901  0.861 3.040 
Lambda -1.571 -7.392** 3.567 3.245 1.501* -0.941  
F 14.02*** 6.02*** 10.88*** 4.60*** 30.54*** 28.39***  
Adj R2 0.44 0.62 0.33 0.41 0.59 0.78  
R2 0.45 0.66 0.36 0.55 0.61 0.83 0.28 
Difference in Adj R2  0.18***  0.08  0.19***  
Mean VIF  2.24  2.74  2.67  
Max VIF 1.32 3.99 1.48 7.20 1.33 5.02  
N 135 135 68 68 68 68  
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Outliers have been defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure. 
See pages 223 - 225 for variable definitions. 
 
Incremental value relevance of the impact disclosed in the reconciliation statements: H5.7 & H5.8 (N=153). WLS Regression. 
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 Full sample 
Above MV Median Below or Equal MV Median 
Variables (5.9) (5.13) (5.9) (5.13) (5.9) (5.13) 
Difference between Large and Small 
(5.13) 
Intercept 2.043 2.802** 6.634*** 5.071 1.580 0.518 4.553 
BVEIFRS 0.533**  0.474  0.336***   
NIIFRS 3.612**  3.052  2.038   
BVEGR  0.054  -0.032  0.249*** -0.281 
IAS_2_36  0.609  1.432  -0.819 2.252 
IAS_10  17.282***  5.046  10.370*** -5.324 
IAS_12  2.195  2.661  1.016 1.645 
IAS_16  1.305***  1.876*  0.406** 1.470 
IAS_19  0.119  0.742  -0.217 0.958 
IAS_20  -2.377  -2.264  0.493 -2.758 
IAS_32_39  0.150  0.416  0.692** -0.276 
IAS_37  -2.823*  -9.974***  -0.601 -9.373** 
IAS_38  -1.920*  -1.024  -1.330** 0.306 
Other  -0.146  1.336  0.604* 0.732 
∆BVEIFRS  -0.830  -2.386*  0.317 -2.704** 
NIGR  2.068  6.139*  1.695* 4.443 
∆NIIFRS-GR  -1.227  -1.270  1.130 -2.400 
∆NIIFRS  2.570*  4.225*  0.994 3.231 
Lambda -4.721 -1.013** -1.593 -2.081 2.790 -0.540  
F 7.55*** 17.61*** 2.19* 5.76*** 43.26*** 22.95***  
Adj R2 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.27 0.46 0.70  
R2 0.38 0.54 0.28 0.44 0.48 0.77 0.29 
Difference in Adj R2  0.12  0.02  0.24***  
Mean VIF 1.72 2.72 1.80 4.63 1.04 2.58  
Max VIF  5.58  18.85  4.90  
N 135 135 68 68 68 68  
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Outliers have been defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure. 
See pages 223 - 225 for variable definitions. 
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5.6.3.3 Discussion of the findings regarding H5.7 & H5.8 
The above analyses show that the bottom line adjustment to earnings is not 
significant. This finding is in line with the results of Horton and Serafeim (2007) 
with reference to Spain and Horton and Serafeim (2009) with reference to the UK. It 
is also in line with the argument that individual adjustments, rather than the bottom 
line net adjustments, are likely to provide better information (cf. Beckman et al., 
2007). The latter is confirmed by the findings indicating that individual adjustments 
with regard to shareholders equity are value relevant.  
More specifically, the adjustments relating to IAS 38 are significant but with a 
negative coefficient. This finding is interpreted as follows. IAS 38 removes from the 
balance sheet certain intangibles, but the market perceives these capitalised expenses 
as providing future economic benefits and contributing to the growth of companies. 
Subsequently the market ‘reverses’ these adjustments (recapitalising the intangibles). 
This is consistent with a large body of research in the US which shows that market 
participants view Research and Development expenses as intangible assets when 
valuing a firm (e.g. Xu et al., 2007).  
The disaggregation of the sample across large versus small companies illustrates that 
this finding is mainly driven by the small companies. This is in line with the 
evidence that book value of equity is more important for valuations of small 
companies (Ohlson, 1995; Collins et al., 1997). Accordingly, it can be argued that an 
adjustment with reference to the book value of equity and in particular related to 
future prospects has profound valuation effects on small companies, for which high 
growth is expected. 
The positive adjustment with regard to IAS 16 is consistently incrementally value 
relevant with a positive coefficient. This reinforces the notion that IFRS are 
standards of higher quality, i.e. reflecting companies’ assets (and liabilities) more 
accurately (cf. Ball, 2006). The fact that the majority of companies followed the 
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option of IFRS 1 and restated their properties at fair value as deemed cost is 
perceived by the investors as reflecting companies’ assets more accurately.126  
The positive adjustment with regard to dividends (IAS 10) is also incrementally 
value relevant with a positive coefficient. This also is interpreted as investors 
perceiving that IFRS better reflect a company’s underlying economics (cf. Barth et 
al., 2001; Barth et al., 2008). Accordingly, investors do not perceive proposed 
dividends as a liability before they are agreed by the annual general meeting (they 
were recognised as a liability under Greek GAAP). The adjustment is found to be 
consistently incrementally value relevant for small companies, indicating that it has 
more profound relevance for the companies in this sub-sample. 
These findings, as well as the weak evidence regarding the incremental value 
relevance of the adjustments regarding IAS 32&39, IAS 12 and IAS 37, reject the 
null hypotheses that the reconciliations adjustments not being value relevant (cf. 
H5.7). They also support the argument for preparing reconciliation statements. These 
results indicate that the market is interested and responds to the individual changes 
reported in these statements, using the new information to assess what last year’s 
financial statements would have been if they had been produced under IFRS.  
5.6.4 Value relevance and compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H5.9 
– H5.11) 
The analyses in this section refer to the same 135 observations examined above. The 
findings regarding H5.9 – H5.11 are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. The former 
shows the results regarding H5.9 and the latter the results regarding H5.10 and 
H5.11. Both tables also include the findings regarding the alternative non-deflated 
specification used (Barth and Clinch, 2009; Beckman et al., 2007; Harris and Muller, 
1999; Barth and Kallapur, 1996). It is to be remembered that the dependent variable 
and the book values are expressed in millions of euro in this specification and the 
number of shares outstanding is introduced as a control variable in the regression.  
                                                 
126 It is noteworthy that small companies were affected mostly by IAS 16 and IAS 38 (10 more 
regarding IAS 16 and five more regarding IAS 38).  
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Additionally, to analyse the findings of this section, one needs to reflect on the 
findings of chapter 4 with regard to the compliance scores identified for the 
companies in the sample (4.7.2). These findings indicate that relatively low levels of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures were identified and that there was 
considerable variation of compliance scores. This is particularly relevant to the 
purposes of the present analyses as it implies that substantially different levels of 
information reaching investors.  
5.6.4.1 Value relevance of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (H5.9) 
Focusing on panel A of Table 5.8, as shown previously, when the model is run in its 
‘conventional form’ (i.e. not including ‘other information’), the adjusted R2 is 0.45 
and both coefficients of book values of equity and net profit are statistically 
significant. When the compliance score is introduced as a proxy for ‘other 
information’, very small change (decrease) is observed regarding the coefficients of 
book value of shareholders’ equity and net income. Additionally, as was expected, 
the R2 is increased marginally because of the introduction of a further variable. With 
reference to the hypothesis tested, the actual score measured with the PC method is 
significantly (at 5%) and positively related to market values (and with a relatively 
high coefficient of 5.900 in particular). Additionally, the F test conducted indicates 
that its marginal contribution to the regression is significant at 5%. These findings 
indicate that beyond companies’ fundamentals, the disclosures provided in the notes 
accompanying the financial statements do convey relevant information to investors.  
Very similar results are obtained when the compliance score is calculated with 
Cooke’s method and used as a proxy for ‘other information’. More specifically, a 
small change (decrease) is also observed in the coefficients of book value of 
shareholders’ equity and net income. Additionally, the coefficient of the compliance 
score is higher (7.403 instead of 5.900) and also significant at 5%. Furthermore, the 
F test conducted indicates that its marginal contribution to the regression is again 
significant at 5%. 
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ed specification (panel B) are very 
ilar to those reported in panel A.127 When the compliance score is measured with
ethod, it is significantly (at 5%) and positively related to market values. At 
t (396,000,000) seems to be very high. This actually means
e in the disclosure level would result in an average increase of 
ost 4 million euro in a company’s market value. Table 5.2 above shows that the 
arket value of the companies in the sample is almost 274 million euro. 
on, an increase of 1% of the disclosures provided would 
proximate average 1.4% increase in the market value.128  
The results are very similar when the compliance score has been computed with 
Cooke’s method. The coefficient of the compliance score is also high (552,000,000) 
and significant at 5%. In both cases, the F test conducted indicates that the 
pliance score’s marginal contribution to the regression is significant at 5%. 
 are very robust. No bias is introduced 
ployed (per share versus non-deflated) or because of 
ethod employed for measuring compliance (PC versus Cooke’s method). 
H5.9 is not rejected: mandatory disclosures do convey 
relevant information to investors and is relevant for valuation purposes, i.e. 
compliance with mandatory disclosures is ‘priced’. 





 It is noted that the coefficient book value of shareholders’ equity is negative and non-significant. 
nd Sommers (2003), this is a potential deficiency of the non-deflated 
 they argue that ‘coefficient bias may lead to spurious inferences in un-
ated price-levels regressions’ (ibid: 47). 
 It is to be remembered that the review of the relevant literature (5.4.2.2) indicated that it is very
mon the proxies used for ‘other information’ to exhibit very large coefficients. 
Value relevance of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures (N=135) 
(5.9):
(5.14): ititititit LambdabCSbNIbBVEbaMV ε+++++= 43210  




Panel A: Value relevance of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures – per-share specification 
Compliance 
score Model Intercept BVE NI CS 
No. 
Shares† Lambda F Adj. R
2 R2 Max VIF N 
 (5.9) 1.777* 0.558*** 6.520***  n/a -1.571 14.02*** 0.45 0.45 1.32 135 
PC method (5.14) -3.340 0.557*** 6.515*** 5.900** n/a 0.662 13.60*** 0.45 0.47 1.33 135 
Cooke’s 
method (5.14) -4.672 0.539*** 6.367*** 7.403** n/a 0.246 13.01*** 0.45 0.47 1.33 135 
Panel B: Value relevance of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures – non-deflated specification† 
Compliance 
score Model Intercept BVE NI CS 
No. 
Shares† Lambda F Adj. R
2 R2 Max VIF N 
 (5.9) -1.95e+08** -0.391 5.437***  8.165*** 3.72e+08 32.44*** 0.72 0.73 2.16 135 
PC method (5.14) -5.43e+08** -0.371 5.481*** 3.96e+08** 8.154*** 5.35e+08* 39.77*** 0.73 0.74 2.17 135 
Cooke’s 
method (5.9) -6.91e+08** -0.382 5.349*** 5.52e+08** 8.261*** 5.41e+08** 35.64*** 0.73 0.74 2.16 135 
†In a non-deflated specification, the total number of shares outstanding is introduced in the regression as a control variable. 
Variable definitions: MVit is the market value of a company i one month after the publication of the financial statements relating to the 2005 financial period (t); 
BVEit is the book value of net assets of company i at the end of 2005 (t); NIit is the net profit after tax of company i at the end of 2005 (t); No. Shares is the number  
of shares outstanding; CSit is the compliance score with IFRS’ mandatory disclosures of company i in 2005 (t); Lambda is the IMR calculated through the  
selection model; and εit is the mean zero disturbance term. Outliers have been defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure.  
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
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5.6.4.2 Discussion of the findings regarding H5.9  
Hypothesis 5.9 explores the importance of mandatory disclosures for valuation 
purposes (cf. Hassan et al., 2009; Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Kang and Pang, 2005). 
These results indicate that, within the theoretical framework of the Ohlson (1995) 
Model (OM), compliance with mandatory disclosures does convey information to 
investors which assists in predicting future earnings (Ohlson, 2001). Accordingly, the 
compliance score can be a suitable proxy for v in the OM. 
This finding implies that companies with higher compliance exhibit higher market 
values, i.e. they are better off. It appears that in the particular context of Greece, 
where compliance with IFRS is in practice voluntary (as companies extent of 
compliance is very low (cf. Nobes and Parker, 2008)) and non-compliance costs are 
negligible in the period of reference, investors do value higher compliance. Thus, 
high compliance companies are perceived as ‘good’ and ‘responsible’, representing 
‘good practice’ and consequently are ‘rewarded’ by investors (cf. Goncharov et al., 
2006).  
Arguably, consistent with the premises of signalling theory, companies with higher 
compliance levels ‘take advantage’ of the weak enforcement by making the effort 
and/or incurring the necessary high information costs to comply and consequently 
differentiate themselves. This appears to have ‘rewarding’ implications and to be in 
line with the ‘free market theory’ where transmission of reliable information plays a 
crucial role. For example, Friedman and Friedman (1980: 37) argue that ‘…the 
beauty of the market system is that the price which brings the information also 
provides an incentive to act on it’ (cited in Leventis, 2001: 20).  
The present finding is consistent with prior literature regarding the positive valuation 
consequences of voluntary disclosures (e.g. Hussainey and Walker, 2009). It is also 
consistent with the results of Goncharov et al. (2006) with regard to compliance with 
the corporate governance code in Germany.  
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However, it contradicts the findings of Hassan et al. (2009) with reference to Egypt. 
The authors report a negative relationship between market values and compliance 
levels (although they use a different research design). An explanation might be that 
the Greek market is developed while Egypt is an emerging market. Thus, there may 
be higher demand for more transparent financial statements in Greece due to the 
potentially more sophisticated investors and analysts following listed companies (cf. 
Keane, 1993). Another reason might be the different periods covered. Hassan’s et al. 
(2009) study examines Egyptian companies’ compliance for the years 1995 to 2002 
which might have led to different disclosures mandated by IAS at that time, 
compared to those examined here. Finally, their research instrument with regard to 
mandatory disclosures includes 49 items. This is substantially lower from the number 
of items examined in this study (481). 
5.6.4.3 Value relevance of high versus low compliance companies (H5.10 & H5.11) 
The results discussed in this section refer to the same 135 observations. Table 5.9 
reports the findings regarding the value relevance of accounting information of high 
compliance versus that of low compliance companies.  
Beyond the pricing effect of compliance indicated above, it is shown that high 
compliance scores and in turn high level of disclosures lead to more transparent 
financial statements (cf. Pownall and Schipper, 1999), mitigating uncertainty about 
companies’ fundamentals (Anctil et al., 2004; Hope, 2003a). This follows the 
premise that higher disclosure levels should lower information asymmetry in general 
(cf. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) and that higher compliance with mandatory 
disclosures reduces information asymmetry in particular (Bushee and Leuz (2005). 
More specifically, it is observed that the relative value relevance of accounting 
information of high compliance companies is higher than that of the remaining 
companies by 0.07. However, Cramer’s Z statistic indicates that this difference is not 
significant. Similarly, when the compliance scores are measured by Cooke’s method, 
the relative value relevance (i.e. R2) of the high compliance companies is also higher 
by 0.09 but again not significantly higher. Although even under the non-deflated 
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reported, it is also non-significant. The fact that this 
difference is not significant might be due to the relatively small number of 
observations within the sub-samples, which reduces the power of the test (cf. Hung 
and Subramanyam, 2007 with reference to Cramer, 1987). Thus, although H5.10 is 
not accepted, there is weak evidence that the relative value relevance is higher when 
companies’ levels of mandatory disclosures are higher.  
However, the tests regarding H5.11 shed more light on the subject. When the 
compliance score is measured by the PC method, the valuation coefficient of 
shareholders’ equity of high compliance companies is significantly (at 5%) higher
(by 0.593) than that of the remaining companies. In fact, the book value of 
shareholders’ equity of low compliance companies is very small and not significant. 
When the compliance score is measured by Cooke’s method, the coefficient of book 
value of shareholders’ equity of high compliance companies is again significantly 
higher (by 0.555). However, this difference is significant at 10% (compared to 5% 
when using the PC method).  
These findings are in line with what is reported under the non-deflated specification.
When the compliance score is measured by the PC method, the coefficient of 
shareholders’ equity of high compliance companies is again significantly (at 1%) 
higher (by 0.177). When the alternative technique for measuring compliance is used, 
the coefficient of shareholders’ equity of high compliance firms is significantly (at 
5%) higher (by 0.107).  
As far as the coefficient of net income is concerned, it is shown that there is no 
high compliance companies. This is 
fication used or the method with which the 
pliance score has been computed. On the basis of these findings, it is concluded 
 partially rejected: only the valuation 
uity is higher for high compliance firms. 
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(5.9):
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Panel A: Value relevance of high compliance vs. low compliance companies – per-share specification 
Compliance 
score Sample Model Intercept BVE NI 
No. 
Shares† Lambda F Adj. R
2 R2 Max VIF N 
Higher CS (5.9) 1.183 0.730*** 6.538*** n/a 1.327 19.16*** 0.45 0.47 1.30 68 
Lower CS (5.9) 2.661 0.137 6.493*** n/a -3.242 13.89*** 0.37 0.40 1.28 67 PC method 
Difference (5.15)  -0.593** -0.045     -0.07   
Higher CS (5.9) 1.114 0.750*** 6.522*** n/a 1.605 19.74*** 0.46 0.48 1.35 68 
Lower CS (5.9) 2.593** 0.195 6.231*** n/a -3.429 13.50*** 0.36 0.39 1.23 67 Cooke’s method 
Difference (5.15)  -0.555* -0.291     -0.09   
Panel B:  Value relevance of high compliance vs. low compliance companies – non-deflated specification† 
Compliance 
score Sample Model Intercept BVE NI 
No. 
Shares† Lambda F Adj. R
2 R2 Max VIF N 
Higher CS (5.9) -2.54e+08*** -0.418* 6.820** 9.195*** 6.38e+08** 61.40*** 0.78 0.80 2.36 68 
Lower CS (5.9) 9.16e+07* -0.595*** 9.230*** 2.879*** -3.26e+08* 43.90*** 0.74 0.72 2.30 67 PC method 
Difference   -0.177*** 2.410     -0.08   
Higher CS (5.9) -2.41e+08*** -0.456* 7.287* 9.200*** 5.86e+08** 62.12*** 0.78 0.80 2.41 68 
Lower CS (5.9) 9.09e+07* -0.563*** 9.080*** 2.774*** -3.15e+08* 41.89*** 0.71 0.73 2.24 67 Cooke’s method 
Difference   -0.107** 1.793     -0.07   
†In a non-deflated specification the total number of shares outstanding is introduced in the regression as a control variable.  
Variable definitions: MVit is the market value of a company i one month after the publication of the financial statements relating to the 2005 financial period (t);BVEit is 
the book value of net assets of company i at the end of 2005 (t); NIit is the net profit after tax of company i at the end of 2005 (t); No. Shares is the number of shares 
outstanding; Lambda is the IMR calculated through the selection model; and εit is the mean zero disturbance term. Outliers have been defined and excluded by using 
Cook’s Distance as a measure. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
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5.6.4.4 Discussion of the findings regarding H5.10 & H5.11  
The findings regarding H5.10 and H5.11 complement those discussed in the previous 
section and they are particularly relevant in the context of Greece. As discussed 
above, the literature indicates that under Greek GAAP there was high level of 
earnings management with regard to balance sheet (Spathis, 2002; Spathis et al., 
2002; Baralexis, 2004). Additionally, Greece represents a low trust society in general 
which is detrimental to trust in the ‘true and fair view’ of financial statements. An 
explicit mistrust of the accounting numbers published has been consistently 
documented in the literature with regard to Greece (e.g. Papas, 1993; Ballas, 1994; 
Ballas et al., 1998; Kontoyannis, 2005; Tsakumis, 2007). Arguably, the low trust in 
the financial statements was also a result of the low levels of mandatory disclosures 
required under Greek GAAP. This was even further worsening by the fact that 
companies tended not to disclose the notes to the financial statements in the public 
domain before IFRS (Valchos, 2001). This enabled companies to be secretive 
regarding the accounting policies and practices followed as well as the significant 
assumptions used while preparing their financial statements.  
Some examples regarding the information not provided to investors under Greek 
GAAP which could lead to low trust in the financial statements include the 
following, but are not exhaustive: provisions not recognised, including those related 
to pensions; revenue recognition policies; inventories’ and other assets’ impairment; 
start-up costs capitalised; hedging activities and fair values of financial assets not 
recognised; and disclosures in respect of contingent assets and/or liabilities (cf. 
Tsakumis, 2007). These areas are related to the areas of creative accounting practices 
followed and expected to be curtailed with the introduction of IFRS (3.4.2). Not 
disclosing information regarding the above issues could allow more flexibility 
regarding the actual items recognised (or not) in the financial statements.  
However, the mandatory disclosures required by IFRS ‘force’ companies to disclose 
more information regarding the preparation of the financial statements and thus 
‘more complete’ information reaches investors (cf. Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). In 
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favour of this argument, (Hope, 2003b: 317) states that disclosing the accounting 
policies followed ‘could constrain some potentially harmful managerial actions’. 
The findings of the previous chapter (4.7.3) indicate that standards that introduced 
new measurement and/or recognition requirements compared to Greek GAAP, 
exhibit very low average levels of compliance. They also exhibit significantly high 
variability of compliance scores. Similar is the case for the standards require 
disclosures that involve high proprietary costs. Thus, a large proportion of the 
companies examined, continue to be secretive about their policies, especially with 
regard to issues that relate to future prospects. 
Hence, companies providing high levels of mandatory disclosures have the 
opportunity to signal less earnings management and to communicate their practices 
in a more transparent way under IFRS.129 Thus, consistent with the previous finding 
that investors place value on mandatory disclosures, investors do assign (higher) 
value on the book value of shareholders’ equity of high compliance companies. This 
indicates that higher compliance with mandatory disclosures mitigates uncertainty 
about companies’ economic situation in general (cf. Hope, 2003a) and the quality of 
the accounting information reflected on the financial statements in particular (Anctil 
et al. 2004). Accordingly, improved disclosure reduces information asymmetry (cf. 
Bushee and Leuz, 2005) and more weight is placed on companies’ fundamentals (i.e. 
shareholders’ equity in the case of Greece).  
Summarising, drawing on Leuz and Wysocki’s (2008) call for research, the findings 
of the present study suggest that mandatory disclosures do feed back information to 
investors. The level of mandatory disclosures is positively related to market values. 
Additionally, the higher the compliance with mandatory disclosures, the higher the 
value relevance of the book value of shareholders’ equity. 
                                                 
129 This could well be the case under Greek GAAP providing that companies complied with the 
mandatory disclosures and produced informative notes to the financial statements being available to 
the public domain. 
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5.7 Limitations 
The findings reported in the present chapter are subject to the following limitations.  
In line with similar value relevance studies, it is assumed that investors understand 
and evaluate the implications and effects of IFRS. Arguably, this may not be 
completely the case where IFRS are introduced for the first time in a country with a 
substantially different accounting tradition. Further, IFRS did lead to greater variance 
in the book value of shareholders’ equity and earnings compared to previous Greek 
GAAP measures (see Table 5.2).130 Additionally, it is possible that some of the 
sample firms gradually transitioned to IFRS, narrowing the differences between 
Greek GAAP and IFRS. This could potentially lower the power of the tests leading 
to no significant change in the value relevance of accounting information after the 
adoption of IFRS.  
A reason for not finding significant change in the value relevance of accounting 
information might be the relatively small sample which limits the power of the tests 
(cf. Hung and Subramanyam, 2007). This limitation also applies when examining the 
incremental value relevance of the reconciliation adjustments across the sub-samples 
and the relative value relevance of high versus low compliance companies.  
Further, as Barth et al. (2008) suggest ‘(A) limitation of comparing the accounting 
quality of IAS firms in the pre and post adoption periods is that we could detect an 
improvement in accounting quality because of changes in the economic environment 
of IAS firms unattributable to the financial reporting system.’ (ibid: 480).131 Contrary 
to Barth et al. (2008), this study is not looking at IFRS vs. non-IFRS adoption, a 
context that allows a treatment-control sample design. The pre-post design uses the 
firm as its own control. Additionally, the dummy variable design employed in this 
study includes an intercept dummy which captures other changes between 2004 and 
2005 non attributable to the financial reporting system. This leaves the slope dummy 
                                                 
130 I am in debt to one anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
131 I am in debt to Pauline Weetman for pointing this limitation out. 
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to capture changes in the mapping of book value of shareholders’ equity and net 
income into market value from 2004 to 2005. 
Additionally, inadequate reconciliation disclosures in companies’ first IFRS 
statements were reported. Selective or incomplete reporting/disclosure with regard to 
transition to IFRS may mislead investors with reference to the implications of IFRS 
implementation. Furthermore, the analyses reported in chapter 4 indicate that the 
overall levels of compliance with IFRS were relatively low for a large proportion of 
the companies. This may distort the findings regarding the incremental value 
relevance of the adjustments reported in the reconciliation items.  
A further limitation of the present research is that it examines the incremental value 
relevance of the adjustments reported in shareholders’ equity reconciliation 
statements. Companies’ inadequate disclosures regarding the corresponding 
adjustments with reference to income did not allow for the examination of the 
incremental value relevance of those adjustments as well. 
Moreover, as discussed previously, although the necessary procedures and specific 
criteria were followed, measuring compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements always entails a degree of subjectivity. This may hinder replication of 
the study with regard to the value relevance of companies’ compliance with IFRS.  
Finally, although a relatively large sample is used, the study focuses only on one 
year, with reference to the value relevance of compliance with IFRS disclosure 
requirements. Thus, the results may be time specific, i.e. first year of mandatory 
implementation of IFRS. It is probable that companies’ disclosures would increase in 
the following years (cf. Hassan et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2008) and thus the large 
variability of the level of information reaching investors may decrease. Arguably, 
although this may affect the value relevance of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures per se it should have no impact on the analyses regarding the difference 
in the valuation coefficients of high versus low compliance companies.  
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5.8 Conclusions 
This final part of the study provides answers to three of the six research questions of 
this thesis, namely Q4, Q5 and Q6. With regard to Q4, the study builds on and 
contributes to literature suggesting that Anglo-Saxon, shareholder oriented 
accounting regimes (such as IFRS) provide more value relevant accounting 
information than the stakeholder regimes in Continental Europe (cf. Ali and Hwang, 
2000; King and Langli, 1998). It also informs the literature examining the value 
relevance of accounting information after the mandatory implementation of IFRS in 
EU (cf. Capkun et al., 2008; Paananen, 2008). With regard to Q5, it builds on and 
contributes to literature suggesting the information provided in companies’ 
reconciliation statements is value relevant (cf. Niskanen, 2000; Beckman, 2007; 
Horton and Serafeim, 2009). As far as Q6 is concerned, this part of the thesis 
addresses recent calls for research regarding the lack of empirical evidence of the 
valuation effects of mandatory disclosures (cf. Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008; Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Kang and Pang, 2005). 
The first objective was to examine any change in the valuation coefficients of book 
value of shareholders’ equity and net income after the implementation of IFRS. The 
second objective was to examine any change in the relative value relevance of 
accounting information after the adoption of IFRS. This analysis was partitioned 
across the sub-samples of large versus small companies and companies with a ‘Big 
4’ auditor and a non-‘Big 4’ audit firm.  
The findings suggest that there is no change in the valuation coefficient of book 
values of shareholders’ equity after the adoption of IFRS. Additionally, a non-
significant decrease, in the relative value relevance of accounting information is 
observed. These results hold independent of factors which might be perceived to 
affect the quality of accounting information (i.e. firm size and audit quality). 
However, there is weak evidence that after the switch to IFRS investors continue to 
give higher weight to earnings produced by firms having a ‘Big 4’ auditor.  
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Overall, these results suggest that the change in accounting standards is not a 
sufficient condition for changing the market participants’ perception about the value 
relevance of the accounting information. They do not support the assumption that 
accounting quality improves after the adoption of IFRS, at least not if accounting 
quality is defined as the association between book and market values (Paananen, 
2008; Horton and Serafeim, 2009; Barth et al., 2008). This may not be surprising for 
the Greek context if one considers the particular features of the country. The 
consistent arguments of the prior literature, suggesting an explicit mistrust of the 
accounting numbers published, are in favour of the present findings. 
These findings are particularly relevant to standard setters (Barth et al., 2001). They 
also contribute to the debate on whether shareholder-focused accounting principles 
are more value relevant than traditional continental European accounting regulations. 
At least in the case of Greece, it is evident from the present study that this is not so. 
The third objective was to examine the incremental value relevance of the 
adjustments reported in the reconciliation statements required by IFRS 1. This was 
particularly relevant in the present context because there was the expectation that the 
adoption of particular IFRS would curtail previous creative accounting practices (see 
also chapter 3).  
The results show that, with regard to the full sample, the adjustments resulting from 
IAS 10 and IAS 16 are (positively) incrementally value relevant. It is noteworthy that 
the adjustment with regard to IAS 38 is also incrementally value relevant but with a 
negative coefficient. These results are driven by the sub-sample of small companies 
for which similar findings are reported. The results regarding large companies are 
inconclusive. Additionally, there is weak evidence that the adjustments regarding 
IAS 12, IAS 37 and IAS 32&39 are positively and significantly value relevant.  
Although findings with regard to the previous objective suggest that the participants 
in the Greek market do not change their attitude towards book values because these 
are now produced under IFRS (i.e. relative value relevance), these findings do 
suggest that investors process the information reported within the transitional 
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reconciliation statements. This is in line with Alciatore (1993) who concludes that 
the market assigns value to information explaining how and why a net change 
reported has arisen. Consequently, the identification of incremental value relevance 
of the individual adjustments supports the usefulness of the reconciliation statements, 
at least as far as Greece is concerned.  
The fourth objective was to examine the valuation implications of mandatory 
disclosures. This was first pursued by implementing the Ohlson (1995) Model while 
using companies’ levels of compliance as a proxy for ‘other information’. 
Subsequently, any potential difference in the valuation coefficients of high versus 
low compliance companies was examined.  
The robust findings suggest that investors do place value on mandatory disclosures. 
The level of mandatory disclosures is positively related to market values. This 
appears to be consistent with the premises of signalling and free market theories. 
Companies with higher compliance levels ‘screen’ themselves and this has 
‘rewarding’ implications. Additionally, it is shown that investors do assign (higher) 
value on the book value of shareholders’ equity of high compliance companies. This 
indicates that higher compliance with mandatory disclosures reduces information 
asymmetry (cf. Bushee and Leuz, 2005) and mitigates uncertainty about companies’ 
fundamentals (Anctil et al. 2004). In conclusion, drawing on Leuz and Wysocki’s 
(2008) call for research, the findings of the present study suggest that mandatory 
disclosures do have valuation effects.  
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Chapter 6 - Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Introduction 
After long debates and attempts for achieving accounting harmonisation and 
comparability across the companies within the EU, since January 1st 2005, all EU 
listed companies are required to prepare consolidated accounts on the basis of IFRS. 
This development has been described as the most significant event in the history of 
financial reporting. Considering the subsequent ‘concerns’ expressed and the 
research opportunities suggested by the recent literature, the present study examined 
several dimensions relating to the mandatory adoption of IFRS by Greek listed 
companies. The present research intentionally focused on the first year of mandatory 
IFRS implementation not only investigating several issues independently but also 
exploring the links between them. 
This chapter provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. A summary of the 
research objectives, questions, and methods is initially provided (section 6.2). Then, 
a summary of the key research findings and their implications is discussed (section 
6.3). The summary of the limitations of the study follow (section 6.4). Finally, 
opportunities for further research are highlighted (section 6.5). 
6.2 Summary of Research Objectives, Questions, and Approach 
6.2.1 Research objectives 
Considering the Greek financial reporting system, the timing of the research (i.e. first 
year of IFRS implementation) and the suggested opportunities for research, the 
present study pursued the following objectives:  
 To make a contribution to the relevant international accounting literature on the 
financial statement effects of transition to IFRS.  
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 To make a contribution to the relevant literature regarding compliance with 
mandatory disclosures in general and after IFRS implementation in the EU in 
particular.  
 To make a contribution to the literature regarding the methods for measuring 
compliance with accounting standards’ mandatory disclosures.  
 To make a contribution to the literature regarding disclosure theories via the 
exploration of proxies for the factors explaining compliance with accounting 
standards’ mandatory disclosure.  
 To make a contribution to the literature regarding value relevance research and 
valuation theory using the Ohlson (1995) model.  
 To make a contribution to the literature regarding effects of IFRS 
implementation on the relative and incremental value relevance of accounting 
information.  
 To make a contribution to the literature regarding the valuation implications of 
mandatory disclosures. 
6.2.2 Research questions 
The research objectives set are informed by providing answers to the six research 
questions explored in this thesis: 
Q1. Was the impact of transition to IFRS on Greek listed companies material and 
statistically significant? 
Q2. To what extent did Greek listed companies comply with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures, during the first year of IFRS adoption?  
Q3. Which factors explain Greek listed companies’ compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures?  
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Q4. Is there a change in the accounting quality (defined as the value relevance of 
accounting information) after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Greece? 
Q5. Is the information reported within shareholders’ equity reconciliation 
statements of Greek listed companies incrementally value relevant to the 2005 
book values? 
Q6. What are the valuation implications of IFRS mandatory disclosures in Greece? 
6.2.3 Research approach 
6.2.3.1 Research question 1 
To provide an answer to Q1, Gray’s comparability index was employed on the basis 
of a sample of 238 companies (i.e. approximately 75% of the Greek listed companies 
in March 2006). Breaking the index down into partial indices also permitted the 
measurement of the impact of specific IFRS. Additionally, the present research 
expands on previous studies by exploring the impact of IFRS recognition and 
measurement requirements on gearing and liquidity. By measuring the impact of 
transition by means of a commonly applied index, the study also provided a 
benchmark for comparison with studies examining the impact of mandatory 
transition in other countries, especially those with stakeholder accounting regimes 
such as Germany, France and Italy. Considering the evidence provided in the 
literature regarding the relationship between audit firm size and earnings 
management in Greece, the results have been disaggregated across the sub-samples 
of companies with ‘Big 4’ and non-‘Big 4’ auditors.  
6.2.3.2 Research question 2 
To provide an answer to Q2, a disclosure index containing all the disclosure items 
mandated by the IFRS extant at the end of 2006 was constructed. Based on this 
research instrument, and the two disclosure index methods employed (namely the PC 
method (Street and Gray, 2001; Al-Shiab, 2003) and the commonly used 
dichotomous approach, 153 Greek listed companies’ compliance with IFRS 
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mandatory disclosures in their first year of implementation was examined. This 
sample represents approximately 48% of the Greek listed companies in March 2006. 
6.2.3.3 Research question 3 
To provide an answer to Q3, first a review of the relevant disclosure theories was 
conducted. On that basis, drawing on capital market based theories, agency theory, 
and cost based theories, the features of the Greek financial reporting system, and 
considerations regarding the timing of the research a priori expectations regarding 
the factors explaining compliance with the mandatory disclosures were established. 
Subsequently, 8 variables were tested as proxies for the factors related to the 
compliance identified. These factors include size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, 
industry and audit firm size as well as the impact on 2004 shareholders’ equity and 
net income reported as reported in companies’ reconciliation statements. The 
significance of the association of the above characteristics and the compliance levels 
identified was assessed by conducting both univariate (parametric) and multivariate 
analyses (OLS regressions).  
6.2.3.4 Research question 4 
The present study perceives accounting quality inter alia as the association between 
book values and market values i.e. value relevance of accounting information. 
Consistent with the relevant literature, the Ohlson (1995) model (OM) was employed 
to provide an answer to Q4. These analyses were focused on the same 153 companies 
examined for providing an answer to Q2 and Q3. In particular, two dimensions 
related to the change of the value relevance of accounting information of Greek listed 
companies were examined. First, any change in the valuation coefficients of book 
values of shareholders’ equity and net income between 2004 and 2005 was 
examined. Panel data analyses were used for this examination. Second, any change in 
the relative value relevance (i.e. R2) between 2004 and 2005 was examined. These 
analyses were performed by using Cramer’s Z statistic (Cramer, 1987). All analyses 
were partitioned across the sub-samples of large versus small companies and 
companies with ‘Big 4’ versus non-‘Big 4’ auditors. This facilitated the exploration 
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of other factors which may influence the value relevance of accounting information 
in general and in Greece in particular. 
6.2.3.5 Research question 5 
To provide an answer to Q5, the present study also employed the OM. More 
specifically, focusing only on 2005, the book value of shareholders’ equity was 
decomposed across the adjustments resulted from the adoption of individual IFRS, 
on transition to the new accounting regime. These were the following ten items: 
impact from IAS 2 and IAS 36 (aggregate because they both deal with impairment of 
assets); IAS 10; IAS 12; IAS 16; IAS 19; IAS 20; IAS 32/39 (joint as companies 
tended to disclose this impact jointly); IAS 37; IAS 38; and the sum of the impact 
from all other standards (Other). This analysis is also partitioned across the sub-
samples of large versus small companies. 
6.2.3.6 Research question 6 
Finally, to provide an answer to Q6, three approaches were followed. First, the extent 
of companies’ compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures, with regard to 2005, 
was introduced to the OM as a proxy for ‘other information’. Second, any differences 
in the relative value relevance (i.e. R2) of the high compliance versus low compliance 
companies were examined. Third, any differences in the valuation coefficients of 
high versus low compliance companies were also examined. 
6.3 Research Findings, Contribution and Implications  
6.3.1 Summary of findings 
6.3.1.1 IFRS and financial statements effects (Q1) 
The analyses in chapter 3 reveal the following (see sections 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 for more 
details). It is found that implementation of IFRS had a significant impact on the 
financial position and reported performance as well as on gearing and liquidity ratios, 
of Greek listed companies. On average, a positive adjustment on shareholders’ equity 
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and net income is identified (immaterial and material respectively). With regard to 
gearing and liquidity, the impact was a negative adjustment (material and immaterial 
respectively, on average). Additionally, only companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors 
faced significant impact on net profit and liquidity on transition to IFRS. They also 
faced a significantly greater impact on gearing than companies with ‘Big 4’ auditors. 
However, the large number of companies materially affected with reference to all 
measures examined is somewhat surprising. (Note that the thresholds of materiality 
do not coincide with those of statistical significance.) 
Reflecting on the features of the Greek context (as these are discussed in chapter 2) 
the following inferences can be made. With respect to shareholders’ equity, the 
findings support the notion that Greek GAAP is in fact less conservative than IFRS, 
as applied (de facto) in this context of transition. A large number of companies with 
material negative changes are identified and explanations support this finding. Seven 
standards which cause a significant negative impact on companies’ net assets and 
which appear to be reducing certain creative accounting practices previously 
followed under Greek GAAP (Polychroniadis, 2002; Spathis, 2002; Spathis et al., 
2002; Baralexis, 2004) are identified. For some of these standards, the impact was 
either significant, or only greater, for companies with non-‘Big 4’ auditors.  
These findings are particularly important for several reasons. First, they suggest that 
reporting quality has improved under the new accounting regime. Second, they 
confirm the expectations that Greek listed companies’ financial statements would be 
affected significantly from the adoption of IFRS because of the substantial 
differences between Greek GAAP and IFRS. Third, such a significant change on 
companies’ financial statements may affect contractual obligations and debt 
covenants (Ormrod and Taylor, 2004).  
6.3.1.2 Compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures and its explanatory factors (Q2 
& Q3) 
The analyses in chapter (4) reveal the following (see sections 4.7.2, 4.7.3, 4.7.5 & 
4.7.6 for more details). They illustrate a relatively low average level of compliance 
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with IFRS mandatory disclosures in 2005 by Greek listed companies. This 
approximates to 80% (actual levels depend on the method employed for measuring 
compliance) (Q2). It is also indicative that there is considerable variation in the 
compliance scores identified: standard deviations are 10% or 8%, depending on the 
method employed for measuring compliance.  
Further analyses, on a standard by standard basis, indicate that standards that 
introduced new measurement and/or recognition requirements compared to Greek 
GAAP, exhibit very low average levels of compliance. They also exhibit 
significantly high variability of compliance scores. Similar is the case for the 
standards that require disclosures that involve high proprietary costs. Some examples 
include the following standards: IAS 40; IFRS 3; IAS 14; IAS 37; IAS 19; IAS 28; 
IAS 17; and IAS 36. Additionally, there were several instances where companies did 
not provide any of the information required by specific standards. In contrast, the 
cases where companies complied fully with the requirements of some standards were 
rare.132  
A level of non-compliance with disclosure requirements in the Greek context (‘low 
trust’ society, low importance of the ‘true and fair view’, high ownership 
concentration) might be expected. However, a large number of companies exhibit 
very low compliance levels. For example, if somebody does not consider the 
disclosure requirements regarding IAS 1, more than 20% of the companies examined 
exhibit less than 60% compliance with IFRS requirements. These compliance levels, 
which may be considered low for a developed market, reflect on the lenient approach 
of the regulator regarding compliance with IFRS during the initial period of their 
implementation. (See section 4.7.2 for more details.) 
As far as Q3 is concerned, the present study provides strong evidence that companies 
having the following characteristics comply most with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
in 2005: those having a ‘Big 4’ auditor; those exhibited more positive changes in 
                                                 
132 To the extreme, the analyses in chapter 3 identified a very high level of non-compliance with IFRS 
1 requirements: 42 companies either did not provide reconciliation statements for shareholders’ equity 
and/or net income or the statements provided were of a very poor quality. This appears to be related to 
the type of audit firm. 
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their restated IFRS 2004 net profit figure; and those exhibited more negative changes 
in their restated IFRS 2004 shareholders’ equity figure. It is also shown that larger 
companies exhibit higher compliance levels. However, this association between size 
and compliance levels is found to be significant only in the univariate analyses.  
These findings are informed by the particular context of Greece and can be 
interpreted with the propositions of signalling, agency, and political costs theories 
(see section 4.5 for development of hypotheses and section 4.7.7 for interpretation of 
findings). More specifically, with regard to the two restated measures, there have 
been consistent findings of earnings management by Greek listed companies. As 
discussed above, the areas of creative accounting practices followed under Greek 
GAAP were curtailed with the introduction of IFRS causing a significant impact on 
companies’ financial statements. Accordingly, these findings indicate that such a 
significant change, in companies’ restated measures, has acted as a driving factor for 
companies’ compliance with IFRS overall mandatory disclosure requirements in 
2005. On that basis, the results of this study indicate that the compliance risks that 
managers bear are heavily dependent on the impact caused on their companies’ 
financial position and performance, as a result of the adoption of IFRS. 
With reference to agency theory, company managers may well be under pressure to 
‘communicate’ and explain why their financial position appears to be worse under 
the higher quality accounting standards (i.e. IFRS) which are believed to reflect 
companies’ assets and liabilities more accurately. They would also be under pressure 
to ‘communicate’ the reasons for such an improvement in companies’ restated 
profitability. This would pre-empt allegation that such a significant change is due to 
fraudulent accounting practices (i.e. ‘transitional big bath’) leading to misleading 
perceptions about companies’ profitability levels. 
As far as signalling theory is concerned, this would suggest that management 
provides extended levels of compliance to ‘communicate’ that previous year’s 
performance was low because Greek GAAP was of poor quality. Accordingly, low 
profitability had not been reported because of their inefficiency but it was due to the 
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fact that the previous accounting regime produced conservative reported 
performance. In this way, the managers of these companies try to ‘screen’ their 
companies from those remaining (i.e. the majority) which faced a negative change.  
Finally, in line with the premises of political costs theory, a significantly positive 
change in profitability could well be interpreted as companies intentionally reporting 
lower profits under Greek GAAP so as not to attract the public eye. Accordingly, 
companies facing a positive change in profitability might be more concerned that this 
change may trigger political action with reference to past performance and thus 
provide higher compliance levels to avoid political action. 
As far as audit firm size is concerned, higher earnings management as well as lower 
audit effort are well documented for companies with small auditors in Greece. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising the companies with a ‘Big 4’ auditor to exhibit also 
higher levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Thus, employing a 
‘Big 4’ audit firm acts as a monitoring mechanism and satisfies the need for 
transparency and better quality financial statements. This leads to a reduction of 
agency costs. These findings support the argument that large and international audit 
companies may have greater competence and expertise on IFRS (cf. Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998), resulting in higher levels of compliance. They may also suggest 
that larger audit firms conduct higher audits in order to avoid jeopardising their 
reputation.  
Additionally, managers may also intentionally employ a ‘Big 4’ audit firm as a signal 
of high accounting quality. This would allow them to ‘screen’ their companies from 
those employing a small audit firm which are associated with higher earnings 
management as well as lower audit effort. At the same time, employing a ‘Big 4’ 
may indeed result in higher compliance with mandatory disclosures (as a result of the 
auditors’ expertise). 
6.3.1.3 IFRS and value relevance (Q4, Q5 & Q6) 
The analyses in chapter (5) reveal the following. The findings suggest that there is no 
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change in the relative value relevance of accounting information. Although 
surprising, this is in line with recent lietarture (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Additionally, no significant increases in the valuation coefficients of book values are 
identified. These results hold independent of factors which might be perceived to 
affect the quality of accounting information (i.e. firm size and audit quality). 
However, there is weak evidence that after the switch to IFRS investors continue to 
give higher weight to earnings produced by firms having a ‘Big 4’ auditor.  
Overall, these results suggest that the change in accounting standards is not a 
sufficient condition for changing the market participants’ perception about the value 
relevance of the accounting information. They do not support the assumption that 
accounting quality improves after the adoption of IFRS, at least not if accounting 
quality is defined as the association between book and market values (Paananen, 
2008; Horton and Serafeim, 2009; Barth et al., 2008). This may not be surprising for 
the Greek context if one considers the particular features of the country. The 
consistent arguments of the prior literature suggesting an explicit mistrust of the 
accounting numbers published, the linient approach of the HCMC over incidents of 
non-compliance as well as the problems of preparing the first IFRS financial 
statements are in favour of the present findings. (See section 5.6.2.3 for more 
details). 
The answer to Q3 (i.e. explanatory factors of compliance) indicates a link with the 
findings related to Q1. The value relevance analyses indicate a further link between 
the findings related to one question and that of another.  
More specifically, it is shown that the adjustments resulting from IAS 10 and IAS 16 
and reported in the reconciliation statements are (positively) incrementally value 
relevant. It is noteworthy that the adjustment with regard to IAS 38 is also 
incrementally value relevant but with a negative coefficient. These results are driven 
by the sub-sample of small companies for which similar findings are reported. The 
results regarding large companies are inconclusive. Additionally, there is weak 
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evidence that the adjustments regarding IAS 12, IAS 37 and IAS 32&39 are 
positively value relevant.  
Although findings concerning the relative value relevance suggest that the 
participants in the Greek market do not change their attitude towards book values 
because these are now produced under IFRS, these findings do suggest that investors 
process the information reported within the transitional reconciliation statements. 
This is in line with Alciatore (1993) who concludes that the market assigns value to 
information explaining how and why a net change reported has arisen. Consequently, 
the identification of incremental value relevance of the individual adjustments 
supports the usefulness of the reconciliation statements, at least as far as Greece is 
concerned.  
Furthermore, the findings regarding Q2 (i.e. levels of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures) facilitate answering Q6. More specifically, they are used in 
the Ohlson (1995) model as a proxy for v, testing the value relevance of quantity of 
mandatory disclosures. The findings regarding Q6, which are submitted to robustness 
checks, suggest that investors do place value on mandatory disclosures (see section 
5.6.4). The level of mandatory disclosures is positively related to market values. This 
appears to be consistent with the premises of signalling and free market theories. 
Companies with higher compliance levels ‘screen’ themselves and this has 
‘rewarding’ implications. Additionally, it is shown that investors do assign (higher) 
value on the book value of shareholders’ equity of high compliance companies. This 
indicates that higher compliance with mandatory disclosures reduces information 
asymmetry (cf. Bushee and Leuz, 2005) and mitigates uncertainty about companies’ 
fundamentals (Anctil et al. 2004). These issues are particularly relevant to the present 
context if one considers the background regarding creative accounting with regard to 
balance sheet. (See section 5.6.4.4 for more details) 
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6.3.2 Contribution and implications 
6.3.2.1 Contribution to the literature 
The answer to Q1 contributes to similar academic studies examining the impact of 
IFRS on companies’ financial statements as a result of the differences between 
national GAAPs and IFRS: Cordazzo (2008) (Italy); Lopes and Viana (2008) 
(Portugal); Aisbitt (2006) (UK); Callao et al. (2007) (Spain).  
The answer to Q2 contributes to prior literature examining compliance with 
accounting standards’ mandatory disclosures (e.g. Ali et al., 2004; Glaum and Street, 
2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hodgdon et al., 2008). 
This is the first large scale academic study which examines companies’ level of 
compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosures after their implementation in 2005 
in EU countries.  
In parallel, the relatively high non-compliance levels identified reflect on and 
confirm the concerns expressed in the literature regarding the role that enforcement 
mechanisms play in the achievement of a successful level of comparability across 
jurisdictions that adopt IFRS (e.g. Ball, 2006; Nobes; 2006; Weetman, 2006; Giner 
and Rees, 2005; Schipper, 2005). In fact, the findings of the present study are in 
favour of the argument raised by Nobes and Parker (2008) that low enforcement 
mechanisms may result in de facto voluntary compliance with IFRS.  
The answer to Q3 contributes to prior literature examining compliance with 
accounting standards mandatory disclosures and testing several variables as 
explanatory factors for the levels of compliance identified (e.g. Ali et al., 2004; 
Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005). 
This study illustrates that managers’ compliance behaviour of a company that 
experiences significant changes in its fundamental measures is driven significantly 
by the impact on those measures. More specifically, the impact on shareholders’ 
equity and net income resulting from the implementation of IFRS are significantly 
associated with companies’ levels of compliance. This is the first study to test these 
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two variables. Additionally, consistent with prior literature and of particular 
relevance to Greece, it is shown that companies with a ‘Big 4’ auditor exhibit 
significantly higher levels of compliance. 
The answer to Q4 builds on and contributes to literature suggesting that Anglo-
Saxon, shareholder oriented accounting regimes (such as IFRS) provide more value 
relevant accounting information than the stakeholder regimes in Continental Europe 
(e.g. Ali and Hwang, 2000; King and Langli, 1998). The findings of the present study 
indicate that, at least in the case of Greece, this is not so. The answer to this question 
makes a contribution to the literature examining the value relevance of accounting 
information after the mandatory implementation of IFRS in EU (e.g. Capkun et al., 
2008; Paananen, 2008).  
The answer to Q5 builds on and contributes to literature suggesting that information 
provided in companies’ reconciliation statements is value relevant (cf. Niskanen, 
2000; Beckman, 2007; Horton and Serafeim, 2009). Strong evidence in support of 
this argument is provided. 
The answer to Q6 addresses recent calls for empirical research on the valuation 
implications of mandatory disclosures in general and with regard to IFRS in 
particular. First, it provides direct empirical evidence in relation to firm value and 
level of mandatory disclosures (Hassan et al., 2009; Kang and Pang, 2005). Second, 
it addresses Verrecchia’s (2001: 174) call for empirical disclosure related research in 
‘less developed capital markets than those found in the US’ (ibid: 175). The findings 
of the present study suggest that higher compliance with mandatory disclosures 
reduces information asymmetry (cf. Bushee and Leuz, 2005) and mitigates 
uncertainty about companies’ fundamentals (Anctil et al. 2004). 
6.3.2.2 Methodological contribution 
The findings provide strong evidence that using only one method for measuring 
compliance with mandatory disclosures may produce misleading perception about 
the extent to which companies comply with the standards’ requirements.  
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More specifically, following only the PC method, average compliance of 79% would 
have been reported. Following only Cooke’s approach the corresponding figure 
would have been 83%. Most importantly, following only the PC method would 
report that approximately 50% of the companies are exhibiting compliance in the 
range between 50% and 80%. However, following only the commonly used method, 
approximately 30% of the companies would appear in this category. Additionally, no 
company would have been reported as exhibiting less than 60% compliance. (See 
section 4.7.2.2 for a detailed discussion.) 
Beyond this, using only one method may also have implications with regard to the 
explanatory factors that appear to be significantly associated with the levels of 
compliance identified. For example, the findings of the present study indicate that, 
following only the PC method, industry type is significantly associated with 
companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. This does not 
hold in relation to the results based on Cooke’s method. Accordingly, this study 
suggests simultaneous use of both the commonly used dichotomous approach and the 
PC method as they were employed in this study. (See section 4.7.7.2 for a detailed 
discussion.) 
6.3.2.3 Contribution to theory 
Wallace and Gernon (1991: 20) urge researchers to examine accounting research 
theories ‘in countries other than those in which they were developed’. In line with 
this proposition, the present study examined disclosures and valuation theories in the 
Greek context whilst examining issues regarding the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
(see sections 4.2, 4.3 and 5.3 for more details). As indicated above (sections 6.3.1.2 
and 6.3.1.3), the findings of the analyses regarding Q3 and Q6 contribute to those 
theories. With regard to disclosure theories, they provide strong support for the 
propositions of agency, signaling, political costs, and free market theories. As far as 
valuation theory is concerned and with regard to OM in particular, it is shown that, 
although book values do map market values, ‘other information’ (as proxied by the 
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quantity of IFRS manadatory disclosures) plays also a significant role in valuing a 
company (see also sections 4.7.7 and 5.6.4 for more details).  
6.3.2.4 Policy implications 
The findings of the analyses provided in this thesis should be particularly relevant to 
standard setters. First, support for the production of reconciliation statements is 
provided. This is because the magnitude of the impact on key financial measures, as 
this is reported in reconciliation statements, could indicate companies engaging with 
earnings management under the previous accounting regime. Additionally, it is 
shown that the information provided in reconciliation statements affects managers’ 
compliance behaviour. This could also indicate instances of non-compliance with 
measurement, recognition and/or disclosure requirements. Furthermore, 
reconciliation adjustments are value relevant and hence investors, who are perceived 
to be the main users of the financial statements, are benefited by receiving detailed 
information.  
Second, Barth et al. (2001: 77) argue that value relevance research inter alia 
‘provides insights into questions of interest to standard setters.’ Thus, the evidence of 
no improvement in the value relevance of accounting information in Greece should 
be of interest of standard setter and regulators. In particular, in countries where 
creative accounting is not a rare phenomenon and nor is enforcement strong there is 
no reason that these features should change in the short term with IFRS 
implementation. This has been suggested for Greece both by trading managers (cf. 
Kontoyannis, 2005) and by the interviewees participated in this study. On that basis, 
consistent with Damant (2006) there other contextual factors affecting accounting 
quality for which particular attention should be paid to.  
Third, in relation to the reference to Damant (2006), the relatively high non-
compliance levels with regard to IFRS mandatory disclosures identified confirm the 
concerns regarding the role that enforcement mechanisms play in the achievement of 
a successful level of comparability across jurisdictions that adopt IFRS (e.g. Ball, 
2006; Nobes; 2006; Weetman, 2006; Giner and Rees, 2005; Schipper, 2005). In 
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particular, the findings of the present study are in favour of the argument raised by 
Nobes and Parker (2008) that low enforcement mechanisms may result in de facto 
voluntary compliance with IFRS. These findings should alert the enforcement 
mechanisms in Greece as well as in other jurisdictions where weak enforcement 
mechanisms exist. 
6.4 Limitations of the Study 
Although, each empirical chapter contains a section devoted to discussion related to 
the limitations attributed to the analyses discussed therein, the main limitations of 
this thesis can be summarised as follows.  
The impact reported in the reconciliation statements with regard to the transition to 
IFRS may be affected by creative accounting practices followed before and/or during 
the period of transition. It may also be affected by preparers’ non-familiarity with 
IFRS which may lead to misinterpretation of the standards’ requirements and 
subsequently improper implementation. 
Although the necessary procedures were followed, measuring compliance with 
mandatory disclosures always entails a degree of subjectivity. This may hinder 
replication of the research in a consistent way by other researchers. 
In common with similar value relevance studies, it is assumed that investors 
understand and evaluate the implications and effects of IFRS. This may not be 
(completely) the case where IFRS are introduced for the first time in a country with a 
substantially different accounting tradition. Additionally, selective or incomplete 
reporting/disclosure may mislead investors unfamiliar with the new regime.  
The sample is not randomly selected. Although the necessary controls have been 
followed regarding the value relevance part of this study (i.e. chapter 5), it remains a 
limitation regarding chapters 3 and 4.  
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6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
Adoption of IFRS has stimulated many opportunities for international accounting 
research. Several researchers have indicated some of the issues could be examined 
(e.g. Nobes, 2006; Weetman, 2006; Meek and Thomas, 2004). Additionally, others 
have examined aspects of accounting quality after adoption of IFRS in other 
countries or in multi-country settings (e.g. Platikanova and Nobes, 2006; Daske et 
al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2008; and Jeanjean and Stolowy, 
2008) which have not been examined in the present study.  
However, the findings of the present study can also provide good avenues for 
potential research. Some of the areas for which the present study can provide 
motivation are highlighted below. 
First, prior literature indicates that companies’ compliance with IFRS tends to 
increase within few years after the initial year of adoption. This, in parallel to the fact 
that HCMC enhanced the processes for monitoring listed companies’ financial 
statements in 2007 (see chapter 2), may lead to increased levels of compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures after 2005. Thus, it would worth examining whether 
companies included in the present research, and exhibited compliance below the 
median or average score, improved their compliance levels. This would give an 
indication on whether companies with very low compliance levels have improved.133   
Second, this study indicates that the main factors associated with compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures are: audit firm size; the impact on 2004 shareholders’ 
equity as a result of the adoption of IFRS; and the impact on 2004 net income as a 
result of the adoption of IFRS. The last two of these three variables were relevant to 
the present research and could be examined since this information was observable 
through the main financial statements which were investigated. However, after 2005 
such information will not be provided in companies’ financial statements. 
Accordingly, future research could examine which factors explain compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures in the absence of such information after 2005.  
                                                 
133 I owe debt to Sir David Tweedie for this suggestion. 
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Third, qualitative research could complement the present study, especially for the 
findings regarding the relative value relevance of accounting information. More 
specifically, the present study indicates that there is no change in the relative value 
relevance of accounting information after IFRS adoption by Greek listed companies. 
Discussions with investors and traders in Greece could provide more insights on their 
perceptions regarding the quality of the accounting information provided by Greek 
listed companies. 
Finally, prior qualitative (e.g. Baralexis, 2004) and quantitative (e.g. Spathis, 2002; 
Spathis et al., 2002) research has examined the areas of creative accounting practices 
implemented under Greek GAAP. The findings provided in chapter 3 confirm the 
expectations that the adoption of specific IFRS would result in curtailment of those 
practices. On that basis, future qualitative or quantitative research could provide 
evidence on whether Greek companies continue to apply creative accounting 
practices after IFRS mandatory implementation and, if so, insights regarding the 
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Appendix I – List of the companies examined in this study 
LAMBRAKIS PRESS S.A. TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS S.A. IMAKO MEDIA S.A. 
TILETIPOS S.A. ELEFTHERI TILEORASI S.A. AUDIO VISUAL ENTERPRISES S.A. 
X.K. TEGOPOULOS EDITIONS S.A. KATHIMERINI PUBLISHING SA ATTICA PUBLICATIONS S.A. 
ALMA-ATERMON S.A. LIVANIS PUBLICATIONS SA 
Media (14) 
LIBERIS PUBLICATIONS S.A. PEGASUS PUBLISHING S.A. NAYTEMPORIKI PUBLISHING S.A. 
MINOAN LINES S.A. ATTICA HOLDINGS S.A. BLUE STAR MARITIME S.A. 
INTRALOT S.A. INTEGRATED 
LOTTERY SYSTEMS & SERVICES ASTIR PALACE VOULIAGMENI S.A. ANEK LINES S.A. 
KIRIAKOULIS MEDITERRANEAN 
CRUISES SHIPPING S.A. 
NICK GALIS YOUTH CENTERS & 
ASSISTED LIVING S.A. HYATT REGENCY S.A. 
GREEK ORGANISATION OF 
FOOTBALL PROGNOSTICS S.A. NEL S.A. IONIAN HOTEL ENT. S.A. 
AUTOHELLAS S.A. 
Travel and leisure 
(16) 
OLYMPIC CATERING S.A. LAMPSA HOTEL CO. S.A. GEKE S.A. 
MEDICON HELLAS S.A EUROMEDICA S.A. AXON S.A. HOLDING 
ATHENS MEDICAL C.S.A. LAVIPHARM S.A. Health care (8) 
IASO S.A. VETERIN S.A. 
DIAGNOSTIC & CURING CENTRE OF 
ATHENS YGEIA S.A. 
SPRIDER S.A GERMANOS IND. & COM. CO S.A. NOTOS COM HOLDINGS S.A. 
HELLENIC DUTY FREE SHOPS S.A. REVOIL S.A. ATLANTIC SUPER MARKET S.A. 
ALFA-BETA VASSILOPOULOS S.A. IKONA - IHOS S.A. AS COMPANY S.A. 
MULTIRAMA S.A. MICROLAND COMPUTERS S.A. VARDAS SA 
Retail (13) 
SFAKIANAKIS S.A.   
GR. SARANTIS S.A. YALCO - CONSTANTINOY S.A. ELVE S.A. 
KARELIA TOBACCO COMPANY INC. 
S.A. EL. D. MOUZAKIS  S.A. ALSINCO S.A 
FOLLI - FOLLIE S.A. HELLENIC  FABRICS S.A. SATO S.A. 
F.G. EUROPE S.A. FASHION BOX HELLAS S.A. ELMEC SPORT S.A. 
CHATZIIOANNOU HOLDINGS S.A. DROMEAS S.A. OFFICE FURNITURE INDUSTRY EMPORIKOS DESMOS S.A. 
MINERVA KNITWEAR S.A. DUROS S.A. FIERATEX S.A. 
PLIAS CONSUMER GOODS S.A. SP. TASOGLOU S.A. RIDENCO S.A. 




RILKEN S.A. SANYO HELLAS HOLDING S.A. LANAKAM SA 
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VARANGIS AVEPE S.A. TECHNICAL OLYMPIC S.A. ETMA RAYON S.A. 
VARVARESSOS S.A. EUROPEAN 
SPINNING MILLS FOURLIS  S.A. 
KLONATEX GROUP OF COMPANIES 
S.A. 
BIOKARPET S.A. INDUSTRIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES ZAMPA SA 
KNITWEAR FACTORY MAXIM C.M. 
PERTSINIDIS S.A. 
HELLATEX S.A. SYNTHETIC YARNS NAFPAKTOS TEXTILE INDUSTRY S.A. WOOL INDUSTRY TRIA ALFA S.A. 
INFORMER S.A. MLS MULTIMEDIA S.A. FORTHnet S.A. 
UNIBRAIN S.A. LOGISMOS SA QUALITY AND RELIABILITY S.A. 
CENTRIC MULTIMEDIA S.A. MARAC ELECTRONICS S.A. SPACE HELLAS S.A. 
HITECH SNT S.A. Info-Quest S.A. NEXANS HELLAS S.A. 
PLAISIO COMPUTERS S.A. INTRACOM S.A. HOLDINGS ILYDA S.A. 
ALTEC S.A. INFORM. & COMMUN. 
SYST. INTERTECH S.A. INTER TECHNOLOGIES 
BYTE COMPUTER S.A. UNISYSTEMS S.A. 
Technology (22) 
PROFILE SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE SA COMPUCON COMPUTER APPLICATIONS SA 
LOGIC DATA INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
S.A. 
J. & P. - AVAX S.A. DOMIKI KRITIS S.A. EDRASIS - C. PSALLIDAS S.A. 
TERNA S.A. PROODEFTIKH TECHNICAL COMPANY S.A. KERAMICS ALLATINI S.A. 
BABIS VOVOS INTERNATIONAL  
TECHNICAL S.A. PANTECHNIKI S.A. MATHIOS REFRACTORY S.A. 
ELLΙNIΚΙ TECHNODOMIKI TEB S.A. DELTA PROJECT S.A. BIOSSOL S.A. 
GENER S.A. TITAN CEMENT COMPANY S.A. MESOCHORITI BROS CORPORATION 
ATHENA S.A. INTRACOM CONSTRUCTIONS S.A.TECHN & STEEL CONSTR. 
I. KLOUKINAS - I. LAPPAS S.A.CONSTR. 
AND COM.COMP. 
SHELMAN SWISSHELLENIC WOOD 
PROD. MANUF. S.A. MOCHLOS S.A. BIOTER S.A. 
AKRITAS S.A. MICHANIKI S.A. BETANET SA 
N. VARVERIS-MODA BAGNO S.A. DIEKAT S.A. ERGAS S.A. 
AEGEK S.A. HERACLES GENERAL CEMENT COMPANY S.A. 




XYLEMPORIA S.A. EKTER SA  
HELLENIC FISHFARMING S.A. CHATZIKRANIWTIS & SONS MILLS S.A. PERSEUS SPECIALTY FOODS S.A.  
ALLATINI Ind. and Com Co. S.A. KRE.KA S.A. DIAS AQUA CULTURE S.A. 
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C. CARDASSILARIS & SONS - 
CARDICO S.A. INTERFISH AQUACULTURE S.A. DELTA HOLDINGS S.A. 
FLOUR MILLS  C. SARANTOPOULOS 
S.A. KTIMA KOSTAS LAZARIDIS S.A. ELAIS - UNILEVER S.A. 
KARAMOLENGOS BAKERY 
INDUSTRY S.A. FLOUR MILLS KEPENOS S.A. KEGO S.A. 
KRI-KRI MILK INDUSTRY S.A. EVROFARMA SA STELIOS KANAKIS S.A. 
NIREFS S.A. EUROHOLDINGS CAPITAL & INVESTMENT CORP. S.A. HIPPOTOUR S.A. 
KATSELIS SONS  S.A. BREAD IND. GREGORY'S MIKROGEVMATA  S.A. J.BOUTARIS & SON HOLDING S.A. 
P.G. NIKAS S.A. ELBISCO HOLDING S.A. SELONDA AQUACULTURE S.A. 
KRETA FARM SA GALAXIDI FISH FARMING S.A DELTA ICE-CREAM S.A. 
Food and beverage 
(31) 
ELGEKA S.A.   
S & B INDUSTRIAL MINERALS S.A. ETEM S.A. ALCO HELLAS S.A. 
N. LEVENTERIS S.A. BITROS HOLDING S.A. KORDELLOS CH. BROS S.A. 
MYTILINEOS HOLDINGS S.A. PIPE WORKS  L. GIRAKIAN PROFIL S.A. SIDMA S.A., STEEL PRODUCTS 
ALUMINIUM OF GREECE S.A. ELVAL ALUM. PROCESS. Co. S.A. SHEET STEEL CO. S.A. 
HALKOR S.A (FORMER VECTOR) A. KALPINIS - N. SIMOS Steel Service Center S.A. SIDENOR S.A. (FORMER ERLIKON) 
Basic resources (17) 
ALUMIL MILONAS ALUM. IND. S.A. CORINTH PIPEWORKS S.A.  
Telecommunications 
(3) HELLENIC TELECOM. ORG. S.A. 
COSMOTE - MOBILE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS S.A LAN-NET S.A. 
Oil and Gas (2) MOTOR OIL (HELLAS) CORINTH REFINERIES S.A. 
ELINOIL HELLENIC PETROLEUM 
COMPANY S.A.  
FRIGOGLASS S.A. VOGIATZOGLOU SYSTEMS S.A. CROWN HELLAS CAN S.A. 
METKA S.A. HELLENIC CABLES S.A. IMPERIO S.A. 
M. J. MAILLIS S.A. INFORM P. LYKOS S.A. KLEEMAN HELLAS S.A. 
VIS Container Manufacturing Co. S.A. FLEXOPACK S.A. GEN. COMMERCIAL & IND SA 
PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY S.A. MEVACO S.A. P. PETROPOYLOS S.A 
E. PAIRIS S.A NEWSPHONE HELLAS S.A. AUDIOTEX KARATZIS S.A. 
NEORION HOLDINGS S.A. ELTRAK S.A. XAIDEMENOS S.A. 
SPIDER METAL INDUSTRY 
N.PETSIOS & SONS S.A. THESSALONIKI PORT AUTHORITY S.A. 
VIOHALKO HELLENIC COPPER AND 
ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY S.A. 
Industrial goods and 
services (27) 
ZENON S.A. ROBOTICS AND 
INFORMATICS DIONIC S.A. PAPERPACK - TSOUKARIDIS S.A. 
 





















panies examined in this study 
THRACE PLASTICS CO. S.A. CYCLON HELLAS  S.A. LAMDA DEVELOPMENT S.A. 
THE HOUSE OF AGRICULTURE 
SPIROY S.A. EURODRIP S.A. 
NEOCHIMIKI - L.V. LAVRENTIADIS 
S.A. 
CRETE PLASTICS S.A. ELTON S.A. PETZETAKIS  S.A. 
DRUCKFARBEN HELLAS S.A. DAIOS PLASTICS S.A.  
ARCADIA METAL IND. C. ROKAS S.A. THESSALONIKI WATER & SEWAGE Co. S.A. 
ATHENS WATER SUPPLY & SEWAGE 
Co. SA 
anies have been used in chapter 3. The companies being highlighted have been used in chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
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Paragraph Sub-paragraph IFRS 1 ‘First-Time Adoption of IFRS’  
  
36A   
In its first IFRS financial statements, an entity that adopts IFRSs 
before 1 January 2006 shall present at least one year of comparative 
information, but this comparative information need not comply with 
IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 4. An entity that chooses to present 
comparative information that does not comply with IAS 32, IAS 39 
and IFRS 4 in its first year of transition shall:   
  (a) 
apply its previous GAAP in the comparative information to financial 
instruments within the scope of IAS 32 and IAS 39 and to insurance 
contracts within the scope of IFRS 4;   
  (b) disclose this fact together with the basis used to prepare this information; and   
  (c) 
disclose the nature of the main adjustments that would make the 
information comply with IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 4. The entity need 
not quantify those adjustments. However, the entity shall treat any 
adjustment between the balance sheet at the comparative period’s 
reporting date (ie the balance sheet that includes comparative 
information under previous GAAP) and the balance sheet at the start 
of the first IFRS reporting period (ie the first period that includes 
information that complies with IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 4) as arising 
from a change in accounting policy and give the disclosures required 
by paragraph 28(a)–(e) and (f)(i) of IAS 8 Accounting Policies, 
Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors. Paragraph 28(f)(i) 
applies only to amounts presented in the balance sheet at the 
comparative period’s reporting date.   
37   
Some entities present historical summaries of selected data for 
periods before the first period for which they present full comparative 
information under IFRSs. This IFRS does not require such summaries 
to comply with the recognition and measurement requirements of 
IFRSs. Furthermore, some entities present comparative information 
under previous GAAP as well as the comparative information 
required by IAS 1. In any financial statements containing historical 
summaries or comparative information under previous GAAP, an 
entity shall:   
  (a) label the previous GAAP information prominently as not being prepared under IFRSs; and   
  (b) disclose the nature of the main adjustments that would make it comply with IFRSs. An entity need not quantify those adjustments.   
39   
To comply with paragraph 38: [An entity shall explain how the 
transition from previous GAAP to IFRSs affected its reported 
financial position, financial performance and cash flows], an entity’s 
first IFRS financial statements shall include:   
  (a) 
reconciliations of its equity reported under previous GAAP to its 
equity under IFRSs for both of the following dates:  
(i) the date of transition to IFRSs; and (ii) the end of the latest period 
presented in the entity’s most recent annual financial statements under 
previous GAAP;   
  (b) 
a reconciliation of the profit or loss reported under previous GAAP 
for the latest period in the entity’s most recent annual financial 
statements to its profit or loss under IFRSs for the same period; and   
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  (c) 
if the entity recognised or reversed any impairment losses for the first 
time in preparing its opening IFRS balance sheet, the disclosures that 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets would have required if the entity had 
recognised those impairment losses or reversals in the period 
beginning with the date of transition to IFRSs.   
40   
The reconciliations required by paragraph 39(a) and (b) shall give 
sufficient detail to enable users to understand the material adjustments 
to the balance sheet and income statement. If an entity presented a 
cash flow statement under its previous GAAP, it shall also explain the 
material adjustments to the cash flow statement.   
41   
If an entity becomes aware of errors made under previous GAAP, the 
reconciliations required by paragraph 39(a) and (b) shall distinguish 
the correction of those errors from changes in accounting policies.   
43   If an entity did not present financial statements for previous periods, its first IFRS financial statements shall disclose that fact.   
43A   
An entity is permitted to designate a previously recognised financial 
asset or financial liability as a financial asset or financial liability at 
fair value through profit or loss or as available for sale in accordance 
with paragraph 25A. The entity shall disclose the fair value of any 
financial assets or financial liabilities designated into each category 
and the classification and carrying amount in the previous financial 
statements.   
44   
If an entity uses fair value in its opening IFRS balance sheet as 
deemed cost for an item of property, plant and equipment, an 
investment property or an intangible asset (see paragraphs 16 and 18), 
the entity’s first IFRS financial statements shall disclose, for each line 
item in the opening IFRS balance sheet:   
  (a) the aggregate of those fair values; and   
  (b) the aggregate adjustment to the carrying amounts reported under previous GAAP.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IFRS 1   
  Paragraph Sub-paragraph IFRS 2 ‘Share-based Payment’   
45   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 44 [An entity shall 
disclose information that enables users of the financial statements to 
understand the nature and extent of share-based payment 
arrangements that existed during the period], the entity shall disclose 
at least the following:   
  (a) 
a description of each type of share-based payment arrangement that 
existed at any time during the period, including the general terms and 
conditions of each arrangement, such as vesting requirements, the 
maximum term of options granted, and the method of settlement (eg 
whether in cash or equity). An entity with substantially similar types 
of share-based payment arrangements may aggregate this 
information, unless separate disclosure of each arrangement is 
necessary to satisfy the principle in paragraph 44.   
  (b) 
the number and weighted average exercise prices of share options for 
each of the following groups of options: (i) outstanding at the 
beginning of the period; (ii) granted during the period; (iii) forfeited 
during the period; (iv) exercised during the period; (v) expired during 
the period; (vi) outstanding at the end of the period; and (vii) 
exercisable at the end of the period.   
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  (c) 
for share options exercised during the period, the weighted average 
share price at the date of exercise. If options were exercised on a 
regular basis throughout the period, the entity may instead disclose 
the weighted average share price during the period.   
  (d)  
for share options outstanding at the end of the period, the range of 
exercise prices and weighted average remaining contractual life. If the 
range of exercise prices is wide, the outstanding options shall be 
divided into ranges that are meaningful for assessing the number and 
timing of additional shares that may be issued and the cash that may 
be received upon exercise of those options.   
47   
If the entity has measured the fair value of goods or services received 
as consideration for equity instruments of the entity indirectly, by 
reference to the fair value of the equity instruments granted, to give 
effect to the principle in paragraph 46 [An entity shall disclose how 
the fair value of the goods or services received, or the fair value of the 
equity instruments granted, during the period was determined], the 
entity shall disclose at least the following:   
  (a) 
for share options granted during the period, the weighted average fair 
value of those options at the measurement date and information on 
how that fair value was measured, including: (i) the option pricing 
model used and the inputs to that model, including the weighted 
average share price, exercise price, expected volatility, option life, 
expected dividends, the risk-free interest rate and any other inputs to 
the model, including the method used and the assumptions made to 
incorporate the effects of expected early exercise; (ii) how expected 
volatility was determined, including an explanation of the extent to 
which expected volatility was based on historical volatility; and (iii) 
whether and how any other features of the option grant were 
incorporated into the measurement of fair value, such as a market 
condition.   
  (b) 
for other equity instruments granted during the period (ie other than 
share options), the number and weighted average fair value of those 
equity instruments at the measurement date, and information on how 
that fair value was measured, including: (i) if fair value was not 
measured on the basis of an observable market price, how it was 
determined; (ii) whether and how expected dividends were 
incorporated into the measurement of fair value; and (iii) whether and 
how any other features of the equity instruments granted were 
incorporated into the measurement of fair value.   
  (c) 
for share-based payment arrangements that were modified during the 
period: (i) an explanation of those modifications; (ii) the incremental 
fair value granted (as a result of those modifications); and (iii) 
information on how the incremental fair value granted was measured, 
consistently with the requirements set out in (a) and (b) above, where 
applicable.   
48   
If the entity has measured directly the fair value of goods or services 
received during the period, the entity shall disclose how that fair 
value was determined, eg whether fair value was measured at a 
market price for those goods or services.   
49   
If the entity has rebutted the presumption in paragraph 13 […that the 
fair value of the goods or services received can be estimated reliably. 
That fair value shall be measured at the date the entity obtains the 
goods or the counterparty renders service. In rare cases, if the entity 
rebuts this presumption…], it shall disclose that fact, and give an 
explanation of why the presumption was rebutted.   
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51   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 50 [An entity shall 
disclose information that enables users of the financial statements to 
understand the effect of share-based payment transactions on the 
entity’s profit or loss for the period and on its financial position], the 
entity shall disclose at least the following:   
  (a) 
the total expense recognised for the period arising from share-based 
payment transactions in which the goods or services received did not 
qualify for recognition as assets and hence were recognised 
immediately as an expense, including separate disclosure of that 
portion of the total expense that arises from transactions accounted 
for as equity-settled share-based payment transactions;   
  (b) 
for liabilities arising from share-based payment transactions: (i) the 
total carrying amount at the end of the period; and (ii) the total 
intrinsic value at the end of the period of liabilities for which the 
counterparty’s right to cash or other assets had vested by the end of 
the period (eg vested share appreciation rights).   
52   
If the information required to be disclosed by this IFRS does not 
satisfy the principles in paragraphs 44, 46 and 50, the entity shall 
disclose such additional information as is necessary to satisfy them.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IFRS 2 
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IFRS 3 ‘Business Combinations’ 
66   
An acquirer shall disclose information that enables users of its 
financial statements to evaluate the nature and financial effect of 
business combinations that were effected:   
  (a) during the period.   
  (b) after the balance sheet date but before the financial statements are authorised for issue.   
67   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 66(a), the acquirer shall 
disclose the following information for each business combination that 
was effected during the period:   
  (a) the names and descriptions of the combining entities or businesses.   
  (b) the acquisition date.   
  (c) the percentage of voting equity instruments acquired.   
  (d) 
the cost of the combination and a description of the components of 
that cost, including any costs directly attributable to the combination. 
When equity instruments are issued or issuable as part of the cost, the 
following shall also be disclosed: (i) the number of equity instruments 
issued or issuable; and (ii) the fair value of those instruments and the 
basis for determining that fair value. If a published price does not 
exist for the instruments at the date of exchange, the significant 
assumptions used to determine fair value shall be disclosed. If a 
published price exists at the date of exchange but was not used as the 
basis for determining the cost of the combination, that fact shall be 
disclosed together with: the reasons the published price was not used; 
the method and significant assumptions used to attribute a value to the 
equity instruments; and the aggregate amount of the difference 
between the value attributed to, and the published price of, the equity 
instruments.   
  (e) details of any operations the entity has decided to dispose of as a result of the combination.   
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  (f) 
the amounts recognised at the acquisition date for each class of the 
acquiree’s assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities, and, unless 
disclosure would be impracticable, the carrying amounts of each of 
those classes, determined in accordance with IFRSs, immediately 
before the combination. If such disclosure would be impracticable, 
that fact shall be disclosed, together with an explanation of why this is 
the case.   
  (g) 
the amount of any excess recognised in profit or loss in accordance 
with paragraph 56 [If the acquirer’s interest in the net fair value of the 
identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities recognised in 
accordance with paragraph 36 exceeds the cost of the business 
combination, the acquirer shall: (a) reassess the identification and 
measurement of the acquiree’s identifiable assets, liabilities and 
contingent liabilities and the measurement of the cost of the 
combination; and (b) recognise immediately in profit or loss any 
excess remaining after that reassessment.], and the line item in the 
income statement in which the excess is recognised.    
  (h) 
a description of the factors that contributed to a cost that results in the 
recognition of goodwill—a description of each intangible asset that 
was not recognised separately from goodwill and an explanation of 
why the intangible asset’s fair value could not be measured reliably—
or a description of the nature of any excess recognised in profit or loss 
in accordance with paragraph 56.   
  (i) 
the amount of the acquiree’s profit or loss since the acquisition date 
included in the acquirer’s profit or loss for the period, unless 
disclosure would be impracticable. If such disclosure would be 
impracticable, that fact shall be disclosed, together with an 
explanation of why this is the case.   
68   
The information required to be disclosed by paragraph 67 shall be 
disclosed in aggregate for business combinations effected during the 
reporting period that are individually immaterial.   
69   
If the initial accounting for a business combination that was effected 
during the period was determined only provisionally as described in 
paragraph 62 [If the initial accounting for a business combination can 
be determined only provisionally by the end of the period in which 
the combination is effected because either the fair values to be 
assigned to the acquiree’s identifiable assets, liabilities or contingent 
liabilities or the cost of the combination can be determined only 
provisionally, the acquirer shall account for the combination using 
those provisional values. The acquirer shall recognise any 
adjustments to those provisional values as a result of completing the 
initial accounting: (a) within twelve months of the acquisition date; 
and (b) from the acquisition date.], that fact shall also be disclosed 
together with an explanation of why this is the case.   
70   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 66(a), the acquirer shall 
disclose the following information, unless such disclosure would be 
impracticable:   
  (a) 
the revenue of the combined entity for the period as though the 
acquisition date for all business combinations effected during the 
period had been the beginning of that period.   
  (b) 
the profit or loss of the combined entity for the period as though the 
acquisition date for all business combinations effected during the 
period had been the beginning of the period.   
  (c) 
If disclosure of this information would be impracticable, that fact 
shall be disclosed, together with an explanation of why this is the 
case.   
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71   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 66(b), the acquirer shall 
disclose the information required by paragraph 67 for each business 
combination effected after the balance sheet date but before the 
financial statements are authorised for issue, unless such disclosure 
would be impracticable. If disclosure of any of that information 
would be impracticable, that fact shall be disclosed, together with an 
explanation of why this is the case.   
73   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 72 [An acquirer shall 
disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to 
evaluate the financial effects of gains, losses, error corrections and 
other adjustments recognised in the current period that relate to 
business combinations that were effected in the current or in previous 
periods.], the acquirer shall disclose the following information:   
  (a) 
the amount and an explanation of any gain or loss recognised in the 
current period that: (i) relates to the identifiable assets acquired or 
liabilities or contingent liabilities assumed in a business combination 
that was effected in the current or a previous period; and (ii) is of 
such size, nature or incidence that disclosure is relevant to an 
understanding of the combined entity’s financial performance.   
  (b) 
if the initial accounting for a business combination that was effected 
in the immediately preceding period was determined only 
provisionally at the end of that period, the amounts and explanations 
of the adjustments to the provisional values recognised during the 
current period.   
  (c) 
the information about error corrections required to be disclosed by 
IAS 8 for any of the acquiree’s identifiable assets, liabilities or 
contingent liabilities, or changes in the values assigned to those items, 
that the acquirer recognises during the current period in accordance 
with paragraphs 63 and 64.   
75   
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 74 [An entity shall 
disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to 
evaluate changes in the carrying amount of goodwill during the 
period.], the entity shall disclose a reconciliation of the carrying 
amount of goodwill at the beginning and end of the period, showing 
separately:   
  (a) 
(a) the gross amount and accumulated impairment losses at the 
beginning of the period; (b) additional goodwill recognised during the 
period except goodwill included in a disposal group that, on 
acquisition, meets the criteria to be classified as held for sale in 
accordance with IFRS 5; (c) adjustments resulting from the 
subsequent recognition of deferred tax assets during the period in 
accordance with paragraph 65; (d) goodwill included in a disposal 
group classified as held for sale in accordance with IFRS 5 and 
goodwill derecognised during the period without having previously 
been included in a disposal group classified as held for sale; (e) 
impairment losses recognised during the period in accordance with 
IAS 36; (f) net exchange differences arising during the period in 
accordance with IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange 
Rates; (g) any other changes in the carrying amount during the period; 
and (h) the gross amount and accumulated impairment losses at the 
end of the period.   
77   
If in any situation the information required to be disclosed by this 
IFRS does not satisfy the objectives set out in paragraphs 66, 72 and 
74, the entity shall disclose such additional information as is 
necessary to meet those objectives.   
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  Total level of compliance with IFRS 3   
  Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
IFRS 5 ‘Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and discontinued 
operations’   
33   An entity shall disclose:   
  (a) 
a single amount on the face of the income statement comprising the 
total of: (i) the post-tax profit or loss of discontinued operations and 
(ii) the post-tax gain or loss recognised on the measurement to fair 
value less costs to sell or on the disposal of the assets or disposal 
group(s) constituting the discontinued operation.   
  (b) 
an analysis of the single amount in (a) into: (i) the revenue, expenses 
and pre-tax profit or loss of discontinued operations; (ii) the related 
income tax expense as required by paragraph 81(h) of IAS 12; (iii) 
the gain or loss recognised on the measurement to fair value less costs 
to sell or on the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s) constituting 
the discontinued operation; and (iv) the related income tax expense as 
required by paragraph 81(h) of IAS 12. The analysis may be 
presented in the notes or on the face of the income statement. If it is 
presented on the face of the income statement it shall be presented in 
a section identified as relating to discontinued operations, ie 
separately from continuing operations. The analysis is not required 
for disposal groups that are newly acquired subsidiaries that meet the 
criteria to be classified as held for sale on acquisition (see paragraph 
11).   
  (c) 
the net cash flows attributable to the operating, investing and 
financing activities of discontinued operations. These disclosures may 
be presented either in the notes or on the face of the financial 
statements. These disclosures are not required for disposal groups that 
are newly acquired subsidiaries that meet the criteria to be classified 
as held for sale on acquisition (see paragraph 11).   
34   
An entity shall re-present the disclosures in paragraph 33 for prior 
periods presented in the financial statements so that the disclosures 
relate to all operations that have been discontinued by the balance 
sheet date for the latest period presented.   
35   
Adjustments in the current period to amounts previously presented in 
discontinued operations that are directly related to the disposal of a 
discontinued operation in a prior period shall be classified separately 
in discontinued operations. The nature and amount of such 
adjustments shall be disclosed. Examples of circumstances in which 
these adjustments may arise include the following: (a) the resolution 
of uncertainties that arise from the terms of the disposal transaction, 
such as the resolution of purchase price adjustments and 
indemnification issues with the purchaser. (b) the resolution of 
uncertainties that arise from and are directly related to the operations 
of the component before its disposal, such as environmental and 
product warranty obligations retained by the seller. (c) the settlement 
of employee benefit plan obligations, provided that the settlement is 
directly related to the disposal transaction.   
36   
If an entity ceases to classify a component of an entity as held for 
sale, the results of operations of the component previously presented 
in discontinued operations in accordance with paragraphs 33–35 shall 
be reclassified and included in income from continuing operations for 
all periods presented. The amounts for prior periods shall be 
described as having been re-presented.   
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37   
Any gain or loss on the remeasurement of a non-current asset (or 
disposal group) classified as held for sale that does not meet the 
definition of a discontinued operation shall be included in profit or 
loss from continuing operations.   
38   
An entity shall present a non-current asset classified as held for sale 
and the assets of a disposal group classified as held for sale separately 
from other assets in the balance sheet. The liabilities of a disposal 
group classified as held for sale shall be presented separately from 
other liabilities in the balance sheet. Those assets and liabilities shall 
not be offset and presented as a single amount. The major classes of 
assets and liabilities classified as held for sale shall be separately 
disclosed either on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes, except 
as permitted by paragraph 39 [If the disposal group is a newly 
acquired subsidiary that meets the criteria to be classified as held for 
sale on acquisition (see paragraph 11), disclosure of the major classes 
of assets and liabilities is not required.]. An entity shall present 
separately any cumulative income or expense recognised directly in 
equity relating to a non-current asset (or disposal group) classified as 
held for sale.   
41   
An entity shall disclose the following information in the notes in the 
period in which a non-current asset (or disposal group) has been 
either classified as held for sale or sold: (a) a description of the non-
current asset (or disposal group); (b) a description of the facts and 
circumstances of the sale, or leading to the expected disposal, and the 
expected manner and timing of that disposal; (c) the gain or loss 
recognised in accordance with paragraphs 20–22 [An entity shall 
recognise an impairment loss for any initial or subsequent write-down 
of the asset (or disposal group) to fair value less costs to sell, to the 
extent that it has not been recognised in accordance with paragraph 
19. 21 An entity shall recognise a gain for any subsequent increase in 
fair value less costs to sell of an asset, but not in excess of the 
cumulative impairment loss that has been recognised either in 
accordance with this IFRS or previously in accordance with IAS 36 
Impairment of Assets. 22 An entity shall recognise a gain for any 
subsequent increase in fair value less costs to sell of a disposal group: 
(a) to the extent that it has not been recognised in accordance with 
paragraph 19; but (b) not in excess of the cumulative impairment loss 
that has been recognised, either in accordance with this IFRS or 
previously in accordance with IAS 36, on the non-current assets that 
are within the scope of the measurement requirements of this IFRS.] 
and, if not separately presented on the face of the income statement, 
the caption in the income statement that includes that gain or loss; (d) 
if applicable, the segment in which the non-current asset (or disposal 
group) is presented in accordance with IAS 14 Segment Reporting.   
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42   
If either paragraph 26 [If an entity has classified an asset (or disposal 
group) as held for sale, but the criteria in paragraphs 7–9 are no 
longer met, the entity shall cease to classify the asset (or disposal 
group) as held for sale.] or paragraph 29 If an entity removes an 
individual asset or liability from a disposal group classified as held 
for sale, the remaining assets and liabilities of the disposal group to be 
sold shall continue to be measured as a group only if the group meets 
the criteria in paragraphs 79. Otherwise, the remaining non-current 
assets of the group that individually meet the criteria to be classified 
as held for sale shall be measured individually at the lower of their 
carrying amounts and fair values less costs to sell at that date. Any 
non-current assets that do not meet the criteria shall cease to be 
classified as held for sale in accordance with paragraph 26.] applies, 
an entity shall disclose, in the period of the decision to change the 
plan to sell the non-current asset (or disposal group), a description of 
the facts and circumstances leading to the decision and the effect of 
the decision on the results of operations for the period and any prior 
periods presented.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IFRS 5    
  Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
IFRS 6 ‘Exploration For and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources’   
24   
To comply with paragraph 23 [An entity shall disclose information 
that identifies and explains the amounts recognised in its financial 
statements arising from the exploration for and evaluation of mineral 
resources], an entity shall disclose:   
  (a) its accounting policies for exploration and evaluation expenditures including the recognition of exploration and evaluation assets.   
  (b) 
the amounts of assets, liabilities, income and expense and operating 
and investing cash flows arising from the exploration for and 
evaluation of mineral resources.   
25   An entity shall treat exploration and evaluation assets as a separate class of assets.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IFRS 6   
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 1 ‘Presentation of Financial Statements’ 
8   A complete set of financial statements comprises:   
  (a) a balance sheet;   
  (b) an income statement;   
  (c) 
a statement of changes in equity showing either: (i) all changes in 
equity, or (ii) changes in equity other than those arising from 
transactions with equity holders acting in their capacity as equity 
holders;   
  (d) a cash flow statement; and   
  (e) notes, comprising a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory notes.   
14   
An entity whose financial statements comply with IFRSs shall make 
an explicit and unreserved statement of such compliance in the notes. 
Financial statements shall not be described as complying with IFRSs 
unless they comply with all the requirements of IFRSs.   
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18   When an entity departs from a requirement of a Standard or an Interpretation, it shall disclose:   
  (a) 
that management has concluded that the financial statements present 
fairly the entity’s financial position, financial performance and cash 
flows;   
  (b) 
that it has complied with applicable Standards and Interpretations, 
except that it has departed from a particular requirement to achieve a 
fair presentation;   
  (c) 
the title of the Standard or Interpretation from which the entity has 
departed, the nature of the departure, including the treatment that the 
Standard or Interpretation would require, the reason why that 
treatment would be so misleading in the circumstances that it would 
conflict with the objective of financial statements set out in the 
Framework, and the treatment adopted; and   
  (d) 
for each period presented, the financial impact of the departure on 
each item in the financial statements that would have been reported in 
complying with the requirement.   
23   
When preparing financial statements, management shall make an 
assessment of an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. 
Financial statements shall be prepared on a going concern basis 
unless management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease 
trading, or has no realistic alternative but to do so. When management 
is aware, in making its assessment, of material uncertainties related to 
events or conditions that may cast significant doubt upon the entity’s 
ability to continue as a going concern, those uncertainties shall be 
disclosed. When financial statements are not prepared on a going 
concern basis, that fact shall be disclosed, together with the basis on 
which the financial statements are prepared and the reason why the 
entity is not regarded as a going concern.   
32   Assets and liabilities, and income and expenses, shall not be offset unless required or permitted by a Standard or an Interpretation.   
36   
Except when a Standard or an Interpretation permits or requires 
otherwise, comparative information shall be disclosed in respect of 
the previous period for all amounts reported in the financial 
statements. Comparative information shall be included for narrative 
and descriptive information when it is relevant to an understanding of 
the current period’s financial statements.   
46   
Each component of the financial statements shall be identified clearly. 
In addition, the following information shall be displayed prominently, 
and repeated when it is necessary for a proper understanding of the 
information presented:   
  (a) the name of the reporting entity or other means of identification, and any change in that information from the preceding balance sheet date;   
  (b) whether the financial statements cover the individual entity or a group of entities;   
  (c) 
the balance sheet date or the period covered by the financial 
statements, whichever is appropriate to that component of the 
financial statements;   
  (d) the presentation currency, as defined in IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates; and   
  (e) the level of rounding used in presenting amounts in the financial statements.   
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49   
Financial statements shall be presented at least annually. When an 
entity’s balance sheet date changes and the annual financial 
statements are presented for a period longer or shorter than one year, 
an entity shall disclose, in addition to the period covered by the 
financial statements:   
  (a) the reason for using a longer or shorter period; and   
  (b) 
the fact that comparative amounts for the income statement, statement 
of changes in equity, cash flow statement and related notes are not 
entirely comparable.   
51   
An entity shall present current and non-current assets, and current and 
non-current liabilities, as separate classifications on the face of its 
balance sheet in accordance with paragraphs 57–67 except when a 
presentation based on liquidity provides information that is reliable 
and is more relevant. When that exception applies, all assets and 
liabilities shall be presented broadly in order of liquidity.   
52   
Whichever method of presentation is adopted, for each asset and 
liability line item that combines amounts expected to be recovered or 
settled (a) no more than twelve months after the balance sheet date 
and (b) more than twelve months after the balance sheet date, an 
entity shall disclose the amount expected to be recovered or settled 
after more than twelve months.   
68   
As a minimum, the face of the balance sheet shall include line items 
that present the following amounts to the extent that they are not 
presented in accordance with paragraph 68A:   
  (a) property, plant and equipment;   
  (b) investment property;   
  (c) intangible assets;   
  (d) financial assets (excluding amounts shown under (e), (h) and (i));   
  (e) investments accounted for using the equity method;   
  (f) biological assets;   
  (g) inventories;   
  (h) trade and other receivables;   
  (i) cash and cash equivalents;   
  (j) trade and other payables;   
  (k) provisions;   
  (l) financial liabilities (excluding amounts shown under (j) and (k));   
  (m) liabilities and assets for current tax, as defined in IAS 12 Income Taxes;   
  (n) deferred tax liabilities and deferred tax assets, as defined in IAS 12;   
  (o) minority interest, presented within equity; and   
  (p) issued capital and reserves attributable to equity holders of the parent.   
68 A   The face of the balance sheet shall also include line items that present the following amounts:   
  (a) 
the total of assets classified as held for sale and assets included in 
disposal groups classified as held for sale in accordance with IFRS 5 
Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations; and   
  (b) liabilities included in disposal groups classified as held for sale in accordance with IFRS 5.   
70   
When an entity presents current and non-current assets, and current 
and non-current liabilities, as separate classifications on the face of its 
balance sheet, it shall not classify deferred tax assets (liabilities) as 
current assets (liabilities).   
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76   An entity shall disclose the following, either on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes:   
  (a) 
for each class of share capital: (i) the number of shares authorised; (ii) 
the number of shares issued and fully paid, and issued but not fully 
paid; (iii) par value per share, or that the shares have no par value; 
(iv) a reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning and at the end of the period; (v) the rights, preferences and 
restrictions attaching to that class including restrictions on the 
distribution of dividends and the repayment of capital; (vi) shares in 
the entity held by the entity or by its subsidiaries or associates; and 
(vii) shares reserved for issue under options and contracts for the sale 
of shares, including the terms and amounts; and   
  (b) a description of the nature and purpose of each reserve within equity.   
81   As a minimum, the face of the income statement shall include line items that present the following amounts for the period:   
  (a) revenue;   
  (b) finance costs;   
  (c) share of the profit or loss of associates and joint ventures accounted for using the equity method;   
  (d) tax expense;   
  (e) 
a single amount comprising the total of (i) the post-tax profit or loss 
of discontinued operations and (ii) the post-tax gain or loss 
recognised on the measurement to fair value less costs to sell or on 
the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s) constituting the 
discontinued operation; and   
  (f) profit or loss.   
82   The following items shall be disclosed on the face of the income statement as allocations of profit or loss for the period:   
  (a) profit or loss attributable to minority interest; and   
  (b) profit or loss attributable to equity holders of the parent.   
85   
An entity shall not present any items of income and expense as 
extraordinary items, either on the face of the income statement or in 
the notes.   
93   
Entities classifying expenses by function shall disclose additional 
information on the nature of expenses, including depreciation and 
amortisation expense and employee benefits expense.   
95   
An entity shall disclose, either on the face of the income statement or 
the statement of changes in equity, or in the notes, the amount of 
dividends recognised as distributions to equity holders during the 
period, and the related amount per share.   
96   An entity shall present a statement of changes in equity showing on the face of the statement:   
  (a) profit or loss for the period;   
  (b) 
each item of income and expense for the period that, as required by 
other Standards or by Interpretations, is recognised directly in equity, 
and the total of these items;   
  (c) 
total income and expense for the period (calculated as the sum of (a) 
and (b)), showing separately the total amounts attributable to equity 
holders of the parent and to minority interest; and   
  (d) 
for each component of equity, the effects of changes in accounting 
policies and corrections of errors recognised in accordance with IAS 
8.   
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    A statement of changes in equity that comprises only these items shall be titled a statement of recognised income and expense.   
97   An entity shall also present, either on the face of the statement of changes in equity or in the notes:   
  (a) 
the amounts of transactions with equity holders acting in their 
capacity as equity holders, showing separately distributions to equity 
holders;   
  (b) 
the balance of retained earnings (ie accumulated profit or loss) at the 
beginning of the period and at the balance sheet date, and the changes 
during the period; and   
  (c) 
a reconciliation between the carrying amount of each class of 
contributed equity and each reserve at the beginning and the end of 
the period, separately disclosing each change.   
104   
Notes shall, as far as practicable, be presented in a systematic manner. 
Each item on the face of the balance sheet, income statement, 
statement of changes in equity and cash flow statement shall be cross-
referenced to any related information in the notes.   
108   An entity shall disclose in the summary of significant accounting policies:   
  (a) the measurement basis (or bases) used in preparing the financial statements; and   
  (b) the other accounting policies used that are relevant to an understanding of the financial statements.   
113   
An entity shall disclose, in the summary of significant accounting 
policies or other notes, the judgements, apart from those involving 
estimations (see paragraph 116), that management has made in the 
process of applying the entity’s accounting policies and that have the 
most significant effect on the amounts recognised in the financial 
statements.   
116   
An entity shall disclose in the notes information about the key 
assumptions concerning the future, and other key sources of 
estimation uncertainty at the balance sheet date, that have a 
significant risk of causing a material adjustment to the carrying 
amounts of assets and liabilities within the next financial year. In 
respect of those assets and liabilities, the notes shall include details 
of:   
  (a) their nature; and   
  (b) their carrying amount as at the balance sheet date.   
125   An entity shall disclose in the notes:   
  (a) 
the amount of dividends proposed or declared before the financial 
statements were authorised for issue but not recognised as a 
distribution to equity holders during the period, and the related 
amount per share; and   
  (b) the amount of any cumulative preference dividends not recognised.   
126   An entity shall disclose the following, if not disclosed elsewhere in information published with the financial statements:   
  (a) 
the domicile and legal form of the entity, its country of incorporation 
and the address of its registered office (or principal place of business, 
if different from the registered office);   
  (b) a description of the nature of the entity’s operations and its principal activities; and   
  (c) the name of the parent and the ultimate parent of the group.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 1    
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Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 2 ‘Inventories’ 
36   The financial statements shall disclose:   
  (a) the accounting policies adopted in measuring inventories, including the cost formula used;   
  (b) the total carrying amount of inventories and the carrying amount in classifications appropriate to the entity;   
  (c) the carrying amount of inventories carried at fair value less costs to sell;   
  (d) the amount of inventories recognised as an expense during the period;   
  (e) 
the amount of any write-down of inventories recognised as an 
expense in the period in accordance with paragraph 34 [When 
inventories are sold, the carrying amount of those inventories shall 
be recognised as an expense in the period in which the related 
revenue is recognised. The amount of any write-down of inventories 
to net realisable value and all losses of inventories shall be recognised 
as an expense in the period the write-down or loss occurs. The 
amount of any reversal of any write-down of inventories, arising from 
an increase in net realisable value, shall be recognised as a reduction 
in the amount of inventories recognised as an expense in the period in 
which the reversal occurs.];   
  (f) 
the amount of any reversal of any write-down that is recognised as a 
reduction in the amount of inventories recognised as expense in the 
period in accordance with paragraph 34;   
  (g) the circumstances or events that led to the reversal of a write-down of inventories in accordance with paragraph 34; and   
  (h) the carrying amount of inventories pledged as security for liabilities.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 2    
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 7 Cash Flow Statements 
10   The cash flow statement shall report cash flows during the period classified by operating, investing and financing activities.   
31   
Cash flows from interest and dividends received and paid shall each 
be disclosed separately. Each shall be classified in a consistent 
manner from period to period as either operating, investing or 
financing activities.   
35   
Cash flows arising from taxes on income shall be separately disclosed 
and shall be classified as cash flows from operating activities unless 
they can be specifically identified with financing and investing 
activities.   
39   
The aggregate cash flows arising from acquisitions and from 
disposals of subsidiaries or other business units shall be presented 
separately and classified as investing activities.   
40   
An entity shall disclose, in aggregate, in respect of both acquisitions 
and disposals of subsidiaries or other business units during the period 
each of the following:   
  (a) the total purchase or disposal consideration;   
  (b) the portion of the purchase or disposal consideration discharged by means of cash and cash equivalents;   
  (c) the amount of cash and cash equivalents in the subsidiary or business unit acquired or disposed of; and   
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  (d) 
the amount of the assets and liabilities other than cash or cash 
equivalents in the subsidiary or business unit acquired or disposed of, 
summarised by each major category.   
45   
An entity shall disclose the components of cash and cash equivalents 
and shall present a reconciliation of the amounts in its cash flow 
statement with the equivalent items reported in the balance sheet.   
48   
An entity shall disclose, together with a commentary by management, 
the amount of significant cash and cash equivalent balances held by 
the entity that are not available for use by the group.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 7 
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
IAS 8 ‘Accounting Policies, Changes  
in Accounting Estimates and Errors’ 
28   
When initial application of a Standard or an Interpretation has an 
effect on the current period or any prior period, would have such an 
effect except that it is impracticable to determine the amount of the 
adjustment, or might have an effect on future periods, an entity shall 
disclose:   
  (a) the title of the Standard or Interpretation;   
  (b) when applicable, that the change in accounting policy is made in accordance with its transitional provisions;   
  (c) the nature of the change in accounting policy;   
  (d) when applicable, a description of the transitional provisions;   
  (e) when applicable, the transitional provisions that might have an effect on future periods;   
  (f) 
for the current period and each prior period presented, to the extent 
practicable, the amount of the adjustment: (i) for each financial 
statement line item affected; and (ii) if IAS 33 Earnings per Share 
applies to the entity, for basic and diluted earnings per share;   
  (g) the amount of the adjustment relating to periods before those presented, to the extent practicable; and   
  (h) 
if retrospective application required by paragraph 19(a) or (b) is 
impracticable for a particular prior period, or for periods before those 
presented, the circumstances that led to the existence of that condition 
and a description of how and from when the change in accounting 
policy has been applied.   
30   When an entity has not applied a new Standard or Interpretation that has been issued but is not yet effective, the entity shall disclose:   
  (a) this fact; and   
  (b) 
known or reasonably estimable information relevant to assessing the 
possible impact that application of the new Standard or Interpretation 
will have on the entity’s financial statements in the period of initial 
application.   
39   
An entity shall disclose the nature and amount of a change in an 
accounting estimate that has an effect in the current period or is 
expected to have an effect in future periods, except for the disclosure 
of the effect on future periods when it is impracticable to estimate that 
effect.   
40   If the amount of the effect in future periods is not disclosed because estimating it is impracticable, an entity shall disclose that fact.   
49   
In applying paragraph 42 [an entity shall correct material prior period 
errors retrospectively in the first set of financial statements authorised 
for issue after their discovery], an entity shall disclose the following:   
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  (a) the nature of the prior period error;   
  (b) 
for each prior period presented, to the extent practicable, the amount 
of the correction: (i) for each financial statement line item affected; 
and (ii) if IAS 33 applies to the entity, for basic and diluted earnings 
per share;   
  (c) the amount of the correction at the beginning of the earliest prior period presented; and   
  (d) 
if retrospective restatement is impracticable for a particular prior 
period, the circumstances that led to the existence of that condition 
and a description of how and from when the error has been corrected.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 8 
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 10 ‘Events after the balance sheet date’ 
17   
An entity shall disclose the date when the financial statements were 
authorised for issue and who gave that authorisation. If the entity’s 
owners or others have the power to amend the financial statements 
after issue, the entity shall disclose that fact.   
19   
If an entity receives information after the balance sheet date about 
conditions that existed at the balance sheet date, it shall update 
disclosures that relate to those conditions, in the light of the new 
information.   
21   
If non-adjusting events after the balance sheet date are material, non-
disclosure could influence the economic decisions of users taken on 
the basis of the financial statements. Accordingly, an entity shall 
disclose the following for each material category of non-adjusting 
event after the balance sheet date:   
  (a) the nature of the event; and   
  (b) an estimate of its financial effect, or a statement that such an estimate cannot be made.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 10  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 11 ‘Construction Contracts’ 
39   An entity shall disclose:   
  (a) the amount of contract revenue recognised as revenue in the period;   
  (b) the methods used to determine the contract revenue recognised in the period; and   
  (c) the methods used to determine the stage of completion of contracts in progress.   
40   An entity shall disclose each of the following for contracts in progress at the balance sheet date:   
  (a) the aggregate amount of costs incurred and recognised profits (less recognised losses) to date;   
  (b) the amount of advances received; and   
  (c) the amount of retentions.   
42   An entity shall present:   
  (a) the gross amount due from customers for contract work as an asset;    
  (b) the gross amount due to customers for contract work as a liability.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 11  
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Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 12 ‘Income Taxes’  
77   The tax expense (income) related to profit or loss from ordinary activities shall be presented on the face of the income statement.   
79   The major components of tax expense (income) shall be disclosed separately.   
81   The following shall also be disclosed separately:   
  (a) the aggregate current and deferred tax relating to items that are charged or credited to equity;   
  (c) 
an explanation of the relationship between tax expense (income) and 
accounting profit in either or both of the following forms: (i) a 
numerical reconciliation between tax expense (income) and the 
product of accounting profit multiplied by the applicable tax rate(s), 
disclosing also the basis on which the applicable tax rate(s) is (are) 
computed; or (ii) a numerical reconciliation between the average 
effective tax rate and the applicable tax rate, disclosing also the basis 
on which the applicable tax rate is computed;   
  (d) an explanation of changes in the applicable tax rate(s) compared to the previous accounting period;   
  (e) 
the amount (and expiry date, if any) of deductible temporary 
differences, unused tax losses, and unused tax credits for which no 
deferred tax asset is recognised in the balance sheet;   
  (f) 
the aggregate amount of temporary differences associated with 
investments in subsidiaries, branches and associates and interests in 
joint ventures, for which deferred tax liabilities have not been 
recognised (see paragraph 39);   
  (g) 
in respect of each type of temporary difference, and in respect of each 
type of unused tax losses and unused tax credits: (i) the amount of the 
deferred tax assets and liabilities recognised in the balance sheet for 
each period presented; (ii) the amount of the deferred tax income or 
expense recognised in the income statement, if this is not apparent 
from the changes in the amounts recognised in the balance sheet;   
  (h) 
in respect of discontinued operations, the tax expense relating to: (i) 
the gain or loss on discontinuance; and (ii) the profit or loss from the 
ordinary activities of the discontinued operation for the period, 
together with the corresponding amounts for each prior period 
presented; and (i) the amount of income tax consequences of 
dividends to shareholders of the entity that were proposed or declared 
before the financial statements were authorised for issue, but are not 
recognised as a liability in the financial statements.   
82   
An entity shall disclose the amount of a deferred tax asset and the 
nature of the evidence supporting its recognition, when: (a) the 
utilisation of the deferred tax asset is dependent on future taxable 
profits in excess of the profits arising from the reversal of existing 
taxable temporary differences; and (b) the entity has suffered a loss in 
either the current or preceding period in the tax jurisdiction to which 
the deferred tax asset relates.   
82A   
In the circumstances described in paragraph 52A [In circumstances 
where current and deferred tax assets and liabilities are measured at 
the tax rate applicable to undistributed profits], an entity shall disclose 
the nature of the potential income tax consequences that would result 
from the payment of dividends to its shareholders. In addition, the 
entity shall disclose the amounts of the potential income tax 
consequences practicably determinable and whether there are any   
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potential income tax consequences not practicably determinable. 
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 12  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 14 ‘Segement reporting’  
51 
  
An entity shall disclose segment revenue for each reportable segment. 
Segment revenue from sales to external customers and segment 
revenue from transactions with other segments shall be separately 
reported.   
52 
  
An entity shall disclose segment result for each reportable segment, 
presenting the result from continuing operations separately from the 
result from discontinued operations.   
52 A 
  
An entity shall restate segment results in prior periods presented in 
the financial statements so that the disclosures required by paragraph 
52 relating to discontinued operations relate to all operations that had 
been classified as discontinued at the balance sheet date of the latest 
period presented.   
55   
An entity shall disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets 
for each reportable segment.   
56   
An entity shall disclose segment liabilities for each reportable 
segment.   
57 
  
An entity shall disclose the total cost incurred during the period to 
acquire segment assets that are expected to be used during more than 
one period (property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets) for each 
reportable segment. While this sometimes is referred to as capital 
additions or capital expenditure, the measurement required by this 
principle shall be on an accrual basis, not a cash basis.   
58 
  
An entity shall disclose the total amount of expense included in 
segment result for depreciation and amortisation of segment assets for 
the period for each reportable segment.   
61 
  
An entity shall disclose, for each reportable segment, the total amount 
of significant non-cash expenses, other than depreciation and 
amortisation for which separate disclosure is required by paragraph 
58, that were included in segment expense and, therefore, deducted in 
measuring segment result.   
64 
  
An entity shall disclose, for each reportable segment, the aggregate of 
the entity’s share of the profit or loss of associates, joint ventures, or 
other investments accounted for under the equity method if 
substantially all of those associates’ operations are within that single 
segment.   
66 
  
If an entity’s aggregate share of the profit or loss of associates, joint 
ventures, or other investments accounted for under the equity method 
is disclosed by reportable segment, the aggregate investments in those 
associates and joint ventures shall also be disclosed by reportable 
segment.   
67 
  
An entity shall present a reconciliation between the information 
disclosed for reportable segments and the aggregated information in 
the consolidated or individual financial statements. In presenting the 
reconciliation, the entity shall reconcile segment revenue to entity 
revenue from external customers (including disclosures of the amount 
of entity revenue from external customers not included in any 
segment); segment result from continuing operations shall be 
reconciled to a comparable measure of entity operating profit or loss 
from continuing operations as well as to entity profit or loss from   
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continuing operations; segment result from discontinued operations 
shall be reconciled to entity profit or loss from discontinued 
operations; segment assets shall be reconciled to entity assets; and 
segment liabilities shall be reconciled to entity liabilities. 
69 
  
If an entity’s primary format for reporting segment information is 
business segments, it shall also report the following information:   
  (a) 
segment revenue from external customers by geographical area based 
on the geographical location of its customers, for each geographical 
segment whose revenue from sales to external customers is 10 per 
cent or more of total entity revenue from sales to all external 
customers;   
  (b) 
the total carrying amount of segment assets by geographical location 
of assets, for each geographical segment whose segment assets are 10 
per cent or more of the total assets of all geographical segments; and   
  (c) 
the total cost incurred during the period to acquire segment assets that 
are expected to be used during more than one period (property, plant, 
equipment, and intangible assets) by geographical location of assets, 
for each geographical segment whose segment assets are 10 per cent 
or more of the total assets of all geographical segments.   
70 
  
If an entity’s primary format for reporting segment information is 
geographical segments (whether based on location of assets or 
location of customers), it shall also report the following segment 
information for each business segment whose revenue from sales to 
external customers is 10 per cent or more of total entity revenue from 
sales to all external customers or whose segment assets are 10 per 
cent or more of the total assets of all business segments:   
  (a) segment revenue from external customers;   
  (b) the total carrying amount of segment assets; and   
  (c) 
the total cost incurred during the period to acquire segment assets that 
are expected to be used during more than one period (property, plant, 
equipment, and intangible assets).   
75 
  
In measuring and reporting segment revenue from transactions with 
other segments, inter-segment transfers shall be measured on the basis 
that the entity actually used to price those transfers. The basis of 
pricing inter-segment transfers and any change therein shall be 
disclosed in the financial statements.   
76 
  
Changes in accounting policies adopted for segment reporting that 
have a material effect on segment information shall be disclosed, and 
prior period segment information presented for comparative purposes 
shall be restated unless it is impracticable to do so. Such disclosure 
shall include a description of the nature of the change, the reasons for 
the change, the fact that comparative information has been restated or 
that it is impracticable to do so, and the financial effect of the change, 
if it is reasonably determinable. If an entity changes the identification 
of its segments and it does not restate prior period segment 
information on the new basis because it is impracticable to do so, then 
for the purpose of comparison the entity shall report segment data for 
both the old and the new bases of segmentation in the year in which it 
changes the identification of its segments.   
81 
  
An entity shall indicate the types of products and services included in 
each reported business segment and indicate the composition of each 
reported geographical segment, both primary and secondary, if not 
otherwise disclosed in the financial statements or elsewhere in the 
financial report.   
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Total Level of Compliance with IAS 14  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 16 ‘Property, Plant & Equipment’ 
73   The financial statements shall disclose, for each class of property, plant and equipment:   
  (a) the measurement bases used for determining the gross carrying amount;   
  (b) the depreciation methods used;   
  (c) the useful lives or the depreciation rates used;   
  (d) 
the gross carrying amount and the accumulated depreciation 
(aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning 
and end of the period; and   
  (e) 
a reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning and end of 
the period showing: (i) additions; (ii) assets classified as held for sale 
or included in a disposal group classified as held for sale in 
accordance with IFRS 5 and other disposals; (iii) acquisitions through 
business combinations; (iv) increases or decreases resulting from 
revaluations under paragraphs 31, 39 and 40 and from impairment 
losses recognised or reversed directly in equity in accordance with 
IAS 36; (v) impairment losses recognised in profit or loss in 
accordance with IAS 36; (vi) impairment losses reversed in profit or 
loss in accordance with IAS 36; (vii) depreciation; (viii)the net 
exchange differences arising on the translation of the financial 
statements from the functional currency into a different presentation 
currency, including the translation of a foreign operation into the 
presentation currency of the reporting entity; and (ix) other changes.   
74   The financial statements shall also disclose:   
  (a) the existence and amounts of restrictions on title, and property, plant and equipment pledged as security for liabilities;   
  (b) 
the amount of expenditures recognised in the carrying amount of an 
item of property, plant and equipment in the course of its 
construction;   
  (c) the amount of contractual commitments for the acquisition of property, plant and equipment; and   
  (d) 
if it is not disclosed separately on the face of the income statement, 
the amount of compensation from third parties for items of property, 
plant and equipment that were impaired, lost or given up that is 
included in profit or loss.   
77   If items of property, plant and equipment are stated at revalued amounts, the following shall be disclosed:   
  (a) the effective date of the revaluation;   
  (b) whether an independent valuer was involved;   
  (c) the methods and significant assumptions applied in estimating the items’ fair values;   
  (d) 
the extent to which the items’ fair values were determined directly by 
reference to observable prices in an active market or recent market 
transactions on arm’s length terms or were estimated using other 
valuation techniques;   
  (e) 
for each revalued class of property, plant and equipment, the carrying 
amount that would have been recognised had the assets been carried 
under the cost model; and   
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  (f) 
the revaluation surplus, indicating the change for the period and any 
restrictions on the distribution of the balance to shareholders.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 16  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 17 ‘Leases’ 
    Finance Leases   
31   
Lessees shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of IAS 32 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, make the 
following disclosures for finance leases:   
  (a) for each class of asset, the net carrying amount at the balance sheet date.   
  (b) 
a reconciliation between the total of future minimum lease payments 
at the balance sheet date, and their present value. In addition, an entity 
shall disclose the total of future minimum lease payments at the 
balance sheet date, and their present value, for each of the following 
periods: (i) not later than one year; (ii) later than one year and not 
later than five years; (iii) later than five years.   
  (c) contingent rents recognised as an expense in the period.   
  (d) the total of future minimum sublease payments expected to be received under non-cancellable subleases at the balance sheet date.   
  (e) 
a general description of the lessee’s material leasing arrangements 
including, but not limited to, the following: (i) the basis on which 
contingent rent payable is determined; (ii) the existence and terms of 
renewal or purchase options and escalation clauses; and (iii) 
restrictions imposed by lease arrangements, such as those concerning 
dividends, additional debt, and further leasing.   
    Operating Leases   
35   
Lessees shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of IAS 32 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, make the 
following disclosures for operating leases:   
  (a) 
the total of future minimum lease payments under non-cancellable 
operating leases for each of the following periods: (i) not later than 
one year; (ii) later than one year and not later than five years; (iii) 
later than five years.   
  (b) the total of future minimum sublease payments expected to be received under non-cancellable subleases at the balance sheet date.   
  (c) 
lease and sublease payments recognised as an expense in the period, 
with separate amounts for minimum lease payments, contingent rents, 
and sublease payments.   
  (d) 
a general description of the lessee’s significant leasing arrangements 
including, but not limited to, the following: (i) the basis on which 
contingent rent payable is determined; (ii) the existence and terms of 
renewal or purchase options and escalation clauses; and (iii) 
restrictions imposed by lease arrangements, such as those concerning 
dividends, additional debt and further leasing.   
    Finance Leases   
47   Lessors shall, in addition to meeting the requirements in IAS 32, disclose the following for finance leases:   
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  (a) 
a reconciliation between the gross investment in the lease at the 
balance sheet date, and the present value of minimum lease payments 
receivable at the balance sheet date. In addition, an entity shall 
disclose the gross investment in the lease and the present value of 
minimum lease payments receivable at the balance sheet date, for 
each of the following periods: (i) not later than one year; (ii) later than 
one year and not later than five years; (iii) later than five years.   
  (b) unearned finance income.   
  (c) the unguaranteed residual values accruing to the benefit of the lessor.   
  (d) the accumulated allowance for uncollectible minimum lease payments receivable.   
  (e) contingent rents recognised as income in the period.   
  (f) a general description of the lessor’s material leasing arrangements.   
    Operating Leases   
56   Lessors shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of IAS 32, disclose the following for operating leases:   
  (a) 
the future minimum lease payments under non-cancellable operating 
leases in the aggregate and for each of the following periods: (i) not 
later than one year; (ii) later than one year and not later than five 
years; (iii) later than five years.   
  (b) total contingent rents recognised as income in the period.   
  (c) a general description of the lessor’s leasing arrangements.   
65   
Disclosure requirements for lessees and lessors apply equally to sale 
and leaseback transactions. The required description of material 
leasing arrangements leads to disclosure of unique or unusual 
provisions of the agreement or terms of the sale and leaseback 
transactions.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 17    
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 18 ‘Revenue’ 
35   An entity shall disclose:   
  
(a) 
the accounting policies adopted for the recognition of revenue, 
including the methods adopted to determine the stage of completion 
of transactions involving the rendering of services;   
  
(b) 
the amount of each significant category of revenue recognised during 
the period, including revenue arising from: (i) the sale of goods; (ii) 
the rendering of services; (iii) interest; (iv) royalties; (v) dividends; 
and   
  (c) 
the amount of revenue arising from exchanges of goods or services 
included in each significant category of revenue.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 18    
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 19 ‘Employee Benefits’ 
46   An entity shall disclose the amount recognised as an expense for defined contribution plans.   
120A   An entity shall disclose the following information about defined benefit plans:   
  (a) the entity’s accounting policy for recognising actuarial gains and losses.   
  (b) a general description of the type of plan.   
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  (c) 
a reconciliation of opening and closing balances of the present value 
of the defined benefit obligation showing separately, if applicable, the 
effects during the period attributable to each of the following: (i) 
current service cost, (ii) interest cost, (iii) contributions by plan 
participants, (iv) actuarial gains and losses, (v) foreign currency 
exchange rate changes on plans measured in a currency different from 
the entity’s presentation currency, (vi) benefits paid, (vii) past service 
cost, (viii)business combinations, (ix) curtailments and (x) 
settlements.   
  (d) 
an analysis of the defined benefit obligation into amounts arising 
from plans that are wholly unfunded and amounts arising from plans 
that are wholly or partly funded.   
  (e) 
a reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of the fair value 
of plan assets and of the opening and closing balances of any 
reimbursement right recognised as an asset in accordance with 
paragraph 104A showing separately, if applicable, the effects during 
the period attributable to each of the following: (i) expected return on 
plan assets, (ii) actuarial gains and losses, (iii) foreign currency 
exchange rate changes on plans measured in a currency different from 
the entity’s presentation currency, (iv) contributions by the employer, 
(v) contributions by plan participants, (vi) benefits paid, (vii) business 
combinations and (viii)settlements.   
  (f) 
a reconciliation of the present value of the defined benefit obligation 
in (c) and the fair value of the plan assets in (e) to the assets and 
liabilities recognised in the balance sheet, showing at least: (i) the net 
actuarial gains or losses not recognised in the balance sheet (see 
paragraph 92); (ii) the past service cost not recognised in the balance 
sheet (see paragraph 96); (iii) any amount not recognised as an asset, 
because of the limit in paragraph 58(b); (iv) the fair value at the 
balance sheet date of any reimbursement right recognised as an asset 
in accordance with paragraph 104A (with a brief description of the 
link between the reimbursement right and the related obligation); and 
(v) the other amounts recognised in the balance sheet.   
  (g) 
the total expense recognised in profit or loss for each of the following, 
and the line item(s) in which they are included: (i) current service 
cost; (ii) interest cost; (iii) expected return on plan assets; (iv) 
expected return on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset in 
accordance with paragraph 104A; (v) actuarial gains and losses; (vi) 
past service cost; (vii) the effect of any curtailment or settlement; and 
(viii)the effect of the limit in paragraph 58(b).   
  (h) 
the total amount recognised in the statement of recognised income 
and expense for each of the following: (i) actuarial gains and losses; 
and (ii) the effect of the limit in paragraph 58(b).   
  (i) 
for entities that recognise actuarial gains and losses in the statement 
of recognised income and expense in accordance with paragraph 93A, 
the cumulative amount of actuarial gains and losses recognised in the 
statement of recognised income and expense.   
  (j) 
for each major category of plan assets, which shall include, but is not 
limited to, equity instruments, debt instruments, property, and all 
other assets, the percentage or amount that each major category 
constitutes of the fair value of the total plan assets.   
  (k) 
the amounts included in the fair value of plan assets for: (i) each 
category of the entity’s own financial instruments; and (ii) any 
property occupied by, or other assets used by, the entity.   
 335
Appendix II – The disclosure index employed in this study 
 
  (l) 
a narrative description of the basis used to determine the overall 
expected rate of return on assets, including the effect of the major 
categories of plan assets.   
  (m) 
the actual return on plan assets, as well as the actual return on any 
reimbursement right recognised as an asset in accordance with 
paragraph 104A.   
120A (n)   the principal actuarial assumptions used as at the balance sheet date, including, when applicable:   
  (1) the discount rates;   
  (2) the expected rates of return on any plan assets for the periods presented in the financial statements;   
  (3) 
the expected rates of return for the periods presented in the financial 
statements on any reimbursement right recognised as an asset in 
accordance with paragraph 104A;   
  (4) 
the expected rates of salary increases (and of changes in an index or 
other variable specified in the formal or constructive terms of a plan 
as the basis for future benefit increases);   
  (5) medical cost trend rates; and   
  (6) any other material actuarial assumptions used.   
    
An entity shall disclose each actuarial assumption in absolute terms 
(for example, as an absolute percentage) and not just as a margin 
between different percentages or other variables.   
  (o) 
the effect of an increase of one percentage point and the effect of a 
decrease of one percentage point in the assumed medical cost trend 
rates on: (i) the aggregate of the current service cost and interest cost 
components of net periodic post–employment medical costs; and (ii) 
the accumulated post–employment benefit obligation for medical 
costs. For the purposes of this disclosure, all other assumptions shall 
be held constant. For plans operating in a high inflation environment, 
the disclosure shall be the effect of a percentage increase or decrease 
in the assumed medical cost trend rate of a significance similar to one 
percentage point in a low inflation environment.   
  (p) 
the amounts for the current annual period and previous four annual 
periods of: (i) the present value of the defined benefit obligation, the 
fair value of the plan assets and the surplus or deficit in the plan; and 
(ii) the experience adjustments arising on: (A) the plan liabilities 
expressed either as (1) an amount or (2) a percentage of the plan 
liabilities at the balance sheet date and (B) the plan assets expressed 
either as (1) an amount or (2) a percentage of the plan assets at the 
balance sheet date.   
  (q) 
the employer’s best estimate, as soon as it can reasonably be 
determined, of contributions expected to be paid to the plan during 
the annual period beginning after the balance sheet date.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 19  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
IAS 20 ‘Accounting for Government Grants and 
Disclosure of Government Assistance’ 
39   The following matters shall be disclosed:   
  
(a) the accounting policy adopted for government grants, including the methods of presentation adopted in the financial statements;   
  
(b) 
the nature and extent of government grants recognised in the financial 
statements and an indication of other forms of government assistance 
from which the entity has directly benefited; and   
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  (c) 
unfulfilled conditions and other contingencies attaching to 
government assistance that has been recognised.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 20  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
IAS 21 ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates’  
52   An entity shall disclose:   
  (a) 
the amount of exchange differences recognised in profit or loss except 
for those arising on financial instruments measured at fair value 
through profit or loss in accordance with IAS 39; and   
  (b) 
net exchange differences classified in a separate component of equity, 
and a reconciliation of the amount of such exchange differences at the 
beginning and end of the period.   
53   
When the presentation currency is different from the functional 
currency, that fact shall be stated, together with disclosure of the 
functional currency and the reason for using a different presentation 
currency.   
54   
When there is a change in the functional currency of either the 
reporting entity or a significant foreign operation, that fact and the 
reason for the change in functional currency shall be disclosed.   
55   
When an entity presents its financial statements in a currency that is 
different from its functional currency, it shall describe the financial 
statements as complying with International Financial Reporting 
Standards only if they comply with all the requirements of each 
applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of those 
Standards including the translation method set out in paragraphs 39 
and 42.   
57   
When an entity displays its financial statements or other financial 
information in a currency that is different from either its functional 
currency or its presentation currency and the requirements of 
paragraph 55 are not met, it shall:   
  (a) 
clearly identify the information as supplementary information to 
distinguish it from the information that complies with International 
Financial Reporting Standards;   
  (b) disclose the currency in which the supplementary information is displayed; and   
  (c) disclose the entity’s functional currency and the method of translation used to determine the supplementary information.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 21  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 23 ‘Borrowing Costs’ 
29   The financial statements shall disclose:   
  (a) the accounting policy adopted for borrowing costs;   
  (b) the amount of borrowing costs capitalised during the period; and   
  (c) 
the capitalisation rate used to determine the amount of borrowing 
costs eligible for capitalisation.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 23  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 24 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ 
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12   
Relationships between parents and subsidiaries shall be disclosed 
irrespective of whether there have been transactions between those 
related parties. An entity shall disclose the name of the entity’s parent 
and, if different, the ultimate controlling party. If neither the entity’s 
parent nor the ultimate controlling party produces financial statements 
available for public use, the name of the next most senior parent that 
does so shall also be disclosed.   
16   An entity shall disclose key management personnel compensation in total and for each of the following categories:   
  (a) short-term employee benefits;   
  (b) post-employment benefits;   
  (c) other long-term benefits;   
  (d) termination benefits; and   
  (e) share-based payment.   
17   
If there have been transactions between related parties, an entity shall 
disclose the nature of the related party relationship as well as 
information about the transactions and outstanding balances necessary 
for an understanding of the potential effect of the relationship on the 
financial statements. These disclosure requirements are in addition to 
the requirements in paragraph 16 to disclose key management 
personnel compensation. At a minimum, disclosures shall include:   
  (a) the amount of the transactions;   
  (b) 
the amount of outstanding balances and: (i) their terms and 
conditions, including whether they are secured, and the nature of the 
consideration to be provided in settlement; and (ii) details of any 
guarantees given or received;   
  (c) provisions for doubtful debts related to the amount of outstanding balances; and   
  (d) the expense recognised during the period in respect of bad or doubtful debts due from related parties.   
18   The disclosures required by paragraph 17 shall be made separately for each of the following categories:   
  (a) the parent;   
  (b) entities with joint control or significant influence over the entity;   
  (c) subsidiaries;   
  (d) associates;   
  (e) joint ventures in which the entity is a venturer;   
  (f) key management personnel of the entity or its parent; and   
  (g) other related parties   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 24  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 27 ‘Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements’ 
40   The following disclosures shall be made in consolidated financial statements:   
  (c) 
the nature of the relationship between the parent and a subsidiary 
when the parent does not own, directly or indirectly through 
subsidiaries, more than half of the voting power;   
  (d) 
the reasons why the ownership, directly or indirectly through 
subsidiaries, of more than half of the voting or potential voting power 
of an investee does not constitute control;   
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  (e) 
the reporting date of the financial statements of a subsidiary when 
such financial statements are used to prepare consolidated financial 
statements and are as of a reporting date or for a period that is 
different from that of the parent, and the reason for using a different 
reporting date or period; and   
  (f) 
the nature and extent of any significant restrictions (eg resulting from 
borrowing arrangements or regulatory requirements) on the ability of 
subsidiaries to transfer funds to the parent in the form of cash 
dividends or to repay loans or advances.   
41   
When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that, in 
accordance with paragraph 10, elects not to prepare consolidated 
financial statements, those separate financial statements shall 
disclose:   
  (a) 
the fact that the financial statements are separate financial statements; 
that the exemption from consolidation has been used; the name and 
country of incorporation or residence of the entity whose consolidated 
financial statements that comply with International Financial 
Reporting Standards have been produced for public use; and the 
address where those consolidated financial statements are obtainable;   
  (b) 
a list of significant investments in subsidiaries, jointly controlled 
entities and associates, including the name, country of incorporation 
or residence, proportion of ownership interest and, if different, 
proportion of voting power held; and   
  (c) a description of the method used to account for the investments listed under (b).   
42   
When a parent (other than a parent covered by paragraph 41), 
venturer with an interest in a jointly controlled entity or an investor in 
an associate prepares separate financial statements, those separate 
financial statements shall disclose:   
  (a) the fact that the statements are separate financial statements and the reasons why those statements are prepared if not required by law;   
  (b) 
a list of significant investments in subsidiaries, jointly controlled 
entities and associates, including the name, country of incorporation 
or residence, proportion of ownership interest and, if different, 
proportion of voting power held; and   
  (c) a description of the method used to account for the investments listed under (b);   
  (d) and shall identify the financial statements prepared in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Standard, IAS 28 and IAS 31 to which they relate.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 27  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 28 ‘Investments in Associates’ 
37   The following disclosures shall be made:   
  (a) the fair value of investments in associates for which there are published price quotations;   
  (b) summarised financial information of associates, including the aggregated amounts of assets, liabilities, revenues and profit or loss;   
  (c) 
the reasons why the presumption that an investor does not have 
significant influence is overcome if the investor holds, directly or 
indirectly through subsidiaries, less than 20 per cent of the voting or 
potential voting power of the investee but concludes that it has 
significant influence;   
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  (d) 
the reasons why the presumption that an investor has significant 
influence is overcome if the investor holds, directly or indirectly 
through subsidiaries, 20 per cent or more of the voting or potential 
voting power of the investee but concludes that it does not have 
significant influence;   
  (e) 
the reporting date of the financial statements of an associate, when 
such financial statements are used in applying the equity method and 
are as of a reporting date or for a period that is different from that of 
the investor, and the reason for using a different reporting date or 
different period;   
  (f) 
the nature and extent of any significant restrictions (eg resulting from 
borrowing arrangements or regulatory requirements) on the ability of 
associates to transfer funds to the investor in the form of cash 
dividends, or repayment of loans or advances;   
  (g) 
the unrecognised share of losses of an associate, both for the period 
and cumulatively, if an investor has discontinued recognition of its 
share of losses of an associate;   
  (h) the fact that an associate is not accounted for using the equity method in accordance with paragraph 13; and   
  (i) 
summarised financial information of associates, either individually or 
in groups, that are not accounted for using the equity method, 
including the amounts of total assets, total liabilities, revenues and 
profit or loss.   
38   
Investments in associates accounted for using the equity method shall 
be classified as non-current assets. The investor’s share of the profit 
or loss of such associates, and the carrying amount of those 
investments, shall be separately disclosed. The investor’s share of any 
discontinued operations of such associates shall also be separately 
disclosed.   
39   
The investor’s share of changes recognised directly in the associate’s 
equity shall be recognised directly in equity by the investor and shall 
be disclosed in the statement of changes in equity as required by IAS 
1 Presentation of Financial Statements.   
40   In accordance with IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets the investor shall disclose:   
  (a) its share of the contingent liabilities of an associate incurred jointly with other investors; and   
  (b) those contingent liabilities that arise because the investor is severally liable for all or part of the liabilities of the associate.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 28  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 31 ‘Interests in Joint Ventures’ 
54   
A venturer shall disclose the aggregate amount of the following 
contingent liabilities, unless the probability of loss is remote, 
separately from the amount of other contingent liabilities:   
  
(a) 
any contingent liabilities that the venturer has incurred in relation to 
its interests in joint ventures and its share in each of the contingent 
liabilities that have been incurred jointly with other venturers;   
  (b) 
its share of the contingent liabilities of the joint ventures themselves 
for which it is contingently liable; and   
  
(c) 
those contingent liabilities that arise because the venturer is 
contingently liable for the liabilities of the other venturers of a joint 
venture.   
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55   
A venturer shall disclose the aggregate amount of the following 
commitments in respect of its interests in joint ventures separately 
from other commitments:   
  
(a) 
any capital commitments of the venturer in relation to its interests in 
joint ventures and its share in the capital commitments that have been 
incurred jointly with other venturers; and   
  (b) its share of the capital commitments of the joint ventures themselves.   
56 A 
A venturer shall disclose a listing and description of interests in 
significant joint ventures and the proportion of ownership interest 
held in jointly controlled entities.   
56 B 
A venturer that recognises its interests in jointly controlled entities 
using the line–by–line reporting format for proportionate 
consolidation or the equity method shall disclose the aggregate 
amounts of each of current assets, long-term assets, current liabilities, 
long-term liabilities, income and expenses related to its interests in 
joint ventures.   
57   
A venturer shall disclose the method it uses to recognise its interests 
in jointly controlled entities.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 31  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
IAS 32 ‘Financial Instruments: Disclosure  
and Presentation’ 
56   
An entity shall describe its financial risk management objectives and 
policies, including its policy for hedging each main type of forecast 
transaction for which hedge accounting is used.   
58   
An entity shall disclose the following separately for designated fair 
value hedges, cash flow hedges and hedges of a net investment in a 
foreign operation (as defined in IAS 39):   
  (a) a description of the hedge;   
  (b) a description of the financial instruments designated as hedging instruments and their fair values at the balance sheet date;   
  (c) the nature of the risks being hedged; and   
  (d) 
for cash flow hedges, the periods in which the cash flows are 
expected to occur, when they are expected to enter into the 
determination of profit or loss, and a description of any forecast 
transaction for which hedge accounting had previously been used but 
which is no longer expected to occur.   
59   
When a gain or loss on a hedging instrument in a cash flow hedge has 
been recognised directly in equity, through the statement of changes 
in equity, an entity shall disclose:   
  (a) the amount that was so recognised in equity during the period;   
  (b) the amount that was removed from equity and included in profit or loss for the period; and   
  (c) 
the amount that was removed from equity during the period and 
included in the initial measurement of the acquisition cost or other 
carrying amount of a non-financial asset or non-financial liability in a 
hedged highly probable forecast transaction.   
60   For each class of financial asset, financial liability and equity instrument, an entity shall disclose:   
  (a) 
information about the extent and nature of the financial instruments, 
including significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, 
timing and certainty of future cash flows; and   
  (b) the accounting policies and methods adopted, including the criteria   
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for recognition and the basis of measurement applied. 
61   
As part of the disclosure of an entity’s accounting policies, an entity 
shall disclose, for each category of financial assets, whether regular 
way purchases and sales of financial assets are accounted for at trade 
date or at settlement date (see IAS 39, paragraph 38).   
67   
For each class of financial assets and financial liabilities, an entity 
shall disclose information about its exposure to interest rate risk, 
including:   
  (a) contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier; and   
  (b) effective interest rates, when applicable.   
76   For each class of financial assets and other credit exposures, an entity shall disclose information about its exposure to credit risk, including:   
  (a) 
the amount that best represents its maximum credit risk exposure at 
the balance sheet date, without taking account of the fair value of any 
collateral, in the event of other parties failing to perform their 
obligations under financial instruments; and   
  (b) significant concentrations of credit risk.   
86   
Except as set out in paragraph 90 and 91A , for each class of financial 
assets and financial liabilities, an entity shall disclose the fair value of 
that class of assets and liabilities in a way that permits it to be 
compared with the corresponding carrying amount in the balance 
sheet.   
90   
If investments in unquoted equity instruments or derivatives linked to 
such equity instruments are measured at cost under IAS 39 because 
their fair value cannot be measured reliably, that fact shall be 
disclosed together with a description of the financial instruments, 
their carrying amount, an explanation of why fair value cannot be 
measured reliably and, if possible, the range of estimates within 
which fair value is highly likely to lie. Furthermore, if financial assets 
whose fair value previously could not be reliably measured are sold, 
that fact, the carrying amount of such financial assets at the time of 
sale and the amount of gain or loss recognised shall be disclosed.   
92   An entity shall disclose:   
  (a) 
the methods and significant assumptions applied in determining fair 
values of financial assets and financial liabilities separately for 
significant classes of financial assets and financial liabilities.   
  (b) 
whether fair values of financial assets and financial liabilities are 
determined directly, in full or in part, by reference to published price 
quotations in an active market or are estimated using a valuation 
technique   
  (c) 
whether its financial statements include financial instruments 
measured at fair values that are determined in full or in part using a 
valuation technique based on assumptions that are not supported by 
observable market prices or rates. If changing any such assumption to 
a reasonably possible alternative would result in a significantly 
different fair value, the entity shall state this fact and disclose the 
effect on the fair value of a range of reasonably possible alternative 
assumptions. For this purpose, significance shall be judged with 
respect to profit or loss and total assets or total liabilities.   
  (d) 
the total amount of the change in fair value estimated using a 
valuation technique that was recognised in profit or loss during the 
period.   
94   Derecognition   
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  (a) 
An entity may have either transferred a financial asset  (see paragraph 
18 of IAS 39) or entered into the type of arrangement described in 
paragraph 19 of IAS 39 in such a way that the arrangement does not 
qualify as a transfer of a financial asset. If the entity either continues 
to recognise all of the asset or continues to recognise the asset to the 
extent of the entity’s continuing involvement (see IAS 39, paragraphs 
29 and 30) it shall disclose for each class of financial asset: (i) the 
nature of the assets; (ii) the nature of the risks and rewards of 
ownership to which the entity remains exposed; (iii) when the entity 
continues to recognise all of the asset, the carrying amounts of the 
asset and of the associated liability; and (iv) when the entity continues 
to recognise the asset to the extent of its continuing involvement, the 
total amount of the asset, the amount of the asset that the entity 
continues to recognise and the carrying amount of the associated 
liability.   
    Collateral   
  (b) 
An entity shall disclose the carrying amount of financial assets 
pledged as collateral for liabilities, the carrying amount of financial 
assets pledged as collateral for contingent liabilities, and (consistently 
with paragraphs 60(a) and 63(g)) any material terms and conditions 
relating to assets pledged as collateral.   
  (c) 
When an entity has accepted collateral that it is permitted to sell or 
repledge in the absence of default by the owner of the collateral, it 
shall disclose: (i) the fair value of the collateral accepted (financial 
and non-financial assets); (ii) the fair value of any such collateral sold 
or repledged and whether the entity has an obligation to return it; and 
(iii) any material terms and conditions associated with its use of this 
collateral (consistently with paragraphs 60(a) and 63(g)).   
    Compound financial instruments with multiple embedded derivatives   
  (d) 
If an entity has issued an instrument that contains both a liability and 
an equity component (see paragraph 28) and the instrument has 
multiple embedded derivative features whose values are 
interdependent (such as a callable convertible debt instrument), it 
shall disclose the existence of those features and the effective interest 
rate on the liability component (excluding any embedded derivatives 
that are accounted for separately).   
    Financial assets and financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss   
  (e) 
An entity shall disclose the carrying amounts of financial assets and 
financial liabilities that: (i) are classified as held for trading; and (ii) 
were, upon initial recognition, designated by the entity as financial 
assets and financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss   
  (f) 
If the entity has designated a financial liability as at fair value through 
profit or loss, it shall disclose: (i) the amount of change in its fair 
value that is not attributable to changes in a benchmark interest rate 
(eg LIBOR); and (ii) the difference between its carrying amount and 
the amount the entity would be contractually required to pay at 
maturity to theholder of the obligation.   
    Reclassification   
  (g) 
If the entity has reclassified a financial asset as one measured at cost 
or amortised cost rather than at fair value (see IAS 39, paragraph 54), 
it shall disclose the reason for that reclassification.   
    Income statement and equity   
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  (h) 
An entity shall disclose material items of income, expense and gains 
and losses resulting from financial assets and financial liabilities, 
whether included in profit or loss or as a separate component of 
equity. For this purpose, the disclosure shall include at least the 
following items: (i) total interest income and total interest expense 
(calculated using the effective interest method) for financial assets 
and financial liabilities that are not at fair value through profit or loss; 
(ii) for available-for-sale financial assets, the amount of any gain or 
loss recognised directly in equity during the period and the amount 
that was removed from equity and recognised in profit or loss for the 
period; and (iii) the amount of interest income accrued on impaired 
financial assets, in accordance with IAS 39, paragraph AG93.   
    Impairment   
  (i) 
An entity shall disclose the nature and amount of any impairment loss 
recognised in profit or loss for a financial asset, separately for each 
significant class of financial asset   
    Defaults and breaches   
  (j) 
With respect to any defaults of principal, interest, sinking fund or 
redemption provisions during the period on loans payable recognised 
as at the balance sheet date, and any other breaches during the period 
of loan agreements when those breaches can permit the lender to 
demand repayment (except for breaches that are remedied, or 
inresponse to which the terms of the loan are renegotiated, on or 
before the balance sheet date), an entity shall disclose: (i) details of 
those breaches; (ii) the amount recognised as at the balance sheet date 
in respect of the loans payable on which the breaches occurred; and 
(iii) with respect to amounts disclosed under (ii), whether the default 
has been remedied or the terms of the loans payable renegotiated 
before the date the financial statements were authorised for issue.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 32  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 33 ‘Earnings per Share’ 
66   
An entity shall present on the face of the income statement basic and 
diluted earnings per share for profit or loss from continuing 
operations attributable to the ordinary equity holders of the parent 
entity and for profit or loss attributable to the ordinary equity holders 
of the parent entity for the period for each class of ordinary shares 
that has a different right to share in profit for the period. An entity 
shall present basic and diluted earnings per share with equal 
prominence for all periods presented.   
68   
An entity that reports a discontinued operation shall disclose the basic 
and diluted amounts per share for the discontinued operation either on 
the face of the income statement or in the notes to the financial 
statements.   
69   An entity shall present basic and diluted earnings per share, even if the amounts are negative (ie a loss per share).   
70   An entity shall disclose the following:   
  (a) 
the amounts used as the numerators in calculating basic and diluted 
earnings per share, and a reconciliation of those amounts to profit or 
loss attributable to the parent entity for the period. The reconciliation 
shall include the individual effect of each class of instruments that 
affects earnings per share.   
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  (b) 
the weighted average number of ordinary shares used as the 
denominator in calculating basic and diluted earnings per share, and a 
reconciliation of these denominators to each other. The reconciliation 
shall include the individual effect of each class of instruments that 
affects earnings per share.   
  (c) 
instruments (including contingently issuable shares) that could 
potentially dilute basic earnings per share in the future, but were not 
included in the calculation of diluted earnings per share because they 
are antidilutive for the period(s) presented.   
  (d) 
a description of ordinary share transactions or potential ordinary share 
transactions, other than those accounted for in accordance with 
paragraph 64, that occur after the balance sheet date and that would 
have changed significantly the number of ordinary shares or potential 
ordinary shares outstanding at the end of the period if those 
transactions had occurred before the end of the reporting period.   
73   
If an entity discloses, in addition to basic and diluted earnings per 
share, amounts per share using a reported component of the income 
statement other than one required by this Standard, such amounts 
shall be calculated using the weighted average number of ordinary 
shares determined in accordance with this Standard. Basic and diluted 
amounts per share relating to such a component shall be disclosed 
with equal prominence and presented in the notes to the financial 
statements. An entity shall indicate the basis on which the 
numerator(s) is (are) determined, including whether amounts per 
share are before tax or after tax. If a component of the income 
statement is used that is not reported as a line item in the income 
statement, a reconciliation shall be provided between the component 
used and a line item that is reported in the income statement.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 33  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 36 ‘Impairment of Assets’ 
126   An entity shall disclose the following for each class of assets:   
  (a) 
the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss during 
the period and the line item(s) of the income statement in which those 
impairment losses are included.   
  (b) 
the amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or 
loss during the period and the line item(s) of the income statement in 
which those impairment losses are reversed.   
  (c) the amount of impairment losses on revalued assets recognised directly in equity during the period.   
  (d) the amount of reversals of impairment losses on revalued assets recognised directly in equity during the period.   
129   
An entity that reports segment information in accordance with IAS 14 
Segment Reporting shall disclose the following for each reportable 
segment based on an entity’s primary reporting format:   
  (a) the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and directly in equity during the period.   
  (b) the amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and directly in equity during the period   
130   
An entity shall disclose the following for each material impairment 
loss recognised or reversed during the period for an individual asset, 
including goodwill, or a cash-generating unit:   
  (a) the events and circumstances that led to the recognition or reversal of   
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the impairment loss. 
  (b) the amount of the impairment loss recognised or reversed.   
  (c) 
for an individual asset: (i) the nature of the asset; and (ii) if the entity 
reports segment information in accordance with IAS 14, the 
reportable segment to which the asset belongs, based on the entity’s 
primary reporting format.   
  (d) 
for a cash-generating unit: (i) a description of the cash-generating unit 
(such as whether it is a product line, a plant, a business operation, a 
geographical area, or a reportable segment as defined in IAS 14); (ii) 
the amount of the impairment loss recognised or reversed by class of 
assets and, if the entity reports segment information in accordance 
with IAS 14, by reportable segment based on the entity’s primary 
reporting format; and (iii) if the aggregation of assets for identifying 
the cash-generating unit has changed since the previous estimate of 
the cash-generating unit’s recoverable amount (if any), a description 
of the current and former way of aggregating assets and the reasons 
for changing the way the cash-generating unit is identified   
  (e) whether the recoverable amount of the asset (cash-generating unit) is its fair value less costs to sell or its value in use.   
  (f) 
if recoverable amount is fair value less costs to sell, the basis used to 
determine fair value less costs to sell (such as whether fair value was 
determined by reference to an active market).   
  (g) if recoverable amount is value in use, the discount rate(s) used in the current estimate and previous estimate (if any) of value in use.   
131   
An entity shall disclose the following information for the aggregate 
impairment losses and the aggregate reversals of impairment losses 
recognised during the period for which no information is disclosed in 
accordance with paragraph 130:   
  (a) the main classes of assets affected by impairment losses and the main classes of assets affected by reversals of impairment losses.   
  (b) the main events and circumstances that led to the recognition of these impairment losses and reversals of impairment losses.   
133   
If, in accordance with paragraph 84, any portion of the goodwill 
acquired in a business combination during the period has not been 
allocated to a cash-generating unit (group of units) at the reporting 
date, the amount of the unallocated goodwill shall be disclosed 
together with the reasons why that amount remains unallocated.   
134   
An entity shall disclose the information required by (a)–(f) for each 
cash-generating unit (group of units) for which the carrying amount 
of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated 
to that unit (group of units) is significant in comparison with the 
entity’s total carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives:   
  (a) the carrying amount of goodwill allocated to the unit (group of units).   
  (b) the carrying amount of intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to the unit (group of units).   
  (c) the basis on which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount has been determined (ie value in use or fair value less costs to sell).   
134 (d) if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on value in use:   
  (d) i 
a description of each key assumption on which management has 
based its cash flow projections for the period covered by the most 
recent budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those to which the 
unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is most sensitive.   
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  (d) ii 
a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) 
assigned to each key assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past 
experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of 
information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past 
experience or external sources of information.   
  (d) iii 
the period over which management has projected cash flows based on 
financial budgets/forecasts approved by management and, when a 
period greater than five years is used for a cash-generating unit 
(group of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified.   
  (d) iv 
the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the 
period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts, and the 
justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the long-term 
average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or 
countries in which the entity operates, or for the market to which the 
unit (group of units) is dedicated.   
  (d) v the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections.   
134 (e) 
if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on fair 
value less costs to sell, the methodology used to determine fair value 
less costs to sell. If fair value less costs to sell is not determined using 
an observable market price for the unit (group of units), the following 
information shall also be disclosed:   
  (e) i 
a description of each key assumption on which management has 
based its determination of fair value less costs to sell. Key 
assumptions are those to which the unit’s (group of units’) 
recoverable amount is most sensitive.   
  (e) ii 
a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) 
assigned to each key assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past 
experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of 
information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past 
experience or external sources of information.   
134 (f) 
if a reasonably possible change in a key assumption on which 
management has based its determination of the unit’s (group of 
units’) recoverable amount would cause the unit’s (group of units’) 
carrying amount to exceed its recoverable amount:   
  (f) i the amount by which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount exceeds its carrying amount.   
  (f) ii the value assigned to the key assumption.   
  (f) iii 
the amount by which the value assigned to the key assumption must 
change, after incorporating any consequential effects of that change 
on the other variables used to measure recoverable amount, in order 
for the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount to be equal to its 
carrying amount.   
135 A 
If some or all of the carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets 
with indefinite useful lives is allocated across multiple cash-
generating units (groups of units), and the amount so allocated to 
each unit (group of units) is not significant in comparison with the 
entity’s total carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives, that fact shall be disclosed, together with the 
aggregate carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives allocated to those units(groups of units).   
  B 
 In addition, if the recoverable amounts of any of those units (groups 
of units) are based on the same key assumption(s) and the aggregate 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to them is significant in comparison with the 
entity’s total carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with   
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indefinite useful lives, an entity shall disclose that fact, together with: 
  B(a) the aggregate carrying amount of goodwill allocated to those units (groups of units).   
  B(b) the aggregate carrying amount of intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to those units (groups of units).   
  B(c) a description of the key assumption(s).   
  B(d) 
a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) 
assigned to the key assumption(s), whether those value(s) reflect past 
experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of 
information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past 
experience or external sources of information.   
135 (e) 
if a reasonably possible change in the key assumption(s) would cause 
the aggregate of the units’ (groups of units’) carrying amounts to 
exceed the aggregate of their recoverable amounts:   
  (e) i the amount by which the aggregate of the units’ (groups of units’) recoverable amounts exceeds the aggregate of their carrying amounts.   
  (e) ii the value(s) assigned to the key assumption(s).   
  (e) iii 
the amount by which the value(s) assigned to the key assumption(s) 
must change, after incorporating any consequential effects of the 
change on the other variables used to measure recoverable amount, in 
order for the aggregate of the units’ (groups of units’) recoverable 
amounts to be equal to the aggregate of their carrying amounts.   
136   
The most recent detailed calculation made in a preceding period of 
the recoverable amount of a cash-generating unit (group of units) 
may, in accordance with paragraph 24 or 99, be carried forward and 
used in the impairment test for that unit (group of units) in the current 
period provided specified criteria are met. When this is the case, the 
information for that unit (group of units) that is incorporated into the 
disclosures required by paragraphs 134 and 135 relate to the carried 
forward calculation of recoverable amount.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 36   
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 37 ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’ 
84   For each class of provision, an entity shall disclose:   
  (a) the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period;   
  (b) additional provisions made in the period, including increases to existing provisions;   
  (c) amounts used (ie incurred and charged against the provision) during the period;   
  (d) unused amounts reversed during the period; and   
  (e) the increase during the period in the discounted amount arising from the passage of time and the effect of any change in the discount rate.   
85   An entity shall disclose the following for each class of provision:   
  (a) a brief description of the nature of the obligation and the expected timing of any resulting outflows of economic benefits;   
  (b) 
an indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those 
outflows. Where necessary to provide adequate information, an entity 
shall disclose the major assumptions made concerning future events, 
as addressed in paragraph 48; and   
  (c) the amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of any asset that has been recognised for that expected reimbursement.   
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86   
Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an 
entity shall disclose for each class of contingent liability at the 
balance sheet date a brief description of the nature of the contingent 
liability and, where practicable:   
  (a) an estimate of its financial effect, measured under paragraphs 36–52;   
  (b) an indication of the uncertainties relating to the amount or timing of any outflow; and   
  (c) the possibility of any reimbursement.   
88   
Where a provision and a contingent liability arise from the same set 
of circumstances, an entity makes the disclosures required by 
paragraphs 84–86 in a way that shows the link between the provision 
and the contingent liability.   
89   
Where an inflow of economic benefits is probable, an entity shall 
disclose a brief description of the nature of the contingent assets at 
the balance sheet date, and, where practicable, an estimate of their 
financial effect, measured using the principles set out for provisions 
in paragraphs 36–52.   
91   
Where any of the information required by paragraphs 86 and 89 is not 
disclosed because it is not practicable to do so, that fact shall be 
stated.   
92   
In extremely rare cases, disclosure of some or all of the information 
required by paragraphs 84–89 can be expected to prejudice seriously 
the position of the entity in a dispute with other parties on the subject 
matter of the provision, contingent liability or contingent asset. In 
such cases, an entity need not disclose the information, but shall 
disclose the general nature of the dispute, together with the fact that, 
and reason why, the information has not been disclosed.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 37 
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 38 ‘Intangible Assets’ 
118   
An entity shall disclose the following for each class of intangible 
assets, distinguishing between internally generated intangible assets 
and other intangible assets:   
  (a) whether the useful lives are indefinite or finite and, if finite, the useful lives or the amortisation rates used;     
  (b) the amortisation methods used for intangible assets with finite useful lives;   
  (c) 
the gross carrying amount and any accumulated amortisation 
(aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning 
and end of the period;    
  (d) the line item(s) of the income statement in which any amortisation of intangible assets is included;   
  (e) 
a reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning and end of 
the period showing: (i) additions, indicating separately those from 
internal development, those acquired separately, and those acquired 
through business combinations; (ii) assets classified as held for sale 
or included in a disposal group classified as held for sale in 
accordance with IFRS 5 and other disposals; (iii) increases or 
decreases during the period resulting from revaluations under 
paragraphs 75, 85 and 86 and from impairment losses recognised or 
reversed directly in equity in accordance with IAS 36 Impairment of 
Assets (if any); (iv) impairment losses recognised in profit or loss 
during the period in accordance with IAS 36 (if any); (v) impairment   
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losses reversed in profit or loss during the period in accordance with 
IAS 36 (if any); (vi) any amortisation recognised during the period; 
(vii) net exchange differences arising on the translation of the 
financial statements into the presentation currency, and on the 
translation of a foreign operation into the presentation currency of the 
entity; and (viii)other changes in the carrying amount during the 
period. 
122   An entity shall also disclose:   
  (a) 
for an intangible asset assessed as having an indefinite useful life, the 
carrying amount of that asset and the reasons supporting the 
assessment of an indefinite useful life. In giving these reasons, the 
entity shall describe the factor(s) that played a significant role in 
determining that the asset has an indefinite useful life.   
  (b) 
a description, the carrying amount and remaining amortisation period 
of any individual intangible asset that is material to the entity’s 
financial statements.   
  (c) 
for intangible assets acquired by way of a government grant and 
initially recognised at fair value (see paragraph 44): (i) the fair value 
initially recognised for these assets; (ii) their carrying amount; and 
(iii) whether they are measured after recognition under the cost model 
or the revaluation model.   
  (d) 
the existence and carrying amounts of intangible assets whose title is 
restricted and the carrying amounts of intangible assets pledged as 
security for liabilities.   
  (e) the amount of contractual commitments for the acquisition of intangible assets.   
    Intangible assets measured after recognition using the revaluation model   
124   If intangible assets are accounted for at revalued amounts, an entity shall disclose the following:   
  (a) 
by class of intangible assets: (i) the effective date of the revaluation; 
(ii) the carrying amount of revalued intangible assets; and (iii) the 
carrying amount that would have been recognised had the revalued 
class of intangible assets been measured after recognition using the 
cost model in paragraph 74;   
  (b) 
the amount of the revaluation surplus that relates to intangible assets 
at the beginning and end of the period, indicating the changes during 
the period and any restrictions on the distribution of the balance to 
shareholders; and   
  (c) the methods and significant assumptions applied in estimating the assets’ fair values.   
126   An entity shall disclose the aggregate amount of research and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the period.   
    
Total Level of Compliance with IAS 38  
  
Paragraph Sub-paragraph IAS 40 ‘Investment Property’ 
75   An entity shall disclose:   
  (a) whether it applies the fair value model or the cost model.   
  (b) 
if it applies the fair value model, whether, and in what circumstances, 
property interests held under operating leases are classified and 
accounted for as investment property.   
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  (c) 
when classification is difficult (see paragraph 14), the criteria it uses 
to distinguish investment property from owner-occupied property and 
from property held for sale in the ordinary course of business.   
  (d) 
the methods and significant assumptions applied in determining the 
fair value of investment property, including a statement whether the 
determination of fair value was supported by market evidence or was 
more heavily based on other factors (which the entity shall disclose) 
because of the nature of the property and lack of comparable market 
data.   
  (e) 
the extent to which the fair value of investment property (as measured 
or disclosed in the financial statements) is based on a valuation by an 
independent valuer who holds a recognised and relevant professional 
qualification and has recent experience in the location and category of 
the investment property being valued. If there has been no such 
valuation, that fact shall be disclosed.   
  (f) 
the amounts recognised in profit or loss for: (i) rental income from 
investment property; (ii) direct operating expenses (including repairs 
and maintenance) arising from investment property that generated 
rental income during the period; and (iii) direct operating expenses 
(including repairs and maintenance) arising from investment property 
that did not generate rental income during the period. (iv) the 
cumulative change in fair value recognised in profit or loss on a sale 
of investment property from a pool of assets in which the cost model 
is used into a pool in which the fair value model is used (see 
paragraph 32C).   
  (g) 
the existence and amounts of restrictions on the realisability of 
investment property or the remittance of income and proceeds of 
disposal.   
  (h) contractual obligations to purchase, construct or develop investment property or for repairs, maintenance or enhancements.   
    Fair value model   
76   
In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph 75, an entity that 
applies the fair value model in paragraphs 33–55 shall disclose a 
reconciliation between the carrying amounts of investment property at 
the beginning and end of the period, showing the following: (a) 
additions, disclosing separately those additions resulting from 
acquisitions and those resulting from subsequent expenditure 
recognised in the carrying amount of an asset; (b) additions resulting 
from acquisitions through business combinations; (c) assets classified 
as held for sale or included in a disposal group classified as held for 
sale in accordance with IFRS 5 and other disposals; (d) net gains or 
losses from fair value adjustments; (e) the net exchange differences 
arising on the translation of the financial statements into a different 
presentation currency, and on translation of a foreign operation into 
the presentation currency of the reporting entity; (f) transfers to and 
from inventories and owner-occupied property; and (g) other changes.   
77   
When a valuation obtained for investment property is adjusted 
significantly for the purpose of the financial statements, for example 
to avoid double-counting of assets or liabilities that are recognised as 
separate assets and liabilities as described in paragraph 50, the entity 
shall disclose a reconciliation between the valuation obtained and the 
adjusted valuation included in the financial statements, showing 
separately the aggregate amount of any recognised lease obligations 
that have been added back, and any other significant adjustments.   
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78 A 
In the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph 53 [where fair value 
cannot measured reliably], when an entity measures investment 
property using the cost model in IAS 16, the reconciliation required 
by paragraph 76 shall disclose amounts relating to that investment 
property separately from amounts relating to other investment 
property.    
  B In addition, an entity shall disclose:      
  B(a) a description of the investment property;   
  B(b) an explanation of why fair value cannot be determined reliably;   
  B(c) if possible, the range of estimates within which fair value is highly likely to lie; and   
  B(d) 
on disposal of investment property not carried at fair value: (i) the 
fact that the entity has disposed of investment property not carried at 
fair value; (ii) the carrying amount of that investment property at the 
time of sale; and (iii) the amount of gain or loss recognised.   
    Cost model   
79   In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph 75, an entity that applies the cost model in paragraph 56 shall disclose:   
  (a) the depreciation methods used;   
  (b) the useful lives or the depreciation rates used;   
  (c) 
the gross carrying amount and the accumulated depreciation 
(aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning 
and end of the period;   
  (d) 
a reconciliation of the carrying amount of investment property at the 
beginning and end of the period, showing the following: (i) additions, 
disclosing separately those additions resulting from acquisitions and 
those resulting from subsequent expenditure recognised as an asset; 
(ii) additions resulting from acquisitions through business 
combinations; (iii) assets classified as held for sale or included in a 
disposal group classified as held for sale in accordance with IFRS 5 
and other disposals; (iv) depreciation; (v) the amount of impairment 
losses recognised, and the amount of impairment losses reversed, 
during the period in accordance with IAS 36; (vi) the net exchange 
differences arising on the translation of the financial statements into a 
different presentation currency, and on translation of a foreign 
operation into the presentation currency of the reporting entity; (vii) 
transfers to and from inventories and owner-occupied property; and 
(viii)other changes; and   
  (e) 
the fair value of investment property. In the exceptional cases 
described in paragraph 53, when an entity cannot determine the fair 
value of the investment property reliably, it shall disclose: (i) a 
description of the investment property;(ii) an explanation of why fair 
value cannot be determined reliably; and (iii) if possible, the range of 
estimates within which fair value is highly likely to lie.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 40  
  
Paragraph Sub-Paragraph IAS 41 ‘Agriculture’ 
40   
An entity shall disclose the aggregate gain or loss arising during the 
current period on initial recognition of biological assets and 
agricultural produce and from the change in fair value less estimated 
point–of–sale costs of biological assets.   
41   An entity shall provide (by narrative or quantified) a description of   
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each group of biological assets. 
46   If not disclosed elsewhere in information published with the financial statements, an entity shall describe:   
  (a) the nature of its activities involving each group of biological assets; and   
  (b) 
non-financial measures or estimates of the physical quantities of: (i) 
each group of the entity’s biological assets at the end of the period; 
and (ii) output of agricultural produce during the period.   
47   
An entity shall disclose the methods and significant assumptions 
applied in determining the fair value of each group of agricultural 
produce at the point of harvest and each group of biological assets.   
48   
An entity shall disclose the fair value less estimated point–of–sale 
costs of agricultural produce harvested during the period, determined 
at the point of harvest.   
49   An entity shall disclose:   
  (a) 
the existence and carrying amounts of biological assets whose title is 
restricted, and the carrying amounts of biological assets pledged as 
security for liabilities;   
  (b) the amount of commitments for the development or acquisition of biological assets; and   
  (c) financial risk management strategies related to agricultural activity.   
50   
An entity shall present a reconciliation of changes in the carrying 
amount of biological assets between the beginning and the end of the 
current period. The reconciliation shall include: (a) the gain or loss 
arising from changes in fair value less estimated point–of–sale costs; 
(b) increases due to purchases; (c) decreases attributable to sales and 
biological assets classified as held for sale (or included in a disposal 
group that is classified as held for sale) in accordance with IFRS 5; 
(d) decreases due to harvest; (e) increases resulting from business 
combinations; (f) net exchange differences arising on the translation 
of financial statements into a different presentation currency, and on 
the translation of a foreign operation into the presentation currency of 
the reporting entity; and (g) other changes.   
    Additional disclosures for biological assets where fair value cannot be measured reliably   
54   
If an entity measures biological assets at their cost less any 
accumulated depreciation and any accumulated impairment losses 
(see paragraph 30) at the end of the period, the entity shall disclose 
for such biological assets:   
  (a) a description of the biological assets;   
  (b) an explanation of why fair value cannot be measured reliably;   
  (c) if possible, the range of estimates within which fair value is highly likely to lie;   
  (d) the depreciation method used;   
  (e) the useful lives or the depreciation rates used; and   
  (f) 
the gross carrying amount and the accumulated depreciation 
(aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning 
and end of the period.   
55   
If, during the current period, an entity measures biological assets at 
their cost less any accumulated depreciation and any accumulated 
impairment losses (see paragraph 30), an entity shall disclose any 
gain or loss recognised on disposal of such biological assets and the 
reconciliation required by paragraph 50 shall disclose amounts related 
to such biological assets separately. In addition, the reconciliation   
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shall include the following amounts included in profit or loss related 
to those biological assets: (a) impairment losses; (b) reversals of 
impairment losses; and (c) depreciation. 
56   
If the fair value of biological assets previously measured at their cost 
less any accumulated depreciation and any accumulated impairment 
losses becomes reliably measurable during the current period, an 
entity shall disclose for those biological assets:   
  (a) a description of the biological assets;   
  (b) an explanation of why fair value has become reliably measurable; and   
  (c) the effect of the change.   
    Government grants   
57   An entity shall disclose the following related to agricultural activity covered by this Standard:   
  (a) the nature and extent of government grants recognised in the financial statements;   
  (b) unfulfilled conditions and other contingencies attaching to government grants; and   
  (c) significant decreases expected in the level of government grants.   
    Total Level of Compliance with IAS 41  
  
    Total level of Compliance   
 




  Size Gearing EquCo_I Profitability Ear_Co_I Liquidity Industry Auditor 
Size 1        
Gearing -0.036 1       
EquCo_I -0.168* 0.202* 1      
Profitability 0.363*** -0.336*** -0.147* 1     
Ear_Co_I -0.060 0.166* 0.498*** -0.156* 1    
Liquidity 0.072 -0.117 -0.011 0.080 -0.033 1   
Industry -0.052 0.004 -0.035 -0.089 -0.115 -0.040 1  
Auditor 0.402*** 0.253* -0.041 0.011 -0.015 -0.085 -0.020 1 
*Significant at 10%, ***Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
